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*Cum permissu superiorum.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background to the Condemnation of 1270: Master William of Baglione, O.F.M. . . . .	<i>Ignatius Brady, O.F.M.</i>	5
Richard of Middleton, O.F.M. on <i>Esse</i> and Essence . . . . .	<i>F. A. Cunningham, S.J.</i>	49
The Gift of the Spirit according to J. H. Newman . . . . .	<i>Gerald Dolan, O.F.M.</i>	77
William of Ockham and <i>Suppositio Personalis</i> . . . . .	<i>Robert Price</i>	131
The Structure of the Church and the Function of the Hierarchy according to St. Bernardine of Siena . .	<i>Patrick J. Ryan, S.J.</i>	141
A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of some Contemporary Criticisms	<i>John Swiniarski</i>	181
Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, "Deus Est" . . . . .	<i>Siegfried Wenzel</i>	218





# Communi- catio Socialis

ZEITSCHRIFT  
FÜR PUBLIZISTIK  
IN KIRCHE  
UND WELT

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# Communicatio Socialis

Zeitschrift für Publizistik in Kirche und Welt

Herausgegeben von Dr. Franz-Josef Eilers svd (Rom/Genf), Prof. Dr. Michael Schmolke (Münster), Karl Höller (Aachen) und Drs. Kees Verhaak (Nijmegen).

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Die 1968 gegründete Vierteljahresschrift erscheint seit dem 4. Jahrgang 1971 im Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, und zwar jeweils im zweiten Monat jedes Quartals. Umfang pro Heft: 90–100 Seiten. Jahresabonnement DM 15,— (zuzügl. Zustellgebühr), Patenschaftsabonnement DM 17,— (einschl. Porto); Einzelheft DM 4,50.

Die Zeitschrift für Publizistik in Kirche und Welt wurde gegründet, als nach dem Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil die allgemeine Diskussion über Kirche und Publizistik, über Massenkommunikation und ihre Auswirkungen auf den Auftrag der Kirchen einen neuen, intensiven Anfang genommen hatte. Bis zu ihrer Gründung fehlte es an einem Forum des Gedankenaustausches zu diesem Thema im deutschen Sprachraum. Ob die Einrichtung dieses Forums inzwischen gelungen ist, wollen die Herausgeber und Gründer, die sich seinerzeit auf das Patronat von Emil Dovifat (†) und Henk Prakke berufen konnten, nicht selbst beurteilen. Die „Neue Zürcher Zeitung“ schrieb in einer Rezension über die ersten Hefte: „Als ‚Zeitschrift für Publizistik in Kirche und Welt‘ stellt nämlich dieses katholische Periodikum endlich das Forum für die notwendige Diskussion der kirchlichen und überhaupt der religiösen Publizistik zur Verfügung, und die bis jetzt vorliegenden Beiträge lassen auch schon erkennen, daß die aus Kommunikationswissenschaftlern bestehende Redaktion kompetente Information und nicht Indoktrination anstrebt.“

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# Communicatio Socialis

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- grundsätzliche Auseinandersetzungen und wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen über Themen aus dem Bereich Kirche bzw. Religion und Massenkommunikation;
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**Gary MacEoin**

## **Lateinamerika – Stunde der Entscheidung**

Bilanz und Perspektiven. — 269 Seiten, Leinen DM 14,80. Best.-Nr. 95301.

Das vorliegende Werk ist eine besonders den Problemen der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Lateinamerikas gewidmete Darstellung.

Die seit langem zur Debatte stehenden Sozialreformen, die Abschaffung des Hazienda-Systems und eine grundlegende Besserung der Schulverhältnisse sind Programme, deren Verwirklichung nur zögernd in Gang kommt. An den Beispielen von Mexiko, Bolivien und Kuba, die er eingehend untersucht, zeigt der Verfasser die Auswirkung von gewaltsamen Revolutionen, die zu einem größeren gesellschaftlichen Wandel geführt haben. Das Schwergewicht seiner Untersuchungen liegt auf den verschiedenartigen Problemen der wirtschaftlichen Situation und einer möglichen Entwicklung; dazu bringt er eine Fülle interessanten Zahlenmaterials bei. Besonders aufschlußreich ist der Abschnitt über das Auslandskapital, das Lateinamerika als Starthilfe — vor allem von den USA — zufließt.

Bücherei und Bildung

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**Gerhard Adler**

## **Revolutionäres Lateinamerika**

Eine Dokumentation (in der Reihe „Sammlung Schöningh zur Geschichte und Gegenwart“, hrsg. von Kurt Kluxen). — 216 Seiten, Paperback DM 10,80. Best.-Nr. 774206.

Neuerdings ist durch eine Welle linksorientierter Veröffentlichungen über die kubanische Revolution der Eindruck hervorgerufen worden, als ob der Staat Castros die einzige zukunftssträchtige Erscheinung in Lateinamerika sei. Die Dokumentation Adlers zur revolutionären Situation Süd- und Mittelamerikas will demgegenüber deutlich machen, daß auch andere, nicht zuletzt kirchliche Gruppen z. T. erstaunlich radikale Programme für die soziale und politische Umgestaltung ihrer Länder entwickelt haben. — Der Autor bietet einleitend eine kritische Analyse zum Thema „Revolution“, dem Schlagwort Nummer eins in Lateinamerika. Dadurch führt er auch an das richtige Verständnis der zahlreichen Dokumente heran, die eine Vielzahl revolutionärer Programme widerspiegeln und die noch einzeln kommentiert werden. Ergänzt wird der informative Band durch eine Übersicht zur Geschichte des lateinamerikanischen Kontinents seit der Unabhängigkeit, statistischen Übersichten zu verschiedenen sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Aspekten sowie eine ausführliche Bibliographie.

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# **SCHÖNINGH**

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## BACKGROUND TO THE CONDEMNATION OF 1270: MASTER WILLIAM OF BAGLIONE, O. F. M.

Of a Wednesday in December, 1270, that following the winter feast of St. Nicholas, the tenth of the month, the lord bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, published a list of thirteen propositions condemned and banned with all who knowingly taught or asserted them.<sup>1</sup> The document was the first official notice of a growing rationalism in the faculty of Arts, and particularly of the movement called variously Latin Averroism, Radical Aristotelianism, or Heterodox Aristotelianism.

At least four of the articles directly attacked the teachings of Master Siger of Brabant 1) that the intellect of all men is numerically one and the same; 5) that the world is eternal; 6) that there never was a first man; 8) that the soul separated from the body after death does not suffer from corporeal fire.<sup>2</sup> The other errors condemned were, by and large, inspired by pagan philosophy and more particularly by the interpretations given Aristotle by Greek and Arabian commentators, in specie by Averroes; thus prop. 2: *Quod ista est falsa vel impropria: Homo intelligit*; nn. 10—11: that God does not know singulars, or does not know things other than Himself.

Relatively little is known of the motives or moving forces which induced the bishop to publish the decree. The secular masters in the school of theology, with the exception of Gerard of Abbeville,<sup>3</sup> have left little or no literary remains. Saint Thomas Aquinas, who was in Paris

<sup>1</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle-A. Chatelain, Paris, 1889, n. 432 (tom. I, 486—487); L. Thorndike, *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1944), 80—81. On Bishop Tempier, cf. P. Glorieux, "Tempier (Étienne)", in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, XV, 99—107.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Louvain, 1966), 357—412, 472—474.

<sup>3</sup> See F. Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, 456, note 83; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, (Paris, 1925—1935) I, 111—127, and II, 92—94; and his "Pour une édition de Gérard d'Abbeville," in *Rech. de Théol. ancienne et médiévale*, 9 (1937) 58—84. In his article "Gérard d'Abbeville," in *Dict. de spiritualité*, VI, (1965), 258—263, Ph. Grand calls for further study on the role of Master Gerard in the controversy of 1270. To some extent Grand illustrates this role in his edition of *Quodlibet XIV* of Master Gerard. Cf. "Le Quodlibet XIV de Gérard d'Abbeville," in *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge*, 31 (1964), 222, note 2. Four at least of the propositions condemned are considered in this Quodlibet, which must date from Advent 1269.

in May 1269 for the General Chapter of the Preachers, had possibly returned to the University in January of that year.<sup>4</sup> Yet not until the following year did he directly concern himself with the growing controversy, in his *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, Saint Bonaventure had already begun in Lent of 1267 to direct public attention, in his *Collationes de decem praeceptis*, to the theological and moral implications and dangers of the movement. Here and in the *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti* (1268), as well as in several sermons, he shows himself keenly aware of current errors and their causes and consequences. Indeed, most of the errors listed by Tempier two years later are already known to Bonaventure.<sup>6</sup> Yet the latter's approach is always that of the theologian proclaiming the faith and defending Christian wisdom, and of the pastor of souls concerned with the moral implications of such errors. One could hardly expect more from him, since he was no longer a master in the faculty of theology but Minister General of the Friars Minor. Quite evidently, nonetheless, his influence looms large in the syllabus of 1270.

What is lacking, however, in the history of this condemnation is a more accurate and extensive knowledge of the reaction of the Franciscan regents in the theological faculty. We do know indeed that Guibert of Tournai, regent perhaps about 1259—1261, listed and examined in his later *Rudimentum doctrinae* (c. 1263—1268) a series of errors attributed to Aristotle by contemporary thinkers.<sup>7</sup> Yet this was not a formal attack on the University level. — About the same time, the Disputed Questions of Walter of Brugge (largely concerned with the will, conscience, and fraternal correction), the only known fruit of his regency (1267—1268), do not show much or any concern for current errors, beyond a passing reference to some who say the will is necessitated by its object, the desirable: *Dicunt quidam quod voluntas necessitatur [ab appetibili suo], pro se alligantes aliquas rationes de praedictis*.<sup>8</sup> Although this position is

<sup>4</sup> H. F. Dondaine, "Thomas von Aquino," *Lexikon für Theol. und Kirche*<sup>2</sup>, 10, 118 ff.

<sup>5</sup> See F. Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, 432—437.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Patrice Robert, O.F.M., "Saint Bonaventure, Defender of Christian Wisdom," *Franc. Studies*, 3 (1943) 159—179; Hadrianus a Križovljan, O.F.M. Cap., "Controversia doctrinalis inter magistros franciscanos et Sigerum de Brabant," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 27 (1957) 121—165; on Bonaventure, 127—142.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Hadrianus, *art. cit.*, 142s. The study of these errors occupies the major part of Tract I of the *Rudimentum*. See the table of contents provided by E. Bonifacio in his *Gilberto de Tournai. De modo addiscendi* (Torino 1953), 22—31.

<sup>8</sup> Quaest. IV, resp., in E. Longpré, *Quaestiones disputatae du B. Gauthier de Bruges* [Philosophes Belges X], Louvain 1928, 38.



almost identical with the third error later condemned by Tempier: *Quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult vel intelligit*, none of the arguments seems to be Averroistic in character.<sup>9</sup> The other questions of the series (or more correctly, of the triple series) hardly provided an occasion of discussing errors in the Arts faculty. Hence Walter does not make a contribution to our history, even in the questions on fraternal correction. — Again, a fresh study of the many questions of Eustachius of Arras, regent master 1268 to the end (likely) of 1269, would show that he did not touch on any of the problems or errors current in the Arts; he was more concerned, on occasion, with the new attack on the Mendicants begun by Master Gerard of Abbeville.<sup>10</sup>

It may well be that both Walter of Brugges and Eustace considered the philosophical errors sufficiently answered by their predecessor, Master William of Baglione, regent 1266—1267. Hitherto almost unknown save by name, and then as Barlo, Baslo, Vaglon, etc., William of Baglione<sup>11</sup> reveals himself as one of the more prolific and philosophic Franciscan Masters between Bonaventure and Matthew of Acquasparta.

We here propose to edit certain of his questions bearing on the positions of heterodox Aristotelianism, particularly those concerned with the constitution of man and of the human intellect, reserving those on the problem of the eternity of the world for another occasion. Simply on the basis of William's treatment, we are forced to reverse the order of the errors condemned by Stephen Tempier, to edit those questions first which touch on the expression *Homo intelligit*, then those that answer the thesis of the unicity of the intellect, and finally and in part only one question on hell-fire.<sup>12</sup> It will be all too evident to the reader that the texts published abound in lacunae, errors, misreadings; but we have not attempted, save in manifest cases, to improve on the readings in the manuscripts.

<sup>9</sup> It is well to note that half the index-references to Averroes as Commentator (pp. 7, 8, 17, 18, 22, 56, 61, 140) should be corrected to refer to the Commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics, namely Eustratius et al.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. I. Brady, "Questions at Paris c. 1260—1270 (cod. Flor., Bibl. Naz. Conv. soppr. B. 6. 912)," in *Archivum Franc. Historicum*, 62 (1969) 357—376 (on the questions of Eustachius), 678—692 (on career). For further details, see P. Glorieux, "Maîtres franciscains de Paris: Fr. Eustache," in *La France Franciscaine*, 13 (1930) 125—171.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. I. Brady, art. cit. *Archivum Franc. Hist.*, 61 (1968), 431—461; 62 (1969) 689.

<sup>12</sup> One unexpected by-product of these questions has been to discover that Thomas Aquinas was under attack already in 1267 for certain positions; ex. gr., for his doctrine on individuation (see the Response below, on *Hoc aliquid*, part III). Another, that Matthew of Acquasparta depends on William in several questions, especially on the soul, and on hell fire.

## I. HOMO INTELLIGIT

The first question asks what is the origin of the principle that constitutes man as man, *in esse specifico*: is it educed from the potency of matter or is it the result of the infusion of the rational soul? The question is found in two versions: that given in the codex *Vaticanus Palatinus latinus 612* (ff. 157a—157d) has the appearance of being the original form, a kind of report of the actual disputation; ex. gr., in the third argument the *respondens* interrupts to object: *Ad hoc respondebatur*,<sup>13</sup> some authorities carry erroneous citations; not all objections are answered. The text on the other hand as presented in the Florence manuscript, *Bibl. nazionale conv. soppr. B. 6. 912* (ff. 22b—23c) is, I judge, the revised and final version: the arguments are more concise; some from authority have been discarded; the response is more polished and more precise in its philosophical development; and a reference is added to the later question on the unity of the intellect.<sup>14</sup> Both versions appear below.

The second question: whether the rational soul is a *hoc aliquid* and at the same time the perfection and form of the body, is published only in the final redaction of the response. Master William here combines, I believe, two questions of his series we have entitled *De symbolo*: question 35, the report of a dispute on the soul as *hoc aliquid*, and question 49, on the soul as the perfection and form of the human body. The result is a response which gives more attention to Averroes and to the meaning of *homo intelligit*.<sup>15</sup> No arguments are given; the text simply presents the question, and proceeds directly to the response.

A. *De Esse Specifico*: Vatican version

Quaestio est si illud quod constituit hominem in esse specifico operatione naturae educatur de potentia materiae aut per infusionem animae rationalis.

Et quod sic videtur:

<sup>13</sup> Parallels of such reports (perhaps at times from the Master himself and certainly approved by him), with *respondebatur*, *dicebatur*, are frequent in the disputed questions of Walter of Brugge, Matthew of Acquasparta, and others.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. I. Brady, *art. cit. Archivum Franc. Hist.*, 61 (1968) 444 (question n. 46), and 445, note 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 446, 449, 453; there are no parallels to these questions in the cod. *Vatic. Palatinus latinus 612*.

1. Dicit Gregorius Nyssenus,<sup>1</sup> recitans opinionem Philosophi quod intellectus qui [in] homine est ab extra, quod<sup>2</sup> "nihil facit ad esse eius nec existentiam." Ergo ante infusionem animae constitueretur homo in esse specifico; ergo etc.

2. Item, dicit auctor *De natura elementorum*<sup>3</sup> quod postquam semen receptum est, statim ibi spiritus vitae iussu Dei est; et Philosophus in XVI *De animalibus*, quod "solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco." Sed si statim est ibi spiritus vitae iussu Dei, est ibi per naturam; ergo etc.

3. Item, Philosophus, X *Ethicorum*:<sup>4</sup> "Intellectus est maxime homo," et distinguit ibi<sup>5</sup> duplicem hominem, scilicet hominem qui respicit superiora et hominem qui respicit inferiora. Ergo erit per naturam ibi aliquis homo conditus, cum nihil veniat ab extrinseco nisi intellectus; ergo etc.

4. Item, Commentator, in primo *De anima*:<sup>6</sup> "Membra leonis non differunt a membris equi nisi quod anima ab anima differt." Sed membra hominis concepti differunt a membris equi; ergo anima hominis<sup>7</sup> concepti differt ab anima equi. Ergo cum non differant nisi essentialiter, differentiam habeat<sup>8</sup> homo per aliquid eductum de principiis naturae, sicut et in animali bruto; ergo etc.

5. Item, in homine est perfecta natura. Ergo potest generare tale quale ipsum est, sicut et alia bruta; ergo etc.

6. Item, sensitivum in homine est nobilius quam in pecore. Sed brutum dat esse specificum bruto; ergo et in homine; ergo etc.

7. Item, secundum convenientiam aliquorum in genere debent assignari differentiae specificae, quia genus potestative habet differentias. Sed equus et homo conveniunt in sensitivo. Sed sensitivum de potentia materiae educitur in equo; ergo et in homine. Sed sensitivum est dif-

<sup>1</sup> Id est Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, c. 1 (PG 40, 505A); in versione Burgundionis: "Aristoteles autem hunc quidem potestate constructum esse homini, hunc autem actu deforis nobis supervenire opinatur, non ad esse et existentiam hominis conferentem, sed in perfectione cognitionis naturarum et contemplationis cooperantem" (ed. K. J. Burkhard, in *Achter Jahresbericht des k.k. Staatsgymnasiums* [Vienna 1891], 14). — Sequitur Aristoteles, *De generatione animalium* II, c. 3 (736b 28).

<sup>2</sup> quod] est codex (quem signamus postea ut V).

<sup>3</sup> Non invenimus; verba non sunt Isaac Israelitae in *Libro de elementis* (ed. Lugdun. 1515, f. 4d), quamvis eius sit doctrina. Deinde Aristoteles ut in nota 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cap. 7 (1178a 7—8).

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, parum supra; et in cap. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Text. comm. 53, c. 5, in *Aristotelis Libri omnes . . . cum Averrois commentariis*, Venetiis ap. Iuntas 1550, tom. VI, f. 119 b.

<sup>7</sup> hominis] huiusmodi V.

<sup>8</sup> diff. habeat] distrahatur V.



ferentia specifica equi; ergo et specificum in homine de potentia materiae vel naturae educitur.

Ad hoc respondebatur quod est sensitivum quod praecedit animae rationalis infusionem, et est sensitivum quod est ab infusione animae rationalis per creationem, et a tali homo dicitur, et tale non educitur de potentia materiae. — Contra: educi de potentia materiae et produci per creationem sunt omnino diversa. Si ergo secundum illud sensibile homo et equus convenirent, tunc 'animal' aequivoce praedicaretur de eis, et non univoce. Sed hoc falsum est; ergo etc.

8. Item, natura in generatione non intendit individuum, sed speciem. Sed natura nihil intendit nisi quod est in eius potestate. Ergo potest homo naturaliter educere hominis specificum.

9. Item, differentia est in potestate generis, ut vult Porphyrius;<sup>9</sup> et sicut se habent in praedicamento universalialia, ita et in educatione naturali. Sed differentia hominis et sui oppositi est in potentia generis; ergo et materia. Ergo natura potest producere specificum hominis sicut et bruti.

10. Item, anima creando infunditur,<sup>10</sup> et est corporis perfectio. Sed perfectibile respondet perfectioni. Ergo, cum anima in infusione secum afferat suum vegetabile, suum sensibile et suum rationale, videtur quod ex parte corporis requiratur triplex dispositio, scilicet vegetabilis, sensibilis et rationalis. Ergo, si per operationem naturae corpus disponitur per quoddam vegetabile et quoddam sensibile ad suscipiendum vim vegetabilem et sensibilem infundendam, videtur quod ista debeat operatione naturae per aliquod rationale disponi ad rationalem infundendam.

11. Item, quod facit essentialiter differre constituit in esse specifico. Sed dispositio quae est in conceptu humano differt a sensitivo quod est in conceptu equino. Aut ergo differet essentialiter aut accidentaliter. Non accidentaliter, quia tunc ab illo accidentali per quod differt ab equo nunquam fieret unum cum vegetabili infuso. Ergo differt essentialiter sensitivum hoc in conceptu humano ab alio, scilicet equino; et hoc educitur de potentia materiae; ergo etc. Sed illud per quod aliquid differt essentialiter constituit in esse specifico; ergo etc.

12. Item, per operationem [fol. 157b] naturae et vegetativi animal generat animal propter influentiam sensitivi praesidentis, quia generatio

<sup>9</sup> *Praedicamenta*, cap. 'De differentia', ap. Boethium, *Comm. in Porphyrr.*, IV, c. 9 (PL 64, 125; CSEL 48, 262).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Libri IV Sent.*, II, dist. 18, c. 7 (Quaracchi 1970), tom. I, 420 s.

est operatio vegetativae. Ergo cum rationale habeat influentiam super vegetativum, ipsum potest eadem ratione generare; ergo etc.

13. Item, processus est in formis, quia prima fit secunda, secunda tertia, et sic ulterius, cum forma sit in potentia materiae, et minus perfectum sit materiale respectu magis<sup>11</sup> perfecti. Sed constat quod sensibile magis convenit cum rationali et in obiecto et in apprehendendi modo, quia spiritualiter apprehendit, quam cum vegetativo. Ergo si sensitivum est in potentia vegetabilis et de materia educitur, videtur multo [rationabilius?] quod rationale sit in potentia sensitivi et de ipso educatur; ergo etc.

14. Item, posito quod Deus de conceptu humano subtraheret animam rationalem sive non infunderet: sed ille conceptus est sub aliqua forma, non equina nec asinina, et sic de aliis. Ergo sub forma humanae naturae competenti. Posito ulterius quod procedat in esse extra matrem, constat quod habet vim generativam sicut et alia animalia in suo genere. Ergo generabit sibi simile vel poterit generare, et illo generato secundo potest Deus animam infundere et infundat (*sic!*); ergo illud est perfectum. Sed constat quod ille non poterit generari nisi ab homine. Ergo illud prius generatum, cui non fuit anima infusa, fuit eductum de potentia materiae; ergo etc.

15. Item, illud quo homo est homo constituit hominem in esse specifico; sed corpus est huiusmodi, non anima; ergo etc. — Minor probatur per Isidorum, 12 capitulo,<sup>12</sup> qui dicit: "Anima hominis non est homo; sed corpus, quod ex humo factum est, tantum est homo"; ergo etc.

16. Item, ordinatio praedicamentorum est impermutabilis. Ergo quod est in una coordinatione non est in alia. Sed anima est in ordine substantiae incorporeae. Ergo si anima daret homini esse specificum, transiret ab uno genere in aliud, quod omnino non posset esse; ergo esse specificum hominis non est ab anima; ergo educitur potentia naturali.

17. Item, si anima rationalis reponit hominem in esse specifico, contrahit genus hominis sive sensitivum in homine. Sed sensitivum in homine et anima rationalis sunt aequalis ambitus, quia de quocumque praedicatur rationale et humanum, sensibile vel sensitivum. Ergo non est differentia specifica; ergo etc.

18. Item, secundum Philosophum<sup>13</sup> peccant qui ponunt speciem in differentiam. Sed anima rationalis est species substantiae incorporeae; ergo non erit differentia reponens<sup>14</sup> hominem in esse specifico.

<sup>11</sup> magis] minus V.

<sup>12</sup> *Sentent.*, Lib. I, c. 12 (PL 83, 562 A); cf. etiam nota 40 infra.

<sup>13</sup> *Topic.* I, c. 8 (103 b 15 s); *Anal. Post.* II, c. 3 (90 b 30 ss).

<sup>14</sup> reponens *corr. interl. ex* ponens V.

## Contra:

a. Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, XIII libro, cap. 9:<sup>15</sup> Homo intellectu est homo, quia intellectu differt ab aliis. Ergo, cum intellectus sit ab extrinseco,<sup>16</sup> patet quod esse specificum hominis non educitur de potentia materiae.

b. Item, ab eo quod est melius et principalius in re constituitur res in esse specifico. Sed huiusmodi est intellectus; ergo etc.

c. Item, quod cadit in definitione hominis in recto, dat ei esse specificum. Sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo etc. — Minor probatur per Augustinum, *Super Ioannem*, homilia 20,<sup>17</sup> quod est homo anima rationalis habens corpus; ergo etc.

d. Item, si ante infusionem homo est homo, tunc arguitur: quod advenit alicui post esse completum est illi accidentale. Sed accidentia possunt separari a re praeter eius corruptionem. Ergo anima separata, posset corpus humanum vivere. Quod falsum est; ergo etc.

e. Item, intellectus est actus hominis secundum propriam et principalem hominis operationem, ut dicit Damascenus, III libro, c. 15.<sup>18</sup> Ergo secundum illam partem attenditur hominis esse specificum; ergo etc.

f. Item, anima est perfectio et actus corporis. Aut ergo univoce aut aequivoce aut analogice. Si univoce, habeo propositum;<sup>19</sup> si analogice, ergo per prius convenit ei quam corpori. Ergo vel erunt duo specifica hominis, quod falsum est; vel unum constituet hominem in esse specifico; ergo etc.

g. Item, homo medius est inter angelos et bruta, et convenit cum utroque. Sed convenit cum angelis in rationali; ergo etc.

h. Item, forma quae non est in potentia ad perfectiorem formam ponit rem in esse specifico; sed sic est anima; ergo etc.

## SOLUTIO:

Dicendum quod licet esse specificum ultimum sit in linea praedicali secundum ordinem et prioritatem communitatis, est tamen primum complemento et perfectione, quia in actu completur. Et fortassis

<sup>15</sup> Cf. cap. 24, n. 2 (PL 41, 399; CSEL 40, 654; CCL 48, 409).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Aristoteles supra, nota 1.

<sup>17</sup> Potius hom. 19, n. 15 (PL 35, 1553; CCL 36, 199).

<sup>18</sup> *De fide orthodoxa*, Lib. III, c. 15, n. 5 (PG 94, 1048 B); in versione Burgundionis, c. 59, n. 5 (ed. E. M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure N.Y., 1955, p. 229, lin. 29).

<sup>19</sup> Deest membrum forte de aequivocatione.

in hoc dicunt verum aliqui quod illud est minimum in genere substantiae ad quod omnia reducuntur quae sunt in illo genere.<sup>20</sup> — Item, esse specificum dicit communem naturam pluribus individuís. Quae quidem natura communis substantiali conformitate abstrahitur ab ipsis individuís et per intellectum cognoscitur; et haec natura communis totum esse comprehendit individuorum et praedicatur de omnibus univoce. Et de hoc loquitur Damascenus, libro III, cap. 14,<sup>21</sup> et Boethius, *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*: "Intellectus universalium ex particularibus sumptus est." Et quia anima rationalis est huiusmodi, quia dat homini esse et tale esse, ideo reponit hominem in esse specifico.

Et quia anima rationalis istam perfectionem dat homini, hoc accipitur ex triplici ratione, scilicet ex propria entitate, ex aliorum distinguitate, et ex ultima consummatione.

I. Cum ergo anima rationalis corpori humano organizato infunditur, tunc habet propriam entitatem ex materia et forma, et sic dicitur perfectum cui nihil deest.

Secundo modo dicitur perfectum secundum manifestationem prout res ab aliis distinguitur.

Tertio modo dicitur perfectum quoad consummationem ultimam, quo potest in suum finem ordinari; et ideo anima rationalis dat homini perfecte subsistere.

Et est corpori humano unibilis non ut perfectibilis, sed ut perfectio; et cum sit nobilior quam forma istorum inferiorum, nobiliori modo est forma, ut dicit Augustinus, VII *Super Genesim*.<sup>22</sup> Unde per eius praesentiam et influentiam vivit corpus; et ipsa recedente marcescit, sicut dicit Philosophus, primo *De anima*<sup>23</sup> et Avicenna. Secundo dat perfecte differre et proprie, quia secundum Philosophum<sup>24</sup> respondet propriae materiae. Tertio ordinat ipsam animam in debitum finem. Iste enim ordo intimus est cuilibet rei, quia secundum Philosophum, X *Ethicorum*,<sup>25</sup> anima[e] rationalis optima vita est secundum

<sup>20</sup> Quinam hi sint hucusque non invenimus.

<sup>21</sup> Ioan. Damasc., *De fide orthodoxa*, III, c. 6, ut rectius indicatur in versione Florentina (infra, ad notam 6) (PG 94, 1004 A; ed. E. M. Buytaert, c. 50, p. 187, 18—19). — Sequitur Boethius, cap. 3 (PL 64, 1344 B; vide etiam textum medii aevi apud N. M. Häring, *The Commentaries of Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, Toronto 1966, 388, 25—26).

<sup>22</sup> Cap. 19, n. 25 (PL 34, 364; CSEL 28—I, 215s).

<sup>23</sup> Text. 90, c. 5 (411b 8—9). Sequitur Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 3; p. V, c. 4 (ed. Venetiis 1508), ff. 3c—d, 24d.

<sup>24</sup> *De anima* I, t. 53, c. 3 (407b 23—26).

<sup>25</sup> Cap. 7 (1178a 5—9); textus hic corruptus exstat et incompletus; vide meliorem infra in versione secunda huius quaestionis, ad not. 12, et apud S. Thomae Aq. *Opera omnia* XXI, Parmae 1866, 349.



intellectum: "proprium unicuique<sup>26</sup> est natura optimum et delectabilissimum; et homini utique, quae secundum intellectum<sup>27</sup> vita, et maxime hoc modo." Item, dicit Augustinus, X *De civitate Dei*, c. 1:<sup>28</sup> "*Vita erat lux hominum, lux itaque<sup>29</sup> rationalium mentium, per quas homines a pecoribus differunt et ideo sunt homines.*"

II. Oppositum [f. 157c] autem istius differentiae excludit hominis excellentem multiplicem dignitatem; secundo fovet multiplicem errorem; tertio tollit in Deum multiplicem nobilem manuductionem.

Primo ergo excludit hominis dignitatem propter quadruplicem rationem. Habet enim comparisonem ad illud quod est supra se, scilicet ad Deum, propter rationem imaginis; ad infra habet dignitatem personalitatis; tertio habet dignitatem ad id quod est in ipso secundum dignitatem liberalis voluntatis; quarto habet dignitatem per comparisonem ad id quod est cum ipso ratione universalis exemplaritatis.

De prima dignitate loquitur Isidorus, 9 cap. *De summo bono*,<sup>30</sup> et Augustinus in pluribus locis,<sup>31</sup> quia secundum partem superiorem rationis attenditur ratio imaginis. Et hoc excludit ratio huic veritati contraria, scilicet si homo non constitueretur et perficeretur in suo esse per animam rationalem.

Secunda dignitas est personalis excellentia, quam habet homo de anima rationali, quae removetur ab aliis animalibus, secundum quod dicit Boethius, *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*.<sup>32</sup> "Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia."

Tertio tollit dignitatem liberalis voluntatis, quia in hoc differt a brutis, ut dicit Augustinus,<sup>33</sup> quia habemus liberam voluntatem.

Quarto tollit dignitatem quam habet ratione universalis exemplaritatis, quia in homine relucet omnis creaturae proprietas. Quod non esset si non daret animae [= anima] esse specificum, quia tunc in nullo conveniret cum angelo.

Secundo, oppositum istius veritatis praebeet fomentum multiplicis erroris. Primo, erroris cui obviat ratio recta, scilicet errori Commentatoris, quod intellectus esset unus in omnibus;<sup>34</sup> et ita, sit esset anima

<sup>26</sup> unicuique *seq. lacuna* in V.

<sup>27</sup> intellectum] esse V.

<sup>28</sup> Rectius, ut indicatur in altera versione (ad n. 13), *De Trinitate*, IV, c. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 888; CCL 50, 163).

<sup>29</sup> itaque] utique Aug.

<sup>30</sup> Id est *Sentent.*, I, c. 11, n. 1 (PL 83, 559 A—560 A).

<sup>31</sup> Ex. gr., *De Trin.*, XII, c. 3, n. 3 (PL 42, 999; CCL 50, 357s).

<sup>32</sup> Cap. 3 (PL 64, 1343 C; ed. N. M. Häring, 388, 3—4).

<sup>33</sup> *De Trin.*, XII, c. 1, n. 1; c. 2, n. 17 (PL 42, 997, 1007; CCL 50, 356, 371). Cf. P. Lombardus, *Libri IV Sent.*, II, d. 24, c. 5, nn. 4—5 (*ed. cit.*, I, 454).

<sup>34</sup> Vide quaestionem infra ad hunc errorem spectantem.

ultima perfectio, non esset nisi unus numero. Est enim fomentum erroris in hoc, quod facilius est intelligere quod intellectus sit unus in omnibus hominibus et irradiaret (*sic*) eos si homo ante infusionem intellectus constitueretur in perfecto esse specifico sive hominis, quam si ipsa anima intellect[iv]a esset perfectio unius hominis tantum; et quia tunc oportet quod uni perfectibili respondeat una perfectio. — Praebet etiam fomentum in hoc, quod ponit transitum animae de corpore in corpus; et in hoc cadunt in errorem Manichaeorum. Sequeretur enim ex hoc quod, cum anima naturalem habeat appetitum ad hoc corpus, si transiret de corpore in corpus, non resurgeret magis de hoc vel in hoc<sup>35</sup> corpore quam in illo; quod falsum est.

Secundo, illa positio propinqua est errori cui obviat fidei certitudo; qui scilicet error est quod Christus non fuerit verus homo. Primo, quia assumpsit Christus animam rationalem et veram carnem nostram, et ita sequeretur quod esset verus homo sine anima rationali. Secundo, assumpsit nostram naturam ut noster frater esset, et ideo similis nobis in natura humana. Ideo si anima rationalis non esset forma specifica hominis generati, quae fuit forma corporis dominici, aequivoce diceretur homo de Christo et de nobis.

Tertio oppositum istius positionis vere tollit manuductionem nobilem per quam laudamus Deum nostrum ut summae potentiae, summae sapientiae, summae bonitatis suae communicantem. Si enim fecit creaturam tantum spiritualement et creaturam tantum corporalem, debuit facere creaturam ex utraque compositam.

Propter istas ergo rationes concedendum est quod specificum hominis operatione naturae de potentia materiae non educitur.

#### Ad rationes in contrarium:

1. Dicendum ad primum, 'quod duplex est homo, sicut distinguit Philosophus, X *Ethicorum*, scilicet interior et exterior':<sup>36</sup> si intelligatur de exteriori homine, potest sustineri illa auctoritas. Si autem de interiore, non. Vel potest dici quod in hoc iste auctor non sustinetur.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi dicitur: 'et formatum est, iussu Dei intrat spiritus vitae'. Unde praeter formationem corporis intrat spiritus vitae; et sic non obviat.

3. Ad aliud dicendum quod Commentator non noverit<sup>37</sup> quod sint duo homines, scilicet unus qui vivit aliquando secundum carnem, ali-

<sup>35</sup> vel in hoc *add. marg.* V.

<sup>36</sup> Vide supra, nn. 4—5.

<sup>37</sup> noverit] vel: posuerit *add. marg.* V. || scilicet] sed V.

quando secundum spiritum, ut dicit Philosophus; et sic intelligendum est illud.

4. Ad aliud dicendum quod vegetabile et sensibile derelictum in semine concepto in hominem disponit conceptum ad ultimam formam completam [*lege*: completivam]; et hoc facit differre sensitivum equinum ab homine. Et etiam in hoc differunt quod hoc, scilicet humanum, non est illud, scilicet equinum; sed causatur haec differentia ex comparatione istarum potentiarum ad ultimum complementum.

5. Ad aliud dicendum quod si sensitivum in homine operatione vegetabilis habet generare, hoc habet ab anima rationali, sicut dicit Damas-cenus, II libro;<sup>38</sup> et si nobilioris contemperantiae sit sensitivum humanum quam bruti, non autem in esse specifico, nec differet ab illo nisi in ordine quem habet ad animam rationalem hominis completivum.

6. Ad aliud dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ab insufficienti, sicut patet per praedicta, quia quod sensitivum hominis nobilius est, hoc habet per animam rationalem. Vel licet perfectionis sit in bruto sibi simile producere et constituere per naturam in esse specifico, tamen magnae nobilitatis est in homine quod a solo [Deo] potest constitui in esse specifico et non ab alio.

7. Ad aliud similiter patet, quia ratio qua<sup>39</sup> producit est quia ordinatur ad ultimum complementum, scilicet formam.

8. Quod obicitur de generatione, dicendum quod est in plus quantum ad ambitum et quantum ad continentiam, et hoc non est inconveniens. — Vel dicendum quod differt in modo producendi; id est, productio unius sensibilis differt a productione alterius. Tamen propter hoc non dicitur animal aequivoce de ipsis, sed tantum productio est aequivoca.

9. Ad aliud dicendum quod differentiae sunt in potestate generis, non per potentiam activam vel passivam, sicut forma in materia, sed per indifferentiam, quia se habent indifferenter ad recipiendam illam vel illam ratione sui ambitus, sicut vidimus quod materia est quid indifferens ad illam vel illam formam.

10. Quod obicitur de ordine formarum, dicendum quod ordo praedicalis non respondet omnino naturali generationi, quia defectus est in primis differentiis, ut vidimus quod corporeum et incorporeum sunt duae substantiae. Et si differentiae per omnia haberent se in generatione

<sup>38</sup> *De fide orthodoxa*, II, c. 12, et praesertim c. 27 (PG 94, 928 D, 961 A; in versione Burgundionis, cc. 30, n. 4, et 41, n. 1 (ed. E. M. Buytaert, 123, 153).

<sup>39</sup> ratio qua *add. marg.* V. || producit] qua *add. sed del.* V.

naturali sicut se habent in ordine praedicamentali, cum substantia incorporea secundum illum ordinem praedicamentalem convenit in genere, iam ipsa substantia incorporea educeretur de potentia materiae; quod non est verum. Unde illae formae universales intelliguntur respectu producti vel facti, non ratione ex conformitate generis vel ordinis praedicamentalis.

11. Ad aliud dicendum quod vegetabile et sensibile in homine habent rationem imperfectionis, rationale vero rationem completivi et perfectivi; et ideo haec duo disponunt ad ratiocinativam, non autem ipsum rationale.

12. Ad aliud dicendum [f. 157d] quod sensitivum in homine differt a sensitivo in asino vel in alio bruto. Non tamen facit differentiam specifi-  
cam hominis, sed illud ad quod sensitivum ordinatur.

13. Ad aliud dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod cum sensitivo animae rationalis et cum sensitivo quod est ante infusionem animae fit unum et vegetativum cum alio et rationale cum alio quando infunditur; et cum moritur homo, separatur rationale et remanent illa vegetabilia. Aliter tamen dicendum est: quod cum semine deciduntur spiritus et vigor et calor naturalis, et ex illis spiritibus confovetur semen illud in loco matricis, et tunc virtus formativa ut quidam vigor animae, non anima et non aliqua substantia, ibi operatur usque ad ultimam dispositionem quae dicitur necessitas, et tunc iussu Dei infunditur anima rationalis secum afferens suum vegetabile et suum sensibile; et ita rationale per suam influentiam facit ut producat secundum ordinem ad talem formam tale rationale. — Ad aliud dicendum quod "plus convenire cum aliquo," hoc est dupliciter: aut quantum ad actum aut quantum ad ortum, ut patet: quia musca dicitur nobilior sole quantum ad actum, quia habet potentiam vegetativam et sensibilem. Tamen quoad ordinem sol est nobilior quam musca, quia nobiliori modo productus est. Ita in proposito: quamvis enim ad actum et obiectum et speciem receptivam plus conveniat sensitivum cum rationali quam cum vegetativo, tamen quoad ortum est e converso, et plus convenit cum vegetativo, quia utrumque educitur de potentia materiae.

14. Ad aliud, quod posito quod Deus non infunderet animam, tunc deficeret illud quod coeptum est nec veniret ad partum, et ideo (*sic!*): falsum supponit in positione. Deducitur autem ad partum in hoc quod illud vegetativum et sensitivum disponit ad rationale illud ut ultimum complementum ordine naturae divinitus institutae.

15. Ad aliud dicendum quod Isidorus loquitur per emphasim contra homines sensibiles qui nominant hominem a corpore, non ab anima. Ideo Isidorus volens dicere quod anima non est corpus, dicit quod corpus



est homo et non anima. Vel aliter: quia homo secundum etymologiam dicitur<sup>40</sup> ab humo, et quia anima non est ab humo, sed corpus est de humo formatum, ideo dicit quod corpus est homo, non anima.

16. Ad aliud dicendum quod anima dupliciter potest considerari: vel prout est hoc aliquid et spiritus quidam, et sic est species incorporeae substantiae; et potest accipi prout est forma perficiens et unibilis corpori, et sic est forma eius specifica.

17. Ad aliud dicendum quod rationale contrahit sensitivum in homine, quia sensitivum in homine dicitur de pluribus quam rationale. Ponatur quod tantum sint duo conceptus humani quibus adhuc non sit anima rationalis infusa. Tunc sensitivum humanum communius est quam rationale, quia tunc sensitivum humanum potest dici de omni homine et etiam de illis duobus conceptis. Sed rationale tantum potest dici de omni homine et non de istis duobus conceptis. Praeterea, rationale contrahit ambitum generis, et sic accipitur large sensitivum. Illud autem contractum dicitur sensitivum humanum. Unde si est productio universalis hominis, et singularis, quia universale per creationem et singulare per generationem, productio est aequivoca. Si vero nomen det producto, scilicet singulari, est univoca.

[Ad 18 non datur responsio.]

\* \* \*

### B. *De Esse Specifico*: Florence version

Postmodum quaerebatur utrum illud quod constituit hominem in esse specifico possit virtute naturae educi de potentia materiae.

Quod sic videtur:

1. Sicut dicit Commentator super primum *De anima*:<sup>1</sup> "Membra leonis non differunt a membris cervi nisi quia anima differt ab anima." Quorum ergo membra differunt specie, et animae. Sed membra leonis et membra fetus humani corpore non organizato differunt specie; ergo et animae. Anima ergo sensitiva huius fetus ante infusionem<sup>2</sup> animae rationalis differt a quacumque alia sensitiva specie. Sed penes huiusmodi accipitur esse specificum; haec autem sensitiva per naturam educitur; ergo etc.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Isidorus, *Etymolog.*, XI, c. 1, nn. 4—5: "Homo dicitur quia ex humo factus est . . . Abusive autem pronuntiatur ex utraque substantia totus homo, id est ex societate animae et corporis. Nam proprie homo ab humo" (PL 82, 397).

<sup>1</sup> Text. comm. 53, c. 5 (*ed. cit.*, VI, f. 119b).

<sup>2</sup> infusionem] refusionem F (id est, cod. Flor. Bibl. Naz. *conv. soppr.* B. 6. 912).



2. Praeterea, in homine est natura perfectior quam in brutis. Perfectio autem est generare [f. 22c] sibi simile; sed hoc potest brutum per naturam, ergo et homo idem poterit.

3. Praeterea, specifica differentia<sup>3</sup> est in potentia generis; quod quidem genus in diffinitione logica respondet materiae in natura. Ergo quod erit in potestate generis erit in potentia materiae; et sic etc.

4. Praeterea, sensitivum tale vel tale constituit diversas species sub animali; et hoc necesse est, quia differentia specifica debet assignari circa illud quod est commune. Si ergo sensitivum quod praecedit infusionem est determinans speciem, habeo propositum. Si vero illud quod dicitur infundi simul cum aliis, tunc cum origo istius sensitivi et origo sensitivi equi non sint univocae, praedicabitur animal aequivoce de utroque. Sed hoc nullus diceret; ergo etc.

5. Praeterea, quod natura intendit est in eius potestate; aliter frustra intenderet. Sed natura intendit esse specificum per generationem salvare; ergo etc.

6. Praeterea, sensitiva potest super vegetativam quantum ad potentiam generandi, ut generetur animal. Ergo et rationale poterit super eandem ut generetur homo; et sic etc.

7. Praeterea, in embryone ante infusionem animae est aliquid quod disponit ad vegetativam quae infunditur, et est vegetativum; aliquid ad sensitivam, et est sensitivum; ergo aliquid erit quod disponet ad rationalem, et erit rationale. Sed isto rationali maxime differt huiusmodi fetus seu embryo ab aliis speciebus animalis; ergo etc.

8. Praeterea, ponamus quod illi corpori organizato viventi et sentienti non infundat Deus animam rationalem, et sic nascatur et vivat. Constat quod est animal et in aliqua specie animalis; nec est dare nisi speciem hominis. Ulterius, ponamus quod generet et quod erat generatum habeat rationalem animam. Cum perfecti hominis sit generare, erit illius perfectus homo. Sed in illo nihil quod non sit a natura; ergo etc.

9. Praeterea, ordinatio praedicamenti est inconfusibilis; unde secundum Philosophum<sup>4</sup> peccat qui ponit speciem in differentiam. Peccat etiam qui quod est in ordinatione substantiae incorporeae ponit in serie substantiae corporeae. Sed constat quod anima rationalis est quaedam species substantiae incorporeae. Ergo non erit differentia in genere substantiae incorporeae. Ergo non erit differentia in genere substantiae corporeae nec in eius serie. Sed esset si daret homini specificum; ergo etc.

<sup>3</sup> differentia] et add. F.

<sup>4</sup> *Topic.* I, c. 8 (103b 15s); *Anal. Post.* II, c. 3 (90b 30ss).

## Contra:

a. Eo quod est in re melius et dignius, cum tale debeat esse principalius, constituitur res in esse specifico. Sed tale est in homine anima rationalis, quam nullus sane intelligens ponit educi de potentia materiae; ergo etc.

b. Praeterea, si anima rationalis non dat esse specificum, tunc cum infunditur advenit habenti esse completum. Erit igitur unio eius ad corpus accidentalis. Ad quod multa sequuntur inconvenientia, ut patet consideranti; ergo etc.

c. Praeterea, penes ultimam formam attenditur esse specificum. Sed talis est anima rationalis. Non enim habet ordinem ad formam ulteriorem; ergo etc.

## RESPONSIO:

Licet esse specificum cum accipitur in specie specialissima in linea praedicamentali ordine communitatis sit ultimum, complemento tamen et perfectione est primum. Habet enim actu quidquid est in toto praedicamento quasi in potentia: primo generis generalissimi et deinde generum subalternatorum, sicut patet in specie specialissima quae est homo.

Modo dico quod ista species, cum sit universale ad sua individua, surgit ex consubstantiali similitudine individuorum, sicut dicit Commentator super librum Boethii *De Trinitate*,<sup>5</sup> in quibus individuis hoc universale subsistit, sicut dicit Damascenus, libro III, cap. 6:<sup>6</sup> "Substantia, inquit (et loquitur de universali), secundum se ipsam non subsistit, sed in hypostasibus contemplatur." A quibus individuis universale abstrahitur, sicut dicit Boethius, *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*.<sup>7</sup> "Intellectus, inquit, universalium rerum ex particularibus sumptus est." Et quorum individuorum haec species totum esse dicit, sicut dicit expresse Boethius.<sup>8</sup> Iuxta quod dicit Damascenus in praetacto capitulo<sup>9</sup> quod "numero, non natura differunt hypostases." Et de quibus individuis hoc universale praedicatur, sicut dicit Damascenus in principio praedicti capituli,<sup>10</sup> ex hiis istud habetur; et necessario

<sup>5</sup> Id est, Gilbertus Porretanus, *In De Trinitate*, I, 1 (PL 64, 1263 B; ed. N. M. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, Toronto 1966, p. 75, lin. 30—31).

<sup>6</sup> Ioan. Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, III, c. 6 (PG 94, 1004 A; ed. E. M. Buytaert, c. 50, p. 187, 18—19).

<sup>7</sup> Cap. 3 (PL 64, 1344B; ed. N. M. Häring, 388, 25—26).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *In Porphyry. Comment.* III, cap. De specie (PL 64, 115 A—B; CSEL 48, 236s).

<sup>9</sup> Lib. III, c. 6 (PG 94, 1003; ed. E. M. Buytaert, 186, 9—10).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., parum supra.

sequitur quod penes illud quod dat cuilibet individuo esse perfectum, accipitur in natura communi esse specificum.

Quia igitur, sicut patebit, anima rationalis intellectiva dat cuilibet homini esse perfectum, dico perfectae naturae, secundum illam accipietur in homine ut dicit (*sic!*) naturam communem esse specificum; ideo dico quod per rationale quod huic individuali perfectioni respondet constituitur homo in esse specifico in genere animalis. Quae individualis perfectio cum sit ab infusione per potentiam creantis simul et infundentis, et hoc exigit dignitas naturae suae: solus enim Deus imaginem suam formare et reformare potest; plana est Responsio ad quaestionem, quod huiusmodi non educitur de potentia materiae, et sic esse specificum, homo, non subest potestati naturae inferioris.

I. Quod autem anima rationalis [f. 22d] intellectiva det cuilibet individuo homini esse perfectum, manifestat ipsa perfectio quae aliquando in re assignatur.

Primo penes propriam rei entitatem quam trahit a suis principiis ut sit et dicatur haec res vel illa; et hanc dat cuilibet homini anima rationalis. — In argumentum huius dicit beatus Augustinus, *Super Ioan-nem*, homilia 20,<sup>11</sup> quod homo est anima rationalis habens corpus; et *Ad Volusianum*: "In unitate, inquit, personae anima unitur corpori ut homo sit." Et Philosophus, X *Ethicorum*.<sup>12</sup> "Proprium, inquit, est unicuique natura optimum et delectabilissimum, et homini utique secundum intellectum vita; siquidem maxime hoc homo."

Secundo assignatur perfectio penes rei distinctionem, ut penes illud dicatur perfectum per quod differt ab aliis. Et sicut prima perfectio est existentiae, ita ista est evidentiae. Differt autem homo ab aliis per hoc quod est mentis rationalis, sicut dicit beatus Augustinus, IV *De Trinitate*, c. 1:<sup>13</sup> "Vita, inquit, erat lux hominum, lux rationalium mentium, per quas differunt a pecoribus et ideo sunt homines."

Tertio assignatur perfectio penes ordinationem<sup>14</sup> rei in finem, ut ex hoc dicatur res perfecta quo tendit in suum optimum et quo adhaeret vel unitur suo fini. Et haec est perfectio excellentiae. Iuxta quod dicit Philosophus, VII *Physicorum*,<sup>15</sup> quod "virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum;" et perfectum dicimus quod attingit proprio fini. Certum

<sup>11</sup> Potius hom. 19, n. 15 (PL 35, 1553; CCL 36, 199); deinde *Epist.* 137, c. 3, n. 11 (PL 33, 520; CSEL 44, 110), de qua vide infra, ad finem responsionis (not. 25).

<sup>12</sup> Cap 7 (1178a 5—9).

<sup>13</sup> Num. 3 (PL 42, 888; CCL 50, 163).

<sup>14</sup> ordinationem] hominem (?) F.

<sup>15</sup> Cap. 3 (246b 23); non invenitur in editione Iuntina (IV, 146c).

est autem quod homo per hoc quod est rationalis ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem suum. Quod probat dignitas imaginis, quae in hoc potissime attenditur quod secundum tres actus principales qui non possunt esse nisi animae rationalis tendit in Deum, sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV *De Trinitate*, c. 12:<sup>16</sup> "Haec, inquit, trinitas mentis non propterea est Dei imago quia sui meminit mens et intelligit et diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare a quo facta est."

Hoc ergo pro certo tenendum est, fide dictante et ratione probante, quod scilicet illud quo homo constituitur in esse specifico non educitur de potentia materiae.

II. Contraria autem assertio tollit hominis excellentem dignitatem. — Primo illam quam habet ut ordinatur ad id quod est supra se, propter [*lege: per*] rationem et proprietatem imaginis, sicut dictum est. — Secundo illam quam habet ad id quod infra se, per eminentiam personalitatis. Solus enim homo inter animalia vindicat sibi dignitatem et nomen personae, quae convenit ei eo quod rationalis est, sicut dicit Boethius, *De duabus naturis*,<sup>17</sup> et patet ex diffinitione naturae [*lege: personae*] quam ipse dat, quod scilicet "persona est rationalis naturae substantia individua." — Tertio illam quam habet ad id quod est intra se per praesidentiam libertatis. Libere enim exit in actum sibi proprium, ut patet; nec hoc habet nisi quia rationalis est. Liberum enim arbitrium complectitur iudicium rationis et dominium seu imperium voluntatis. — Quarto tollit dignitatem quam habet homo ad id quod est iuxta se vel quasi iuxta. Habet enim dignitatem universalis exemplaritatis, continens in se omnium rerum naturales proprietates in generali ita ut nomine omnis creaturae censeatur homo, sicut dicit Gregorius expresse, exponens illud Marci ultimi: *Praedicate evangelium omni creaturae*,<sup>18</sup> et dictus est a philosophis minor mundus. Sed si eius perfectio non est anima rationalis, non conveniet in excellenti actu qui est intelligentiae cum angelis.

Quia igitur ista quatuor secundum veritatem evacuantur nisi rationale ponat hominem in esse specifico, patet quod ista positio tollit hominis multiplicem dignitatem.

III. Fovet nihilominus multiplicem errorem. — Illud primo cui obviat veritas fidei christianae. Si enim alio est homo quam anima rationali,

<sup>16</sup> Num. 15 (PL 42, 1048; CCL 50 A, 442s).

<sup>17</sup> *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*, c. 3 (PL 64, 1343 C; ed. N. M. Häring, 388, 3—4).

<sup>18</sup> Resp. Marc. 16, 15; cf. Greg. Magnus, *In Evang.*, hom. 29, n. 2 (PL 76, 1214 B).



Christus Dominus, de quo christianus intrepide confitetur quod est "perfectus homo ex anima rationali et carne subsistens,"<sup>19</sup> non est nobis in natura conformis, et cessat recognitio beneficii quod omni dulcedine plenum est, quod propter nos factus est Dei Filius frater noster.

Fovet etiam errorem pestiferum de intellectus unitate, de quo erit sequens quaestio.<sup>20</sup> Si enim anima rationalis non dat homini esse perfectum, et non est homo per rationale in esse specifico, aperitur via ad illum errorem. Ideo, sicut melius patebit inferius, ille infidelis Commentator hoc primo voluit confirmare. Qui error quidquid est fidei, quidquid morum subvertit.

Fovet etiam errorem de animarum translatione, quod scilicet transeunt de corpore in [f. 23a] corpus; quem deridet etiam ipse Philosophus in primo *De anima*.<sup>21</sup> Nec ille error potuit ponere hunc transitum circa rationale quod de potentia materiae educeretur. Istud enim corrumpi posset, sed non transire ab uno ad alterum. Si igitur rationale non dat homini esse specificum, cum ex hoc, sicut arguebatur,<sup>22</sup> sequatur quod unio animae ad corpus erit accidentalis, non videtur tunc haec anima necessario magis appropriare sibi istud corpus quam aliud. Ideo Philosophus obvians illi errori et isti erroneae positioni, dicit ibi<sup>23</sup> quod "propriae materiae respondet propria forma."

Ista etiam positio tollit manuductionem ad Dei nostri magnificationem, ut relucet eius potentia mirabilis in coniunctione spiritualis substantiae cum corporali, sicut dicit Hugo, libro I, p. VI, c. 1:<sup>24</sup> "Eius, inquit, potentia immensa et bonitas inenarrabilis magnificatur in unione sui ad nostrum [spiritum]." Ad quod credendum efficaciter persuadet Augustinus ex consideratione unionis animae rationalis ad corpus, sicut dicit in epistola *Ad Volusianum*:<sup>25</sup> "Sicut, inquit, in unitate personae anima unitur corpori ut homo sit, ita in unitate personae Deus unitur homini ut Christus sit. In illa ergo persona mixtura est animae et corporis, in hac persona, mixtura est Dei et hominis." Et dicit mixturam, non ut velit assignare hic aliquam mixturam sicut accipitur a philosophis, sed ut expressius ostenderet unionis veritatem.

<sup>19</sup> Secundum Symbolum Athanasianum (Denzinger-Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, n. 76).

<sup>20</sup> Sed revera, ut iam notavimus, non invenitur in codice Florentiae; vide editionem infra exhibitam ex cod. Vatic. Palatino.

<sup>21</sup> Probabiliter, ut videtur ex nota 23 infra, in textu 53, c. 3 (407b 20—23).

<sup>22</sup> Supra, in arg. b.

<sup>23</sup> *De anima*, I, t. 53, c. 3 (407b 23—24).

<sup>24</sup> Potius paraphrasis quam ipsissima verba (PL 176, 263 D); unde sumpsimus *spiritum* (lacuna in F.).

<sup>25</sup> *Epist.* 137, c. 3, n. 11 (PL 33, 520; CSEL 44, 110).



Rationes ergo quae impugnant istam positionem veritati tam contrariam concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod obicitur in contrarium, de verbo Commentatoris: licet in ista materia non multum sit audiendus, tamen illatio non valet. Quamvis enim differant essentialiter sensitivum equi et sensitivum illius fetus, non propter hoc sequitur quod istud constituat hominem in specie. Ad differentiam enim specificam non sufficit quod sit essentialis, sed oportet quod sit completiva. Unde interim illam propositionem quae dicit quod differt ab aliis specie, nisi forte istud sustineatur per hoc quod habeat ordinem ad animam rationalem quae facit complete speciem differre.

2. Ad illud quod obicitur de perfectione naturae humanae, dico quod in hoc est perfecta et aliis omnibus perfectior, quod virtute generantis aptari potest corpus ad susceptionem animae rationalis.<sup>26</sup>

4. Ad illud quod obicitur de illo sensitivo, dicendum quod sensitivum quod est commune homini et brutis sic determinatur per differentias, sicut et animal, ut dicatur pro parte brutorum, quae propter suam imperfectionem sub una differentia et quasi sub una specie reponuntur in conditione contra hominem, dicatur inquam sensitivum irrationale, ex parte hominis rationale. Ideo quia volunt colligere diffinitionem hominis ex diffinitione animalis et differentiis homini propriis vel differentia propria, dicunt quod homo est substantia animata, sensibilis, rationalis, mortalis. Sensitivum ergo rationale, accipiendo ista duo non ut dicunt puras differentias, sed ut concernunt suppositum, dicit hominis esse specificum sicut animal rationale. — Et quod obicit de univocatione, dico quod univocatio in praedicatione universalium non respicit in individuis modum exeundi in esse sed esse absolutum, quod habet quaelibet res per formam suam. Unde in hoc falsum dixit Commentator super VIII *Physicorum*,<sup>27</sup> quod homo generatus et homo non generatus essent homo aequivoce; et locutus est irrationabiliter et sicut infidelis ignorans conditionem et reparationem et glorificationem hominis. Quis enim auderet dicere quod non praedicaretur homo de Adam et Eva et sua posteritate univoce? quod non praedicaretur similiter de Christo homine et benedicta Matre eius et quolibet alio homine? Quod enim dicit Damascenus,<sup>28</sup> quod speciem Christo non est invenire,

<sup>26</sup> Resp. ad tertiam obiectionem datur ad calcem quaestionis, post ad 9.

<sup>27</sup> Text. comm. 46: "Si esset possibile ut homo generaretur a non semine hominis, tunc de necessitate ille homo diceretur homo aequivoce cum isto homine . . ." (tom. IV, 176c). Loquitur consequenter de perpetuitate seu aeternitate generis humani.

<sup>28</sup> *De fide orthodoxa*, III, c. 3 (PG 94, 993 A; in ed. E. M. Buytaert, c. 47, n. 6, p. 176, 61—62).

non destruit istam univocationem, sed sicut ipse exponit seipsum, vult ostendere unionis singularitatem. Nullus enim alius quam Christus vel fuit vel est vel erit Deus et homo. Nullus etiam fidelis diceret quin homo de homine ut nunc est et post resurrectionem praedicaretur univoce. Univocatio ergo per similitudinem originis non impeditur, sicut dicit beatus Augustinus in prima quaestione [f. 23b] *Ad Deogratias*:<sup>29</sup> "Propter diversitatem, inquit, nativitatis non interest aliquid ad naturam eorum quae procreata sunt ex terra, et eorum quae illis coeuntibus orta sunt."

5. Ad illud quod obicitur de intentione naturae, plana est responsio: quod natura intendit et appetit secundum sui a Deo institutionem, qui *omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuit*.<sup>30</sup> Intendit ergo natura humana generare hominem; cuius intentio completur virtute naturae corpus coaptante et Deo servante quod instituit et animam infundente, et quia ad unum sequitur alterum, ideo in communi modo loquendi quasi totum naturae attribueretur: dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et scriptum est Genesis 46<sup>31</sup> quod tot animae egressae sunt de femore Iacob.

6. Ad illud quod obicitur de posse sensitivae, per idem est responsio, quia anima rationalis hoc potest ut semen sit tantae virtutis ut formetur et aptetur ad susceptionem animae rationalis et sic ad generationem sibi similis, sicut dicit Damascenus, libro II, c. 12:<sup>32</sup> "Anima, inquit, est substantia vivens, simplex et incorporea, corporalibus oculis secundum propriam naturam invisibilis, immortalis et intellectualis, infigurabilis, organico utens corpore, et huic vitae et augmentationis et generationis tributiva."

7. Ad illud quod obicitur de dispositionibus correspondentibus ad vegetativam et sensitivam, dicendum quod non est simile, quia illae sunt vires inferiores. Ideo poterunt habere dispositiones convenientes re et nomine. Non sic autem intellectiva, quae, sicut dicit Philosophus,<sup>33</sup> est vis divina.

8. Ad illud quod obicitur de illo fetu ante infusionem animae rationalis, dico quod secundum legem naturae ista positio destruit seipsam. Ista enim sunt impossibilia, quod scilicet sit fetus humanus per se vivens

<sup>29</sup> *Epist. 102*, q. 1, n. 4 (PL 33, 371; CSEL 34, 547). Pro *nativitatis*, F legit *necessitatis*.

<sup>30</sup> Sap. 11, 21.

<sup>31</sup> Gen. 46, 26.

<sup>32</sup> *De fide orthod.*, II, c. 12, n. 6 (PG 94, 924; in ed. E. M. Buytaert, c. 26, n. 6, p. 115, 51–55).

<sup>33</sup> *De anima* I, t. 66, c. 4 (408b 29); *De generatione animalium* II, 3 (736b 27–29); *Ethic. Nic.* X, c. 7 (1177b 27, 30).

et non sit animatus anima rationali. Unde si post debitam corporis organizationem non infundatur anima rationalis ad quam ordinantur omnes praecedentes dispositiones, debet<sup>34</sup> dici illud mortuum sicut post animae separationem, sicut catulus post nonum diem ita dicitur caecus secundum Philosophum,<sup>35</sup> sicut per privationem praecedentis visus. — Ista ergo positio quae fingit istud vivere et generare ponit idem vivum et mortuum. Tamen demus quod Deus de potentia sua hoc faceret, quod scilicet illa vita praecedens et ille sensus sufficerent ad esse huius et quod esset animal: tunc dico quod semper esset animal incompletum nec sub aliqua specie animalis proprie posset poni, sed esset singulare monstrum cuius esse determinaretur per suam imperfectionem cum expressione perfectionis<sup>36</sup> quam secundum ordinem naturae habere debuit, ut sic diceretur: "Hoc est aptum natum esse homo, et non est homo;" et sicut privatio reducitur ad idem genus in quo est habitus, ita istud imperfectum per reductionem poterit dici in eodem genere esse in quo esset si esset perfectum. Sed istud in nullo cogit quod huiusmodi sensitivum det esse specificum; immo magis concludit contrarium.

9. Ad illud quod obicitur de distinctione praedicamenti, dici potest quod anima rationalis ut est substantia individua et hoc aliquid est in genere substantiae incorporeae. Ut autem est perfectio talis quae est pars hominis, est in alio genere in quo est suum totum. Et sic etiam potest dici uno respectu species, alio quasi differentia, quia sine dubio non esset proprie differentia ut dicitur differentia quid praedicabile. Sed si dicatur differentia large, quia scilicet est origo vel causa differentiae vel species quod (*sic*) intellectus abstrahens accipit intentionem differentiae, hoc modo potest dici differentia et constituere hominem in esse specifico.

3. Ad id quod omisum est, de potestate generis, quod scilicet in ea sunt differentiae, dico quod ordinatio praedicamenti nec debet nec potest accipi secundum ordinem naturalis productionis, ut dicatur haec vel illa differentia vel haec vel illa species educi de potentia generis sicut forma de potentia materiae. Non debet, dico, quia intentio universalis secundum hos gradus qui sunt genus et species et differentia, secundum quos decurrit series praedicamenti et in linea et in latere, non abstrahit a rebus ut exeunt in esse. Sed ut habent esse, bene verum est quod exitus iste vel origo rerum vel earum productio habet sua universalialia,

<sup>34</sup> debet] set F.

<sup>35</sup> Exemplum potius est Averrois, *In Metaph.* V, t. 27 (VIII, f. 63c); sed cf. Aristot., *ibid.* (1022b 27—31), et *Categor.*, c. 8 (10) (12a 33—34).

<sup>36</sup> perfectionis] imperfectionis F.

sua genera, suas species, sicut dicitur quod est quoddam genus productionis cum res de nihilo producitur, et est creatio; aliud cum de aliquo producitur per virtutem naturae, et est generatio; et huiusmodi. Sed ista genera et istae species non sunt in genere vel in praedicamento substantiae. Non potest etiam sic accipi, per modum scilicet exeundi in esse, quia certum est quod substantia spiritualis quae cadit in prima differentia non educitur de potentia alicuius vel generis vel materiae. Unde [f. 23c] genus non est materia, sicut probat Commentator in II et in XI *Metaphysicae*,<sup>37</sup> sed ad modum materiae se habet in diffinitione, sicut dicit Porphyrius.<sup>38</sup> Tamen a Philosopho, in VII *Metaphysicae*,<sup>39</sup> dicuntur omnes partes diffinitionis formae.

Quod ergo dicitur quod genus habet differentias potestate et species actu, dico quod hoc est quia dividendo de ambitu generis quasi de quodam lato sinu potentiae educuntur et sub eodem genere continentur; et propter hoc, quia sic quasi de ipso sunt et sub ipso, dicitur quod sunt in eius potestate, non tamen in eius possibilitate.

Si forte obicias contra principale de verbo Philosophi, XVI *De animalibus*,<sup>40</sup> ubi dicit quod "prius est animal quam homo", et sic erit species animalis ante infusionem animae rationalis: nihil valet, quia ita posses obicere de quolibet bruto. Ibidem enim dicitur quod prius est animal quam equus. Sed nullus diceret quod aliud quam forma vel perfectio equina, ut ita dicam, poneret equum in specie animalis. Voluit ergo Philosophus per illa verba ostendere tantum gradus sive ordinem in processu vis formativae quae est in semine, quia scilicet procedit ab incompleto ad completum; et, sicut dictum est, ista vis in semine humano venit ad suum completum effectum cum produxit corpus vel fetum ad debitam organizationem.

Quia igitur praecedit etiam in brutis sensus incompletus sensum completum, et maxime sensus tactus, qui secundum eundem in II *De anima*<sup>41</sup> facit animal, ideo dixit quod "prius est animal quam homo, prius animal quam equus." Et quod sua intentio non fuerit ponere vel dicere illud esse animal pro aliquo specifico, evidenter ostendit Avicenna, qui fuit quasi expositor Aristotelis in suo XVI *De animalibus*,<sup>42</sup> ubi loquens

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Lib. II, c. 2, text. comm. 10 (VIII, f. 16c); Lib. XI, id est XII, c. 5, text. comm. 28 (VIII, ff. 146d—147a).

<sup>38</sup> Apud Boethii *In Isagogen Porphyrii ed. prima*, II (PL 64, 53 C; CSEL 48, 95); et planius in editione secunda, IV, cap. 'De differentia' (PL 64, 127 C; CSEL 48, 267).

<sup>39</sup> Text. 35, c. 10 (1035b 34).

<sup>40</sup> *De generatione animal.* II, c. 3 (736b 1—2).

<sup>41</sup> Text. 27, c. 3 (414b 3).

<sup>42</sup> Id est *De natura animalium*, XVI, c. 1 (ed. cit., f. 61b).



de virtute seminativa praeambula dicit: "Erit, inquit, sicut in ebrio et epileptico; sed completur ab extrinseco intellectum conferente. Ceterae autem virtutes complentur corpore et rebus corporeis. Et si puer esset sensibilis, deinde fieret rationalitate homo, permutaret se cum complemento de specie ad speciem." Satis aperte ostendit quod antequam sit rationalis sub nulla specie est vel nullum habet esse specificum; et absque dubio, si per aliud quam per rationale esset homo species animalis, aut esse rationale erit homini accidentale aut si essenziale est, cum istud inveniatur in quolibet individuo hominis, erit ab ista consubstantiali similitudine<sup>43</sup> vel substantiali consimilitudine abstrahere esse specificum. De quo quaeretur ab istis depravantibus philosophiam in quo genere erit, nec dabunt aliquod nisi fingant novum praedicamentum.

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### C. Response: *Hoc aliquid et perfectio corporis*

Postmodum quaerebatur utrum anima rationalis ex natura sua sit hoc aliquid, et cum hoc sit vera perfectio corporis faciens cum eo unum esse.

### Responsio:

Absque dubitatione tenendum est et absque dubitatione asserendum est quod anima rationalis ex natura sua, hoc est ex suo et sibi naturali esse, est hoc aliquid, et ex sua et sibi naturali inclinatione est vera et prima perfectio hominis, ita quod est vera perfectio humani corporis secundum illam diffinitionem animae quam ponit Philosophus in II *De anima*,<sup>1</sup> quod scilicet "anima est perfectio corporis organici, physici, potentia vitam habentis."

Haec autem veritas manifeste probatur per eius naturalem originem, per eius naturalem potestatem, per eius naturalem dignitatem.

I. Sed antequam ista diffusius explicentur, videndum est quid sit dictum rem aliquam esse hoc aliquid et esse perfectionem alicuius.<sup>2</sup> — Sciendum est ergo primo quod hoc aliquid in suo pleno intellectu includit quadruplicem conditionem [f. 54 bis c] entis. Dicit enim primo ens quod habet esse signatum, quod probat demonstratio pronominis. Dicit secundo ens quod habet esse proprium, hoc est ex principiis sui generis. Dicit tertio ens quod habet esse permanens, quod scilicet sine alio in se possit subsistere; dicimus enim ens in se fixum esse hoc aliquid. Quarto dicit

<sup>43</sup> Cf. supra, not. 5.

<sup>1</sup> Text. 4, c. 1 (412a 19—21).

<sup>2</sup> Vide quaest. 35 nostri auctoris, in eodem codice Florentino, f. 33c; cuius responsionem hic sequitur et ampliorem reddit.

ens quod habet esse independens, quia hoc aliquid dicimus de esse completo; et per haec tria loquimur esse rei ut esse absolutum, ita quod non dicatur vel praedicetur de aliquo alio.

Unde per hoc excluditur respectus rei ad aliud<sup>3</sup> ut de quo, qualem habet universale ad individuum; propter quod universale non est hoc aliquid. — Excluditur respectus qui est ad aliud in quo, qualem habet accidens ad substantiam; ideo nec accidens est hoc aliquid. — Excluditur respectus ad aliud ut sine quo esse non potest, qualem habet anima sensitiva ad corpus in bruto; propter quod non dicitur communiter esse hoc aliquid. — Excluditur respectus ad aliud ut cum quo habet constituere tertium quod vere ex utroque compositum est, qualem habet anima rationalis ad humanum corpus; sunt enim verae partes hominis; et propter hoc, quamvis vere dicatur hoc aliquid quia ex natura sua habet esse signatum, esse proprium: composita enim est ex materia et forma secundum esse spirituale sibi correspondentibus, sicut inferius dicetur in quaestione speciali quae movetur de hac compositione;<sup>4</sup> habet etiam esse fixum in se et permanens, quia incorruptibilis et immortalis [quando] a corpore separatur; quamvis, inquam, propter haec tria vere dicatur hoc aliquid, tamen secundum quartam acceptionem non convenit ei haec intentio, sed secundum hanc est vera humani corporis perfectio, cum quo facit unum esse.

Propter quod non dicitur forma tantum efficientiae, sicut aeterna Veritas dicitur omnium forma quia omnia format, dans omnibus esse quod nullum est sine forma. Sicut dicit<sup>5</sup> beatus Augustinus in secundo libro *De libero arbitrio*, in fine:<sup>6</sup> “Noli, inquit, dubitare esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommutabilem quae neque contineatur et quasi diffundatur locis, neque protendatur neque varietur temporibus, per quam cuncta ista formari valeant, et pro suo genere implere atque agere locorum et temporum numeros. Omnis enim res mutabilis, etiam formabilis sit necesse est.” Haec ergo forma non facit unum esse cum rebus creatis, sed dat omnibus esse formatum.

Uterius, anima rationalis non tantum dat esse quasi tantum actus suae materiae quam perficit; sed etiam habet actum in ipsum corpus et per ipsum corpus et supra ipsum corpus. — Habet actum in ipsum

<sup>3</sup> aliud] aliquid F.

<sup>4</sup> Secundum ordinem quaestionum in eodem codice (F), ff. 19d—21c, haec quaestio (n. 24) potius superius quam inferius movetur (cf. I. Brady, in *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, 61 [1968] 443s).

<sup>5</sup> dicit] autem F.

<sup>6</sup> Cap. 16—17, nn. 43—44 (PL 32, 1264s; CSEL 74, 79s).

corpus per infimam potentiam quae est potentia vegetativa, cuius partes sunt nutritiva, augmentativa, et generativa, per quarum actus movet anima corpus in loco, non ad locum, sicut dicit de vegetativa in plantis beatus Augustinus, *Super Genesim*, libris II et VII: "Moventur, inquit, et arbusta non tantum vi extrinsecus impellente velut cum ventis agitantur; sed illo motu quo intrinsecus agitur quidquid ad incrementum speciemque arboris pertinet,<sup>7</sup> quo ducitur succus in radicem, vertiturque in ea quibus constat herbae natura vel ligni. Nihil ergo horum sine interno motu. Sed iste motus non est spontaneus qualis ille qui sensui copulatur ad corporis administrationem, sicut in omni animalium genere, quam vocat Scriptura *animam vivam*.<sup>8</sup> Nam et nobis nisi inesset etiam ille motus, nec crescerent nostra corpora, nec unguis capillosque producerent." Haec Augustinus in septimo libro;<sup>9</sup> et in secundo satis dicit huic simile. Per hunc actum differt haec perfectio a forma elementari, quae tantum est actus materiae, ut patet.

Habet actum per corpus, qui pertinet ad potentiam mediam quae dicitur potentia sensitiva, ex qua est in corpore et per corpus sensus et motus quem vocat Augustinus<sup>10</sup> spontaneum, de loco ad locum. Et per hoc differt haec perfectio non solum a forma elementari, sed etiam a vegetativa, quae est perfectio plantae.

Habet actum [f. 54 bis d] supra corpus per supremam potentiam quam vocamus intellectivam seu rationalem. Per hunc enim actum anima supra se reflectitur; et in hoc actu, cum scilicet intelligit, quidquid corporale est necessario dimittitur. Licet pro statu viae actus qui per corpus fit, hoc est ipsum sentire, praeambulus sit: manifeste patet ex multis verbis Augustini, XI *De Trinitate*,<sup>11</sup> et sicut dicit Philosophus<sup>12</sup> quod "nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu;" tamen, sicut dictum est, non intelligitur aliquid nisi ab omni appendicio materiae abstrahatur. Et quia iste actus sic est supra corpus, licet indigeat pro statu ministerio corporis, illud intelligere "nullius partis corporis est actus" nec potentia intellectiva est virtus organica.<sup>13</sup> — Unde cum est actus coniuncti, totius est, non partis alicuius corporis. HOMO enim

<sup>7</sup> pertinet *Aug.*, per omnem *F.*

<sup>8</sup> *Gen.* I, vv. 21, 24, 30; 2, 7.

<sup>9</sup> *Cap.* 16, n. 22 (PL 34, 363; CSEL 28—I, 214); deinde *Lib.* II, c. 13, n. 27 (PL 34, 274; CSEL 28—I, 52s).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Augustinus, *De Gen. ad litt.*, VII, cc. 16—17, nn. 22—23 (PL 34, 363s; CSEL 28—I, 214).

<sup>11</sup> *Ex. gr.* in *cap.* I, n. 1 (PL 42, 985; CCL 50, 333s); et *passim*.

<sup>12</sup> *De sensu et sensato*, c. 6 (445b 16—17).

<sup>13</sup> Ita Aristoteles, *De anima* III, tt. 4—6, c. 4 (429a 18—29).

INTELLIGIT, sed secundum animam.<sup>14</sup> Non sic est de sensitiva potentia quae, sicut patet, secundum diversas partes sui perficit partes corporis organici; et ideo de ratione sui non habet actum supra corpus. Per hoc ergo quod anima rationalis per potentiam intellectivam habet actum supra corpus, propter quod potest esse sine corpore, differt haec perfectio a perfectione bruti.

Ex his patet quo sensu dicitur anima rationalis perfectio humani corporis, et ex consequenti perfectio hominis. Quoniam scilicet suo perfectibili dat esse, unum esse cum eo constituens, ideo est perfectio vere et formaliter, habens actum in ipsum et per ipsum et supra ipsum. Propter haec est perfectio, ut ita dicam, formaliter et effective, propter quae est forma et perfectio ultima et nobilissima, sine qua non est intelligere universum esse perfectum, sicut diffusius dictum est in argumentis per quae probatur esse corporis perfectio vera.<sup>15</sup>

II. Est igitur anima rationalis vere hoc aliquid et vera perfectio. Quod, sicut tactum est prius, colligitur ex eius naturali origine. Quae est quod a solo Deo immediate creatur, non solum ut sit ab ipso, sed ut sit ad ipsum rediens per actum suum in primum principium sicut in finem ultimum, sicut habetur a beato Augustino in libro *De fide ad Petrum*.<sup>16</sup> Et manifeste hoc dicit in libro *De vera religione*: "Rationalis, inquit, anima si Creatori suo serviat, a quo facta est et per quem facta est et ad quem facta est, cuncta ei cetera servient." Servit autem, sicut ibidem dicitur, bene administrando corpus suum, ad quod dedit ei Dominus naturalem inclinationem, sicut dicitur VII *Super Genesim*.<sup>17</sup> "Melius, inquit, creditur naturaliter hoc velle, id est, in ea natura creari, ut scilicet mittatur in corpus." Nec est dubium quin aequae naturalis vel amplius sit inclinatio quam habet anima a Creatore in sua creatione, sicut illa et quantum illa quam habet quaecumque alia forma in hoc et ex hoc quod ab agente naturali educitur de potentia materiae. — Si ergo a Deo immediate produci et ad Deum non convenit nisi substantiae completae quae per se posset esse et agere et naturaliter velle, alii uniri dicit naturalem respectum perfectionis ad perfectibile. Probat haec naturalis origo animae quod ipsa est hoc aliquid propter primum, et vere et prima perfectio propter secundum.

Secundo colligitur hoc idem ex eius naturali potestate per quam habet non solum vivere et in actum perfectum exire, sed etiam vitam

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Aristot., *De anima* I, t. 64, c. 4 (408b 14).

<sup>15</sup> Quoad argumenta, cf. quaest. 49 in eodem codice (F), f. 46b—c.

<sup>16</sup> Non invenimus, nisi forte in cap. 3, n. 30 (31) (opus Fulgentii, PL 65, 686 B; CCL 91 A, 731).

<sup>17</sup> Cap. 27, n. 38 (PL 34, 369; CSEL 28—I, 224s).



influere et actum suum communicare. Ab ipsa enim est vita, sensus et motus, et [actus] intellectivae qui est actus totius coniuncti. Quam influentiam exprimit Damascenus valde aperte in diffinitione animae quam ponit, II libro, c. 12:<sup>18</sup> “Anima, inquit, est substantia vivens, simplex, incorporea, invisibilis, immortalis et intellectualis et infigurabilis, organico utens corpore, et huic vitae et augmentationis, sensus et generationis tributiva.” — Et ex hoc manifeste concluditur [f. 55a] quod si est “substantia vivens, intellectualis, immortalis,” vere est quid in se ens completum, et hoc aliquid. Et si est corpori “tributiva” ista quae non possunt nisi a quanta<sup>19</sup> perfectione et prima corporis humani, hoc est vivere, etc., concluditur irrefragabiliter quod est vera et prima perfectio hominis, quia vera et prima perfectio humani corporis.

Tertio colligitur huius sententiae veritas ex ipsius animae naturali dignitate quam habet ex hoc quod gerit divinam similitudinem, non solum in hoc quod fertur in Deum per actus trium potentiarum seu virium quae sunt memoria, intellectiva, et voluntas, de quo habetur diffusius XIV *De Trinitate*,<sup>20</sup> sed in hoc quod regit et administrat corpus suum tamquam quoddam suum universum, sicut insinuat Augustinus, VII *Super Genesim*,<sup>21</sup> et expressius habetur in alio libro qui dicitur *De spiritu et anima*, ubi dicitur quod “sicut Deus est ubique in universo, ita anima est in qualibet parte corporis sui, cui praestat vitam, sensum et motum,” sicut dictum est supra. — Si autem anima tantum est motor corporis et non eius vera perfectio faciens cum eo unum esse, non erit hoc verum necessario quod sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. Exsistens enim in una parte, et illam partem ubi esset et totum residuum posset movere. Sed quia est eius perfectio, necesse est dicere quod ubi est aliquid corporis quod ab anima vivificatur et sensificatur, sit ipsa anima vel aliquid eius. Sed non habet partem et partem. Ergo tota erit in singulis partibus; et ideo per ipsum actum vivificandi et sensificandi manifestat beatus Augustinus<sup>22</sup> hanc animae simplicitatem et hanc universalem praesentiam in epistola ad Hieronymum *De origine ani-*

<sup>18</sup> *De fide orthodoxa*, II, c. 12, n. 6 (PG 94, 924; ed. E. M. Buytaert, c. 26, n. 6, p. 115, 51—55).

<sup>19</sup> quanta] quinta F.

<sup>20</sup> Praesertim in cc. 6—12, nn. 8—16 (PL 42, 1041—1049; CCL 50 A, 430—444).

<sup>21</sup> Cap. 17, n. 23; c. 19, n. 25 (PL 34, 364s; CSEL 28—I, 214ss). Sequitur pseudo-Augustinus, *De spiritu et anima*, c. 18; et in parte, c. 35 (PL 40, 794, 805); fons cuius erat pseudo-Ambrosius, *De dignitate conditionis humanae*, c. 2 (PL 17, 1015 B).

<sup>22</sup> Augustinus] in libro de fide ad petrum et manifeste add. ex textu supra (ad not. 16) sed del. F.

*mae*.<sup>23</sup> "Per totum, inquit, corpus quod animat, non locali diffusione sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur. Nam per omnes eius particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus et in maioribus maior; sed alicubi intensius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est. Neque enim aliter, quod in corpore etiam non toto sentit, tamen tota sentit. Nam cum exiguo puncto in carne viva aliquid tangitur, quamvis locus ille non solum totius corporis non sit, sed vix in corpore videatur, animam tamen totam non latet; neque id quod sentitur, per corporis cuncta discurrit, sed ibi tantum sentitur ubi fit." Haec Augustinus.

Si igitur animae dignitas hoc necessario habet quod fertur in Deum per actus suarum virium, clarum est quod vere est hoc aliquid. Si administrat corpus suum et regit sicut perfectibile cum quo facit unum esse, manifestum est quod [est] vera et prima perfectio humani corporis ut est susceptibile vitae et sensus et motus; [et quod] vere et proprie communicat ei diffinitio illa animae quam assignat Philosophus in secundo *De anima*,<sup>24</sup> non aequivoce secundum deliramentum Commentatoris.

III. Contrarium autem ponentes, quod scilicet anima rationalis non est hoc aliquid, et quod non est prima perfectio humani corporis, et sic non est prima perfectio hominis, favent illi perniciosissimo errori Commentatoris de unitate intellectus.

Ista enim duo principalia sunt fundamentum illius erroris, sicut manifestissimum est inspicienti et legenti verba Averrois in illo passu.<sup>25</sup> Propter quod isti errores consequuntur se, quamvis aliqui velint unum defendere sine alio. Qui etiam ponunt quod anima rationalis non est ex se hoc aliquid, sed per corpus individuatur, [f. 55b] propinqui sunt illi favori, quia animam per corpus individuari non potest intelligi nisi anima recipiat a corpore vel in corpore illud quod secundum ipsos causa est omnis individuationis in ente completo. Hoc autem est materia. Ergo materiam recipit anima vel a corpore vel in corpore tamquam partem sui. Hoc autem absurdissimum est dicere, ut manifeste sunt sibi ipsis contrarii, quia cum disputant de simplicitate animae, omnino negant eam habere materiam.

<sup>23</sup> *Epist.* 166, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 33, 722; CSEL 44, 551s).

<sup>24</sup> Text. 4, c. 1 (412a 19—21).

<sup>25</sup> Vide quaestionem sequentem, ubi passus famosus Commentatoris in libr. III *De anima*, praesertim text. comm. 5, abundantius citatur. — *Aliqui* referri videtur ad Thomam Aquin., de individuatione animae, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 (ed. Parmae VI, 531b); ac inde inferius, de simplicitate animae, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2; et *In II Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2 (VI, 79s; 531a—b).

Praeterea, secundum Philosophum<sup>26</sup> et secundum sententiam communem omnium qui noverunt philosophiam, cum ens et unum convertantur, a quo recipit res essentialem unitatem, ab eo recipit entitatem. Ab eo autem recipit unitatem a quo individuationem. Ergo anima recipit esse a corpore. Ex quo aperitur via ad errorem multiplicem. Si enim sic est, corrumpetur anima corrupto corpore;<sup>27</sup> et vacuabuntur omnia quae Scriptura continet de animae rationalis dignitate. Dignitas enim imaginis non potest stare cum stultitia huius conclusionis. Evacuabuntur omnia quae continet de humana reparatione, iustificatione, remuneratione. Haec enim omnia necessario supponunt animae immortalitatem. Ad haec sequuntur innumerabilia inconvenientia omnino contraria et rationi sincerissimae [et] fidei christianae.

Praeterea, si per corpus individuatur, ergo separata non erit hoc aliquid sive individuum. — Sed ad hoc respondent per exemplum Avicennae<sup>28</sup> de liquido coagulabili quod retinet formam sui continentis sicut patet in caseo et cera. Quod exemplum cum hoc quod rationaliter iudicatur omnino impertinens [est]. Nihil enim habet simile existentia animae in corpore ad huiusmodi contenta liquida, nisi hoc valde remotum, quod anima dicitur esse in corpore. Sed extraneissimus est iste modus essendi 'in' ab illo, maxime cum anima magis contineat corpus quam contineatur ab illo, sicut dicit Damascenus, libro I, 17 cap.<sup>29</sup> Cum hoc, dico, in superficie et applicatione sui sapit errorem Vincentii Victoris, contra quem disputat Augustinus in quarto libro *Ad Vincentium Victorem*,<sup>30</sup> qui posuit animam intra corpus contineri et corpori configurari.

Reiecto igitur isto exemplo et dimissis istis humanis et vanis adinventionibus, tenendum est, sicut praemisi in responsione: quod anima rationalis ex natura sua est hoc aliquid et ex natura sua est perfectio corporis.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Metaph.* X, text. 8, c. 2 (1054a 19).

<sup>27</sup> Hic notare licet quod septimus inter errores condemnatos an. 1270 sic currit: "Quod anima, quae est forma hominis secundum quod homo, corrumpitur corrupto corpore." Sequelae huius erroris hic enuntiatae fusius considerantur in tertia parte responsionis quaestionis sequentis *De unitate intellectus*.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, p. V, c. 3 (ed. cit., f. 24b—c); sed exemplum potius est Thomae Aquin., qui hic impugnatur. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6 (VI, 80b).

<sup>29</sup> Legendum est XIII pro XVII; cf. *De fide orthodoxa*, I, c. 13, n. 5: "Anima vero colligata est corpori tota toti, et non pars parti; et non continetur ab ipso, sed continet ipsum, sicut ignis ferrum" (PG 94, 853; ed. E. M. Buytaert, 59).

<sup>30</sup> *De natura et origine animae*, lib. IV, cc. 13—14, nn. 19—20 (PL 44, 535ss; CSEL 60, 398—401).

## II. DE UNITATE INTELLECTUS

The question on the unicity or unity of the human intellect, promised in the Florentine codex,<sup>1</sup> is one of five found only in the Vatican Palatine latin cod. 612 (ff. 158c—159b).<sup>2</sup> There is no doubt that all these questions belong to Master William. The question at hand bears interesting comparison to the seventh of the *Quaestiones disputatae De anima XIII* ascribed to Matthew of Acquasparta.<sup>3</sup>

Quaestio est utrum in omnibus hominibus sit intellectus unus numero. Quod posuit ille Commentator.

Et quod sic videtur:

1. Philosophus dicit<sup>1</sup> quod ex intellectu et re intellecta fit unum. Sed possibile est unum intellectum, scilicet rem intellectam unam numero, a pluribus intelligi intelligentibus. Ergo ex illo intellectu et illis intelligentibus fit unum. Sed quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem. Ergo cum plures intelligentes sint idem uni et eidem, inter se sunt eadem. Ergo pluribus intelligentibus erit unus intellectus; ergo etc.

2. Item, potentior est anima in intelligendo quam in vegetando. Sed in remotissimis locis a se potest vegetare, ut dicit Augustinus, VI *Musicae*,<sup>2</sup> quod radius procedens ab oculis in remotissimis locis vegetatur ab anima. Ergo etiam potest eadem anima in diversis intelligere; et sic, erit una numero in pluribus.

3. Item, quod minus dependet ab alio, in pluribus potest esse quam quod magis dependet. Sed anima sensibilis, quae magis dependet a corpore quam rationalis, potest una numero esse in pluribus, quia plura organa habet movere. Ergo multo magis intellectiva; ergo etc. — Et de hoc ponitur exemplum ab Augustino, XVIII *De civitate Dei*, c. 18,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Fol. 22d; see question B above, at note 20.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. I. Brady, "Questions at Paris . . .," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 61 (1968) 455s. This is followed by a question (*ibid.*, 456) in which the first words of the solution offered some hope that it might touch on the sixth error to be condemned by Tempier: *Quod nunquam fuit primus homo*, since the response begins (fol. 159c): "Dicendum quod quorundam error fuit qui posuerunt hominem non habuisse creationis principium, ut aliqui philosophi et eorum sequaces quos reprehendit et confutat Augustinus." However, the primary interest of the question is the original status of Adam and Eve, not the eternity of the human species.

<sup>3</sup> Edited by A. J. Gondras [O.F.M.], Paris 1961, 117—135; especially 128—129.

<sup>1</sup> Aristot., *De anima* III, t. 15, c. 4 (430a 2—3); cf. t. 36, c. 7 (431b 17).

<sup>2</sup> Cap. 8 (PL 32, 1174).

<sup>3</sup> Num. 1—2 (PL 41, 547—5; CSEL 40—II, 290s; CCL 48, 608s).



quod phantasticum nostrum quodam modo alii homini quam nobis incorporatur et in eodem tempore idem phantasticum est in pluribus.

4. Item, quod magis est perfectum in pluribus potest esse quam quod minus est perfectum et completum. Sed eadem sapientia est in doctore et discipulo; in doctore ut inaccepta, in discipulo ut accepta, ut dicit Richardus, quinto libro.<sup>4</sup> Ergo multo magis anima; etc.

5. Item, unum accidens potest esse plurium subiectorum. Ergo multo magis anima potest esse in pluribus, quae minus est dependens quam accidens. Maior probatur per Anselmum in libro *De veritate* in fine.<sup>5</sup> Dicit quod omnium motuum unum est tempus numero. Ergo multo fortius et intellectus.

6. Item, quod intellectus est separabilis et non dependet a materia attestatur eius nobilitati et dignitati. Sed quod aliquid unum numero sit in pluribus, ex hoc apparet magis esse independens a materia et nobile. Ergo attribuendum est intellectui.

7. Item, in natura nihil est otiosum.<sup>6</sup> Sed anima a corpore separata aut erit otiosa aut movebit aliud corpus.<sup>7</sup> Sed non erit otiosa; ergo movebit aliud corpus; ergo erit una numero in pluribus.

8. Item, materia omnium est eadem numero. Sed uni materiae respondet una forma; ergo una forma numero debet esse omnium. Ergo si anima composita est ex materia et forma, et materia est una omnium, ergo et forma erit una; ergo etc.

9. Item, anima aut est ab aeterno aut non. Si sic, ergo cum nisi unum sit aeternum, una erit anima. Si non, tunc creatur de novo; ergo creans exit ab otio in actum. Quod falsum est. Ergo manet primum, scilicet quod est ab aeterno et una numero.

10. Item, dicebat Respondens quod anima est perfectio corporis, et quia perfectibilia sunt diversa numero, ergo et perfectio. — Contra hoc obieiebatur sic: Homo inquantum est homo est corruptibilis; intellectus est incorruptibilis; sed incorruptibile non est perfectio corruptibilis; ergo non erit perfectio; et ita non oportet eum variari secundum variationem corporum.

<sup>4</sup> Potius in lib. VI, c. 23 (PL 196, 988 B; ed. J. Ribaillier, Paris 1958, 261, 10—18).

<sup>5</sup> Cap. 13, in fine (PL 158, 486 C).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Aristot., *De caelo* I, 4 (271a 33).

<sup>7</sup> Argumentum Averrois; cf. *In XII Metaph.*, t. 44: "Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod, si aliquae substantiae essent non moventes, essent otiosae" (VIII, f. 153d). Cf. Bonaventura, *In II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 6 et ad 6 (II, 445a, 447a).

11. Item, secundum illum Commentatorem,<sup>8</sup> quorum animatorum est perfectio inseparabilis sunt unum numero, quia si motor corporis caelestis est unus et mobile esset aliud et aliud, aliud superflueret. Ergo si sunt intellectus plures numero, non erit hominis prima perfectio; ergo etc.

12. Item, si intellectus diversus est in diversis, est hoc aliquid; ergo individuum. Ergo non recipit nisi hanc formam particularem et individuum. Sed ista forma individua non facit actu intelligere, sed tantum est in potentia intelligendi. Ergo cum anima sit individua nisi recipiat hanc formam individua quae tantum est in potentia intelligendi, nunquam actu intelliget; quod falsum est; ergo etc.

13. Item, intellectus agens semper actu intelligit. Ergo si intelligit in hoc et in alio, ergo cum hoc non esset nisi esset unus; ergo etc.

14. Item, si intellectus diversus est in diversis, videtur quod sicut ignis generat ignem, ita sapientia in doctore generat sapientiam in discipulo. Quod est falsum; ergo etc.

15. Item, ubi agens est unum et materia est una, ibi unus est effectus. Sed agens est unum, scilicet Deus creans, et materia est una; ergo effectus, scilicet intellectus, erit unus; ergo etc.

16. Item, Hugo dicit, parte VI, cap. 36:<sup>9</sup> "Sunt quae non habent multiplicari, nec sunt materia,<sup>10</sup> ut sunt spiritus incorporei;" ergo etc.

17. Item, Augustinus, *De quantitate animae*:<sup>11</sup> "Si dicerem animam unam esse numero, conturbaberis; si multas tantum dixerim, me ipsum deridebo." Ergo cum se ipsum derideret, patet quod non sunt multae.

### Contra:

a. Intellectus est perfectio hominis. Sed propria perfectio respondet suo perfectibili. Sed perfectibile non est unum numero; ergo etc.

b. Item, intellectus aut educitur de potentia materiae aut [venit ab] extrinseco. Sed primum non fit, cum omnino sit immaterialis; ergo erit secundum. Ergo non est idem numero cum intellectu prius creato, quia tunc sequeretur quod idem crearetur et non crearetur, et esset et non esset. Quod falsum est; ergo etc.

<sup>8</sup> In *III De anima*, text. comm. 5 (VI, 164c); cf. In *XII Metaph.*, text 44 (VIII, 154a).

<sup>9</sup> Rectius *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, Lib. I, p. VI, c. 37: "Sed ex his rursum quae ex simplicitate unum sunt, alia unitatem suam ex multis non colligunt, quia non sunt composita; nec unitatem suam in multa effundunt, quia multiplicari non possunt, neque esse materia. Quales sunt incorporei spiritus" (PL 176, 286 A—B).

<sup>10</sup> materia] multa V.

<sup>11</sup> Cap. 32, n. 69 (PL 32, 1073).

c. Item, ante intellectum homo<sup>12</sup> non est homo. Ergo est eius prima perfectio. Ergo diversus in diversis.

d. Item, anima habet se ad corpus sicut ars ad instrumentum. Ergo sicut artes diversae diversa habent instrumenta, videtur quod corpora humana diversa diversos habeant intellectus.

### SOLUTIO:

Dicendum quod intellectus noster accipitur multipliciter. — Uno modo dicitur intellectus noster effective et proprie; et sic Deus dicitur intellectus noster, qui facit nos intelligere, et iste intellectus est unus numero essentialiter. — Secundo dicitur [f. 158d] intellectus noster effective quodam modo sed improprie; et sic intellectus angelicus dicitur noster, quia quodam modo nos habet illuminare et perficere quadam vigorosa operatione, sed non proprie. Et iste intellectus numeratur secundum distinctionem individuorum. — Tertio modo dicitur intellectus noster effective proprie, et pertinet ad esse nostrum, et iste dicitur aliquid de esse hominis. Et de [hoc] est quaestio.

Fuit autem circa hoc error illius Commentatoris, qui posuit<sup>13</sup> unum intellectum numero in omnibus hominibus. Et propter hoc videntum est quid fuit erroris motivum, quis modus ponendi, tertio quae sit perniciositas illius erroris.

I. Hic primo notandum quod motivum istius positionis fuit quia ille vidit<sup>14</sup> quod duplex est intellectus: agens, et possibilis sive materialis, qui recipit formas corporales et sensibiles, et ideo “non est corpus nec virtus in corpore,”<sup>15</sup> quia in hoc distinguitur a materia, quia recipit formas universales, non particulares; sed materia recipit particularem et individuum.<sup>16</sup> — Item, ille intellectus cognoscit et distinguit; materia non. Et ex hoc concludit ille<sup>17</sup> quod intellectus non est hoc aliquid, quia si esset hoc aliquid, tales formas universales non reciperet, sed individuas tantum, cum receptum se habeat per modum recipientis. — Ulterius, quia hoc non posset sustineri, quia sic intellectus esset hominis perfectio; sed aequivoce dicitur perfectio de intellectu et aliis poten-

<sup>12</sup> homo *corr. marg. ex hominis* V.

<sup>13</sup> Praesertim, *In III De anima*, text. comm. 4—5, c. 4 (VI, ff. 160a—166d). In sequentibus, ad text. comm. 5 (ff. 160c—166c) citatur semper Antiqua Translatio. Videsis etiam *In XII Metaph.*, t. 38 (VIII, 151a).

<sup>14</sup> *In III De anima*, t. 4 (VI, 160a—b).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* (160a) et quasi passim.

<sup>16</sup> Text. comm. 5 (f. 160c).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

tiis.<sup>18</sup> — Hoc habito, ulterius dixit<sup>19</sup> et concludit quod intellectus est unus numero omnium.

Ad haec nota quod ad istam quaestionem quae videtur sibi contrariare, scilicet quod idem est numero: ergo quod iste intelligit, ego intelligo et e converso; ipse sic respondet<sup>20</sup> quia forma sensibilis recipitur in imaginatione, et est ibi in potentia; et tunc intellectus agens per sui illuminationem et irradiationem reddit eas actu intelligibiles et facit actu moventes; et hic dicitur intellectus speculativus. — Dicit<sup>21</sup> ergo quod HOMO INTELLIGIT per continuationem nostri ad illas formas illuminatas, non ex continuatione hominis intelligentis ad intellectum possibilem sive materialem. Et illo modo intellectus semper intelligit, quia si uno modo dicitur actu intelligere intellectus agens, eo quod idem non continuatur ad formas illuminatas, tamen dicitur in aliquo alio intelligere qui continuatur ad formas illuminatas, ut dictum est; et sic salvat ipse illud, quod intellectus agens semper intelligit. Et dicit quod ista res intellecta quoad intellectum nostrum non est in formis. Ideo quod ego intelligo potest ille non intelligere et e converso. Et ponit<sup>22</sup> exemplum de puero qui non intelligit.

Sed videtur quod motivum principale non sufficiat, quia forma universalis sive universale debet dupliciter intelligi: aut quantum ad proprietatem qua dicitur unum praeter multa; alio modo in quantum praedicatur de pluribus. — Quod dicitur, quod non intelligit formas has particulares et individuas, ibi non accipit universale secundo modo sed primo, scilicet ut abstrahit quidditatem rei et puritatem ab appendicii[s] materiae et [ab] hic et nunc. Unde non tantum intelligit quae abstrahit a sensu et etiam per sensus; immo etiam intelligit quae recipit ab influentia superiore, et etiam se ipsam intelligit et virtutem suam et angelum et fidem et huiusmodi per substantiam intelligit; et sic non tantum intelligit universale sed et particulare ut singulare et quod non praedicatur de pluribus. Tamen illud particulare induit formam universalis in quantum abstrahitur ab appendiciis materiae et ab hic et nunc.

Quod autem dicitur, quod hoc aliquid non intelligit ut hoc aliquid, dicendum quod verum est si accipiat hoc aliquid ut sensibile. Si autem in sua quidditate accipiat, falsum dicitur. — Quod postea dicitur,

<sup>18</sup> Text. 5 (f. 161c, 162a).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* (f. 165a).

<sup>20</sup> Text. 5 (f. 162a); cui difficultati respondet infra (f. 166a).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* (f. 164c; 166a).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* (f. 164c).



quod intellectus non est prima perfectio hominis, dicendum quod falsum est, sicut in praecedenti quaestione<sup>23</sup> declaratum est.

Quod dicitur, quod perfectio aequivoce dicitur de intellectu et aliis potentiis perficientibus hominem, dicendum quod falsum est nisi intelligatur quod intellectus sit eius perfectio accidentalis, et aliae potentiae et formae sint perfectiones substantiales; quod falsum est dicere. Vel nisi intelligatur quod intellectus sit una perfectio secundum vocem et nomen, aliae autem secundum vocem et nomen; quod similiter est falsum. Quia ergo intellectus est perfectio hominis, per prius convenit intellectui prima perfectio hominis quam aliis potentiis animae. Unde esse completivum et esse specificum idem est re.

II. Quod autem dicitur de modo ponendi, quod non intelligimus nisi per continuationem ad species imaginarias et phantasticas, dicendum quod falsum est quia phantasticum et imaginarium in quantum tale non intelligit; vel quod ipsius est intelligere in eo quod tale, nec est illius actus. Immo intelligere convenit intellectui possibili et materiali ex sui continuatione.<sup>24</sup> Et ideo dicendum quod intellectus in diversis diversus est.

Et propter hoc nota quod intellectus multipliciter accipitur. Aliquando sumitur pro substantia intellectiva, aliquando pro potentia; aliquando est nomen actus, aliquando nomen habitus; aliquando pro ratione intelligendi quae dicitur species recepta. Si ergo intelligamus ut est nomen substantiae, non est idem numero in omnibus. Sequitur de necessitate quod nec erit idem in pluribus, prout est nomen potentiae; et sic de aliis.

Si ergo intellectus dicitur unus in omnibus, aut hoc est quia ubique praesens aut ubique praesens et influens aut ubique praesens, influens et perficiens. — Primo modo dicitur ubique praesens propter sui immensitatem. Intellectus autem est finitae excellentiae, quia cum est hic non [est] ibi. Ideo hoc modo non potest dici praesens vel unus in omnibus. Si dicas quod non ponunt intellectum esse immensum; contra: ponunt quod generatio hominum esset aeterna.<sup>25</sup> Ergo sequitur necessario quod intellectualis substantia sit immensa, cum aeternum a parte ante sit immensum.

<sup>23</sup> Vide quaestionem C: *Hoc aliquid*, etc., et versiones priores eiusdem responsionis.

<sup>24</sup> continuatione] *sequitur lacuna* in V.

<sup>25</sup> Vide sextum errorem damnatum an. 1270: *Quod nunquam fuit primus homo*. De quo, Averroes, *In III De anima*, text. comm. 5: "... opinati sumus ex hoc sermone quod intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus, et etiam ex hoc sumus opinati quod species humana est aeterna, ut declaratum est in aliis locis" (VI, f. 165a).

Si autem accipiatur [f. 159a] intellectus secundo modo, quia praesens et influens, tunc minoris est extensionis quam prius. Est enim limitatae potentiae et operationis finitae et per operationem determinatur ad localem diffinitionem.

Si autem accipitur tertio modo, non potest esse unus in omnibus, quia prout dicit perfectionem hominis dat esse, vivere, sentire et intelligere homini. Si ergo est hominis perfectio, necesse est quod aliud sit esse intellectus in isto homine quam in isto, et vivere, sentire et intelligere. Manifestum est nobis quod diversae et variae sunt affectiones [in] intelligentibus.

III. Tertio ista positio perniciosa est valde et fomentum praebet magni erroris. Ponit enim destructionem omnium credibilium quae attenduntur quoad hominis conditionem et quoad eius lapsum et quoad eius reparationem et quoad eius iustificationem et glorificationem.

Quoad eius conditionem primo, quia si unus intellectus est in omnibus, peccante primo Eva non potuit stare primus homo: quod est contra fidem.

Quoad reparationem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, *Ad Volusianum*,<sup>26</sup> Deus per medium intellectum naturam humanam sive animam rationalem [assumpsit].

Quoad iustificationem, quia sic uno peccante peccaret omnis; et uno iustificato iustificarentur omnes; quod falsum est.

Quoad glorificationem similiter patet quod confunderentur gradus praemiorum et meritorum.

Et ideo concedendum quod intellectus in diversis est diversus.

1. Ad primum dicendum quod verum est 'intelligendo fiunt unum', sed non in essendo. Consequens propositio intelligitur: 'quae sunt uni et eidem eadem', in essendo. Vel aliter dicendum quod illud verbum Philosophi intelligitur de specie recepta, non de obiecto; et species recepta est diversa in diversis, licet obiectum a quo recipitur sit unum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud verbum Augustini intelligitur de generatione radiorum quod esse productionem et conservationem quod in ipso per continuationem sui ad ipsos radios qui procedunt ab ipsa, quod non est [in] intelligendo.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Epist. 137, c. 3, n. 11 (PL 33, 520; CSEL 44, 110); sed auctoritas potius est Ioan. Damasceni, *De fide orthodoxa*, III, c. 6 (PG 94, 1006 B; in versione Burgundionis, c. 50, n. 3, ed. E. M. Buytaert, 189; in versione Cerbani, *ibid.*, 400). Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Libri IV Sent.*, III, dist. 2, c. 2 (Quaracchi 1916), p. 555.

4. Ad tertium [= quartum] dicendum quod vel Richardus sequitur<sup>27</sup> positionem Hugonis, qui ponit<sup>28</sup> quod non est alia sapientia qua sapimus quam sapientia increata, et sic non sustinetur; vel si non est eam secutus, item dicendum quod sapientia respicit et scientem et scibile. Ex parte rei scibilis una potest esse obiective sapientia in doctore et discipulo. Si autem loquamur ex parte scientis, sic aliud et aliud est.

3. Ad quartum [= tertium] dicendum quod ponendo casum<sup>29</sup> aliquis mercator accipiens venenum dat alteri, qui postquam sumpsit consopitur et deprimitur graviore somno quam quando homo simpliciter dormit; et videtur sibi quod sit caballus et quod portet avenam; et aliis similiter videtur. Phantasticum enim illud incorporatur in patiente ministerio daemonum, ita quod videatur patienti sic esse et idem etiam conspicientibus offertur. Et ista est ibi delusio in phantastico communi. Dicit Augustinus<sup>30</sup> quod est ibi verum onus et falsum corpus omnino; vera est ibi avena, sed quod corpus suum caballus sit falsum est et illusio est ex parte ministerio daemonum, et daemon portat avenam. Et ita phantasticum illius non est in pluribus, sed offertur pluribus, et ita phantasticum non accipitur pro potentia sed pro specie recepta; et sic patet illud.

5. Ad quintum, de tempore, dicendum quod tempus dupliciter potest accipi: aut ut est mensura communis aut prout est mensura propria cuiuslibet rei quae dicitur periodus. Si accipiat tempus ut est mensura communis, sic tempus est in primo motu primi mobilis sicut in subiecto; et tunc illud tempus non est istis inferioribus particularibus tamquam in subiecto, secundum quod ratio illa Anselmi procedere videtur. Sed unum tempus numero est plurimum motus, id est plures motus qui sunt in eodem tempore uno tempore numero mensurantur. Et sic similitudo non valet, quia intellectus fit unum cum homine.

Si autem accipiat tempus prout est propria mensura, prout quaelibet actio et res propria periodo mensuratur, sic diversarum rerum et actionum diversa sunt tempora mensurativa, non idem numero. Et sic est de intellectu, quod unus est numero in quolibet individuo et diversus in diversis. — Vel aliter potest dici, quia, ut dicit Philosophus,<sup>31</sup> quod idem est numerus decem hominum et decem canum, quia si

<sup>27</sup> sequitur] secundum V. Cf. Matth. ab Aquasparta, *Qq. disp. De anima XIII*, q. 7: "Ad tertium dicendum quod Richardus secutus est in hac sententia magistrum Hugonem . . . et ideo . . . non tenetur" (*ed. cit.*, p. 133).

<sup>28</sup> *De sapientia animae Christi* (PL 176, 851 B).

<sup>29</sup> ponendo casum, illum scilicet quem describit Augustinus (supra, nota 3); notare autem licet quod casus caseum implicat!

<sup>30</sup> *De civitate Dei*, XVIII, c. 18, n. 2 (PL 41, 575; CSEL 40—II, 291; CCL 48, 609).

<sup>31</sup> *Physic.* IV, text. 113, c. 12 (220b 10—13).

accipiat ly 'decem' ut est numerus naturalis, sic variatur secundum quod applicatur huic materiae vel illi. Si autem accipiat ly 'decem' quoad rationem numerandi sive ut est numerus mathematicus, sic unus est numerus. Sic etiam tempus isto modo dupliciter potest accipi; et sic uno modo unum potest esse in omnibus. Dicunt autem isti quod tempus respicit omnia mutabilia et mobilia tamquam unum subiectum mensuratum. Et potest aliquo modo dari exemplum de angulo, qui est duarum linearum, non in quantum sunt duae, sed in quantum sunt unum, id est in quantum coniunguntur et continuatur in ipso. Tamen Augustinus dicit, XIII *Confessionum*,<sup>32</sup> quod "tempus est praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de praesenti cognitio, praesens de futuro expectatio;" et ita secundum variationem diversificatur.

6. Ad sextum, quod obicitur de sensitiva,<sup>33</sup> dicendum quod verum est de sensitivo communi quod perficit diversa organa ut unum, scilicet in ratione unius perfectibilis, secundum quod faciunt unum corpus organicum.

7. Ad septimum, de otiositate, dicendum quod anima ideo apta nata est ad movendum corpus quia ipsum perficit. Cum autem separatur a corpore, non est otiosa, quia cum ipsa tali tempore non perficiat, ipsa pro tali tempore non apta nata movere, sed tantum quando unita est corpori. Illud enim dicitur otiosum quod<sup>34</sup> debet facere aliquid et non facit. Praeterea, licet ipsa non moveat corpus, propter hoc non est otiosa quia facit alias operationes, ut est sentire et intelligere.

8. Ad octavum, de materia, dicendum quod materia in sua generalitate considerata est una numero; non autem ubi consideratur prout est sub tali vel sub tali<sup>35</sup> forma: sic est diversa, et sic etiam habet diversas formas. Et sic est humanus intellectus in diversis partibus unitus, et ideo in omnibus non est idem numero.

9. Ad nonum dicendum sicut supra dictum est: Deus aeterno consilio et immutabili creat animam; et ideo nulla mutatio fit in Deo nisi in suo effectu, ut dicit Augustinus, XII *De civitate*.<sup>36</sup> [f. 159b]

10. Ad decimum dicendum quod anima potest considerari vel in quantum est motor et perfectio corporis vel in quantum est substantia et hoc aliquid. Primo modo est corruptibilis quodam modo, id est aliquando est non-motor; secundo modo est incorruptibilis; et primo modo desinit perficere.

<sup>32</sup> Rectius Lib. XI, c. 20, n. 26 (PL 32, 819; CSEL 33, 298).

<sup>33</sup> Non proprie respondet ad arg. 6, ubi nihil obicitur de sensitiva.

<sup>34</sup> quod] quando V.

<sup>35</sup> vel sub tali *add. marg.* V.

<sup>36</sup> Cap. XVII (XVIII), n. 2 (PL 41, 367; CSEL 40—I, 598; CCL 48, 374).



11. Ad undecimum dicendum quod ideo motus caeli sive ipsum corpus caeleste est unum, quia motor est unus. Sed quia totus formae appetitus per formam caeli terminatur et completur, et etiam quia tota materia quae susceptibilis est illius formae continetur sub illa forma. Sicut Philosophus in primo *De caelo et mundo*<sup>37</sup> dat exemplum: Si omnia ossa et omnis caro redacta essent in unum et essent sub una forma hominis, non esset nisi unus homo. Unde si amoveretur motor, esset unus motus primi mobilis. Mixtio autem est hominis ex anima et corpore, ut dicit Augustinus, *Ad Volusianum*.<sup>38</sup>

13. Ad duodecimum [= 13], quod intellectus semper intelligit, dicendum quod sicut videmus quod lux duplicem habet actum, scilicet lucere et illuminare, et semper est in actu lucendi et non semper in actu illuminandi, sic intelligendum est de intellectu agente, quod semper est in actu lucendi, et non illuminandi. Unde Augustinus, IX *De Trinitate*:<sup>39</sup> "Anima semper se cognoscit, sed non semper se considerat," et ita illud verbum non intelligitur de intellectu ut manuducitur per formas sensibiles.

12. Ad decimum tertium [= 12] dicendum quod etsi intellectus intelligat formas individuas et particulares, sortiuntur tamen rationem formarum universalium, quia abstrahuntur ab appendiciis materiae, et anima similiter propriam materiam suam habet individuare, et differentiam habent sua propria principia.

14. Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod non sic disciplina docet scientiam sicut ignis ignem, quia discipulus habet aptitudinem naturalem qua doceri potest a magistro; et nisi istam haberet, a magistro doceri non posset. Quia enim discipulus habet aptitudinem istam et magister dat efficacem operationem in docendo discipulum et excitando intellectum eius, per irradiationem divini luminis intelligit discipulus, ut dicit Augustinus in libro *De magistro*.<sup>40</sup>

16. Ad decimum quintum [= 16] Hugonis, dicendum quod differt 'multa esse' et 'multiplicari'. Spiritus multi sunt, sed multiplicari non possunt, scilicet per generationem sicut corpora et substantiae sensibiles.

17. Ad ultimum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur nihil diffiniendo, sicut patet ibidem; et ideo non arguit ad propositum. Vel dicendum quod intendit ibi dicere quod non tantum est in animabus

<sup>37</sup> Cap. 9 (278a 33—35).

<sup>38</sup> *Epist.* 137, c. 3, n. 11 (PL 33, 520; CSEL 44, 109ss); cf. Quaest. B: *De esse specifico* (supra), ad not. 11 et proprius ad not. 25.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Lib. X, c. 5, n. 7 (PL 42, 977; CCL 50, 320s); et XIV, c. 6, n. 8 (PL 42, 1041; CCL 50 A, 430s).

<sup>40</sup> Cap. 12, n. 40 (PL 32, 1217; CSEL 77, 48—50). Non respondetur ad arg. 15.

qualitas sed etiam quantitas virtutis. Unde sensus est: Si dico plures tantum, id est si dico quod in animabus tantum pluralitas sive qualitas, me ridebo; immo est una per quam, scilicet unitatem, ipse intendit exprimere quantitatem virtutalem animae, et ideo non potest ex hoc argui ad propositum.

### III. THE FIRE OF HELL

The eighth error condemned by Stephen Tempier: *Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corporeo*, is drawn directly, as Canon F. Van Steenberghen has shown, from the *Quaestiones in III De anima* of Master Siger of Brabant. Venturing beyond the philosophical, Siger asked in question XI: *Quaeritur consequenter de anima in statu separationis, et est quaestio non multum philosophica, scilicet utrum anima separata pati possit ab aliqua natura elementari, ut ab igne*, and proceeded to deny that there was any way in which the separated soul could suffer from hell-fire save that it would be so locked in the fire (so to speak) as to be incapable of doing anything apart from its fiery prison.<sup>1</sup>

These questions have hitherto been dated as simply before 1270. Whether the question of Baglione here presented in part can provide a more precise chronology, is not immediately evident, since the Franciscan's reference to *philosophantes* need not forthwith be identified with Master Siger, though I should judge this highly probable, even if we cannot offer reasonable certainty.

At first sight, the text of William's question in the Florence codex BNaz. conv. soppr. B. 6. 912, ff. 28a—29a<sup>2</sup> (no parallel is found in the Vatican Palatine manuscript) seemed to have no reference to the heterodox Aristotelian: the arguments, for example, are apparently not those proposed by Siger (and no answer to them is provided).<sup>3</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> Canon Van Steenberghen thus summarizes Siger's conclusion: "Comment l'âme sera-t-elle unie au feu? Non pas, certes, comme la forme à la matière, mais *sicut locatum unitur loco, quia operatur in eo*; l'âme sera détenue dans le feu, incapable d'agir ailleurs que dans le feu, et ce sera la cause de sa tristesse. Peut-être Aristote répondrait-il autrement. Il dirait que l'âme séparée est impassible; peut-être ajouterait-il avec son Commentateur que l'intellect, unique pour tous les hommes, n'est jamais séparé de tous les individus" (*Siger de Brabant: Les œuvres inédites* [Phil. Belges XII], Louvain 1931, 171).

<sup>2</sup> Question 29 in the series we have called *De symbolo*; cf. I. Brady, "Questions at Paris . . .," *Arch. Franc. Hist.* 61 (1968) 445.

<sup>3</sup> Apart from the poor condition of the text, we feel no qualms in not providing complete documentation, since a fuller and more developed form of the question, in direct dependence on Master William de Baglione, is provided by Matthew of Acquasparta in his sixth question *De anima separata*:

point of fact, the text of the Florentine manuscript at this juncture is in very poor condition; the hand that copied the *quarta pecia* (ff. 24—31) does not seem to have been very intelligent. As a result we were about to give up any transcription, despite Baglione's sympathy with the difficulties of philosophy and reason concerning this question, when we came upon the remarks on those modern philosophers known as the *philosophantes*. We present the text for what it is worth as a contribution to the background of the condemnation of 1270.

Postmodum quaerebatur utrum spiritus rationalis absolutus a corpore possit pati ab igne corporali. Quod non possit pati ab igne vel quod ignis corporalis non possit agere in ipsum ostendebatur:

1. Primo, quia omne agens corporale assimilatur sibi patiens per impressionem formae consimilis . . .

#### [RESPONSIO:]

[f. 28c] Ad istam quaestionem quid indubitanter tenendum sit facile est respondere, quoniam iuxta verbum Veritatis, Matth. 25 et Luc. 18, certum est spiritum absolutum a corpore, quales sunt daemones pro quibus dicitur in Matthaeo:<sup>1</sup> *Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum, qui parati estis diabolo et angelis eius*; spiritum similiter separatum a corpore, animam scilicet rationalem exutam, qualis erat anima divitis epulonis de quo habetur in Luca;<sup>2</sup> certum, dico, eos pati ab igne materiali. Ille enim ignis vere corporalis est, sicut expresse dicit Gregorius, *Moralium* XV,<sup>3</sup> et in tertio Danielis, et beatus Augustinus, XXI *De civitate*, cap. 10.

Difficile tamen est ostendere quod hoc possit fieri et quomodo possit hoc intelligi, quia huic sententiae videntur et philosophi<sup>4</sup> et ratio contradicere. Naturalis enim philosophus probat et asserit quod inter illa in quibus non potest esse communicatio in materia nec contactus nec contrarietas aliqua [non?] possit esse actio et passio, sicut plene colligitur ex verbis Philosophi, primo *De generatione*.<sup>5</sup> Ut igitur istud aliquantulum pateat, oportet considerare passionis meritum et patientis statum et patiendi modum.

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*Utrum vere patiatur ab igne infernali*, in his *Qq. Disp. De anima separata, De anima beata, De ieiunio et De legibus* [Bibl. Franc. Schol. XVIII], Quaracchi 1959, 93—119.

<sup>1</sup> Matth. 25, 41.

<sup>2</sup> Potius Luc. 16, 19—31.

<sup>3</sup> Greg. Magnus, *Moral.*, XV, c. 29 (PL 75, 1098s); seq. Dan. 3, 21, et 46—49, de fornace ignis ardentis; deinde Augustinus, Num. 1 (PL 41, 724s; CSEL 40, 537s; CCL 48, 775s); cf. Matth. ab Aquasp., *quaest. cit.*, 101.

<sup>4</sup> philosophi *lectio coniecturalis*; lacuna in F; forte legendum sit philosophia.

<sup>5</sup> Text. 50, c. 7 (323b 29—33), cf. Matth., p. 93, not. 3.

I. Passionis meritum est inobedientia creaturae rationalis quae propria volens potestate gaudere, sicut dicit Augustinus in epistola *Ad Dioscorum*,<sup>6</sup> et secundum se magis quam secundum Deum vivere, sicut dicit idem, XIV *De civitate*, cap. 4, spreto bono incommutabili, rebus mutabilibus et se inferioribus per amorem perversum adhaesit, sicut diffinit Augustinus peccatum.<sup>7</sup> Propter quod iustum est ut creatura quae servire noluit<sup>8</sup> suo superiori a quo in eam sibi conformatam influente reciperet plenitudinem gloriae subdatur suo inferiori, rei scilicet corporali, a qua in eam assimilata agente patiat supplicium extremae miseriae . . .

II. Patientis status est finalis et ultimus in deformitate peccati, cui convenit ut afflictivum(?)<sup>9</sup> . . .

III. [f. 28d] Patiendi modum assignare etsi sit difficile, ex his tamen quae dicta sunt ad eum declarandum multum iuvamur. Dico ergo quod spiritus absolutus a corpore patitur ab igne materiali non passione in qua per naturalem agentis virtutem corporaliter transmutetur qualitatibus eius corporalibus assimilatus . . . sed patitur passione in qua per supernaturalem ignis actionem veraciter affligitur ab eo, hoc est a corpore, merito praevaricationis suae . . .

[29a] Modum igitur patiendi aliqui videntur colligere ex ipsius apprehensione, ut in hoc quod ignem videt patiat ab igne, quia in anima separata idem sunt tactus et visus et videre et tangere . . . Sed quia difficile est videre quomodo in anima separata omnino idem sint sensitivae potentiae; quamvis enim non differant in supposito vel in esse, servant tamen proprietates quas etiam sensus spirituales inconfusibiliter habent . . .; ideo ultra hoc, alii assignant modum patiendi ex ipsius spiritus aestimatione, ex hoc scilicet quod apprehendit ignem ut sibi nocivum . . . nec huic obviat quod aliqui philosophantes<sup>10</sup> dicant quod scilicet spiritus separatus certus est quod ab igne pati non potest, quia vel est perturbatum iudicium merito peccati, ut scilicet trepidet ubi non est timendum, vel quamvis sciat quod spiritus non potest pati ab igne secundum ordinem naturae, conscius tamen praevaricationis suae scit quod transgressor spiritus pati potest secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae.

<sup>6</sup> *Epist.* 118, c. 3, n. 15 (PL 33, 439; CSEL 34, 680). Deinde, *De civitate Dei*, XIV, c. 4, n. 1 (PL 41, 407; CSEL 40—II, 7; CCL 48, 418).

<sup>7</sup> *De libero arbitrio*, II, c. 19, n. 53 (PL 32, 1269; CSEL 74, 86s).

<sup>8</sup> servire noluit] summe voluit F.

<sup>9</sup> Hic textus adeo corruptus est ut prosequi non possimus.

<sup>10</sup> philosophantes] ph'atēs F.



Tamen, quia iste modus non videtur nisi sola affectione timoris concludere,<sup>11</sup> propterea alii addunt et colligunt modum patiendi ex hoc quod spiritus est igni materiali inseparabiliter alligatus . . . Sed quia iste modus non videtur concludere nisi afflictione tristitiae seu displicentiae vehementis . . . Ideo assignatur quartus modus, ut scilicet dicatur isto modo pati quia igni corporali ut vere ab eo passibilis subditur. Passibilis dico per corporalem similitudinem ut contractam per inordinatum amorem, et, ut ita loquar, quasi compactam per finalem obstinationem, ut spiritus natura incorporeus quasi corporalis factus a corporea flamma instar spiritus incorporati trahat non passionem naturalem sed animalem, afflicto ardore, non affectus calore, vere et verum dolorem sentiens, nullam qualitatem elementarem ex hac actione ignis contrahens. Et istum quartum modum simul cum tertio ponit beatus Augustinus, XII *De civitate*, cap. 10.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> concludere] concludetur F.

<sup>12</sup> Num. 1 (PL 41, 724 s; CSEL 40, 537 s; CCL 48, 775 s).

## RICHARD OF MIDDLETON, O. F. M. ON *ESSE* AND *ESSENCE*

Richard of Middleton appears right in the middle of the original controversy on *esse* and *essence* in a creature. His was the second voice to be raised in opposition to the real distinction, the most persuasive of all in telling us that this was primarily a problem in predication.

Richard's star is comparatively pale today alongside some of the other luminaries of the thirteenth century. Still, his competence is attested to by the epithets, *clarissimus* and *eximius*.<sup>1</sup> His *Commentary on the Sentences* was a best seller in its day;<sup>2</sup> that on the fourth book of those *Sentences*, a classic.<sup>3</sup> "Scotus is the best for the first book; Giles for the second; Bonaventure for the third; Richard of Middleton for the fourth."<sup>4</sup>

Richard's authority was invoked at the Councils of Constance,<sup>5</sup> of Basel,<sup>6</sup> and of Trent.<sup>7</sup> He was rated in this age of giants as among the foremost theologians of the second rank, i. e., among those who de-

<sup>1</sup> *Clarissimi theologi Magistri Richardi de Media Villa super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi Quaestiones Subtilissimae*, ed. Ludovicus Silvester, 4 v., Brixiae: apud Vincentium Sabbium, 1591 [Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963] [St. Louis, Mo.: Manuscripta: microfilms of rare and out-of-print books, List 27, no. 24]; at the end of Vol. IV, *Quodlibeta doctoris eximii Richardi de Media Villa ordinis Minorum*.

<sup>2</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle, O.P. et A. Chate-lain, 4 v., Paris: Fratres Delalain, 1889-97, II, pp. 107-112, n. 642, esp. p. 109.

<sup>3</sup> Edgar Hocedez, S. J., *Richard de Middleton, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine*, Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1925, p. 112.

<sup>4</sup> Prosper de Martigné, O.M.C., *La Scolastica e le Tradizioni Francescane*, 2 v., Foligno: F. Salvati, 1890, II, p. 21, nota 1: "In primum excellit Scotus; in secundum Aegidius, in tertium Bonaventura, in quartum Richardus de Media Villa." For a similar tribute at the head of the *Fourth Book* in the Venice 1509 edition, see Hocedez, p. 122, n. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio . . . ab initiis ad 1870*, ed. Giovanni Domenico Mansi et alii, Florentiae: expensis Antonii Zatta Veneti, 1759-1798 (ed. novissima, 53 v. in 58; Parisiis: H. Welter, 1901-27), Vol. XXVIII, col. 59.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIX, col. 758.

<sup>7</sup> *Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatum nova collectio*, ed. Societas Goerresiana, 13 v., Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder & Co., 1901-61, Vol. IX, pp. 118 and 664.

parted in some measure from St. Thomas.<sup>8</sup> His psychology has been studied assiduously; his doctrine on being, not nearly enough.

Pierre Mandonnet, O. P. judged Richard in the terms of his departure from Henry of Ghent;<sup>9</sup> Edgar Hocedez, S. J., in his addition of a logical distinction to Henry's real.<sup>10</sup> Josef Lechner restricted his judgment to Richard's sacramental theology;<sup>11</sup> Roberto Zavalloni, O.F.M., to his plurality of forms.<sup>12</sup>

This plurality of forms, of course, along with its offspring, universal hylomorphism, made up the *famosissimum binarium Augustinianum*, the twofold pillar of "Augustinianism,"<sup>13</sup> which, I believe, is the source of the real distinction. All are agreed on Richard's calm and orderly manner in his analysis of a question, *claro de fonte Richardi*.<sup>14</sup>

It is this last feature, this calm and orderly manner, which I would single out in estimating Richard's contribution. It was this basic soundness in his approach that seems to have been the one common denominator of all his honorific titles. Richard is called the *Doctor solidus* et

<sup>8</sup> *Doctoris ecstatici D. Dionysii* [Lewwis] *Cartusiani Opera Omnia*, 42 v., Tournai: Herder, 1896—1913, 1935, *In I Sent.*, Proemium (XIX, p. 37): "Petrus de Tarantasia et Richardus de Mediavilla, qui tamen in aliquibus recedunt a Thoma."

<sup>9</sup> "Les premières disputes sur la distinction réelle entre l'essence et l'existence, 1276—1287," *Revue Thomiste*, XVIII (1910), 741—765, esp. p. 760.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 400—401.

<sup>11</sup> *Die Sakramentenlehre des Richard von Mediavilla*, (Münchener Studien zur historischen Theologie, Heft 5), München: Kösel u. Pustet, 1925.

<sup>12</sup> Roberto Zavalloni, O.F.M., *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes. Textes inédits et étude critique*, Louvain: L'institut supérieur de philosophie, 1951, pp. 498—499.

<sup>13</sup> Gabriel Théry, O.P., "L'Augustinisme médiéval et le problème de l'unité de la forme substantielle," *Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae ab Academia Romana, Romae*, 23—30 Aprilis 1930, Turin: Marietti, 1931, pp. 140—200, esp. 145—146.

<sup>14</sup> Pierre Féret, *La Faculté de Théologie de Paris et ses docteurs les plus célèbres. Moyen-Age*, 4 v., Paris: Picard et Fils, 1895, II, 380:

"Sacra refert celebrer Ricardus dogmata, quondam

Quem tenuit Media Villa, decora virum;

Hauserunt veteres claro de fonte Richardi

Doctoresque novi qui meliora docent."

Cf. C. L. Kingsford, *Dictionary of National Biography*, London: 1909, XIII, pp. 356—357, esp. 356, under "Middleton, Richard," says that the above verses were taken from the 1499 (Venice) edition of Richard's *Commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences*. Cf. also A. F. Petro Rodulphio, O.F.M., *Historiarum seraphicae religionis libri tres* . . . , ed. Tossinianensi, Venetiis: apud Franciscanum de Francis, 1586 (Manuscripta, II, 47), tom. III, fol. 333v. Henri Willot, O.F.M., *Athenae orthodoxorum sodalitii Franciscani*, Leodii: Arnoldus à Courouvremia, 1598, p. 315.

*copiosus* par excellence;<sup>15</sup> the *doctor fundatissimus et authoratus*;<sup>16</sup> *fundatissimus et profundus*.<sup>17</sup>

This calm and orderly manner likewise seems to be the one gift which is as rare as it is indispensable in this controversy. Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome were violent polemicists. Each had his vision concentrated on one side of the shield. Richard looked on both. He took the trouble to wend his way back and forth in order that he might be able to scrutinize both sides in all charity. Richard was the last representative of the so-called "Augustinians." He served as a sort of a bridge between the old Franciscan school of St. Bonaventure and the new of Scotus. Pierre Duhem called him the intermediary between Bacon and Ockham.<sup>18</sup>

Richard is our best source for a cool and a judicial examination of this real distinction. Located as he was here at the very core of the storm, he remained a detached witness throughout. Giles and Henry each expressed himself before Richard; each after. Neither ever objected to any of the logical postulates which Richard's magisterial presentation exposed.

Personally, I do not agree with Richard's positive solution. But he did give us the original *status quaestionis*: why is it, that we cannot say that *esse* is the essence of a creature? And he gave us a major premise: no part can be predicated of the whole. The fact that he accepted the abstract terms, *esse* and *essence* [considered as a part], as though they were the concrete *ens* and *res*, is, I believe, due to an unwise concession which Henry of Ghent made to Giles of Rome.

<sup>15</sup> Franz Ehrle, S.J., *Die Ehrentitel der Scholastischen Lehrer des Mittelalters*, 60 pp. in *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse*, Jahrgang 1919, 9. Abhandlung, München: G. Franzschen (J. Roth), 1919, pp. 37, 41, 44, 47, 52, 54, 55.

<sup>16</sup> Ioannis Pitsei Angli *Relationum historicarum de rebus anglicis tomus primus*, ed. William Bishop, Parisiis: apud Rolinum Thierry et Sebastianum Cramoisy, 1619 (Manuscripta, 12. 40), pp. 385—386. According to Hocedez, p. 123, these titles go back to the Venice, 1509, edition of the *Quodlibeta*: the *authoratus*, to the title and the preface; the *fundatissimus*, to the remarks of the editors at the end.

<sup>17</sup> Anthony à Wood, *Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis Oxoniensis*, 2 v., Oxonii: e theatro Sheldoniano, 1674 (Manuscripta, 30. 30), Lib. I, pp. 86 and 128. The *profundus* goes back to the Council of Basel (1432), Mansi, tom. XXIX, col. 768. *Scriptores ordinis minorum quibus accessit syllabus illorum qui ex eodem ordine pro fide Christi fortiter occubuerunt. Priores atramento, posteriores sanguine christianam religionem asseruerunt*, recensuit fr. Lucas Waddingus, ed. novissima, Romae: A. Nardecchia, 1906, pp. 203—204, esp. 203: "Ibi Doctoris Solidi, et Copiosi, ac Fundatissimi, etiam et Authorati cognomen sortitus est."

<sup>18</sup> Pierre Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci. Ceux qu'il a lus et ceux qui l'ont lu*, 3 v., Paris: A. Herman et Fils, 1909, II. p. 371: "Richard de Middleton nous apparaît ici comme l'intermédiaire entre Bacon et le *Venerabilis Inceptor*."



This intellectual background is valuable to us chiefly because it is so different from our own. Accepted in the original controversy without question, it is not even adverted to today. It must be made explicit. Thomists sincerely trying to find the mind of St. Thomas cannot afford to ignore Richard's systematic revelation of the presuppositions involved in this dispute.

### LIFE

There are not many fixed points in this life. *The Chronicle of the Twenty-four Generals* (written c. 1369) tells us that in 1283 Bonagratia appointed a commission to examine the works of Peter John Olivi. One of the bachelors of theology named on that commission was Richardus de Mediavilla.<sup>19</sup> In 1285, Peter, in his response to this commission, includes Richard in the list of the Masters.<sup>20</sup> Richard must have held his inception in the meantime.

During the captivity of Prince Louis of Toulouse, 1288—1295, Richard is mentioned as one of his companions.<sup>21</sup> In 1295, a Doctor of Theology called R. de Mediavilla was elected the Minister Provincial for France.<sup>22</sup> In 1296, Richard was with Louis again near Naples.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> *La Chronique des XXIV Généraux*, in *Analecta Franciscana sive Chronica aliaque documenta ad historiam Fratrum Minorum spectantia*, ed. a Patribus Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi) Florentiae: ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1885—, t. III (1897), pp. 374—376. This excerpt can also be found in Franz Ehrle, S. J., "Petrus Johannis Olivi, sein Leben und seine Schriften," *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, herausgegeben von H. Denifle-F. Ehrle, 7 Bde., Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1885—1900 (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1955), t. III (1887), pp. 409—552, esp. 416—417. Likewise, in Hocedez, pp. 80—81.

<sup>20</sup> *Collectio Judiciorum de novis erroribus 1100—1173*, ed. Carolus du Plessis D'Argentré, 3 v., Lutetiae Parisiorum: apud Lambertum Coffin, 1724—1736 (Manuscripta, 36, 10), t. I (1728), p. 226. Hocedez, pp. 81—83.

<sup>21</sup> *Acta Sanctorum*, ed. Joannes Bollandus et alii, Parisiis: V. Palmé, 1863—1919, A. S. Augusti, t. III (1867) Aug. 19, De Ludovico Ep. Tolosano, O.F.M., pp. 775—822, esp. 810a. Cf. *Vita S. Ludovici Ep. Tolosani conscripta a Johanne de Orta*, in *Analecta Bollandiana*, Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes, 1882—, Vol. IX (1890), pp. 278—359, esp. 295. Hocedez, 115—118.

<sup>22</sup> Hugolinus Lippens, O.F.M., "Discussiones: de modo celebrandi capitulum deque observantia regulae in provincia Franciae post annum 1517 (Juxta documenta inexplorata)," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXXVII (1944) 3—47, esp. pp. 25—27. Cf. Valens Heynck, O.F.M., in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 2 ed., herausgegeben von J. Hofer und K. Rahner, 11 v., Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder & Co., 1957—66, Vol. VIII, col. 1292 under "Richard v. Mediavilla (de Meneville), O.F.M."

<sup>23</sup> *Processus canonizationis et legendae variae Sancti Ludovici O.F.M., Episcopi Tolosani*, cap. xxiii in *Analecta Franciscana*, VIII (1951), p. 14: "Existens in castro Ovi, post susceptum presbyteratus ordinem, omni fere die... intendebat collocacioni... maxime post adventum fr. Richardi

Richard had just published a new edition of his *Commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences*.<sup>24</sup> He is also credited with three *Quodlibeta*, 1285—1287;<sup>25</sup> forty-five *Quaestiones Disputatae*;<sup>26</sup> some commentaries on the Epistles and the Gospels; four sermons.<sup>27</sup>

For lack of precise data with regard to the time of Richard's birth, youth, and entrance into religious life, we must make presumptions. A Master of Theology should be at least thirty-five years old;<sup>28</sup> therefore, Richard must have been born in the first half of the century. A Master should have spent a certain number of years internship as a Bachelor;<sup>29</sup> therefore, Richard must have been teaching in Paris from about 1278.<sup>30</sup> There is no record of Richard ever having returned to the Franciscan *studium generale* in Paris; therefore, Richard's regency must have been confined to the three years, 1284—1287.

Our secondary sources come two hundred years late. St. Antonius, O. P. († 1459) tells us that Richard was proficient in canon law.<sup>31</sup> The *Firmamentum trium ordinum* (c. 1512) makes him out to be a doctor

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[Cod. Raymundi] de Mediavilla." This excerpt may also be found in Margaret R. Toynbee, *St. Louis of Toulouse and the Process of Canonisation in the Fourteenth Century*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1929, p. 105. Cf. Willibrordus Lampen, O.F.M., "Utrum Richardus de Mediavilla fuerit S. Ludovici Tolosani magister," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XIX (1926), 113—116; *idem*, "De Richardo de Mediavilla, O.F.M., socio Ludovici Tolosani," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXIII (1930), 246—248, esp. p. 246.

<sup>24</sup> Msgr. Palémon Glorieux, "Richard de Mediavilla," *La France Franciscaine* (Lille), XIX (1936), 97—113, esp. pp. 106—107.

<sup>25</sup> *Idem*, *La Littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, 2 v., Bibliothèque Thomiste V & XXI, Kain (Belgique): Le Saulchoir, 1925 & 1935, Vol. I, pp. 267—271. Hocedez, pp. 31—38.

<sup>26</sup> Hocedez, "Les *Quaestiones Disputatae* de Richard de Middleton," *Recherches de science religieuse*, VI (1916), 493—513, esp. pp. 500 sqq.; *idem*, *Richard*, pp. 27—33. Franciscus-M. Henquinet, O.F.M., "Descriptio Codicis Assisii in bibliotheca communalis," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXIV (1931), 91—108, 215—254, esp. p. 240.

<sup>27</sup> P. Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., "Maîtres Franciscains de Paris. Supplément au Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle de M. le Chan. P. Glorieux," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXVII (1935), Codicographia, 531—564, esp. pp. 554—555. Hocedez, *Richard*, pp. 12—127.

<sup>28</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I, pp. 78—80, n. 20, esp. p. 79. Hilarin Felder, O.Cap., *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franziskanerorden bis um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1904, pp. 211—212, note 4.

<sup>29</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, pp. 691—704, nn. 1188—1189, esp. p. 692.

<sup>30</sup> *Annales Minorum seu trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum auctore A.R.P. Luca Waddingo, ed. tertia, P. Josephi Fonseca*, 30 v., *Ad Claras Aquas* (Quaracchi): [tipografia Barbèra] 1931—57, t. V, ad annum 1278, n. 31, p. 55.

<sup>31</sup> St. Antonius, O.P. [*Pars historialis*], 3 pts. in 1 v., Bâle: 1491, t. III, tract, xxiv, 8 (fol. 244<sup>v</sup>): "... valde peritum in iure canonico, ..."

in both civil and canon law.<sup>32</sup> But the Franciscans were not cultivating law at this time.<sup>33</sup> This double doctorate may well go back to a confusion of our Richard with a certain Richardus Anglicus († 1242) who had published a couple of works on jurisprudence at Bologna.<sup>34</sup>

This Richardus Anglicus may also have been the occasion for Dom Trimethius († 1516) telling us that Richard was born in England.<sup>35</sup> There is no early authority for this claim. Still, Leland († 1552) followed this lead.<sup>36</sup> Major († 1550) had him teaching at Oxford.<sup>37</sup> Bale († 1563) had him making his studies at Oxford.<sup>38</sup> Sixtus de Sienne († 1569) said that Richard was an Englishman, *Anglicus*.<sup>39</sup> Pits († 1616) interpreted Sixtus as having said that Richard was a Scot, but he also says that he, Sixtus, was mistaken.<sup>40</sup> Dempster († 1625) endorsed Pits' claim as to what Sixtus had said, without its personal disclaimer.<sup>41</sup> Wood († 1695) leaned heavily on Leland and Pits.<sup>42</sup> Hardy in 1862 challenged the credentials of Pits, Bale and Dempster.<sup>43</sup>

Fr. Lippens thought that if Richard were not a Frenchman, then the decree naming him the French Provincial should have mentioned that

<sup>32</sup> *Firmamenta trium ordinum Beatissimi Patris nostri Francisci*, Paris: per Johannem Frellon, 1512, In prima parte cap. 2, fol. xlii: "utriusque iuris doctor."

<sup>33</sup> Felder, p. 386.

<sup>34</sup> Hocedez, *Richard*, pp. 16, 17, 64.

<sup>35</sup> Ioannes Trithemius, O.S.B., *Opera Historica*, 2 partes, Frankfurti: typis Wecheliani apud Claudium, 1601 (Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966), *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, Pars prima, pp. 184—400, esp. 301, line 4: "natione anglicus."

<sup>36</sup> *Commentarii de Scriptoribus Britannicis* auctore Joanne Lelando, ed. Antonius Hall, 2 v., Oxonii: e theatro Sheldoniano, 1709 (Manuscripta, 3. 10), p. 310, cap. CCIV.

<sup>37</sup> John Major, *A History of Greater Britain as well England as Scotland*, translated by Archibald Constable (Publications of the Scottish History Society, X), Edinburgh: University Press, 1892, p. 23.

<sup>38</sup> John Bale, *Scriptorum illustrium Maioris Brytannie quam nunc Angliam et Scotiam vocant: Catalogus*, 2nd ed., 2 v. in 1, Basiliae: apud I. Oporium, 1557—59 (Manuscripta, 4. 3; also in 13 microcards, double-faced, made by Lost Cause Press, Louisville, 1959), pp. 359—360.

<sup>39</sup> *Bibliotheca Sancta a F. Sixto Senensi in octo libros digesta*, 2 ed. Frankfurti: ex officium typographica Nicolai Bassaei, 1575, Lib. IV, p. 319: "Richardus Mediovillanus, Anglicus, ex ordine Minorum, . . ."

<sup>40</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 385: "Mediovillanum vocat Sixtus Senensis, sed non recte, Scotum fuisse scribit, . . ."

<sup>41</sup> Thomae Dempsteri *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Scotorum sive De Scriptoribus Scotis*, ed. altera 2 v., Edinburgi: Andreas Balfour cum sociis, 1829, v. II, lib. xii, pp. 482—483, esp. 482: "Mediovillanus Scotus fuit, ut Sixto Senensi placet et repetit Pitsaeus Anglus . . ."

<sup>42</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue of Materials relating to the History of Great Britain*, (*Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores*, No. 26), 2 parts in 4 v., London: Longmans & Co., 1862, t. I, pp. xl—xli.

fact.<sup>44</sup> Are we sure that this R. de Mediavilla is our Richard?<sup>45</sup> Fr. Pelster has pointed out that the name, Meneville, belongs to an old Norman family in Northumberland.<sup>46</sup> There are, however, as many variants of this name as you will find for that of any phonetic challenge in one of our New York City Hospitals today. Richard's interest in the experimental sciences would be consonant with an English background.<sup>47</sup> Fr. Lampen summed up a half dozen articles with the plea to leave this question of Richard's nationality open.<sup>48</sup>

St. Louis of Toulouse was the second son of King Charles II of Sicily. As a fourteen year old boy, he was taken captive and held as a hostage in Catalonia for seven years, 1288—95.<sup>49</sup> Richard was one of the Franciscans sent to assist with his education.<sup>50</sup> The young prince was so impressed with these monks that he made a vow to enter their religious order. After his release he renounced the rights of primogeniture which had come to him when his elder brother died. Then, he seems to have made his entrance into the Order a condition with Pope Boniface VIII before accepting the Bishopric of Toulouse.<sup>51</sup> Louis died in 1297, and was canonized in 1316.<sup>52</sup>

From the fact that Richard is not mentioned in Louis's will, it is inferred that Richard was not with him at this time, 1297.<sup>53</sup> Fr. Marian de Florence (c. 1520) had Richard raised to the Archbishopric of Rheims; this is a mistake.<sup>54</sup> The *Necrology of Auxerre* says that Richard died at

<sup>44</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 26, note 1.

<sup>45</sup> W. Lampen, "De Patria Richardi de Mediavilla, O.F.M.," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XVIII (1925), 298—300, esp. p. 299: "Insuper fieri potuit scriptorem confudisse nostrum cum Richardo qui anno 1295 electus fuit Minister provincialis Franciae et quidem in capitulo Metensi." Hocedez, *Richard*, p. ix.

<sup>46</sup> Franz Pelster, S. J., "Die Herkunft des Richard von Mediavilla, O.F.M.," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft*, Fulda, XXXIX (1926), 172—178, esp. 178; *idem*, "Das Heimatland des Richard von Mediavilla," *Scholastik*, XIII Jahrgang 1938, Eupen (Belgium): Esch & Co., 1938, pp. 399—406. Cf. A. G. Little and F. Pelster, S. J., *Oxford Theology and Theologians, c. A. D. 1282—1302*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934, pp. 96—97.

<sup>47</sup> P. Eugene Portalié, "L'hypnotisme au moyen âge. Avicenne et Richard de Middleton," *Etudes* (Paris), LVII (1892), 481—499; 577—597.

<sup>48</sup> "War Richard von Mediavilla, O.F.M. Engländer?" *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXIII (1930), 246—248. Cf. Etienne Amann, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, E. Amann, 15 v. in 30, Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1908—1950, Tom. XIII (1937) under "Richard de Mediavilla," coll. 2669—2675, esp. 2670.

<sup>49</sup> *Acta Sanctorum*, Augusti, III, pp. 806—810.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 810a. Ioannes de Orta, p. 295.

<sup>51</sup> Toynbee, p. 112.

<sup>52</sup> *Acta Sanctorum* Augusti, III, pp. 811—822. Ioannes de Orta, p. 288.

<sup>53</sup> Hocedez, *Richard*, p. 118.

<sup>54</sup> *Compendium Chronicarum Fratrum Minorum* scriptum a Patre Mariano de Florentia (1281—1520), ed. P. Theophilus Domenichelli, O.F.M., *Archi-*



Rheims. March 30, 1300.<sup>55</sup> Msgr. Glorieux, arguing from the date of a couple of the sermons, would push the year back to 1302 or 1303.<sup>56</sup> Fr. Astexanus de Asti († 1317) places his death between that of Gauthier, the Bishop of Poitiers († 1307), and that of Duns Scotus († 1308).<sup>57</sup>

YEAR	PLACE	FUNCTION
1245—1249	{ Amiens (?) Northumberland (?)	born
1269 (?)	Oxford (?)	student
1278	Paris	Bachelor
1283	"	commission re Peter John Olivi
1284	"	incepted as <i>Magister Theologiae</i>
1284—1287	"	<i>Magister regens in studium generale</i>
1288	Catalonia	tutor (?) for Prince Louis
1295	Metz (?)	elected Minister Provincial (?)
1296	near Naples	in the company of Louis
1302—1307	Rheims (?)	died.

### MISCONCEPTIONS

There are a few misconceptions which should not need more than to be made explicit in order to be rejected. The disputants about *esse* and essence were not natural scientists equipped with white coats, scalpels and atom smashers. They did not think of this composition as something analogous to that of sodium and chlorine in salt, NaCl; or as some great graduate problem featuring a proton and a electron in a hydrogen atom, distinct though inseparable. Neither did they lay claim to any privileged insights into the internal structure of a being. This has been one modern notion of metaphysics; it was not theirs.

*vum Franciscanum Historicum*, I—IV (1908—1911), esp. II (1909), p. 462, with note 4.

<sup>55</sup> P. Antoine Béguet, O.F.M., "Necrologe des Frères Mineurs d'Auxerre," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, III (1910), 115—138; 310—332; 530—550; 716—738, esp. p. 138: "Cejourd'huy, 30<sup>e</sup> du mois de mars de l'an 1300, décéda au convent de Rhims, T.R.P.F. Richard de Mediavilla."

<sup>56</sup> "Richard de Mediavilla," pp. 111—113. *Idem*, *Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 2 v., Paris: Vrin, 1933, Vol. II, no. 324, pp. 120—123, esp. p. 120. Cf. Gideon Gál, O.F.M., in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. Most Rev. W. J. McDonald and others, 14 v., Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America (McGraw-Hill), 1967, Vol. XII, p. 481 under "Richard of Middleton (Mediavilla)."

<sup>57</sup> *Summa Astensis, clarissimi et eximii sacrae Theologiae professoris*, Fr. Astesani de Asta ex ordine Seraphico Patriarchae Sancti Francisci,

These doctors were not laymen. Neither were they simple clerics who just happened to be teaching Alchemy I or Alchemy II. They were all priests, dedicated to theology. The elder among them were already masters of theology; the younger, masters of arts who were aspiring to the faculty of theology. What these theologians were concerned about was interpreting Aristotle in the light of our Christian revelation. The only tools they had for this exegesis were taken from logic. Their chief argument was the indirect, the inadmissible consequences involved in heresy, in an infinite regress, in a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Giles of Rome, for instance, tells us repeatedly that his whole reason for introducing this real distinction was to show how creation is intrinsically possible.<sup>58</sup> His only evidence was predication: the essence of a creature is not *esse*.<sup>59</sup> Henry of Ghent denied this inference.<sup>60</sup> If indeed this negative predication implied a real distinction, then the essence of that creature would be left uncreated. Neither of these men was directly interested in the intrinsic merits of Aristotle's thought on the ontological constitution of a being. Each was chiefly concerned with wresting some interpretation out of Aristotle and the other standard authorities which would be favorable to a position which he had previously determined elsewhere.

Within one generation this real distinction had begun to percolate all through creation, the Incarnation, transubstantiation, predestination and the other mysteries of our Christian revelation. It was always and solely a theological problem. No physicist ever gave it serious consideration. It might be called a metaphysical problem, but only in the theo-

Romae: Hieronymi Mainardi, 1728, tom. I, proemium. Pierre Claude François Daunou, in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, Paris: Librairie Universitaire, 1847, tom. XXI under "Richard de Middleton," pp. 128—132, esp. 129.

<sup>58</sup> *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia*, ed. with an introduction by Edgar Hocedez, S.J., Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1930, Th. XIX, p. 129, lines 1—4 (Manuscripta, 27. 5, fol. 30<sup>v</sup>—31<sup>r</sup>): "Quia tota causa quare nos investigamus quod esse sit res differens ab essentia ex hoc sumitur ut possimus salvare res creatas esse compositas et posse creari et posse esse et non esse, . . ." *Fertilissima Aegidii Romani Quodlibeta* . . . , Venetiis: apud Bonetum Locatellum, 1504 (Manuscripta, 19. 1) *Quodlibetum I*, quaes. 7, Resp., fol. 5<sup>vb</sup>: "Ex hoc etiam patere potest quomodo fit creatio rerum. Nam si res essent simplices et non esset compositio ex essentia et esse, non video quomodo creari possent." This question may also be found in *Quodlibeta*, cura industriae Fr. Simonis de Ungeria, Bologna: Dominicus de Lapis, 1481 (Manuscripta, 16. 6) no pagination.

<sup>59</sup> *Quodlibetum I*, quaes. 7, Resp., fol. 5<sup>vb</sup>: "Omne quod habet esse ab alio non est suum esse."

<sup>60</sup> *Quodlibeta magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo*, 2 vols., Paris: Jacobius Badius Ascensius, 1518 (Photochemical reprint, Louvain: Bibliothèque Societatis Jesu, 1961) *Quodlibetum I*, quaes. 9, fol. 7<sup>v</sup>: "Ad primum: quod si essentia creaturae esset suum esse, esset esse subsistens, dicendum est quod non sequitur."

logical sense in which Aristotle had used that term, not in the Heidegger sense in which it is commonly used today.

Even among those who accepted this theological setting, the conceptions of later centuries were not those of the thirteenth. Capreolus, for instance, is the Prince of Thomists; he spent his time proving a real distinction between an essence high up in heaven in the mind of God and the *esse* of a creature down here on earth.<sup>61</sup> Cardinal Cajetan was the most influential of all of the classical commentators; his real distinction required no more than one real term.<sup>62</sup> M. Gilson is perhaps the most respected name in Thomism today; he claims to have discovered a real distinction in St. Thomas which had escaped all other Thomists for seven hundred years.<sup>63</sup>

### PRECONCEPTIONS

St. Hilary of Poitiers († 367/8) was not surprised to hear that *esse* is predicated of a creature *per accidens*. This was not news; this was immediately evident. The big news, the news which he says converted him, was the revelation that this is not true of God.<sup>64</sup> God is, in a sense which is not true of any other being. *Esse* is predicated of God substantially, that is, *per se*. *Yahweh*, "I am Who AM." St. Augustine of Hippo († 430) said much the same thing in the same context.<sup>65</sup>

An attribute is predicated essentially, or *per se*, when it is found in the comprehension of a subject; otherwise, it can only be predicated *per accidens*. St. Anselm († 1109) meditated on this truth. If *esse* is predicated *per se* of God, then the nature of God must contain *esse*. Just as the notion of humanity includes that intelligible note called rationality, so too the notion of God must include that intelligible note called *esse*. Any essence which does not include *esse* in its comprehension cannot be the concept of a God; it must be the essence of something

<sup>61</sup> *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. Paban-Pègues, 7 v., Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1900, Vol. I, pp. 321a and 330ab. See Norman J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVIII (1960) 1—24, esp. 16.

<sup>62</sup> In "De ente et essentia" D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria, ed. M. H. Laurent, Turin: Marietti, 1934, p. 158: "... non enim requiritur ad distinctionem realem quod utrumque eorum habeat propriam existentiam."

<sup>63</sup> *Being and Some Philosophers*, Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949, p. 154: "[W]hat was perhaps deepest in the philosophical message of Thomas Aquinas seems to have remained practically forgotten since the very time of his death."

<sup>64</sup> *De Trinitate*, I, 5—6; VII, 11; XII, 24 in *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, ed. J. P. Migne, Series II: *Ecclesiae Latinae*, 221 v., Paris: 1844—55, X, 28—30; 208 B; 447 B.

<sup>65</sup> *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 2 (Migne PL, XLI, 350).

else. A non-existent god would be a contradiction in terms.<sup>66</sup> St. Bonaventure recognized this truth as part of the Franciscan tradition.<sup>67</sup>

We can think of a man or a horse without knowing whether or not it happens to exist. Just as the quiddity of an animal does not contain rationality, so the quiddity of a creature does not contain *esse*. The answer to the question, *quid est*, is not the same as that to the question, *an est*; in God, it is.

The essence of God is *esse*. This was given. From now on no one was denying this truth. But, how about its obverse: the essence of a creature is not *esse*? Does this follow? "The identity of *esse* and *quod est* is a property of God alone."<sup>68</sup> Richard of Middleton gives us Hugh of St. Victor as his authority for this step.<sup>69</sup>

### ST. THOMAS († 1274)

St. Thomas never made any "distinction," either real or logical, between an essence and its *esse*.<sup>70</sup> "Distinction" in his vocabulary was a cognitive term which was not particularly divisive. No potency can be known except through its act. Matter must be known through its form; a genus by reason of its species;<sup>71</sup> a subject by way of its accidents; an essence by means of, not apart from, its *esse*. To "distinguish" an essence independently of its *esse* would be to treat them as two coordinate objects on a horizontal level; it would be to move, not in a vertical plane down from a formal object of the mind to a material, but sideways. That is not the way the mind operates.

<sup>66</sup> *Proslodium* III (Migne PL, CLVIII, 228 C).

<sup>67</sup> *Opera Omnia*, II v., Quaracchi: Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1882—1902, *In I Sent.*, dist. 8, pars 1, art. 1, quaes. 2 (I. 153—156): "[Deus] non possit cogitari non esse."

<sup>68</sup> Hugonis de S. Victore, *Eruditionis Didascalicae Libri Septem*, I, 7 (Migne PL, CLXXVI, 745): "... cui non est aliud esse et id quod est, ... ut est solius naturae genitor et artifex." Cf. *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor*, translated by Jerome Taylor, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, Book I, ch. 6, p. 52.

<sup>69</sup> *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, art. 1, quaes. I Resp.: "Praeterea. Hugo (*I Didascalicon*, c. 6) in solo Deo idem est esse et illud quod est."


<sup>70</sup> F. A. Cunningham, S.J., "Distinction According to St. Thomas," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXVI (1962), 279—312, esp. 279.

<sup>71</sup> S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera Omnia* jussu impensaue Leonis XIII, P. M. edita, Romae: Typis R. Garroni, 1882—, *Summa Theologiae*, I, quaes. 15, art. 3 ad 3 (Leonina IV. 204b): "Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est." All Thomistic references will also be given according to the Parma edition, *Opera Omnia*, 25 v., Parma: Tipis P. Fiacadori, 1852—1872 (Parma I. 72). Cf. *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. M.-R. Cathala, Turin: Marietti, 1935, *In IX Metaphy.*, 3. 1846 (Parma XX. 542).



This does not mean that St. Thomas did not study essence and *esse*. But it does mean that that classical formula, "real distinction between essence and existence," is not his. The old cognitive notion of "distinction" is just another one of the many casualties suffered in this controversy.

St. Thomas recognized two different relationships of essence to *esse*. He accepted the old European tradition of Boethius which dealt with the composition of essence considered as a whole supposit with *esse* considered as a nature, even as that of a concrete *quod est* with an abstract *quo est*.<sup>72</sup> Likewise, the later Arabic tradition of Avicenna which dealt with the opposition of essence considered as a potential part to *esse* considered as its act, even as that of one abstract *quo est* to another.<sup>73</sup> St. Thomas kept these two relationship apart by treating them in successive articles.<sup>74</sup>



### GILES OF ROME († 1316)

Two years after the death of St. Thomas, one of his pupils, Giles of Rome, complained about the formulas: *non est, est aliud quam, differt, accidit, componit*. He upraided those who had been using them. These men are upholding the difference between *esse* and essence in name only.<sup>75</sup> If the essence of a creature is not *esse*, then it must be really

<sup>72</sup> Cunningham, "Precedentes Históricos de la Teoría de *esse* y *esencia* en Santo Tomás," *Pensamiento*, XX (1964), 155—172, esp. 162—168.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168—171.

<sup>74</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, 3, 3 and 4 (Leonina IV. 39—43; Parma I. 11—12). *Contra Gent.*, I, 21 and 22 (Leonina XIII. 63—70; Parma V. 18—19). *Compendium Theologiae ad Fratrem Reginaldum*, I, 10 and 11 in *Opuscula Theologica*, ed. R. A. Verardo, 2 v., Turin: Marietti, 1954, Vol. I, pp. 9—138, esp. 16, nn. 18—21 (Parma XVI. 3).

<sup>75</sup> "Theoremata de corpore Christi," in *Primus Tomus Operum D. Aegidii Romani*, Romae: Antonium Bladum, 1555, penultimo loco (Manuscripta,

distinct from that *esse*. This was a corollary from Avicbron († ca. 1058): every difference in our concepts implies a corresponding difference in the real world of nature.<sup>76</sup> The universal hylomorphists accepted this norm.<sup>77</sup> So too, many Thomists.<sup>78</sup>

St. Thomas himself had fought this epistemological error all his life. "It is not necessary that those objects which are distinct in the intellect be likewise distinct in the real world of nature. The intellect apprehends things according to its own manner, not according to that of the things themselves."<sup>79</sup> No difference in our concepts, save that of opposition, is a sign of a real distinction in the world of nature.<sup>80</sup> So far from being a sign of a real composition, the mental composition, *S* is *P*, is a sign of a real identity.<sup>81</sup> "This is the source of many errors, passing judgments on forms just as though they were substances."<sup>82</sup>

Giles never invoked the authority of St. Thomas. He never gave his old master credit for being anything more than a mere "popularizer" and not a very good one at that.<sup>83</sup> Giles was the sternest critic St. Thomas ever had.<sup>84</sup>

5. 13) prop. 29, fol. 18<sup>v</sup>: "... multi, cum loquuntur de esse et essentia in solis verbis sustentantur, ..."

<sup>76</sup> *Fons Vitae*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen*, Münster: Aschendorff, I (1891) cap. IV, n. 6 (p. 223): "Signum huius est quod ultimum ad quod intellectus apprehendo pervenit, hoc est apprehensio generis et differentiae; et in hoc est signum quod materia et forma sunt finis rerum." Fernand Brunner, *Platonisme et Aristotélisme. La Critique d'Ibn Gabirol par saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1965, p. 38.

<sup>77</sup> S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opuscula Omnia necnon Opera Minora*, ed. J. Perrier, 3 v., Paris: Lethielleux, 1949, *De Substantiis Separatis*, IV. 19 (I. p. 136) (Parma XVI. 187).

<sup>78</sup> Henri Renard, S.J., *The Philosophy of Being*, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce, 1948, p. 57.

<sup>79</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, 50. 2 Resp. (Leonina V. 6a; Parma I. 204): "Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint distincta in rebus: quia intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum."

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 28. 3 ad 2 (Leonina IV. 324b; Parma I. 123): "[P]otentia et bonitas non important in suis rationibus aliquam oppositionem."

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 85 5 ad 3 (Leonina V. 341b; Parma I. 341): "[C]ompositio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur."

<sup>82</sup> *De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 11 (Parma VIII. 570). Resp. in initio: "Multis error accidit circa formas ex hoc quod de eis iudicant sicut de substantiis iudicator."

<sup>83</sup> D. Dionysii [Lewwis] Cartusiani, *In I Sent.*, dist. 17, quaes. 6 (XX. 38): "... contra S. Thomam loquitur tam acute sed irrationabiliter valde." *Ibid.*, dist. 32, quaes. 1 (XX. 342): "Verum in his quoque contradicit Aegidius magistro suo Thomae, ..." Gerardo Bruni, *Incerti Auctoris Impugnaciones contra Aegidium Romanum Contradicentem Thomam super Primum Sententiarum*, Bibliotheca Augustiniana Medii Aevi, Series I. Textus Theologici et Philosophici I, Vatican, 1942.

<sup>84</sup> Giles of Rome, *Errores Philosophorum*, Critical text with notes and introduction by Josef Koch, translated by John O. Riedl, Milwaukee,

Negative predication, S is not P, is the only evidence Giles ever brought forward for this real distinction. According to him, a negative predication implies a real distinction; according to his adversaries, it does not. No one ever denied that God could create a being according to Giles's dimensions. All they could argue was that this formula, S is not P, does not automatically presuppose a real difference.

Affirmative predication, S is P, does presuppose a real identity; that is true. But here, we must beware of the fallacy of the antecedent.<sup>85</sup> If it is raining, the ground is wet; true. If it is not raining, the ground is not wet? Similarly, if this essence is *esse*, then they are really identified. If this essence is not *esse*, so what? Nothing follows. There is only one correct sum in an arithmetical addition; there are an infinite number of false answers. All of Giles's adversaries were agreed that his logic was off. As to just what this negative predication did imply, here they differed among themselves.

If one concrete supposit, e. g., Peter, is not another, e. g., Paul, then we have a real distinction. But that is not what we have here. If the essence [considered as a whole] is not *esse*, then we have one concrete supposit, *quod est*, with an abstract predicate, *esse quo est*, man is not humanity. If the essence [considered as a part] is not *esse*, then we have two abstract terms. Animality is not rationality; *cursus* is not *currere*. These do not imply any real distinction; why essence and *esse*?

Giles started with creation: if essence is not really distinct from *esse*, then creation is not possible.<sup>86</sup> Bernard of Trillia, O. P. († 1292) went further; he taught that the Incarnation was the assumption of a human nature (essence) without its *esse*.<sup>87</sup> John Quidort of Paris, O. P. († 1306) went still further; he understood the real presence as a sort of *Verbum Impanatum*, that is, as a hypostatic union with the sub-

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Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1944, p. lvi. Hocedez in *Theoremata de esse*, (43)—(68). *Idem*, "Giles de Rome et saint Thomas," *Mélanges Mandonnet. Etudes d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge*, 2 v., Bibliothèque Thomiste, XIII and XIV, Paris: Vrin, 1930, I. 385—409. M. Chossat, S. J., "L'Averroïsme de saint Thomas. Notes sur la distinction d'essence et d'existence à la fin du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Archives de Philosophie*, IX (1932) cahier 3, 128 [465]—177 [513], esp. 145 [481]—155 [491]. Peter E. Nash, S. J., "Giles of Rome, Auditor and Critic of St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1950) 1—20.

<sup>85</sup> St. Thomas(?), *De Falaciis*, in *Opuscula Omnia necnon . . .*, Tom. I, pp. 428—460, cap. xv, Perrier nn. 36 and 37, esp. p. 457, no. 37 (Parma XVI. 386).

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *supra*, footnote 58.

<sup>87</sup> G. S. André, S. J., "Les *Quolibeta* de Bernard de Trilia," *Gregorianum*, II (1921) 226—265, esp. *Quolib. II*, quæes. 9, p. 249: "Contra. Natura assumpta in Christo fuit assumpta sine proprio esse; hoc autem non fuisset si esse et essentia essent ydem."

stance (essence) of bread without its *esse*.<sup>88</sup> No one would hold these applications of the real distinction as true today. Error in the first generation often appears to be fertile; then it goes sterile. What legitimate progeny has this so-called real distinction ever given us?

In the beginning no one bothered to invoke St. Thomas for or against the real distinction. As a matter of fact, he was already several years dead before anyone seems to have even heard of it.<sup>89</sup> It was only after the General Chapters at Paris, 1279 and 1286, had imposed the teaching of Brother Thomas on all the Dominicans, that some who were already teaching the real distinction now began to make use of his name.<sup>90</sup> Not many. Seventy years after his death, two thirds of the Dominican masters steadfastly refused to accept this real distinction as a part of Thomism.<sup>91</sup> And this was the only real distinction known as such for the first couple of centuries.

### THE CONFRONTATION

Pope John XXI (Peter of Spain, † 1277) was one of the more illustrious alumni of the University of Paris. His *Summulae logicales* was a best seller for three centuries. In January, 1277, he asked Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, to check on the theological innovations at his old alma mater.<sup>92</sup> Stephen set up a commission, one of whom was Henry of Ghent, the most prominent theologian in the last quarter of that century.

Henry had just attacked the real distinction one month before at his Christmas *Quodlibetum*. According to Giles, *esse* was itself a creature,<sup>93</sup>

<sup>88</sup> *Determinatio Parisiensis Praedicatoris, De modo existendi Corpus Christi in sacramento altaris, alio quam sit ille quem tenet Ecclesia*. Londini: J. Cailloüe, 1686, (102): "Ego dico panem ibi manere, non in proprio supposito, sed tractum ad esse et suppositum Verbi, mediante carne aut Corpore Christi, ut dictum est." Msgr. Martin Grabmann, "Le 'Correctorium Corruptorii' du dominicain Johannes Quidort de Paris (d. 1306)," *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, XIX (1912) 404—418, esp. 405.

<sup>89</sup> Marcel Chossat, S.J., *Le Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, IV (1910) under "Dieu (Nature)," coll. 757—1300, esp. 1180.

<sup>90</sup> *Acta capitulorum generalium ordinis Praedicatorum, I, 1220—1303* ed. B. M. Riechert, O.P., in *Monumenta ordinis fratrum Praedicatorum historica*, III (1898), Romae: ex typographia polyglotta S.C. de propaganda Fidei, 1898, I. 204 and 235. A. Mortier, *Histoire des maîtres généraux de l'ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, 8 v., Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1903—1920, Vol. II, p. 139. Maur Burbach, O.S.B., "Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation regarding St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies*, IV (1942), 139—158, esp. 141—149.

<sup>91</sup> Hocedez, in *Theoremata de esse*, (106)—(107). Chossat, "L'Averroïsme . . .," p. 141[477].

<sup>92</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I. p. 541, n. 471.

<sup>93</sup> D. Egidii Romani . . . *Primus Sententiarum*, ed. A. Montifalconio, Venetiis: Octavianus Scoti, 1521 (Manuscripta, 27.3) *In I Sent.*, dist. 8, pars 2<sup>a</sup>, prin. 2, q. 1, fol. 54<sup>r</sup>: "... ipsum esse . . . creatura est . . ."



and creation was no more than an *esefactio*. Just as *calefactio* is the action which gives heat, so *esefactio* is the action which gives being.<sup>94</sup> This type of creation, of course, amounted to no more than the impression of an *esse* on an uncreated essence.<sup>95</sup> Henry expressed astonishment that any theologian could not see that according to this theory God would not be the creator of the whole being.<sup>96</sup>

Still, it was not this real distinction, but the identity of *quod est* and *quo est* which was condemned, March 18, 1277.<sup>97</sup> Neither Giles, nor St. Thomas, nor anyone else, ever had any solid grounds for fearing to teach the real distinction openly. This is a libel. From the official point of view, the real distinction was the *pars tutior*.

Giles was a bachelor at this time. He was not affected directly in March, but he was later in that same year delated to Simon du Val, the French Inquisitor for nineteen propositions on the nature of the angels.<sup>98</sup> Instead of heading for Rome straightway, as Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Sweden had done, Giles decided to stick it out and fight. He lost. He refused to retract. He was judged contumacious, placed under edict, and expelled from Paris.<sup>99</sup> Then, he went to Rome.

Seven years later (1284), with a new Pope and a new Bishop of Paris, Giles came back. Honorius IV had written on his behalf to Bishop Ranulphe d'Homblières. Giles was allowed to retract his errors and to be received back into the University.<sup>100</sup> Once he had secured his degree as a master, however, Giles turned on Henry of Ghent.

Within the next two years, there were some dozen serious confrontations. For the next generation, there was scarcely a single *Quodlibetum* which did not feature this polemic. For the next seven hundred years, there has hardly been a single name philosopher who has not added his own contribution to this problem.

<sup>94</sup> *Quodlibetum* VI, quaes. 4, fol. 80<sup>va</sup>: "Differt tamen calefactio quae est actio ignis a creatione quae est quaedam esefactio et est actio ipsius Dei."

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, *Quodlibetum* I, q. 7, fol. 5<sup>v</sup>, d-b: "[E]sse ergo nihil est aliud quam quaedam actualitas impressa omnibus entibus ab ipso Deo, . . ." Cf. *Theoremata de esse*, XX, pp. 135—142 (Manuscripta 27. 5, fol. 32<sup>v</sup>—34<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>96</sup> *Quodlibetum* I, quaes. 9, fol. 7<sup>r</sup>: "Mirum est ergo quod non possunt videre quidam theologi quod viderunt philosophi: maxime cum hoc convincit ratio veridica."

<sup>97</sup> Carolus Jellouschek, O.S.B., "Quaestio Magistri Joannis de Napoli, O.Pr.: 'Utrum licite possit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusioneseius' hic primum in lucem edita," in *Xenia Thomistica*, ed. S. Szabó, 3 v., Romae: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1925, Vol. III, pp. 73—104, esp. 89—90.

<sup>98</sup> Hocedez, "La condamnation de Gilles de Rome," in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, IV (1932) 34—58, esp. 57 and 58.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* Zavalloni, p. 489. Glorieux, *Le Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XV (1946) under "Tempier (Etienne)," coll. 97—107, esp. 104.

<sup>100</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I, p. 633, n. 522.

## RICHARD AS A SOURCE

Richard is our best source. He treats the original problem in its simplest terms, almost as though he had found it in a vacuum. He wrote in 1284. This was just before Henry and Giles began calling each other names. Thomas of Sutton († 1300) was over in England. Bernard of Trillia, John Quidort of Paris, and Godfrey of Fontaines († 1306) were not yet in the picture. Richard was writing for undergraduates, not for a hostile review.

Richard wrote as though he did not even have a copy of Giles's works in his hand.<sup>101</sup> Why, for instance, should he go to the trouble of proving that *esse* cannot be an accident,<sup>102</sup> after Giles himself had already insisted that it was not?<sup>103</sup> Richard never quotes Giles. He does not press a point. He never argues *ad hominem*. He describes all the possible positions just as though he had heard about them in a report from some distant planet. None of the disputants ever challenged the accuracy of this exposition.

Fr. Mandonnet thought that Richard differed from Henry on two points: *esse* as an accident; and the essence of a creature is *esse*.<sup>104</sup> Fr. Hocedez, however, has shown with several pages of parallel columns that this is a misinterpretation.<sup>105</sup> Neither Henry nor Richard held that *esse* was a predicamental accident; each held that it was a predicable. Both admitted that the essence of a creature is its own *esse essentiae*, not its *esse existentiae*.

Richard did not use Henry's term *intentio*. But the thought is the same. Richard accepts Henry's real relationship to the Creator, and then adds a logical relationship of his own to the supposit. According to Richard, *esse* adds a double relationship. It differs from essence not only as the term, creature, differs from thing, but also as a supposit differs from a substance, *relatio ad seipsam ut est habens rationem suppositi*.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Hocedez, *Richard* . . . , pp. 405—406, 432.

<sup>102</sup> *Quodlibetum* I, quaes. 2, fol. 13<sup>ra</sup>: "Si forte dicas, . . ."

<sup>103</sup> Egidius Romanus [*Quaestiones Disputatae*] de *esse et essentia*, de *mensura angelorum et de cognitione angelorum*, Venetiis: Simon de Luere, 1503, *De Esse et essentia*, quaes. 9, fol. 20<sup>vb</sup>: "Sciendum est quod esse non est in genere . . ."

<sup>104</sup> "Les premières disputes . . ." *Revue Thomiste*, XVIII (1910) 741—765, esp. 759—761.

<sup>105</sup> *Richard* . . . , pp. 398—401. Cf. Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique*, *Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale* XXV, Paris: J. Vrin, 1938, pp. 128—129.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 407. See *Quodlibetum* I, quaes. 2, fol. 14<sup>ra</sup>.

## SOME PRENOTES

There were several stipulations made in the original controversy.

*Esse actualis existentiae*

Essence was a new term in St. Augustine's day.<sup>107</sup> In Boethius, and in practically all of the older authors, *esse* expressed both the act and the potency of the *ratio essendi*. Giles called this potency, *esse essentiae*, the act *esse actualis existentiae*, and treated them as two concrete terms.<sup>108</sup> We shall omit this pleonasm in the English.

*Esse diminutum*

In Siger of Brabant, *esse diminutum* was a logical being, the surrogate in the mind of the real being in the world of nature.<sup>109</sup> In Giles, *esse diminutum* became a concrete *esse participatum* [*actualis existentiae*] in the real world of nature itself.<sup>110</sup> Terminology is not important in itself; it can, however, be dangerous.

*A logical distinction*

Giles refused to admit any intermediary between a logical difference expressed by an affirmative predicate, and a real difference signified by a negative.<sup>111</sup> Henry accepted this restriction. Richard likewise. "When terms are only mentally different, *secundum rationem*, one may be predicated of the other. . . . This predication, however, is false: the essence of an angel is its *esse*."<sup>112</sup> Therefore, they must be really distinct.

<sup>107</sup> *De Civitate Dei*, XII. 2 (Migne PL 41. 350). "Sicut ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia: sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia, novo quidem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt Latini sermonis auctores, . . ."

<sup>108</sup> [*Quaestiones Disputatae*] *de esse et essentia*, quaes. 9, fol. 18<sup>rb</sup>. Cf. *Theoremata de esse* . . ., p. (100).

<sup>109</sup> Siger de Brabant. *Questions sur la Métaphysique*, ed. C. A. Graiff, O.S.B., in *Les Philosophes Médiévaux*, Tome I, Louvain: L'institut supérieur de philosophie, 1948, Introductio, quaes. 7, p. 13, lines 70—72: "Secundum quod praedicatur esse diminutum vel esse in effectu, sic est problema de accidente . . . secundum quod praedicatur esse non diminutum, . . ."

<sup>110</sup> [*Quaestiones Disputatae*] *de esse et essentia*, quaes. 9, fol. 19<sup>ra</sup>: "... quia hoc est participare quasi partem capere et habere diminutum esse." *Ibid.*, quaes. 11, fol. 25<sup>ra</sup>: "... esse creaturae est esse diminutum." Cf. Armand Maurer, C.S.B., "Ens Diminutum: A Note on its Origin and Meaning," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1950) 216—222.

<sup>111</sup> *Opus super secundo libro Sententiarum*, Venetiis: Luca di Domenico, 1482 (Manuscripta, 16, 51) *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, pars 1, quaes. 1, art. 2, p. 171: "Sed quod non sit dari medium inter differre re et ratione in *Quaestionibus nostris* de esse et essentia [*Quaes. Disputatae*, quaes. 12, fol. 30] diffusius diximus." Cf. *Theoremata de esse*, Th. XII, pp. 67 and 68 with note 1; 69 with note 1; 142 with note 1.

<sup>112</sup> *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, art. 1, quaes. 1, Resp.: "... ea quae sola ratione differunt, unum praedicatur de alio . . . Sed haec praedicatio est falsa, essentia Angeli est suum esse."

*L'être for l'étant*

Instead of quarreling with these rather arbitrary *petitiones principii*, Henry and Richard tried to go along with turning those two abstract terms, *esse* and *essence* [considered as a part] into concrete. Just as we might say a man is a substance, a living being, and an animal, so they tried to call a creature, a *res*, an *essence*, and an *existentia quaedam*.<sup>113</sup> Now, *essence* [considered as a whole, e. g., man] can be treated as a concrete *quod est*; *essence* [considered as a part, e. g. humanity] should not be. This ambiguity killed the abstract usage of *essence*. The altogether indefensible usage of *esse* as a concrete term, *existentia quaedam*, buried the corpse.

*Esse* is not a concrete term; no infinitive is. The Greeks used to put an article in front of the infinitive, when they wanted to call attention to its use as a verbal noun expressing the action of the root in the abstract, cf. *tò esse*. This use was true in all languages. It is still true today in all the languages which developed outside the influence of this controversy. It is no less true in these other languages in the case of every other root except *esse*. Why the exception?

No one would say *le courrir* for *le courant*; why *l'être* for *l'étant*?

No one would say *das rennen* for *der rennende*; why *das sein* for *das seinde*?

No one would say *lo correre* for *il corrente*; why *l'essere* for *l'essendo*?

No one would say *el correr* for *el corriendo*; why *el ser* for *el siendo*?

No one would say "to run" for one running; nor "to be" for a being.

No one would say τὸ τρέχειν for ὁ τρέχων; nor τὸ εἶναι for ὁ ὢν.

No one would say *currere* for *currens*; why *esse* for *ens*?

This peculiar idiom was introduced just when our modern languages were going through their formative stage. This stage happened to come about just when the philosophic thought on the continent was dominated by our controversy. The ordinary man in the street accepts his vocabulary from the so-called leaders of thought. Perhaps this was just a form of affectation commonly associated with growing pains. Perhaps this was the only form this man ever heard. At any rate, it was this elegant abstract form of the infinitive which was preferred to the rather pedestrian concrete use of the participle whenever there was occasion to refer to that transcendental philosophical value, being.

<sup>113</sup> *Summae quaestionum ordinarium . . . Henrici a Gandavo*, 2 v., Paris: J. Badii Ascensii, 1520 (reproduced in St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953), art. 28, quaes. 4, (Vol. I, fol. 168<sup>rv</sup>): "Idcirco ergo in quolibet creatura alia est ratio et intentio seorsum qua est res a reor: alia qua est essentia: alia qua est existentia quaedam."



After all, God is *ipsum esse*. He could be called "The Deity" by right, just as a king could be called, "Your Majesty," by courtesy. If the abstract could be used for the concrete in this polite usage, why not *esse* for *ens* also? This idiom grew of this controversy, and then it provided a protective coloring to the concrete use of *esse* in the real distinction ever since. It is a form of linguistic violence.

St. Thomas allowed *esse* to be called an *ens*,<sup>114</sup> but he did not allow *ens* to be called an *esse*. *Ens* is a transcendental. Everything can be called an *ens*, even abstractions. He warned us, however, that *ens* in the second sense of that term often does not have an *esse*, e. g., privations.<sup>115</sup>

The present participle of the verb "to be" has all but lost its function in the Romance languages. By the same token, it has become practically impossible to express the abstract act of that root, should anyone be inclined to do so. The present infinitive has been preempted in order to serve as a substitute for the present participle in expressing a concrete being. This, of course, could not happen in a dead language, such as the philosophical Greek. Nor in a language which was insulated from this particular confusion by the English Channel.

Fr. Henri Renard, S.J. wrote about a real distinction between a "to be" and an essence;<sup>116</sup> this is not English. Fr. Gerard Smith, S.J. translated *ens* as an "iser" doing its "ising;"<sup>117</sup> this is tolerable, but only because *esse* is an "isness." Existence is an equivalent for isness, but existence does not exist. Fr. Maurer, C.S.B. translates *esse* as the "act of being."<sup>118</sup> But which act? *Esse* expresses the abstract act of the *ratio essendi*, just as *currere* for the *ratio currendi*; not the concrete act, as Fr. Maurer assumes.

St. Thomas made use of *currere* and *cursus* as a parallel for *esse* and essence.<sup>119</sup> Richard of Middleton developed it.

"Here is an example. *Currere* surely does not add anything absolute to *cursus*. All it adds is a relationship to the one running, *ad currentem*. He who uses the term *currere* does not say anything more

<sup>114</sup> *De Veritate*, quæst. 21, art. 4 ad 4 (Parma IX. 308—309).

<sup>115</sup> *Opuscula Omnia necnon . . .*, *De Ente*, cap. I, par. 2 (I, p. 26) (Parma XVI. 330): "... aliqua enim in hoc modo dicuntur entia quæ essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus."

<sup>116</sup> *The Philosophy of Being*, p. 53, and passim.

<sup>117</sup> *Natural Theology: Metaphysics II*, New York: MacMillan, 1951, p. 48.

<sup>118</sup> *On Being and Essence*, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated and with an Introduction by Armand Maurer, C.S.B., Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949, p. 11, and passim.

<sup>119</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, quæst. 50, art. 2 ad 3 (Leonina V. 6b; Parma I. 205): "Ipsum autem esse est quo substantia est, sicut cursus est quo currens currit."

in an absolute sense than *cursus*. All he adds is a relationship of this action to the one who is performing it. This predication is accordingly false: *cursus est currere*.

"In like manner, he who uses the term, *esse*, does not say anything more in an absolute sense than essence; all he adds is a certain relationship to the supposit of that substance. Therefore, this predication is not acceptable: the essence of a creature is its *esse*. *Esse* does not add any absolute note to essence. All it adds is a relationship to itself as a supposit, and a relationship to its Creator as a creature."<sup>120</sup>

### *A problem in predication*

All of the original disputants recognized this question as a problem in predication. For Giles, negative predication, S is not P, meant a real distinction; for his adversaries, it did not. Richard hammered this predication feature home some half dozen times in less than two pages and a half.<sup>121</sup> Richard gave us the *status quaestionis*: why is it, we cannot say that *esse* is the essence of a creature? And he gave us a major premise: no part can be predicated of the whole. But I do not think that he gave us the correct positive solution.

Richard could have said: animality is not rationality in a man; that is no proof of a real distinction. Both are abstract terms. So too, essence considered as a part and *esse* are abstract terms. The fact that one is not the other is no proof at all of any corresponding difference in the real world of nature.

Instead of saying this, however, Richard accepted *esse* and essence as two concrete terms equivalent to *ens* and *res*. Then, he was arguing that we cannot say that the *esse*, *l'être*, *ens*, of a creature is its essence, because this *esse* includes two relationships which the simple essence does not. No part can be predicated of the whole. Therefore.

<sup>120</sup> *Quodlibetum I*, quaes. 2, corpus ad finem: "Ad hoc potest adduci aliquo modo exemplum. Certum est enim quod currere non dicit super cursum aliquid absolutum, sed tantummodo relationem ad currentem: unde qui dicit cursus absolute dicit currere, in quantum est in currente, et tamen videmus quod ista praedicatio est falsa: cursus est currere. A simili dico in proposito, quod quare illud quod nominat essentiam absolute nominat esse cum quadam relatione ad seipsam ut est suppositum substantans semetipsam; ideo haec praedicatio non est recipienda: essentia creata est suum esse; quamvis esse nullam rem absolutam addat super essentiam, sed tantummodo relationem ad seipsam ut est habens rationem suppositi, et respectum ad creatorem qui debetur essentiae creaturae inquantum creata est."

<sup>121</sup> *Quodlibetum I*, quaes. 2, fol. 12—14: "Nec tamen ista praedicatio est recipienda, . . . ista praedicatio non est recipienda, . . . unum de quinque praedicabilibus, . . . talis ergo praedicatio non est recipienda . . . ista praedicatio est falsa, . . . haec praedicatio non est recipienda."

How about the converse: the essence of a creature is its *esse*? This *esse* is not a part of the essence; it is more. Richard seems to have accepted the conclusion, "the *esse* of a creature is not its essence," as a singular or a universal negative, i. e., as an E-proposition, that is simply convertible. Indeed, his most common formula is: the essence of a creature is not *esse*; not the other way round. He goes back to Hugh of St. Victor for his authority here.

It is not in the truth of his statement, but in his logical explanation of that truth, that he runs into trouble. Richard was following Henry of Ghent in accepting the stipulation that *esse* and essence were two concrete terms equivalent to *ens* and *res*. Negatively, they were still correct; positively, however, they had surrendered their best position. A man may happen to be right for a number of different reasons.

### *Universal Hylomorphism*

Avicbron had taught that every difference in our concepts implies a corresponding difference in the real world of nature; and that, on a one-for-one basis. If this is true, then there should be a plurality of substantial forms in a man, that of life, animality, and so on. When this doctrine is pushed to its uttermost limit, the last potential principle in a creature could be called matter, and the last actual principle form. Or essence and *esse*.

Logically, this makes sense. Historically, this is what happened. Avicbron's assumption became the epistemological basis for the *famosissimum binarium Augustinianum*, the twofold pillar of "Augustinianism": universal hylomorphism and the plurality of substantial forms.<sup>122</sup> Fr. Zavalloni denies that the plurality of forms flows from this Jewish correspondence of the real order to the logical; he would prefer to trace it to a scholastic parallelism between the physical order and the metaphysical.<sup>123</sup> But he has not documented his theory. I believe he is mistaken.

Many of the Franciscans had been holding matter and form in the sense of a *quod est* and its *esse*.<sup>124</sup> Gilbert of la Porée († 1154) called the

<sup>122</sup> Théry, pp. 145—146: "Cette thèse de la composition hylémorphique des substances séparées, . . . est métaphysiquement et historiquement une de plus authentiques doctrines de la philosophie juive." Cf. Daniel A. Callus, O.P., *The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford*, The Aquinas Paper, No. 5, London: Blackfriars, 1955, p. 4.

<sup>123</sup> Zavalloni, pp. 498—499.

<sup>124</sup> D. Odon Lottin, O.S.B., *Psychologie et morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 3 v., Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942, Vol. I, p. 460: "Jean de la Rochelle, à la suite de Philippe, soutient la composition des deux

concrete subject, *quod est*, and the abstract form, *quo est*.<sup>125</sup> St. Thomas called them a supposit and its nature;<sup>126</sup> that is, an essence considered as a whole and an essence considered as only a part of that whole, e. g., man and humanity. Could the potential element in the *quod est* of an angel be properly called matter? Its actual element, form? St. Thomas thought it could, although it would be a violation of common usage.<sup>127</sup>

Richard went along with this. "The *esse quo est* of an angel is not predicated of its essence *quod est*; no part is predicated of the whole."<sup>128</sup> Still, this substitution of essence for matter does not follow common usage. "That which takes the place of matter in an angel is not an essence simply in potency. Therefore, I cannot subscribe to this opinion."<sup>129</sup>

Giles, on the other hand, was perfectly willing to exploit this ambiguity.<sup>130</sup> That potential element which the universal hylomorphists had been calling matter in a broad sense, Giles now called essence; that actual element which they called form, he called *esse*. "Where they join matter and form, we posit essence and *esse*."<sup>131</sup> "They may be said to differ from us only in terminology."<sup>132</sup> Were it not for this mere verbal difference, "it might not be easy to show how existence is added to essence as something real."<sup>133</sup> "This may well be just what Avicbron had in mind."<sup>134</sup> Here is St. Bonaventure all dressed up in a white habit.

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principes *quod est* et *quo est*; Alexandre de Halès en revient à la composition de matière et de forme. Odon Rigaud ne voit pas de différence entre les deux opinions." *Idem*, "La Composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles," *Revue Néoscholastique de philosophie*, XXXIV (1932) 21—41, esp. p. 33. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon. The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries*, Louvain: L'institut supérieur de philosophie, 1950, p. 81, note 1. Dorothy E. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century*, New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964, p. 261 and note 1.

<sup>125</sup> *Gilberti Porretae Commentaria in Librum "Quomodo substantiae bonae sint"*, PL 64, coll. 1313—1334, esp. 1318 CD; 1321 BC.

<sup>126</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I. quaes. 3, art. 3 (Leonina IV. 39b; Parma I. 11).

<sup>127</sup> *De Ente*, IV. 22 (ed. Perrier, I. p. 42; Parma XVI. 335): "Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen materia et forma nisi aequivoce."

<sup>128</sup> *Quodlibetum*. I, dist. 3, art. 1, quaes. 1 Resp.: "[E]sse angeli non praedicatur de eius essentia, sicut nec pars de toto."

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, "[I]llud quod est loco materiae in Angelo, non est natura pure potentialis, et ideo illi opinioni non consentio."

<sup>130</sup> Peter W. Nash, S.J., "Giles of Rome on Boethius' '*Diversum est esse et id quod est*,'" *Mediaeval Studies*, XII (1950) 57—91, esp. p. 90.

<sup>131</sup> [*Quaestiones Disputatae*] *de esse et essentia*, quaes. 9, fol. 19<sup>rb</sup>: "... non ponentes eam [compositionem] ex materia et forma, sed ex esse et forma (sic)." This last "forma" reads "essentia" in *Theoremata de esse*, (26), note 1.

<sup>132</sup> *Quodlibetum* I, quaes. 8, fol. 6<sup>rb</sup>: "... solum ergo in verbis dicuntur discordare a nobis."

<sup>133</sup> *Theoremata de esse*, Th. XIX, p. 128, lines 6—7: "... forte non esset facile ostendere quomodo esse esset aliquid realiter essentiae superadditum."

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, Th. XX, p. 139, line 8: "Et hoc forte voluit intelligere Avicbron."



Giles was successful with his olive branch. Within one generation, the universal hylomorphists dropped out of the history of philosophy. They have not been heard from since. Once the real distinction had come in, there was no further need for their universal matter and form; essence and *esse* had taken their place. Their basic epistemological error, however, remains.

### THE CONTEXT

Up as late as the last third of the thirteenth century, this problem had always been set in the context of the divine nature. The essence of God is *esse*; the essence of a creature is not. This meant that this problem belonged to the *First Book of the Sentences*, dist. 8.<sup>135</sup> That is where Peter the Lombard († 1159) treated the divine simplicity. Just as there is no composition of a genus and a difference in God, so neither of essence and *esse*. This is not true, as everyone knows, in the case of a creature. You can conceive of a genus in a creature without any of its particular species; so too, of an essence without its *esse*.

In the last third of this century, however, the context shifted. Siger of Brabant († 1285) asked the question: does *esse* pertain to the essence of a creature? But he had no place in the whole of Aristotle's metaphysics to fit it. He ended up placing it in his Introduction.<sup>136</sup> It is Giles, I would say, who was responsible for transferring this problem from the divine nature to the angelic. But it seems to have been Richard who was the first to incorporate it in the corresponding context of the *Second Book of the Sentences*.<sup>137</sup> There it was to remain for the next few centuries, so long as the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard remained as a standard text.

This shift to another context changed the question itself. Instead of asking why is it we cannot say: the essence of a creature is *esse*, now the scholastics were beginning to ask: are essence and existence really distinct? This question seems to assume that there are a concrete essence and a concrete *esse* buried deep in the intrinsic constitution of an *ens*, and that is our job to isolate them and then to dig them out.

<sup>135</sup> S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 8, quaes. 1, art. 1 (Parma VI. 66—67): "Utrum esse proprie dicatur de Deo."

<sup>136</sup> *Questions sur la Métaphysique*, Introductio, quaes. 7, pp. 11—22: "Utrum esse in causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum."

<sup>137</sup> *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, art. 1, quaes. 1: "Utrum in Angelis sit aliqua realis compositio ex esse et essentia."

## The TEXT

The *Quodlibetum* was the work of a master of theology; the *Commentary on the Sentences* was normally the work of a bachelor. Sbaraglia accordingly placed Richard's *Commentary* earlier than his *Quodlibeta*.<sup>138</sup> In this case, however, we cannot be sure. Richard's *Commentary* went through a good number of editions. Richard showed a certain diffidence in his *Quodlibetum*. Still, he seems to have thought this problem through much more completely there. Fr. Hocedez could not say definitely which came first.<sup>139</sup>

The big thing to remember here, however, is the fact that this text is a *reportatio*. Without the prenotes given, the arguments frankly do not make sense. With them, the arguments are still difficult. They call for a sympathetic understanding of the limitations of a *reportatio*.

In the thirteenth century the students did not have an abundance of textbooks. They sat at the feet of a master, and copied down his lecture word for word. A conscientious teacher would not speak too rapidly. He was by definition prolix. He never said in one word what he might be able to say equally well in six. He was imbued with the Semitic parallelisms found in the Divine Office. He was judged by his pace, and his ability to talk around a subject. Giles was the best in the city;<sup>140</sup> he was the *Doctor Verbosus*. Jean Rivière thought he was *trop prolixe*.<sup>141</sup> Richard was only one of the better; he was a mere *Doctor Copiosus*.<sup>142</sup>

*Repetitio est mater studiorum*. After all these repetitions in class, the students used to come together in small groups and compare notes. There, instead of providing a little editorial revision, they would add their own periphrastic constructions to those of the master. They would fill out these tautologies with redundancies which were not always accurate. Sometimes they would give us a *reportatio longa* with all of these circumlocutions spelled out; sometimes a *reportatio brevis*, with not quite so many.

The Latin text is accessible today. Are these *reportationes* worth translating literally? Literary tastes change. Today a Fowler or a Bern-

<sup>138</sup> *Supplementum et castigatio ad Scriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci a Waddingo aliisque descriptos; cum adnotationibus* fr. Jo: Hyacinthi Sbaraleae (Giovanni Gianinto Sbaraglia) 3 v., ed. nova, Romae: A. Nardecchia, 1908—12, Vol. III, p. 633.

<sup>139</sup> *Richard . . .*, p. 55; 397—407; 435.

<sup>140</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, pp. 8—11, n. 539, esp. p. 10.

<sup>141</sup> *Le problème de l'église et de l'état au temps de Philippe le Bel*, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense. Etudes et documents, Fasc. 8, Paris: Champion, 1926, pp. 144, 192. Cf. Hocedez, *Richard . . .*, p. v.

<sup>142</sup> Hocedez, *Richard . . .*, pp. 112—114.

stein would give bad marks for those very same pleonasms which were once considered perfectly proper rhetorical flourishes. What these *reportationes* need now, I would say, is a crisp rewrite job done along the lines of the *Reader's Digest* or the *New York Daily News*. This is the function I am attempting here.

*Quodlibet*. I, quaes. 2: Whether an *esse* is really identical with its essence?

CONTRA: This identity, *ens per essentiam*, is a property of God alone.

PRO: Otherwise, this *esse* would be itself a creature which needed a further *esse*, and so on in an infinite regress.

CONCLUSION: *Esse* does not add any absolute reality to the essence.

RESPONSE: That which an essence expresses in an absolute manner, *esse* expresses along with a relationship to God at its efficient cause. This is why we cannot say: the essence of a creature is its *esse*.

- 1) *Esse* is not an accident. It is the substantial form, not an accidental, which gives *esse*. Man is a being and a unit *per se*, not *per accidens*. (Aristotle)
- 2) *Esse* does not flow from its essence. *Operari sequitur esse*. Nothing can cause anything before it exists itself. (Algazel)
- 3) *Esse* is not a new positive intelligible note added to the comprehension of an essence. *Ens*, and *unum*, both express the essence in different ways. (Averroes) *Esse* is a predicable accident, not a predicamental. (Porphyry)
- 4) The reason why we cannot say that *esse* is the essence of a creature is the fact that no part can be predicated of the whole. *Esse* expresses everything which essence expresses, plus a relationship which essence does not. The *esse* of an accident expresses the essence of that accident, plus the relationship to its substance; the *esse* of a substance expresses the essence of that substance, plus the relationship to its supposit.

We cannot say *currere est cursus*, because *currere* expresses everything which is contained in *cursus*, plus a relationship to the one running, *ad currentem*. We cannot say the *esse* of a creature is its essence, because that *esse* expresses everything which is contained in that essence, plus a relationship to the supposit and to its Creator.

REPLY TO CONTRA: A creature is an *ens per essentiam*, formally, not efficiently. It participates in *esse*, even as it participates in goodness.

In *II Sent.*, dist. 3, art. 1, quaes. 1:

Whether there is a real composition of *esse* and essence in the Angels?

CONTRA:

- 1) This *esse* would be a creature. This would call for a further *esse*, and so on in an infinite regress.
- 2) This *esse* would be an accident. A substance does not exist per accidens.
- 3) There is no need for a real composition of goodness with the essence; why in the case of *esse*?
- 4) No new positive note is needed in order for a thing to be recognized as a unit, *unum*, or a being, *ens*. (Boethius: *De Uno*)

PRO:

- 1) *Diversum est esse et id quod est.* (*De Hebd.*)
- 2) The essence of an angel can be conceived without its *esse*.
- 3) An angel may be said to have an essence from all eternity, but not an *esse*.

CONCLUSION:

The essence of angel differs from its *esse* in reality as an absolute from a relative; so too are they composed.

RESPONSE:

First opinion: a purely mental composition, *secundum rationem*. (NEG.)

Thus, one could be predicated of the other. But this predication is false: the essence of an angel is its *esse*. (Hugh of St. Victor)

Second Opinion: a composition of the actual with the potential.

(Univ. Hylomorphism) (NEG.)

We cannot say the *esse* of a creature is its essence, because no part can be predicated of the whole. Still, an essence is neither a simple privation, nor intelligible matter, nor a purely passive potency.

Third Opinion: a composition of one absolute reality, *res*, with another.

(Giles of Rome) (NEG.)

Not necessary.

Fourth Opinion: a composition of an absolute with a relative.

(Henry of Ghent) (AFF.)

We cannot say that the *esse* of a creature is its essence, because *esse* expresses something more than the simple essence; it includes a relationship. That which *cursus* says in an absolute manner, *currere* says with a relationship to the one running. That which



essence says in an absolute manner, *esse* says with a relationship to the supposit and its Creator.

### REPLY

- ad 1) The addition of a mere relationship would not call for an infinite regress.
- ad 2) *Esse* is a predicable accident, not a predicamental; *ens* is a transcendental.
- ad 3) A creature is a being in its own right, just as it is also a good in its own right, i. e., formally, not with regard to its efficient cause.
- ad 4) Just as a fire gives heat, *calefacit*, by reason of its *calefactione* and its *caliditate*, so is a thing, *res*, a being, *ens*, by reason of its *esse* and its essence.

The opposing arguments are conceded in the sense of an absolute with a relative, not in the sense of two absolutes.

- ad i) *Diversum est esse et id quod est.*  
*Quod est* is the supposit, i. e., an essence considered as a whole. *Esse* could be *ipsum esse*, i. e., the Creator (*Sic* Gilbert of la Porée) or *esse quo est*. This would add a relationship to the essence.
- ad ii) Just as the term color can be considered without any particular color, so an essence can be considered without its *esse*. This is only in the mind.
- ad iii) An Angel has its essence from all eternity in God; so too, it can have an intentional *esse* in the Divine Intellect.

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## THE GIFT OF THE SPIRIT ACCORDING TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAN (1828—1839)

John Henry Newman has long been counted among the more significant religious thinkers and controversialists of the Nineteenth Century.<sup>1</sup> More recently, however, he is acknowledged as one of the great seminal minds — if not the greatest seminal mind — of the contemporary Church, as one who, despite his own disclaimer of teaching as a theologian, has provided many of the theological insights which have been exploited by religious thinkers in today's world.<sup>2</sup> Most often his name is associated with the growing conviction of the importance of the lay role in the Church to which he gave expression in his essay of 1859: *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine*.<sup>3</sup> Here he defended the role the body of Christians as keepers of tradition and witnesses to

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<sup>1</sup> Since the focus of this article concerns the years 1828—1839, the following list will facilitate references to the more important writings. The date in brackets indicates the year in which the volume first appeared in its present form; the second is that of the edition consulted.

- Apo.* *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* [1865], London, 1891.  
*Arians.* *The Arians of the Fourth Century* [1833], London, 1876.  
*Essays.* *Essays, Critical and Historical* [1871], 2 vols. London, 1877  
*Grammar.* *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* [1870], London-New York, 1947.  
*Jfc.* *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification* [1838], London, 1892.  
*Mozley.* *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his Life in the English Church*, 2 vols. [1891] London, 1891.  
*P.S.* *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 8 vols. [1834—1843], London, 1858—1869.  
*S.S.D.* *Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day* [1843], London, 1909.  
*Tracts.* *Tracts for the Times*, 6 vols., London, 1840.  
*U.S.* *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford* [1843], London, 1872.  
*V.M.* *The Via Media of the Anglican Church*, 2 vols. [1837], London, 1895.

<sup>2</sup> E. Przywara gives an idea of the extent of Newman's influence by saluting him as the modern Augustine: "... Newman als möglicher Kirchenlehrer der Neuen Zeit, heißt in seiner Besonderheit: heutiger Augustinus" (Idem, "Newman möglicher Heiliger und Kirchenlehrer der Neuen Zeit?" in *Newman Studien*, III (1957), p. 28).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. J. H. Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine* (ed. J. Coulson), New York, 1961, for the history and edition of this article. Among more recent works relating to the same theme may be cited: S.D. Femiano, *Infallibility of the Laity, the Legacy of Newman*, New York, 1967; W. T. Patterson, *Newman Pioneer for the Layman*, Washington, 1968; C. Hollis, *Newman and the Modern World*, Garden City, N.Y., 1967; J. Guitton, *The Church and the Laity*, New York, 1965.

the truth taught the Magisterium. In this essay when he points to the discernment of error by the body of the Church, he uses words which seem indicative of a much wider line of thought:

The religious life of a people is of a certain quality and direction, and these are tested by the mode in which it encounters the various opinions, customs, and institutions which are submitted to it. Drive a stake into a river's bed, and you will at once ascertain which way it is running and at what speed; throw up even a straw upon the air, and you will see which way the wind blows; submit your heretical and Catholic principle to the action of the multitude, and you will be able to pronounce at once whether it is imbued with Catholic truth or heretical falsehood.<sup>4</sup>

Much of what Newman taught seems reflective of that part of Vatican II's *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church "Lumen Gentium"* which bears the subtitle: "The Sense of the Faith and the Charisms among the Faithful."<sup>5</sup> The first paragraph of the section states that the whole People of God share in the prophetic office of Christ. The following lines focus upon the graces and gifts which are charismatic.

... He distributes special graces among the faithful of every rank. By these gifts He makes them fit and ready to undertake various tasks or offices advantageous for the renewal and upbuilding of the Church, according to the words of the Apostle: "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to everyone for profit" (1 Cor., 12, 7). These charismatic gifts, whether they be the more outstanding or the more simple and widely diffused, are to be received with thanksgiving and consolation, for they are exceedingly suitable and useful for the needs of the Church.<sup>6</sup>

It should be noted that the text speaks of gifts of the Spirit which are granted independently of office or ministry and yet which can be considered a functional element in the Church's constitution. However, *Lumen Gentium* gives no clear indication of what activities should be considered charismatic. Certain sections come close to naming charismatic activity, but there is no exposition of circumstances whereby an action can be termed charismatic.<sup>7</sup>

For one whose interest concerns Newman's influence upon contemporary theological problems, the question naturally arises: "Did Newman

<sup>4</sup> J. H. Newman, *Op. cit.*, pp. 74--75.

<sup>5</sup> Second Vatican Council, Session V (November 21, 1964), *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church "Lumen Gentium"*, cf. *A.A.S.*, 57 (1965), pp. 16--17 (it may be noted that the titles given the various sections are not official parts of the text).

<sup>6</sup> *Lumen Gentium*, II, § 12; the English version of this and other Conciliar Documents is taken from W. M. Abbott (ed.), *The Documents of Vatican II*, New York, 1966, pp. 29--30 (Hereafter cited as *D.V.*).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Lumen Gentium*, I, §§ 4, 7; II, § 12; IV, §§ 30, 32, 33.

say anything enlightening about this problem?" After an active theological career as an Anglian Clergyman, Newman, upon his reception into the Catholic Church, deliberately set aside the possibility of functioning as a doctrinal teacher. It seemed better, according to his own judgment, that he limit his competence and activities to the realms of history and philosophy.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless he did touch upon theological questions during his Catholic years after a long silence. It is, however, his earlier life in the Church of England which is also of interest as the time when his thought underwent many and lasting developments. While each of these periods may be said to have its own history and to manifest his membership in differing religious traditions, they are permeated by certain common, unaltered, yet developing, judgments and convictions.

Although Newman had been an Evangelical in his youth, he came into the tradition of High Anglicanism as a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. It was during this Oxford period of his life that he was, both as University Don and Parish Priest, most active. These years are themselves divisible into two parts. The first began with his assumption of the pastoral charge of the University Church and lasted through the years of the Oxford Movement to 1839. They saw him, convinced of the rightness of his cause and principles, advance to a position of undisputed leadership in the Church of England. The Spring of 1839 saw the beginning of the end of Newman the Anglican. He began to doubt his position, but refused to be moved quickly or without intellectual conviction. It was during this time that he staked his Anglican claim on the single note of holiness and sanctity in the Church. What would be his final defense had been from his earliest, though with modifications and clarifications about its inner meaning and reality, the primary stimulant for his Christian life.<sup>9</sup>

Considerations from Newman's own thought have been the incentive for seeking, under the title *The Gift of the Spirit*, what may contribute to a contemporary understanding of the charismatic in the Church, the abode and means of communicating the Holy Spirit to men and to their world.

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. J. H. Newman, *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions* [1857], London, 1892, p. V.

<sup>9</sup> *Apo.*, p. 5: "... for years I used almost as proverbs what I considered to be the scope and issue of his [Scott's] doctrine, 'Holiness rather than peace,' and 'Growth the only evidence of life'"; Concerning the evolution of Newman's thought about the inner reality of Justification from the forensic notion of the Evangelicals through to the realization of Baptismal regeneration, cf. T. L. Sheridan, *Newman on Justification*, New York, 1967.



One may doubt the propriety of seeking clarification of a grace-inspired function proclaimed by an Ecumenical Council in the writings of one who was not merely a convinced member of the Anglican Communion, but explicitly antagonistic to the teaching and claims of the Catholic Church. The justification can be found in the Conciliar *Decree on Ecumenism* which states:

Nor should we forget that whatever is wrought by the grace of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of our separated brethren can contribute to our own edification. Whatever is truly Christian never conflicts with the genuine interests of the faith, indeed it can always result in a more ample realization of the very mystery of Christ and the Church.<sup>10</sup>

## I

In view of the fact that Newman never undertook a systematic treatise concerning the nature of the Church and that his thought is not so complete as to manifest all the elements of a full ecclesiology, it is provocative to note that he is seen as one of the forerunners of contemporary ecclesiological efforts.<sup>1</sup> His thought is the reflection of a life focused upon the realities of the living God and the concrete man. His concern is not so much with theology as with religion; not so much with the logical clarification of religious truth as with revelation itself, in which the individual comes to know his own reality in the contemplation of God whom he confronts in faith. For Newman theological speculation is not an end in itself; it is a service to God, his revelation, and the believing man. Theology is the servant of religion and faith. This is the bent wherein we must detect his thought, and it is not surprising that its finest expression should be found in his sermons, especially those in which he directed his hearers — and readers — along the way in which the Tractarian Movement was tending.

It has been charged that the Tractarian Movement, of which Newman emerged as the leader, was a return from the charismatic religiousness of English Evangelicalism during the eighteenth century<sup>2</sup> to the more

<sup>10</sup> Second Vatican Council, Session V (November 21, 1964), *Decree on Ecumenism* "Unitatis Redintegratio", cf. *A.A.S.*, 57 (1965), p. 96 (*D.V.*, p. 349).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. O. Karrar, *Newman*, Cologne, 1946, vol. I, p. 31; it should be noted that in his *Lectures on the Prophetic Office* Newman did not attempt to construct a theology of the Church so much as to defend the teaching function of the English Church.

<sup>2</sup> For an understanding of Evangelicalism cf. L. E. Elliott-Binns, *The Evangelical Movement in the English Church*, London, 1928; Id., *The Early Evangelicals: a Religious and Social Study*, London, 1953; for the Evangelical

institutional forms of orthodox Anglicanism.<sup>3</sup> In what sense this is true in Newman's case, and to what degree it may be an over-simplification, needs to be clarified. To this end we propose to treat Newman's thought under two titles: the first, tending toward a definition of the Church, considers the visible community gathered "in the Spirit"; the second, looking more to the Church's inner reality, will focus upon the "abode of the Spirit."

### a. *The Community Gathered "In the Spirit"*

The Church is the reality of God revealing himself in Jesus Christ in a living way throughout history. A mystery eluding human comprehension, it is the living Christ among us.<sup>4</sup> As *Christ* among us, it bears the marks of the Lord, it is living, holy and subject to persecution; as *Christ among us*, it is marked by the faults and the guilt of all who are its members.<sup>5</sup> In order to show that this description is correct and to appreciate something of its meaning as a reflection of Newman's thought, it is necessary to progress according to Newman's own appreciation of the Anglican Church, whose existence and function he and his friends in the Movement set out to defend. It should be noted immediately that his own activities were twofold. The argumentative role in which he sought to persuade his countrymen of the true nature of the Church found expression in the *Tracts for the Times*, in articles later collected in *The Church of the Fathers*, in his widely ranging correspondence, and particularly in the lectures which would later be collected in the first of the two-volume work as *The Via Media of the Anglican Church*. Here he gives the dogmatic and polemic reasons to support his position. In the pulpit, however, he engaged in a second kind of activity, that of creating a proper atmosphere for grasping his teaching. For him the pulpit was not the forum in which matters of controversy were discussed,

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influence on Newman's early career, cf. J. E. Linnan, *The Evangelical Background of John Henry Newman, 1816—1826*, 2 vols., Louvain: Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Theology, 1965; and T. L. Sheridan, *Newman on Justification*, New York, 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. R. Knox, *Enthusiasm*, Oxford, 1950, pp. 549—550.

<sup>4</sup> We would but note the remark of P. Flanagan, *Newman, Faith and the Believer*, London, 1946, p. 43, to the effect that Newman's thought does not admit such an affirmation: "... the Church is not really a living body; it was but a memorial and a defaced memorial, of an age that had been." This judgement seems based in Newman's later severity in judging the Anglican Church, not upon the actual state of his belief.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. W. van de Pol, *De Kerk in het leven en denken van Newman*, Nijkerk, 1936, pp. 231 ff; also J. H. Newman, "The Protestant Idea of Antichrist," in *Essays*, II, p. 171: "... the Church is what Christ is ... Has Christ, or has He not, left a representative behind Him?"

but the place for inculcating the moral values which flowed from doctrinal principles. In this regard, as touching upon the inner life of the preacher and his congregation, the influence of the pulpit was to bring out clearly and exactly what the Tractarians were striving to do — to create the moral atmosphere in which the questions raised by the *Tracts* could be judged.<sup>6</sup>

The nineteenth of the *Articles of Religion* described the visible Church as: "... a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly ministered, according to Christ's ordinance, in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same."<sup>7</sup> The interpretation of this Article, framed in 1571, differed accordingly as the fortunes of the Church changed with the evolution of government. During the course of the eighteenth century, under the influence of Erastianism, the Church had become little more than an arm of the government, which looked to it as teacher and maintainer of secular standards of conduct.<sup>8</sup> This did not preclude the survival of a traditional theological interpretation which, looking back beyond the events which resulted in the English Reformation, considered the Church as the legitimate successor of the Catholic Church in England, and derived its theology from the Fathers and the consent of the Ancient Councils.<sup>9</sup> It was into this tradition, in its intellectual stronghold at Oxford, that Newman entered, and it was under the influence of this tradition that he took up the defense of the Church. The fact is that Newman was not in the position of a scholar elaborating a theory, but he was a controversialist defending a position which he saw rooted in Revelation and threatened by a liberalizing lay Parliament.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. R. W. Church, *The Oxford Movement*, London, 1892, p. 130; also C. Dawson, *The Spirit of the Oxford Movement*, London, 1933, pp. 121—122; L. Bouyer, *Newman, His Life and Spirituality*, London, 1958, p. 178; F. Tardival, *La personnalité littéraire de Newman*, Paris, 1937, pp. 28—29.

<sup>7</sup> C. Hardwick, *A History of the Articles of Religion*, London, 1895, p. 228; cf. "Remarks on Certain Passages of the Thirty-nine Articles, Tract XC," in *V.M.*, II, p. 288; in a sermon of November 18, 1826, Newman had given his first expression of High Church Principles: "By the *Church* in the Credo is meant that visible body and society instituted by Christ and His Apostles, professing the one faith of the Gospel, governed by certain laws, however the members of it may be divided by difference of country, language, manners or civilization" (Unpublished MS in J. Linnan, *Op. cit.*, II, p. 547).

<sup>8</sup> Erastianism takes its name from Erastus (Thomas Lüder, d. 1583), advisor to the Elector of Saxony who taught that if, as was usual during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, excommunication entailed civil disability, only the civil authority could wield it. Under the deistic influences of the eighteenth century, the Church of England gradually submitted to Parliament.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Y. Brilioth, *The Anglican Revival*, London, 1925, p. 22; G. Tavard, *The Quest for Catholicity*, New York, 1964, pp. 141—143.

Newman's springboard was the proclamation of the *authority and apostolic descent* of Bishops, and with them as co-operators in their office, priests and deacons. His initial cry of alarm was addressed to the clergy, demanding that they recognize their station as sharers in the burden of the Bishops who alone were "the Representatives of the Apostles, and the Angels of the Churches."<sup>10</sup> Although the activities of a reforming Parliament provoked the shrill tone evident in the first of the *Tracts*, the principle enunciated therein was deeply rooted in Newman's appreciation of the nature of the English Reformation. Contrary to the Continental Reform, England had never severed the bond of valid ordination. The Bishops, therefore, continued to be, and were, the successors of the Apostles. This he affirmed to have been the intention of the English Reformers who framed a "golden mediocrity" or a *via media* between two systems which had equally betrayed Christianity, the Continental Reformers and the Roman Church.<sup>11</sup>

Newman's concern was to convince the clergy that their real and only strength lay in the boldest possible affirmation of their own authority as deriving, not from the nation or the people, but from Christ through Apostolic Succession.<sup>12</sup> It is they to whom have been entrusted the means of grace. It is they who have received the Gift of the Spirit in Ordination consecrating them to participate in the threefold mission of Christ as priest, as prophet, and as king. As Christ had been anointed with the Spirit at the beginning of his ministerial office, so had the Apostles after his Resurrection, and so were Bishops and, in their turn, the priests and deacons. It is from this descent that, through appointed channels, the Gospel blessings, the Gifts which Christ had promised as the fruit of his mediating office, are applied to each individual.<sup>13</sup>

The Church is a society whose visibility is particularly evident in the person of the Bishop. As the visible center of communion he is the sign

<sup>10</sup> "Thoughts on the Ministerial Commission, Respectfully addressed to the Clergy, Tract I," p. 4, in *Tracts*, vol. I; cf. also "The Catholic Church, Tract II," and "The Visible Church, Tract XI," in *loc. cit.*; also "Suggestions in Behalf of the Church Missionary Society" [1830], in *V.M.*, II, p. 11.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. "The Via Media — No. 1, Tract XXXVIII" [1834], in *V.M.*, II, p. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. "Tract I," in *Tracts*, vol. I, where Newman asserts that it is the Bishop who *transmits* the Holy Spirit whom he has himself received for his office through the imposition of hands reaching back to the Apostles; of interest is Newman's anti-Erastian and anti-Democratic emphases, against both Governmental reduction of the Church to an agency of civil power, and the assumption by the laity of active roles in ecclesiastical polity, cf. "Witnesses of the Resurrection" [April, 1831], in *P. S.*, I, p. 284; "The Restoration of Suffragan Bishops" [1835], in *V.M.*, II, pp. 65, 71.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. "The Christian Ministry" [December, 1834], in *P.S.*, II, pp. 300—319.



of the *unity* of the Church. However, Newman perceived the fact of division in the Church. Not only was the Church of England separated from the rest of Christianity, it was internally torn by factions which interpreted the Establishment differently. Nevertheless he affirmed that unity is that which guaranteed the Church of England to be the Church of Christ. Scripture witnesses to the foundation of a visible Church, its endowment with power and its promise of permanence. That body has continued and exists all over the world. Its legitimate presence in England is the Established Church.<sup>14</sup> What, then, does Newman mean by unity?

Can local bodies which have separated from each other be parts of one and the same body? Can the Church of England, the Church of Rome, and the Church of the Orthodox East be one Catholic Church? These are questions which Newman set out to answer, and it must be said that his replies are burdened with what he himself acknowledged to be the indeterminateness characteristic of English theology.<sup>15</sup> He affirms unity to be that which secures purity of faith in the whole body of the Church. It is, as it were, a *sacramentum*, a grace-laden reality and condition through which the gifts of the Spirit promised by Christ were to be guaranteed and secured to the world. Unity, according to Newman, is "the divinely blessed symbol and pledge of the true faith, so also it is the obvious means (even humanly speaking) of securing it."<sup>16</sup> History has shown, however, that the unity which had reigned during the first ages of the Church as the special mark of Christ's disciples had been broken and forfeited. It was first infringed by the quarrels of the Greeks and the Latins; later, in the West, it was further injured by the disunity of the Western Schism; and it was finally sundered by the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century.<sup>17</sup> The resulting loss of unity in the whole Church meant that no single Church could be considered the depository of the *whole* truth of the Gospels. Each possessed the fundamentals of the faith according to the measure in which they agreed with the faith of the ancient and undivided Church Catholic. It is this faith, witnessed in the agreement of the Church of Antiquity, which is enshrined in the traditional Creeds.<sup>18</sup> It must therefore be said

<sup>14</sup> Cf. "Tract XI," in *Tracts*, vol. I.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *V.M.*, vol. I, pp. 129, 160, n. 3.

<sup>16</sup> "On the Mode of Conducting Controversy with Rome, Tract LXXI" [1836], in *V.M.*, vol. II, p. 134; also "Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church," in *V.M.*, vol. I, pp. 199—211.

<sup>17</sup> "Tract LXXI," in *V.M.*, vol. II, p. 134, to which he adds: "... our own Church keeping the nearest of any to the complete truth. Since that era at least, Truth has not dwelt simply and securely in any visible Tabernacle."

<sup>18</sup> "Lectures on the Prophetical Office," in *V.M.*, vol. I, pp. 200—201.

that all of the Churches lost something integral to their structure and mission as teachers and transmitters of the doctrine of the Gospels. It is only the Church of Antiquity which was possessed of full unity, and to it appeal must be made in matters of doctrine.<sup>19</sup> A further assertion is that, although history has shown a breaking of unity, it has also shown that the English Church, though not escaping the effects of this sin, has been more faithful in transmitting the doctrine of Antiquity, and is therefore possessed of a more legitimate claim to Gospel authenticity.

Innumerable as the difficulties inherent in this outline are, it is important to note that Newman's conception of the Church's legitimacy in England is differently nuanced from that which is ordinarily understood as the Branch Theory. This theory, at least as witnessed in the work of William Palmer,<sup>20</sup> is usually understood to signify that the different Churches, the Latin, the Greek and the English, are each descended from the one Church instituted by Christ, and are the visible Ordinance of God in the areas in which they hold sway. Each may therefore determine, by an authentic judgment, that to which assent must be given in faith. According to this, it is the Church which is the informant in matters of belief, and that the essentials are those in which all the Branches agree.<sup>21</sup>

In Newman's thought the truth of Divine Revelation is definite in its outline and is the property, not only of the Church, but of each individual member. This truth is received not simply from the Church, but also from Scriptural and historical sources. Therefore, since the doctrines accepted in faith may be received independently of the Church, the individual believer is bound to obey the Church *only* insofar as the Church itself holds to the faith. Should the Church depart from the faith, each one may and must defend the faith against the Church.<sup>22</sup> The belief of the primitive Church is the gauge of faith, for it was then

<sup>19</sup> Concerning the duration of the undivided Church, cf. *V.M.*, vol. I, pp. 205—209, where the time is said to extend from the Third Century to the Seventh, during the reign of Pope Gregory the Great and his sending of Augustine to England. Newman adds this restriction: "Thus [*sic*] much is plain, that the termination of the period of purity cannot be fixed much earlier than the Council of Sardica, A.D., 347, which an historian of the next century names as the commencement of the division, nor so late as the Second Nicene or seventh General Council which was held in A.D. 787" (p. 207).

<sup>20</sup> W. Palmer, *A Treatise on the Church of Christ*, London, 1842.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Newman's Review of Palmer's work, "Palmer on Faith and Unity" [1838], in *Essays*, vol. I, pp. 168—170, and Palmer's rejoinder published in *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 454—455.

<sup>22</sup> "Palmer on Faith and Unity," in *Essays*, vol. I, p. 173, 174: "The Truth is entirely objective and detached, not lying hid in the bosom of the Church

that all Apostolic Churches throughout the world, despite occasional aberrations, agreed together.<sup>23</sup> The conclusion must be, and we think it Newman's, that the truth is preferable to the Church which is, in any event, only the means of enforcing the *fact* of Apostolic Tradition as the doctrinal key to the Scriptures.<sup>24</sup>

Actual unity in the Church had not, according to Newman, perished. This is not, however, to deny that there does exist a Church of divine institution descended from the Church instituted by Christ. The Church of England is "but a continuation of one which existed in the age before us, and then again in the age before that; and so back till we come to the age of the Apostles."<sup>25</sup> It would seem that whatever unity is to be found in the Church is to be detected, not in the Communion of existing Churches, but only indirectly, in a sort of generative unity with the Church of Antiquity. It is this descendant, imperfect unity which sufficiently guarantees that the Christian Church retains "the substance of the great outlines of the Gospel as taught by the Apostles,"<sup>26</sup> and holds the means of salvation in the Sacraments.

The English Church is a visible society and depends on no single individual, but upon Christ and the Apostles whose teaching is wit-

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*as if one with her*, clinging to her and (as it were) lost in her embrace, but as being sole and unapproachable as on the Cross or at the Resurrection, with the Church close by, but in the background" (*emphasis added*).

<sup>23</sup> Newman saw Palmer's admission of an actual doctrinal authority in the Church as an implicit avowal that additions could be admitted by the ancient creeds; this would be an implicit admission of the legitimacy of the Roman Church. This Palmer denied (cf. *Essays*, vol. II, p. 455).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *V.M.*, vol. I, p. 192; if we inquire into the ground of the Church's authority to teach matters of faith, "... the Creed Athanasian answers, that she speaks merely as the organ of the *Catholic* voice, and that the faith thus witnessed, is, as being thus witnessed, such, that whoso does not believe it faithfully cannot be saved"; "The Church not only transmits the faith by human means, but has a supernatural gift for that purpose; that doctrine, which is true, considered as an historical fact, is true *also* because she teaches it" (*emphases added*).

<sup>25</sup> "Tract XI," in *Tracts*, vol. I; cf. *Apo.* p. 70.

<sup>26</sup> *V.M.*, vol. I, p. 196; it may be observed that Newman's act of faith was given to the Church of Antiquity, and only to the Anglican Church insofar as he saw it the legitimate successor of that ancient Church. That he did see the Church of England as such, at least until the final struggles prior to his entrance into the Catholic Church seems beyond dispute. Therefore it seems proper to affirm that this faith was absolute. "Now, in spite of the differences within and without, our own branch may surely be considered as to us the voice of her who has been in the world ever one and the same since Christ came. Surely she comes up to the theory; she professes to be the Catholic Church, and to transmit that one ancient Catholic Faith, and she does transmit it simply and intelligibly . . . There is no mistaking in this day in England, where the Church Catholic is . . . [her words] are the accents of the Church Catholic and Apostolic as she manifests herself in England" (*ibid.*, pp. 262—263).

nessed in the consent of the Fathers.<sup>27</sup> It is visible in its institutions, in its constitution and in its hierarchy. It is Catholic to the extent and in the same manner as it is one, admitting a presently existing accidental union of many unique Churches "so far as the civil power unites any number of them together."<sup>28</sup> Because of the fact that there is no existing Catholic Communion among the English, the Greek and the Roman Churches, there is the question whether Newman understood Unity and Catholicity as pertaining to the essence of the Church. His response is strained. Apostolic Succession is clearly the necessary means for insuring the generative descent from the Church of Antiquity. At the same time he affirms that "something" of value has been lost to Christianity through schism and disunity, but that this loss has not annulled the various communions being themselves truly Church. His thought betrays the conviction that unity and catholicity among the Churches pertain more to the integrity or the *bene esse* of the Church. That Unity suffices which manifests agreement with the Church of Antiquity, and this sufficiently bespeaks catholicity. The claims of the Church are sufficiently guaranteed in her descent from the Apostles through Episcopal Consecration.

The Church is therefore that society which is visible in its head the Bishop, together with the priests, deacons and people subject to and dependent upon him; it is one and catholic in its continuity and descent from, and agreement in faith with, the Church founded by Christ upon the Apostles and which lasted in unity and catholicity until the great divisions of east and west.<sup>29</sup>

### b. *The "Abode of the Spirit"*

Useful as it is to grasp in outline Newman's basic doctrinal position concerning the Church of England, of much greater importance is it to

<sup>27</sup> "A letter addressed to the Rev. the Margaret Professor of Divinity" [1838], in *V.M.*, vol. II, p. 217.

<sup>28</sup> "The Catholicity of the Anglican Church," in *Essays*, vol. II, p. 18.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. "The Restoration of Suffragan Bishops" [1835], in *V.M.*, vol. II, p. 71; "Tract LXXI" [1836], in *loc. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 132—133; *Arians*, pp. 257—258; "The Church Visible and Invisible" [1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 222: "Properly speaking the One Church is the whole body gathered together from all ages; so that the Church of this very age is but part of it, and this in the same sense in which the Church in England, again, in this day, is but part of the present Church Catholic"; "The Catholicity of the Anglican Church," in *Essays*, vol. II, p. 20: "Each diocese is a perfect and independent Church sufficient for itself; and the communion of Christians with one another and the unity of them all together, lie, not in a mutual understanding, intercourse and combination, not in what they do in common, but in what they are and what they have in common, in the possession of the Succession, their Episcopal Form, their Apostolic faith, and the use of the Sacraments."



understand what he thought the Church's inner reality to be. Newman's defense of the Church as one, visible and hierarchical is beyond doubt. The question which faces the inquirer is to determine the reason why he exerted so many and such strenuous efforts in her defense. What has been said thus far would lead to the conclusion that he was defending a static reality, a mere memorial of the past whose worth was to be judged according as it transmitted and reiterated the Gospel and Creed of a former day. We need to know his appreciation of that which underlies the Church's visibility. In short, he saw the Church as the means of divine appointment to realize the blessings of the Gospel.<sup>30</sup> Since 1823 Newman had been deeply influenced by Joseph Butler's *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and course of nature*.<sup>31</sup> Butler's work provided a rational foundation for Newman's religious thought and impressed on his mind the idea of "an analogy between the separate works of God" leading to the conclusion "that the system which is of less importance is economically or sacramentally connected with the more momentous system."<sup>32</sup>

Although the course of nature is not an argument in proof of Revelation, once Revelation is affirmed, it must also be affirmed that the course of nature can indicate no incompatibility or a priori presumption against that which Revelation contains.<sup>33</sup> Butler's influence was strengthened by his reading of the Alexandrian Fathers, from whom Newman accepted the teaching of *Economies* and *Dispensations*. The lessons of history, as he studied them in the writings of the Fathers and during the struggles of the Arian controversy, showed him a Church united in its belief as manifesting a life principle enabling it to shake free from the infectious heresy of the Arianizers.<sup>34</sup> This life, which he saw essentially identical with sanctity, showed the presence of Christ in the Church as the great

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Arians*, pp. 257—258; *P.S.*, VII, p. 242.

<sup>31</sup> *Apo.*, p. 10; Butler's work was first published in 1736, and later republished in 1824; cf. W. J. Norton, *Bishop Butler: Moralism and Divine*, New Brunswick, 1938; for his influence on Newman, cf. K. Dick, "Das Analogieprinzip bei John Henry Newman und Seine Quelle in Joseph Butlers 'Analogy,'" in *Newman Studien*, V (1962) pp. 9—228.

<sup>32</sup> *Apo.*, p. 18: "... material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen"; cf. C. F. Harrold, *John Henry Newman, an Expository and Critical Study of his Mind, Thought and Art*, London, 1945, p. 15.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion, Tract LXXXVIII," in *Essays*, vol. I, p. 69.

<sup>34</sup> J. Guittou, *La philosophie de Newman*, Paris, 1933, p. xv, asserts that Newman's was the problem which faced the whole nineteenth century, the meaning of history; L. Bouyer, *Newman, His Life and Spirituality*, London, 1958, p. 162: "... There shines out, through the vision of the past which illuminates [the Arian controversy], his faith in a living Church. It is this

gift given by the Father through the Holy Spirit.<sup>35</sup> He also discerned in the teaching of the Alexandrians the affirmation of the Scriptural teaching that God is not without witnesses in the world, and that he continues to give intimations of himself to all men. Although the Word of the Scriptures and the Sacraments are the unique possession of the Christian, all men have had the guidance of tradition, together with internal helps implanted in their hearts by God for arriving to right notions of what must be done and avoided, and why.<sup>36</sup>

In a Tract contrasting rationalistic and Catholic tempers of thought, Newman, in opposition to that attitude which looks upon the words of Scripture as signs of ideas, replies that faith takes the words of Scripture as signs of things and realities.<sup>37</sup> Faith is a penetrating beyond the words and works of God to perceive their Author. This is true in a supremely eminent way concerning belief in the Church. It is not merely a visible and ordered society. Spiritualized by the shedding of the blood of Christ, it has been since Pentecost "an integral part of that unseen, but really existing world, of which 'the Lord is the everlasting light'."<sup>38</sup> Legitimate in Apostolic Succession and Sacramental ministry, and one in the conformity of its teaching with the Church of Antiquity, the Church is both herald calling for holiness of life and instrument of conveying this sanctity.

There can be little doubt as to what Newman understood by the *Sacramental Principle*. It is "the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen."<sup>39</sup> Two aspects need to be noted. On the one hand the material and visible phenomena are types — impressions, imprints, copies, images, patterns — however faint in their delineation, of that which is in its own nature more important and momentous in the spiritual, and therefore the real,

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belief in the existence of an ever-living Catholic Church, reflected in the writings of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory, and the like, that was now Newman's aim to define, so that he might infuse it into the Anglicanism of his day."

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. VI, p. 121: "Christ has come so close to the Christian Church (if I may so speak) that we cannot gaze on Him or discern Him. He enters into us, He claims and takes possession of this purchased inheritance; He does not present Himself to us, but He takes us to Him. He makes us His members" [May, 1838].

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Arians*, pp. 79—91; "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively" [1830], in *U.S.*, pp. 19—21; *Apo.*, p. 27.

<sup>37</sup> "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion, Tract LXXVIII" [1835], in *Essays*, vol. I, p. 35.

<sup>38</sup> "The Gift of the Spirit" [November, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 257; cf. also "The Church a Home for the Lonely" [October, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 196.

<sup>39</sup> *Apo.*, p. 18.

order of things.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, these very realities are, to a certain but undetermined degree, the instruments of that of which they are types, dependent upon them both for their general orientation and for the power leading to ulterior developments. We are confronted with a strangely ever-present paradox in Newman's thought and works. He had affirmed the world to be unreal, to be nothing, to be a danger to the Christian soul, to be positively sinful.<sup>41</sup> Parallel but, as it were, in minor mode run affirmations that the world is good and possessed of positive value to the extent that it retains in outline traces of God's creation, that it possesses tokens of God's presence and is capable of drawing the Christian close to him.<sup>42</sup>

As creation is a type of invisible reality, so much more is the Church "in her sacraments and her hierarchical appointments . . . a symbol of those heavenly facts which fill eternity."<sup>43</sup> Newman taught that the Ascension of Christ is to be interpreted as the prelude and condition of the Descent of the Holy Spirit. Christ is still on earth "by His Divine Spirit."<sup>44</sup> However, the Spirit came upon the community, the Church of the Upper Room, henceforth the "body of faithful men considered

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<sup>40</sup> Although this "principle" in its "fulness" pertains to the technical meaning of *Sacrament*, it extends, according to Newman's vision also to the Article of Faith affirming the *Communion of Saints* and to the general mysteries of religion (cf. *Apo.*, p. 18). It can be assumed, in view of Newman's ignorance of the Scholastic problem of *instrumentality* in relation to sacraments, that it extends not merely to things or words, but to events and developments (cf. *Arians*, pp. 79—81; *Apo.*, pp. 26—27). It would be more specifically expressed in 1841: "All that is seen, — the world, the Bible, the Church, the civil polity, and man himself, — are types, and, in their degree and place, representatives and organs of an unseen world, truer and higher than themselves. The only difference between them is, that some things bear their supernatural character upon their surface, are historically creations of the supernatural system, or are perceptibly instrumental, or obviously symbolical; while others rather seem to be complete in themselves, or run counter to the unseen system which they really subserve, and thereby make demands on our faith" ("Milman's View of Christianity," in *Essays*, vol. II, p. 193).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. "The Immortality of the Soul" [July, 1833], in *P.S.*, vol. I, pp. 20—21; "The World Our Enemy" [July, 1839], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, pp. 27—40 *passim*.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Arians*, p. 75; "Waiting on Christ" [December, 1840], in *P.S.*, vol. VI, p. 248: "How then, it may be asked, can this world . . . bring us to Him? Yet certainly so it is, that in spite of the world's evil, after all, He is in it and speaks through it, though not loudly . . . But His voice is so low, and the world's din so loud . . . that it is difficult to determine when He addresses us and what He says."

<sup>43</sup> *Apo.*, p. 27.

<sup>44</sup> "The Unity of the Church" [November, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, p. 242: "The Church is a Divine society, a great work of God, a true relic of Christ and His Apostles, as Elijah's mantle upon Elisha"; "Christ, Hidden from the World" [December, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 250: "For instance, the

as the dwelling-place of the one Holy Spirit."<sup>45</sup> Of Newman's many affirmations concerning the Church as the presence of Christ among men, this short statement epitomizes his teaching concerning the Church's inner reality.

The Church is not a society of like-minded men who, on the basis of similarity of religious conviction, have banded together for the worship of God and their mutual assistance. The Church is that society which Christ has established and endowed with power to convey to all who believe and are initiated into its body through Baptism the graces of Redemption. A visible polity of earth, it possesses the characteristics of other social organizations, but with this difference: whatever is seen of it outwardly is but a manifestation of an inward, enlivening and directing Principle whereby it reflects the Saviour of the world in all that pertains to him, his perfections, his offices and his works. What Newman affirms of the Church must surpass what is signified by the term reflect. It does not seem too strong to state that Newman teaches a certain *absorption* of the visible Church into that which is invisible. There is difficulty in distinguishing and articulating elements proper to each. Because of the Gift of the Spirit, the Church on earth is the Lord's "outer Lineaments."<sup>46</sup>

Well may Newman's position be termed mystical, provided that at all times we remember the tension between revealed truth and the concrete facts and experiences of history which, as dependent upon the activities of men, betray all the characteristics of human contingency aggravated by sin. By way of illustration we may allude to what he called a general rule or principle to be understood in the interpretation of scriptural teaching concerning Divine Providence. Scripture betrays a singular peculiarity. It speaks of the world as seen in the eternal view of God. It speaks of the divine *design*, the *substantial work*, the *tendency* of divine gifts over a long period of time and of their *ultimate fruits*. It does not, except where clearly indicated, speak of the *extent* or the *measure* of Providence's fulfillment in this or that period of time. In

Church is called 'His Body': what His material body was when He was visible on earth, such is the Church now. It is the instrument of His Divine Power."

<sup>45</sup> "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively" [April, 1830], in *U.S.*, p. 30.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. "The Visible Church an Encouragement to Faith" [September, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 240: "The visible Church of God is that one only company which Christians know as yet; it was set up at Pentecost with the Apostles as founders, their successors for rulers, and all professing Christian people for members"; *Jfc.*, pp. 196, 198; W. Becker, "Newman und die Kirche," in *Newman Studien*, I (1948), p. 243.



this way he envisages "the sealing up of events" in the Word of God whereby the fullness and absoluteness of that which shall be revealed in the consummation is already included in the first beginnings and throughout the history of the Church.<sup>47</sup> In suchwise Newman spoke, not of an ideal Church, but of the existing Christian body of which, despite irregularity and sin, he predicated the titles and imagery of the Scriptures.<sup>48</sup>

It is the Church, the representative and instrument of God's mercy in the world, through which the Spirit is given. Justification is bestowed by incorporating the individual through Baptism into the "whole indivisible Body of Christ Mystical."<sup>49</sup> Whatever functions and duties flow from the Church, the imposition of hands, its rites and ceremonies, the remission or retention of sin, the granting of power and authority to its ministers, all is rooted in the fact that the Church is a visible body divinely interposed between the soul and God; it is invested with the presence of the Spirit and stands for Christ.<sup>50</sup>

Another peculiarity which Newman discovered in Revelation is the method of "personation." The Mystery of the Blessed Trinity is revealed to be the union in one Divine Nature of Three Persons; the doctrine of Original Sin is centered in the act of a person, Adam; the principle of evil in the world is shown to be personal in its author, Satan. The continuation of this is the predication of a "metaphorical personality" to the body of faithful men, the Church, considered to be the tabernacle, the dwellingplace of the Holy Spirit.<sup>51</sup> It was at Pentecost that the Church was grafted on and "assimilated to the spiritual Body of Christ."<sup>52</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Cf. "The Glory of the Christian Church" [1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 82—90; p. 84: "... whereas God is one, and His will one, and His purpose one, and His work one; whereas all He is and does is absolutely perfect and complete... yet in His actual dealings with this world, that is, in all in which we see His Providence... He seems to work by a process, by means and ends...".

<sup>48</sup> E. g., *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 90—91: "All accidents are excluded, when He speaks; the present and the to come, delays and failures, vanish before the thought of His perfect work. And hence it happens that the word 'elect' in Scripture has two senses, standing both for those who are called *in order* to salvation, and for those who at the last day shall be the *actually resulting fruit* of that holy call... His word is the mirror of His designs, not of man's partial success in thwarting His gracious call.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. "The Unity of the Church," [November, 1929], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, p. 232.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. "The Church Visible and Invisible" [October, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 224; also "The Protestant Idea of Antichrist" [1840], in *Essays*, vol. II, pp. 170—171.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively" [April, 1830], in *U.S.*, pp. 29—30.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. "The Communion of Saints" [May, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 169—179; p. 170: "Thus Christ came, not to make us one, but to die for us: the

The Day<sup>53</sup> of Pentecost must be considered as the moment in time when, by the endowing of separate individuals with the life of the Spirit of God, the Church came to exist. Thereafter, each member, because of his union with Christ glorified and in union with each other and the company of saints who reign with Christ, is in the Church as a separate development or extension, a vessel, an instrument and work of him who is invisible.<sup>54</sup> Each is gifted not only for himself, but as an outward manifestation of Christ. If a sacrament is an outward manifestation or instrument of an inward grace, an "outward form of a heavenly truth and in this sense a mystery or sacrament,"<sup>55</sup> it seems legitimate to see the strength of Newman's affirmations to be the predication of sacramentality to the Church as a whole, to those of its acts which properly fulfill the definition of sacrament, and to the existence and activities of its various members.

This conclusion is reinforced, not only by the general tenor and meaning of his works, but made explicit in his comparison of the Baptism of Christ and the event of Pentecost. The former signified, in the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Jesus of Nazareth, his consecration to the ministry foretold to be his as priest, prophet and king.<sup>56</sup> The latter, wherein the Spirit came upon those gathered in the Upper Room, signified the transferral of the threefold office and ministry of Christ, which Newman perceived as included in the meaning of the Scriptural terms "the Spirit" and the "Gift of the Holy Ghost,"<sup>57</sup> to the Apostles as their consecration. Every gift and office which is Christ's, except his being himself the atoning sacrifice, has been bestowed upon the Apostles in their particular function of Master-builders of the Church. From them, through the imposition of hands and the invocation of the Holy Spirit, these have been given to all who have succeeded in their place, the Bishops and their assistants in the ministry, priests and deacons.

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Spirit came to make us one in Him, who had died and was alive, that is, to form the Church."

<sup>53</sup> It is of interest to note the significance of "day" in this context. Cf. "The Spiritual Presence of Christ in the Church" [May, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. VI, pp. 122—124; p. 123: "The Day, then, that dawned upon the Church at the Resurrection, and beamed forth in full splendour at the Ascension, that Day which has no setting which will be, not ended, but absorbed in Christ's glorious appearance . . . is described . . . as a state of special Divine manifestation, of special introduction into the presence of God."

<sup>54</sup> Cf. "The Communion of Saints" [May, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 170—176; *Jfc.*, pp. 196, 198.

<sup>55</sup> *V.M.*, vol. I, p. 257.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. "The Christian Ministry" [January, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 303.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

It is important to note the emphasis in this outline. Newman was defending the rights of the Bishops and seems to attribute in a particularly unique way the Gift of the Spirit to the clergy. It is they who, having received the imposition of hands, are the organs of the Church and the moving principle within her.<sup>58</sup> The laity were conceived to be passive recipients of the services and administrations of the clergy.<sup>59</sup> As the attitude of those in authority passed from polite interest to firm and implacable opposition to the thought of the Tractarians, Newman came to insist more and more on the independent value of holiness in the Church, and predicated the threefold office of Christ to all the members in their various positions and functions.<sup>60</sup>

Integral to the understanding of the primacy of holiness and the activity of the Spirit in the Church is the relation which Newman perceived between the Church in time and the Saints in Glory expressed in the Communion of Saints. If Apostolic Succession guarantees unity and legitimacy, holiness is the ultimate foundation and principle of ecclesiastical life. The visible body of this or that age is but part of the one Church which is the whole body gathered from all the ages of time. It is to the heavenly Jerusalem that can be applied *in a proper way* the title Spouse of Christ; it is the invisible Church which is the *true* Church, the visible being but a part of it, "representing it in type, and witnessing it, and leading towards it."<sup>61</sup> Newman came to oppose the then Evangelical application of the term *invisible* to the Church signifying the body of the "perfect" as distinct from the church as Christ *among us*

<sup>58</sup> Cf. "The Unity of the Church" [November, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 238; also *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 148.

<sup>59</sup> Newman did not perceive the ordinary run of laity in his day, against whom he defended the rights of the clergy, as seriously professing Christians. To follow, or depend on such was, in the words of "Tract III", to betray one's office, and "to follow the Dead" (*Tracts*, vol. I). The consequence of turning to appeal to the Christian people he saw to be "... a lowering of Christian views ... and the state of Dissention ..." ("Primitive Christianity," in *Historical Sketches*, vol. I, p. 34).

<sup>60</sup> The years 1835—1836 are pivotal to Newman's development as he came to accept the teaching of Regeneration effected in Baptism, and as changing his attitude to the responsibility of all in the Church. As accusations of *Romanizing* increased, the *Tracts* took on a different form, becoming *Catenae* of the Fathers and Anglican Divines in support of Apostolic Succession, Baptismal Regeneration, the Sacraments, etc., cf. J. H. Newman, *Autobiographical Writings* (ed. H. Tristram), London, 1956, pp. 69—98; *Mozely*, vol. II, pp. 159, 160—164, 168—169; C. F. Harrold, *Op. cit.*, pp. 33—39.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. "The Communion of Saints" [May, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 174—175; also *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 222: "Properly speaking, the One Church is the whole body gathered together from all ages, so that the Church of this very age is but part of it, and this in the same sense in which the whole Church in England, again in this day, is but a part of the present Church Catholic."

who is subject to the influences of sin in a greater or lesser degree. There is but one Church whose reality can be distinguished variously by the mind alone.<sup>62</sup> It is visible in the perceived sanctity of its members; it is invisible in its dependence upon the sanctifying Spirit and its continuity with those saints who have passed to Glory. This "total view", although in a developing stage, is an important index of the sacramental reality he predicates of the Church in the whole of her structures and the entirety of her members.

It is only with great effort that the relation between the visible and the invisible in the Church can be stated accurately. The Visible Church is the preparation for the Invisible. The Spirit acts in it through sacraments and ministry "in the instance of this man and that" gradually molding the elect for salvation. There is something of weakness included in his predication of the term "Mystical Body" to the visible body. While the individual Christians may be in relation to the Holy Spirit and the saints, their relation one to another is less than clear. Sincere Christians are scattered here and there and depend upon the Church as upon a vine. Because the actual degree or state of individual sanctity cannot be determined, they find no consolation or strength from fellow Christians.<sup>63</sup> Newman concentrates on the aloneness of the individual Christian whose relation to the Church seems to be mainly passive. He is united to other Christians only indirectly, *in* and *through* the Church as formal institution. Besides the properly sacramental ministrations, he finds his support from the memory and example of the Saints of the past. It is this which comforts his isolation in the world and makes him more fully pertain to the Mystical Body of Christ. There is little said about the direct influence of one Christian upon another in a way which could be called sacramental or quasi-sacramental. However, in his conception of the invisible world influencing men through the memorials of the past something more than external exemplarism is latent. Whether they be monuments, literary works, such memorials seem endowed with power to lead to and encourage sanctity.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 221; vol. IV, p. 172.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. III, pp. 241—242; "The Visible Church for the Sake of the Elect" [November, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 157: "... we are not accustomed to give to living men the *title* of saints, since *we* cannot know well, while they are among us, who have lived up to their calling and who have not. But in the process of time, after death, their excellence perhaps gets abroad, and they become a witness, a specimen of what the Gospel can do..."; "Reverence in Worship" [October, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. VIII, pp. 1—16 *passim*; also "Tract XI," in *Tracts*, vol. I.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. "The World's Benefactors" [November, 1830], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 10—11; "The Gospel Palaces" [November, 1836], in *P.S.*, VI, p. 275;



The same framework does offer another perspective which is both more positive and active.<sup>65</sup> The Visible Church is a living body, entirely and fully present in all lands at once wherever her outward instruments are found. She is the means whereby the unseen and Spiritual Church encroaches upon that which is seen; whereby individuals are admitted by Baptism — whether given in the Roman, the Greek or the English Church — into the one company of elect souls; whereby her “visible ministry on earth, the Bishops and Pastors, *together with* Christians depending on them,” are, in the “bodily presence of Bishop and People, . . . given as keys and *spells*”<sup>66</sup> witnessing to the world him who is the source of holiness.

If we take Newman’s predication of *mystery* to the present state and office of the Church to be analogous to a *truth sacramental* which he called a “high invisible grace lodged in an outward form, a precious possession to be piously and thankfully guarded for the sake of the heavenly reality contained in it,”<sup>67</sup> then it seems legitimate to affirm that he concentrates on the externals of the Church only as they evidence and betray her inwardness. His defense of the institution was motivated by a deepening vision of the Church as a holy ordinance by which, in her various members variously, the truth and blessings of the Redemption are available for the sanctification of men. Many of his conceptions are difficult to harmonize.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, taking everything into account, his concern for the inner reality of the Church can be seen as anticipating current speculation concerning the mysterious nature of that Body which is the Church. His thought is more clearly delineated by taking into account that which he saw to differentiate the Old and the New Testaments.

The *distinguishing* grace of the Gospel dispensation is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in individual Christians and in the whole Church.<sup>69</sup> The special note of the New Testament is not that there is a new and more abundant *activity* of the Spirit among men, but a substantial and

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“The Invisible World” [July, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 207—208; “The Church, a Home for the Lonely” [October, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 190—193.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. “The Communion of Saints” [May, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, pp. 168-184 *passim*.

<sup>66</sup> *P.S.*, vol. VII, p. 176 (*emphasis added*); cf. “The Use of Saints Days” [November, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 393—394; “The Indwelling Spirit” [November-December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 227.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 211.

<sup>68</sup> The mayor difficulty deriving from his system, the relation of sanctity to membership in the Church, will be treated in its proper place subsequently.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Jfc.*, p. 147.

real presence of the Holy Spirit which is altogether new. The first father of the race had been gifted upon his creation with the indwelling Spirit. When he sinned, this unique gift was withdrawn, to be restored only in and through the promised mediator. According to Newman, the fact of Revelation is that the ancient Patriarchs, Prophets and holy ones of the Old Testament were truly sanctified and influenced by the invisible Spirit of God, but they were not regenerate.<sup>70</sup> The Spirit of God had been shown to be active in the Old Testament as the secret presence of God in creation; as the source of those ordinary and extraordinary gifts which marked the prophetic mission of individuals and of the whole people looking toward the dispensation to come; as the inspirer of faith in Abraham and his descendents in the Jewish Nation; as the principle of their individual and collective sanctification. There is no grace which can be affirmed of the Christian Dispensation which may not be attributed to the Old Testament, with the sole exception of the Gospel Gift of Regeneration.<sup>71</sup> It is true that St. Paul calls forth the figures of those who, after the example of Abraham, received the gift of sanctification through faith as models for those who come in faith to receive the Gospel Gift.<sup>72</sup> Faith is the condition for righteousness and acceptableness of man before God. However, concerning the nature of the righteousness which Abraham and the holy ones of the Old Testament received, whether "a mere act of God's will or by a positive gift on His part,"<sup>73</sup> Newman sees nothing contrary to Paul's argument in stating that the "same blessing which was conveyed before Christ came in one way, should under the Gospel come . . . in another and more precious way."<sup>74</sup> The blessings of the Old Testament were but

<sup>70</sup> Cf. "Letter Addressed to a Magazine on behalf of Dr. Pusey's Tracts on Holy Baptism, Tract LXXXII" [1837], in *V.M.*, vol. II, pp. 165—169.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166: "I grant that there is a sense in which the terms applicable to Christian privileges are also applicable to Jewish. The Jews were 'sons of God,' were 'begotten' of God, had 'the Spirit,' saw 'the glory of God,' and the like; but in like manner, the Saints also in heaven, as their peculiar gift, will see 'the glory of God,' the Angels are 'sons of God,' yet we know that nevertheless Angels and Saints are in a state different from Jews. The question, then, still remains open, whether, in spite of the absence of discriminating terms, Christians also have not a gift which the Jews had not, and whether the word regeneration in its proper sense does not denote it. Our proof is simple. The word 'regeneration' occurs twice only in Scripture; in neither can it be interpreted to include Judaism . . ." (he cites *Tit.*, 3, 4—5 and *Matt.*, 19, 28).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Rom.*, 4, 18—22; *Heb.* 11, 8—10 (referring to *Gen.*, 15, 5—6.)

<sup>73</sup> *Jfc.*, p. 193.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*; the incompleteness of the gift of sanctity given under the Old Law may be discerned from Newman's view of what existed until the Resurrection: "At first, indeed, in the lifetime of the Apostles, a great proportion of the whole body of the Church was in the world; that is, not

preparatory and figurative of that which was to be received in the fullness of time.<sup>75</sup>

Everything in the Old Testament was but temporary, perishable, aided but not inhabited by the grace of God. Everything looked toward Christ, presaged him in a dark manner, but the dispensation which he inaugurated "speaks and acts from Him."<sup>76</sup> A new beginning, a new creation has been made. Those elements which were but temporary and figurative have been abolished as tainted with the marks of sin and destitute of inner reality.<sup>77</sup> The difference between the two dispensations must be found in the single truth of Regeneration. The actions recorded in the Old Testament are of individuals who, under the influence of the Holy Spirit performed undoubtedly good works before God and for the people. The worth of their actions depended upon the worthiness of the individuals and as such is essentially different from those of the saints of the New Testament. All the works of the Old Testament have been united and superseded forever in the act of Christ, uniquely anointed as priest, prophet and king. To him are to be attributed, as to their Source, the actions of all who, upon reception of regenerating Baptism, are made temples of the Spirit, members of the Church and, as such, Christ's delegates and members.<sup>78</sup>

The Gift of the Spirit may not be disassociated from the constitution and mission of the Church. We have noted that Newman's efforts for reform in the Church of England were inspired by the awakening conviction of the Church as the locus of the Spirit's presence on earth and the instrument of the Spirit's communication to men. Newman's concern for defending the legitimacy of the English Church was focused upon Apostolic Succession, but his care was governed by the vision and need

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taking into account those saints, who had lived in Jewish times, and whom Christ, on His departure made partakers of the privileges then purchased by His death for *all* believers" (*P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 172); "... we see how wide and *essential* a difference there is, there must be, in this life between good men before His coming, and good men after" (*Jfc.*, p. 194, *emphasis added*).

<sup>75</sup> Cf. "The Gift of the Spirit" [November, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, pp. 256—257.

<sup>76</sup> *Jfc.*, p. 195; cf. also *P.S.*, vol. VI, p. 179.

<sup>77</sup> The cleavage and continuity between the Old Testament and the New is not the *abolition* of rites significant of the yearnings of human nature for the coming mediator, but the addition to their existence of an inward power and strength coming from Christ; cf. "The Christian Church a Continuation of the Jewish" and "The Principle of Continuity between the Jewish and Christian Churches" in *S.S.D.*, pp. 180—217 *passim*; *P.S.*, vols. II, pp. 185, 221; III, pp. 256—257; VI, p. 271; VII, p. 164; and *Jfc.*, p. 196.

<sup>78</sup> *Jfc.*, p. 196; cf. "The Gospel Witnesses" [December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 193; and "The Gift of the Spirit" [November, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, pp. 254—270 *passim*.

of the Church to be holy itself and to convey evangelical sanctity to men. It possessed the sacraments and in its own structures and individuals was a sacramental reality. It remains to examine how he thought the manifestation by the individual of the inner ecclesial reality takes place.

## II

In his authoritative study of the Tractarian Movement, Richard W. Church maintained that Newman's accomplishment was to make the English people face the reality and the consequences of the Article of the Creed which states: "I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church."<sup>79</sup> The task had been, not to speculate about this or that possible dispensation of God for man, but to understand how the actual Church of Christ is the visible home and memorial of truth. However, a consideration of the elements of Newman's thought which would clarify his conception of the Church's instrumentality confronts difficulties. These arise from Newman's "native" view of the world to which the Church is sent, and the often tortuous path which his thought takes during these developmental years. We will give our attention to the reality of grace, the inner principle given in the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, and also to the Ordinances of the *Prayer Book*,<sup>80</sup> insofar as his thought affirms of it some external value of witness for the Church. Our remarks must likewise be governed by his perception of Divine Providence, wherein Christianity is a particular scheme within the general governing Providence, a part of it and conducive to its ultimate completion. The uniqueness of Christianity is its own mysterious economy and powers which, in and through the Church, manifest the special direction of Christ and of his Spirit.<sup>81</sup> In the effort to discern an idea of the charismatic in Newman we need to treat of the relationship of the Church and the world, and then of the means or instrumentality by which she is to fulfill her mandate to and in the world.

<sup>79</sup> R. W. Church, *The Oxford Movement*, London, 1892, p. 33.

<sup>80</sup> It seems that Newman, besides affirming Baptism and the Eucharist as true sacraments, affirmed a lesser or modified sacramentality of the Ordinances of the *Prayer Book*, e. g., Ordination, Visiting the Sick, Confirmation and Matrimony; cf. "Human Responsibility" [April, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 330; "The Christian Ministry" [December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 300—319 *passim*; "Tract XI" in *Tracts*, vol. I; "Remarks on Certain Passages of the Thirty-nine Articles, Tract XC," in *V.M.*, vol. II, pp. 310—314; *Jfc.*, pp. 152—153, 216—220, 278, 313—315, 324—325.

<sup>81</sup> "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Religion, Tract LXXIII" [1836], p. 57, in *Tracts*, vol. III.



a. *The Church and the World — Witness and Opposition*

Christ established the Church upon the foundation of the Apostles. They and their successors were to be his representatives and continue his visible presence among men. To them were given powers of teaching, correcting and reprehending in succession to Christ who is ruler, prophet and priest. As he is the teacher of men and their intercessor before God, so are they.<sup>82</sup> In its temporal existence the Church is not separate from the world, but enmeshed in its affairs. To the unbelieving eye it betrays nothing of divine endowment except as may be detected in its existence during a long history of confronting every variety of human thought and triumphing over all that has been, and has been shown to be, untrue.<sup>83</sup> To the Church, in the person of Peter "upon whom the Church is built", Christ appeared on Easter morning to raise up witnesses who were to be ministers of his word.<sup>84</sup> There are, however, various undercurrents in Newman's thought deriving from his conception of the organic continuity of the invisible Church with the visible which concern the reality of sin within the Church and in the world to which the Church is witness.

The reality of sin and sinfulness weighed heavily on Newman's thought and has given rise to what has been termed his pessimistic view of the world under sin and in its very sinfulness.<sup>85</sup> Our present consideration of the actual Church must briefly look to consequences which arise from his conception of sin's effects in the Church. Briefly stated, the difficulties of the Anglican years revolve around the problem of whether or not Newman thought the actual sinner to be a member of the Church.

There are two significant texts which date from the years 1835 and 1838. The first, commenting on Heb., 6, 4—6, states:

I would have you pay particular attention to this last passage, which, in speaking of those who thwart God's grace, runs through the various characteristics of titles of that glory which they forfeit: — illumination, the heaven-

<sup>82</sup> Cf. "The Protestant Idea of Antichrist," in *Essays*, vol. II, pp. 170—171; *P.S.*, vol. VII, p. 242; "The Catholic Church, Tract II" [September, 1833], in *Tracts*, vol. I.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. "The World our Enemy" [March, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, pp. 36—37; *U.S.*, pp. 41—42.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. "Christ, a Quickening Spirit" [April, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 148; "The Gospel Witnesses" [December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 193.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. "Jeremias, a Lesson for the Disappointed" [September, 1830], in *P.S.*, vol. VIII, p. 136; "The Church a Home for the Lonely" [October, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 192; "The Church and the World" [January, 1837], in *S.S.D.*, pp. 95—111 *passim*; "Faith and the World" [November, 1838], in *S.S.D.*, pp. 78—94 *passim*.

ly gift, the Holy Ghost, the Divine Word, the powers of the world to come; which all mean the same thing viewed in different lights . . . opened upon our souls through participation of the Incarnate, ministered to us by the Holy Ghost.<sup>86</sup>

The second, treating of the supernatural state of salvation, remarks:

These will be found not to recognize at all the case of instable, variable minds, falling repeatedly into gross sins, and saved by that state of grace in which they have been placed. The Christian state does not shelter a man who sins, but *it lets him drop*. Just as we cannot hold in our hands a thing in flames, but however dear it be to us, thought it be a child, we are forced at length to let it go; so wilful sin burns like fire, and the *Church drops us*, however unwillingly, when we sin wilfully. Not our faith, not our past services, not God's past mercies, avail to keep us in a state of grace, if "we sin wilfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth."<sup>87</sup>

Newman did not, except in certain limited circumstances, clearly distinguish between comparative moral guilt of sins.<sup>88</sup> The severity of these texts inclines one to contend that he must surely speak of sins which incur serious moral guilt. More to the point is the relationship of these sentiments concerning sin to those which affirm that only the saints are the true members of the Church, or that the witness of the Church is the witness of the saints in the world.<sup>89</sup> The saints, in the proper meaning of the term, are those who have already attained the goal of union with Christ. The Christian has been brought into a spiritual kinship with them through Baptism; he shares in their lot but with the qualification that he is still affected by sins about him and his own

<sup>86</sup> "The Gift of the Spirit" [November, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 263 (note, however, *Jfc.*, pp. 304—311, concerning good works as the remedy of post-Baptismal sin).

<sup>87</sup> "The State of Salvation" [March, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 184 (*emphasis added*).

<sup>88</sup> Newman's convictions concerning the destructive nature of sin, original and personal, underwent a development parallel to his thought concerning the reality of regeneration as he matured from the Evangelicalism of his youth. Pastoral experience and the counsel of Edward Hawkins caused him gradually to abandon the harsh line between the regenerate and those who were not (cf. "Autobiographical Memoir," in *Autobiographical Writings*, pp. 77—79). He came to accept a real, not merely an imputed, forgiveness of sin, e.g., the Blood of Christ can "interpose between our sin and its punishment, and to wipe out the former before the latter has overtaken us" ("Moral Consequences of Single Sins" [March, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 38; cf. also "Sins of Infirmary" [April, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. V, pp. 209—221 *passim*).

<sup>89</sup> Cf. "The Visible Church an Encouragement to Faith" [September, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 236—241 *passim*; "The Visible Church for the sake of the Elect" [November, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 150—167 *passim*; O. Karrer, "Die geistige Krise des Abendlandes nach Newman", in *Newman Studien*, I (1946), p. 282.

sins. It is true that one or the other text besides those cited above can be found asserting similar sentiments throughout the works of this period, but we have found none which so explicitly concern themselves with severance of the sinner from membership in the Church.<sup>90</sup>

There is a lack of consistency in Newman's thought. In a sermon treating of "The Church Visible and Invisible," he states that there is nothing incompatible with the *notion* of regeneration to think of it being accorded to impenitent sinners within the Church. In this context he maintained that sinners do in fact remain within the body of the Church. The gift of regeneration is the conferring of "a higher and diviner nature; and sinners may have this gift, though it would be a curse to them, not a blessing."<sup>91</sup> Could it be that Newman, who was wrestling during these years with the problem of Baptismal Regeneration against the background of Evangelical teachings, had come to no clearly defined position concerning the problem of sinners and the Church?<sup>92</sup> By the year 1834 Newman's ideas concerning Regeneration had reached a new level of development from what had been his Evangelical understanding. Rather than conceiving the Gift of the Spirit to be a forensic imputation of certain privileges of pardon, grace and hope of glory which would be discernible in modes of conduct, his position can be explained as "the elevation of man's nature to a wholly new order of being through membership in a kingdom in which we are one with Christ through the Spirit in a manner that approaches Christ's oneness with the Father."<sup>93</sup> This is not to imply that the new state of the regenerate person will not be evidenced in his behavior, but that the Evangelical insistence upon conduct being the manifestation and measure of interior sanctity was an oversimplification.<sup>94</sup>

There is an externalization of the power of the Spirit in the lives of religious men. Some of the characteristics of Newman's appreciation

<sup>90</sup> Cf. "Christian Nobleness" [May, 1831], in *S.S.D.*, pp. 141—143; of interest, too, is the use of the Biblical analogy of the net enclosing many types of fish, e. g., *P.S.* vol. III, pp. 207—209, and his definite forbearance in judging any Christian, e. g., *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 241—242.

<sup>91</sup> *P.S.*, III, p. 231: "I do not say regeneration in its fulness, for that includes in it perfect happiness and holiness, to which it tends from the first."

<sup>92</sup> T. L. Sheridan, *Op. cit.*, pp. 117—135, treats of the development of Newman's thought immediately prior to the beginnings of the Oxford Movement.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>94</sup> "Man regenerate is initiated into the unseen world; and though this membership is meant to develop itself in visible effects also, yet we cannot measure or comprehend it by such, any more than we can judge a man's stature and make-up by his shadow on the ground," "Unpublished Tract on 'Holy Baptism'" [1834], cited in T. L. Sheridan, *Op. cit.*, p. 200.

of the religious man are indicative of the direction of his thought. The religious man is one whose life is characterized by self-denial, contempt of the world and who is ruled by an unending obedience to duty as manifested in conscience.<sup>95</sup> In all his actions the religious man is conscious of the guiding hand of God, his omniscient Guide and future Judge. The strictness of his life rebukes the world and its values. His singleminded devotion, his generosity, his self-denial and enduring patience all betray him as a teacher and pattern of revealed Truth.<sup>96</sup> On the face of it, the majority of Christians cannot be said to betray such characteristics in their lives. The majority temporize with the world and its values, and because of their little zeal for divine truth and their carelessness in observing divine law, they share in a limited way in the Communion of Saints.<sup>97</sup> Newman saw this as fulfilling the types and the teachings of the Scriptures, that the witnesses of Christ in the world are, and are to be, few.<sup>98</sup>

Various influences of his life are here evident. He considered groupings or associations of men unable to initiate any movement of reform. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the primal man prefigured man's true state — imitation of the hermit state of Adam.<sup>99</sup> His strong affirmations concerning the Visible and Invisible Church, the former being the manifestation and preparation for the latter, and bearing upon itself the marks of Christ's obscure life, must conclude to the relative obscurity surrounding the activity of the Church. This is in turn reinforced by his conviction that only the *saints*, those heroic figures recorded in history, and those whose present lives approach that level, can be the instruments for Christ's manifestation to the world. The conclusion to which we are led is that the witness of the

<sup>95</sup> Cf. *U.S.*, pp. 80 ff.; "Antony in Calm," in *Church of the Fathers*, pp. 289—290.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. "Mental Prayer" [December, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, pp. 205—206; "Christian Nobleness" [May, 1831], in *S.S.D.*, pp. 148—149; "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth" [January, 1832], in *U.S.*, p. 92; "The Visible Church for the Sake of the Elect" [November, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 159; "The Weapons of Saints" [October, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 316.

<sup>97</sup> "The Visible Church for the Sake of the Elect" [November, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 158—159; "Such is the ordinary Christian, and such is not one of God's elect"; cf. "Chastisement amid Mercy" [April, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 107—115.

<sup>98</sup> "Witnesses of the Resurrection" [April, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. I, pp. 288—289; "It is an old proverb (which even the heathen admitted), that the 'many are bad.' Christ did not confide His Gospel to the many; had He done so, we may even say, that it would have been at first sight a presumption against its coming from God."

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. V, pp. 69—70, 104.



Church to the world, although in principle divine and superabundant, is, in actual fact, limited according to the witness in sanctity of her individual members.

In addition to obstacles limiting the witness of the Church which are rooted in the sins of her members, there is another factor which needs to be mentioned. Newman discerns a barrier to the communication of religious truth on the part of the world to which the Church is sent. In the notable sermon, "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth,"<sup>100</sup> Newman confronts the problem. The influence of truth lies, not in the gift of miracles which he saw characteristic of the first ages of the Church, nor in evidence or external criteria adapted to the reason of the multitude, but in the personal influence of commissioned teachers.<sup>101</sup> Alluding to Christ, the most perfect embodiment of truth and possessed of power beyond comprehension, Newman points to the fact that Christ's opposition and persecution flowed from the deep-seated power of evil in the world. That which had opposed Christ Newman characterized as the reasoning of the secular mind which, irritated by the purity and severity of the Lord's teaching, dismissed it as strange and ill-adapted to the needs of the world.<sup>102</sup>

The reasoning world can dissect religious truth by analysis against which religious protest seems insufficient. As opposed to religion, reason can construct its own principles and systems of counterfeit virtue and thereby neutralize the power of what is revealed.<sup>103</sup> The principle is: "the holier a man is, the less he is understood by men of the world."<sup>104</sup> This is illustrated in the life of Christ whose low estate and humble origins aroused men's contempt. If Christ was held in contempt by the majority of his contemporaries, so must the instruments he instituted to proclaim his truth and continue his presence. Before Christ can be approached and recognized as the source of salvation, an interior reformation is demanded and this is in opposition to what is characteristic of the reasonings of the world.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>100</sup> *U.S.*, pp. 75—98.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 86—91 *passim*.

<sup>103</sup> Newman states this to have been the case in the Arian controversy during which Antioch, an example of laxity, provided the *ethos* wherein Reason could usurp the role of Revelation. Cf. *Arians*, pp. 9—12, 18—24, 25—38 *passim*.

<sup>104</sup> "Christ Hidden from the World" [December, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 244.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 248—250 where Newman's hesitancy in affirming a true argumentative force of the evidences of Christianity is reflected; cf. also "The Gospel Witness" [December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 187: "... For,

The world's incomprehension can only be reinforced by Newman's appreciation of the Church's visibility. There can be no dispute that he affirmed the visible Church. Nevertheless, in relation to the world, the term *visible* is difficult to master. If the Church is affirmed to be not "properly" of earth, or if it is but "called" the Church, or if the visible Church is but a "fragment" of the Church, we may wonder at Newman's meaning.<sup>106</sup> Each of these modifications reflects his appreciations of inner mysteriousness, and it may be that an apologetic thrust is foreign to his thought. Nevertheless, as reflecting a deeply rooted conviction, it seems true to affirm that Newman's consciousness of being separated from the world, despite his polemic engagement with the society of his time, entails the consequence that the world cannot comprehend the Church.<sup>107</sup>

Suffice it to say that Newman's affirmations concerning the presence of the Church to the world are encumbered with difficulties. The Church is sent to witness Christ as his instrument communicating Truth and Sanctity. In view of what has been said, one must question who are the members of the Church and what are their individual powers of influencing the world. His sharp awareness of sin as debarring from membership and as blinding the world to her true reality leads to the suspicion that Newman has thrown up an insurmountable barrier against the Church fulfilling the mission confided to her. The fact of the matter is, however, that Newman did recognize that Truth has survived, and that the Church had influenced both men and nations. A consideration of the means with which she is gifted to encroach upon an uncomprehending and hostile world will give some direction to a solution of this many-faceted problem.

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though points of evidence seldom avail to the conversion of unbelievers, they are always edifying and instructive for Christians . . .".

<sup>106</sup> "The Communion of Saints" [May, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 172: "The Church then properly considered, is that great company of elect, which has been separated by God's free grace, and His Spirit working in due season from this sinful world, regenerated and vouchsafed perseverance unto life eternal . . . Well then may the Church be called invisible, not only as regards her vital principle, but in respect to her members"; cf. "The World our Enemy" [March, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, pp. 37—38; "Chastisement and Mercy" [March, 1836], in *P. S.*, vol. IV, p. 91.

<sup>107</sup> "The Gospel a Trust Committed to Us" [November-December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 267: "... we do not know, and cannot form a notion, what is the final object of the Gospel Revelation. Men are accustomed to say that it is the salvation of the world, which *it certainly is not*. If, instead of this, we say that Christ came 'to purify unto Himself a peculiar people,' then, indeed we speak a great Truth . . ." (*emphasis added*); cf. *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 235—236: "... the world at large, not only is not Christian, but cannot discern or understand the Christian."

b. *The Church — Ecclesiastic and Prophetic Instrumentality*

We may not underestimate the lessons which Newman learned from his study of the early Fathers, especially from those which preceded the publication of *The Arians of the Fourth Century*.<sup>108</sup> It was here that he was able to discern two antithetic groups within the body of Christians contributing, in ways parallel to the internal development of any social grouping, to the Church's development and defense. On the one hand were the initiatives and inspirations at the root of new movements and currents whose source was to be traced to the influence of individual personalities. On the other were those forces which, under the names of law or discipline, gathered together, controlled, tempered and secured for the good of all the originality of the few.<sup>109</sup> The Arian controversy forced him to acknowledge not only the activities of the orthodox Bishops and their Arian counterparts, but the endurance and fidelity of the Christian people. Nicea had incorporated a formula in its Creed adequate to preserve the Truth then in controversy, but from the moment the Creed was accepted, its future peaceful possession was endangered by the Emperor's thinking it to be an instrument of peace rather than of belief. The problem which had called for a Council would be again thrown back upon the Church, to be expelled finally only through the persevering tenacity of oppressed believers.<sup>110</sup> It was not only the teaching of the orthodox Bishops which was the mainstay of truth against the post-Nicean Arianizers, but the endurance of persecution and the holiness of life on the part of all believers which finally confounded the evil of heresy.

At a later date Newman would propose his theory of the *Via Media* in which he incorporated this awareness by proposing two types of Tradition in the Church. On the one hand there is what he called *Episcopal Tradition*, or that which is contained in the Creeds and the writings of the Fathers which show their unanimous consent. These teachings have been handed down from Bishop to Bishop. They form the body of truth which is to be confessed by all who come to the Church for Baptism.<sup>111</sup> Parallel to this, and of equally Apostolic origin, he proposes a *Prophetical Tradition* which, in its original form, had come from God

<sup>108</sup> It was in 1826 that Newman began to study the Fathers in preparation for this work.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. *Arians*, pp. 354—355; Newman would later give fuller expression to this perception in an article published in 1854, "Office and Work of Universities," in *Historical Sketches*, vol. III, pp. 74, 78, 82, 85—88.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. *Arians*, pp. 255—256, 360—363, 453—456.

<sup>111</sup> *V.M.*, vol. I, p. 249.

and has been transmitted in the Church as doctrines which, though true, are not needful for salvation. The instruments of *Prophetic Tradition* are varied: much is found in the Fathers; some is contained in decrees of Councils; some has circulated in the Church as commentaries and explanations of the Scriptures which, written or unwritten, have given intellectual expression to the spirit and temper of Christians. "Almighty God placed in His Church first Apostles, or Bishops, secondarily Prophets. Apostles rule and preach; Prophets expound."<sup>112</sup> Through the "prophets and doctors" *Prophetic Tradition* interprets Revelation in ways which are at times completely in harmony with *Episcopal Tradition*. However, there are times when the nature of truth which is transmitted by such varied means as liturgical expression, works of controversy, sermons and popular prejudices may make the correspondence of the two traditions difficult to maintain.<sup>113</sup> The Church (understood to mean the Bishops) may not impose any doctrine for belief which is not contained in the Scriptures. However, there have been instances, e. g., the doctrine of Original Sin, when a truth is proposed which is not so explicitly stated or contained in the Scriptures.

Although there must be a close interrelation of the *Episcopal* and the general *Prophetic* Tradition, Newman, while affirming them to be different in kind, does not explain how the virtualities of one can become explicit in the other.<sup>114</sup> He would later dismiss the whole of the *Via Media* as a "paper theory." Nevertheless his distinction does provide a framework wherein may be discerned his appreciation of the workings of the Spirit in the Church. To avoid confusing instrumentalities with traditions, it has been thought better to adopt the terms *Ecclesiastic* and *Prophetic* witness or instrumentality. After some brief notice of the former, attention will be given to those works of the Spirit which may more specifically be termed Prophetic.

Ministerial succession<sup>115</sup> is the channel through which one is consecrated to the priestly office in order to be, in a singular way, the

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*: "This teaching is a vast system, not to be comprised in a few sentences, not to be embodied in one code or treatise, but consisting of a certain body of Truth pervading the Church like an atmosphere, irregular in its shape, from its very profusion and exuberance."

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222: "Even granting that there were articles of faith which as yet lay amid the traditionary teaching, undefined and unrecognized in public formularies, such as the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, is it not plain that still they must have been implied and virtually contained in the Creed?"

<sup>115</sup> Although the following will treat of the Bishops, it must be understood as extending to the ministry of priests and deacons as instruments of the Bishops (cf. "Tract I," in *Tracts*, vol. I; *Apo.*, 50—51).



source from which the blessings of Christianity are to be given to the world. To the Bishop has been committed, as their principal power supplying the principal need of the Church, the ministration of the Sacraments.<sup>116</sup> Union and submission to their authority is itself a *form* which the eye of faith sees possessed of sacramental value and which guarantees continuity with Christ, the Founder and Head of the Church.

So much is clear. The Apostles received the Holy Spirit in order to succeed in the threefold office of Christ. Their position was unique and their graces unique, being "gifted with divers tongues, workers of miracles; and none but they were such."<sup>117</sup> Divine Providence bestows gifts according to the need, and the Christian Ministry possesses gifts of teaching and governing, together with the priestly power of reconciling sinners. The question is: to what extent did Newman consider the Ministerial Order gifted with authentic powers of teaching and governing? From this flows another: to what extent are teaching and governing consequent upon the consecration of Orders, or merely a greater intensity, because of greater responsibility, of the Gift of the Spirit given to the whole Christian people.

Reasons for raising these questions arise from Newman's conditional acceptance of the Church — so long as it reflected the Church of Antiquity, and from his acknowledgement that the Anglican did not possess the ultimate sanction of excommunication. This latter he saw as the formal antagonist and curb against errors from within the Church. He admitted that: "The humblest and meanest among Christians may defend the Faith against the whole Church, if the need arise . . . [He] has nothing to limit him in his protest but his intellectual capacity for making it."<sup>118</sup> Although it was Newman's intention to exalt the office of Bishop, it seems legitimate to state that this exaltation was not so high as recognize in their office an absolute power of *authentically* and *authoritatively* teaching truths of revelation and governing the Church. This evolution is grounded not merely in Newman's assertions which are

<sup>116</sup> "Submission to Church Authority" [November, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 224; cf. "The Christian Ministry" [June, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 302—303; *Jfc.*, pp. 152—153.

<sup>117</sup> "The Christian Ministry" [June, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 306. However, in an article written in 1833, he wrote: "Of course there were then in the Church of the Fourth Century, as at all times, extraordinary and heavenly gifts; but still they were distinct from those peculiar powers which we ascribe to the Apostles as immediate ministers of Revelation" (*Historical Sketches*, vol. II, p. 112 *emphasis added*).

<sup>118</sup> *V.M.*, vol. I, p. 240; cf. pp. 112 ff., and 138 ff.

similar to what has been cited, and others making Antiquity the measure of orthodoxy, but in his appreciation of the character of those whom he acknowledged as champions of orthodoxy.

The first instance is contained in a series of articles written during the years 1833—1836 to illustrate the character of the early Church. Treating of St. Basil who was contemporary with the violent struggles in the Church, Newman states that the instruments raised up by God for the accomplishment of his works are of two kinds, "*equally gifted with faith and piety*, but from natural temper and talent, education or other circumstances, differing in the means by which they promote their sacred cause."<sup>119</sup> The first group comprises men of high intelligence and understanding of human nature who have been called early in life to a directive function in society. Possessed of largeness of view, tact and decision in the conduct of human affairs, they are leaders of men. The second group are the students and solitaries who, only after long periods of prayer and study, find themselves called to take some place in the direction of human affairs. These exercise their trust when called with equal firmness and guilelessness, zeal and integrity as the former, but, lacking their directive abilities, their efforts win no immediate response. Only later are their worth and influence felt. The point at issue is this. Champions for the faith have come from both kinds of men. And even though Newman cites the names of saintly Bishops as representing both groups, Ambrose and Athanasius for the first, Basil and Gregory for the second, there is no specific significance given to their office. Their efforts in defense of the faith are rooted in "faith and piety"; all else is incidental.<sup>120</sup>

A second consideration centers upon *Prospects of the Anglican Church* which Newman published in 1839.<sup>121</sup> An examination of the controversy which had arisen within the English Church because of the Tractarian Movement brings forth a favorable judgment on their activity as auguring well for the future. Two matters are of note. The Movement's origins were the efforts of private individuals of a certain type of religious character.<sup>122</sup> A second observation contains two elements, the

<sup>119</sup> Cf. *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 68 (*emphasis added*).

<sup>120</sup> This is strengthened from what Newman wrote in the same context about Antony the Hermit: "... Monachism became, in a little while, nothing else than a peculiar department of the Christian Ministry — a ministry not of sacraments, or clerical, but especially of the word and doctrine" (*The Church of the Fathers*, p. 258); cf. "The Visible Church, an Encouragement to Faith" [September, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. III, pp. 246—250.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. *Essays*, vol. I, pp. 262—306; also *Apo.*, p. 94.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 279.

one concerned with Antiquity, the other looking to the future. Newman admits to a certain development in the transmission of doctrines from the first ages. What the Tractarians proposed was not a return to the "exact forms of opinion and modes of feeling which are known to have prevailed in those earlier times."<sup>123</sup> Accidental influences, time and place, intellectual capacities and moral insights, do affect the transmission of theological thought.<sup>124</sup> Yet, the study of the "old works" and their implementation will insure legitimacy of the English Church. What is notable is what is left unsaid. There is no mention of the function of the Church or of the Bishops in determining what is essential and to be kept from the past, nor is there any reference to their role in guiding the Church into the future. All is left on the personal and private level of the individual faithful, to what they had studied, and to the ideals of sanctity which had been awakened in them.

These indications, together with what has been noted earlier, incline us to think that Newman did not in fact attribute more to the *Ecclesiastic* witness, or to the Bishops, than he would to the mass of the faithful. He did recall his contemporaries to the hierarchical structures of the Church, but we feel that this should not be understood as signifying any special role of the clergy in the proclaiming truth aside from their specifically ordained role of being ministers of the Sacraments.

What did Newman see as the authority or power inhering in the Church to preserve intact the body of Revelation handed down from the Apostles? He was convinced that Christianity had not been cast upon the random waves of human opinion, but had been committed to a "baptized society."<sup>125</sup> J. Guittou suggests that if we would seek Newman's insight into the manner in which the faith has succeeded in each generation, we must look for it in his meditation on the role of John the Baptist.<sup>126</sup> If Christ declared the least in the Kingdom of Heaven to be greater than the greatest of the Old Testament Prophets, then his truth, besides its own native vigor for support, will never die "while heaven and earth last, but be handed down from saint to saint until the end of all things."<sup>127</sup> Christianity is "a religion for this world, for the busy and influential,

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287, n. As a Catholic Newman admitted that he had gone beyond his usual affirmations in this Article. He did not yet admit a doctrinal development from certain fixed dogmatic truths, but only a certain *metamorphosis*, or recasting of doctrines into new shapes.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. VII, p. 236.

<sup>126</sup> J. Guittou, *Op. cit.*, p. 39; Lk., 6, 18.

<sup>127</sup> *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 1.

for the rich and the powerful, as well as for the poor,"<sup>128</sup> and, as history has witnessed, it is the saints who are the mainstay and operative means for its preservation. This final section will examine the role of the saints in relation to the world about them, and then Newman's thought concerning the powers possessed by the saints.

A phrase which was penned about Newman provides a key to his own perception of the dynamism of the Christian's witness to the world. A letter which Elisabeth Mozley wrote to her brother in 1874 contains the following: "The *sight* of belief in others is next to seeing yourself; and men cling to it."<sup>129</sup> However small their number and obscure their circumstances, Newman affirmed that those who were truly gifted with sanctity supported the Church in their own generation. The collective holiness of the Primitive Church seemed as close an approach to the pattern of Christ as could be attained by men and should be a paradigm for future ages. The holiness of the Church is the revelation in bodily form of the Holy Spirit who is the second Teacher of Truth sent to men since the departure of Christ.<sup>130</sup>

The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit through the grace of regeneration makes the Christian a partaker of the Divine Nature and a son of God and thereby bestows a "place and office" upon him to which he must respond in fidelity and reverence.<sup>131</sup> What best connotes the inner quality of the individual's response is contained in the meaning which Newman attributes to the term *awe* as the sentiment of dread, wonder, reverence, fear and love.<sup>132</sup> The more the Christian comes to understand his Gift, the more will his reverence deepen. Newman would expect that the more ardent the aspirations of the Christian, the more grave, the more subdued, the more obedient and the more serious will be his demeanor, worship and confession.<sup>132a</sup> It is this which marks the Christian from the world, and it is this which is at bottom the reason for the world's inability to comprehend the values enunciated in the Gospel. It is precisely this which Newman sees as characteristic of those who,

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>129</sup> *Mozley*, vol. I, p. 335 n. 1.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth" [January, 1832], in *U.S.*, pp. 82—83; "The Greatness and Littleness of Human Life" [October, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 218; "The State of Innocence" [February, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. V, pp. 101—102.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. "The Indwelling Spirit" [November-December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 222—223.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. *P.S.*, vol. I, pp. 7, 303, 304, 322; vol. III, pp. 26, 35, 269; vol. IV, p. 133; vol. V, pp. 14, 16, 27, 66.

<sup>132a</sup> Cf. "Christian Nobleness" [May, 1831], in *S.S.D.*, pp. 140—145 *passim*; also G. Velocci, *Newman Mistico*, Rome, 1964, pp. 176—186 *passim*.



in God's providence, are to continue "in their turn the succession of his witnesses."<sup>133</sup>

The presence of the Church perceived in the lives of saintly and serious men is a constant and unarticulated protest against the world whose reaction is incomprehension, disdain, ridicule and persecution. The prophetic function as the conscientious response of Christians to the Gift received in Baptism is shown to be genuine when there is persecution. The teachings of the Church call for assent to Something unseen and seemingly unreal and inimical to the interests and prospects of the world, and the world's reaction is strengthened by the vividness with which its values are seen and retained in the imagination. For the Church to be without suffering indicates that she is slumbering and unfaithful to the law of witness exemplified by and received from Christ.<sup>134</sup> Martyrdom, in the varying degrees in which suffering is endured, is a grace-laden event which manifests the presence of Christ who alone is the power strengthening the few against the many who are unable, because they are unwilling, to accede to the Gospel.<sup>135</sup>

One other form of *Prophetic Witness* needs to be mentioned. Newman gave particular attention to the sufferings of the early Church, but he noted Monasticism to be a particularly important witness of piety and holiness. He takes the words *monk* and *monastic* to signify *solitary* and to denote "a mode of life which is so far contrary to nature as to require some special direction or inspiration for its adoption."<sup>136</sup> As exemplified in the life of Antony, the monastic system, its retirement from the world and the austerity of a prayerful and obedient life, preserved and ministered the truth in times and places of great Christian infidelity. The monastic life of piety and holiness is a special department of the Christian ministry which is lay in character and distinct from the ministry of the

<sup>133</sup> "Elisha a Type of Christ and His Followers" [August, 1836], in *S.S.D.*, p. 169: "By Christ's favoured and special servants, I do not merely mean His ministers, such as bishops and others, but all who in any measure have upon them eminent marks of the Lord Jesus; such as evangelists, confessors, solitaries, founders of monastic orders, doctors and the like. Of these . . . Elisha is the type"; cf. "Tract LXXIII," in *Essays*, vol. I, p. 34; *U.S.*, pp. 95, 134—135; *P.S.*, vol. VI, pp. 303—304.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. "Christ Hidden from the World" [December, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. V, pp. 244—245; "Warfare the Condition of Victory" [March, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 228; "The Christian's Portion" [March, 1839], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 297; *The Church of the Fathers*, pp. 2—3.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. "Martyrdom" [July, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 41—50 *passim*; *Arians*, pp. 311, 317—318, 350—361 *passim*.

<sup>136</sup> *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 258.

sacraments confided to the clergy.<sup>137</sup> It is of interest to note that Newman recalled this element of the social fabric of the Church when, in 1838, he affirmed the monastic principle to lay at the root of the existence of Universities. Oxford was but a new form, with new names, of what had been the life of the Benedictines and Augustinians of past ages.<sup>138</sup> The spirit of simplicity, devotion, strictness and zeal which had disappeared from other portions of national life was preserved in the University "as being out of this world, to measure and expose the world, and, as being in the heart of the Church, to strengthen the Church to resist it."<sup>139</sup> It was the university scholar, deeply read and well-bathed in the wisdom of the past, who could be serenely strong in opposing the forces of the world and prescient of the future prospects of the Church.

In his efforts to bring the Church of England to fidelity to the principles which it embodied, it must be said that Newman concentrated upon the *Prophetic Witness* of the Church. Perceived in the sanctity of all, clerics and laymen, it is this which is responsible for adherence to orthodoxy, progress in holiness and growth in members. It does not seem unfaithful to the thought of Newman, as he developed during these active years, to assert that he would acknowledge, not only the witness of the serious individual, but a specific type which is social in character. This, taking its form and spirit from the example of primitive monasticism was expressed concretely in the life of the university as an institution specifically pertaining to the ecclesial complex of the Church. It should not, however, be thought that this University Witness devolves an Ecclesiastical source. Rather is it rooted in the efforts of individuals of serious convictions who may, or may not, pertain to the clerical state.

### III

It is one thing to attribute the growth, continuity and influence of the Church to the sanctity of its members; it is another to determine whether Newman would admit to the existence of specific gifts or graces of the Holy Spirit which may be termed *charismatic*.<sup>140</sup> It is one thing

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 192, 258; male monasticism was counterbalanced by groupings of women who witnessed the Christian ideal of caring for the sick, alleviating suffering, and fostering other works of Charity.

<sup>138</sup> "Medieval Oxford" [July, 1838], in *Historical Sketches*, vol. III, pp. 331—332.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> It is of interest to note that Newman predicates the greek *chárisma*, together with *dōron*, *dōréa*, and *dōrema* of the special abiding gift of the Gospel, which either is, or at least includes justification (*Jfc.*, pp. 139—140, 139 n. 1).

to affirm the primacy of the Gift of Sanctity in the Church; it is another to seek Newman's understanding of the influence of this Gift in the life of the individual. It is therefore necessary to seek further concerning the sanctified individual's perception of his role and function in the life of the Church. We shall attempt to discover if Newman would admit a reality influencing the individual which would be encompassed under the meaning of *charismatic grace*. And, more, if such is to be admitted, are there indications in his thought which would be useful in its identification.

a. *Does Charismatic Grace Exist?*

Our question arises from statements in which Newman seems to give but qualified assent to the existence of all the divine gifts which signaled the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Primitive Church. Together with this is the problem of unity in the Church as the condition and guarantee of the fullness of Revelation and the Gifts of the Spirit. The admission that the primal unity had been broken leads to the suspicion that he must admit of a certain diminution of the endowments which have remained in the Church.

Whatever is done in the Christian Church is done by the Spirit of Christ. These words are, in sum, the expression of Newman's fundamental vision. The Scriptures show that the extraordinary nature of the Gift of the Spirit to the Church pertained in an altogether special way to the Apostles.<sup>141</sup> Throughout the history of the Church there have been gifts given to the Church. Whatever their nature, however, they are distinct from the powers which were the unique possession of the Apostles in their special offices. There is a strange hesitancy on Newman's part to identify, name, or even classify the Gifts of the Spirit. He did admit the possibility of God's immediately acting upon the mind to communicate some truth or to inspire the fulfillment of some particular activity.<sup>142</sup> Beyond this there is little more. He shows himself ill at ease

<sup>141</sup> *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 274; cf. "The Miracles of Scripture," in *Two Essays on Scripture Miracles and on Ecclesiastical*, p. 6: "A Revelation, that is, a direct message from God to man, itself bears in some degree a miraculous character, inasmuch as it supposes the Deity actually to present Himself before His creatures . . . And as Revelation itself, so again the evidences of a Revelation may all more or less be considered miraculous."

<sup>142</sup> "Ceremonies of the Church" [January, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 73: "Matters of Faith indeed, He reveals to us by inspiration, because they are supernatural; but matters of moral duty, through our conscience and divinely-guided reason; cf. J. J. Byrne, "The Notion of Doctrinal Development in the Anglican Writings of J. H. Newman," in *Eph. Theol. Lov.*, 14 (1937), p. 266.

with the distinctions then in vogue in Anglican thought. As the usual divisions, he mentions the *miraculous* and the *moral*. The former are such as were manifest in the first ages, "marvels out of the course of nature, addressed to the senses; such as the power of healing, of raising the dead, and the like, or, again, such as speaking with tongues or prophecy."<sup>143</sup> These have ceased to be evident in the Church. The latter are those divine influences which act upon the minds of men, enabling them to be what they otherwise could not — holy and accepted in all aspects of a Christian character — in short, all influences which issue in sanctification. The former he terms extraordinary, the latter ordinary; the former are *gifts*, the latter are *graces*. Whereas the *gifts* characterized the early ages, the present age bears the mark of the *graces* of the Spirit.

But this cannot be a sufficient description of the true reality "which is something deeper, wider, and more mysterious, though including both miracles and graces."<sup>144</sup> Nothing of what may be said, and no division or limitation can express the total reality of what is properly a mystery. His view would be deliberately large in order to encompass all the qualities which the Scriptures attribute to the Gift of the Spirit, which is the anticipation of heavenly glory and the "present entrance into the next world."<sup>145</sup>

Later Newman does attempt an identification of the various gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit.<sup>146</sup> He asserts that the gifts and operations of the Spirit are manifold. Some are outward, others inward; some sanctify, others are grants of power; some are gifts of knowledge, and others of moral goodness. Whatever they may be, however, the division into *miraculous* and *moral* is declared by Newman to be "jejune and unauthorized."<sup>147</sup> He invokes the analogy of life which he sees to be the same in all living things, but is manifested as "one flesh of man, another of fishes, another of birds."<sup>148</sup> In like manner the spiritual gifts are the same, but diverse; each is holy, but admits of differences of kind and degree. That which distinguishes one individual from another, the Evangelist, the Apostles, the Prophet, the Doctor and the Teacher, is not rooted in a distinction between gifts *miraculous* and *moral*, but in

<sup>143</sup> "The Gift of the Spirit" (November, 1835), in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 258.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 259.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263; cf. "Evangelical Sanctity, the Completion of Natural Virtue" [March, 1831], in *U.S.*, pp. 41—42.

<sup>146</sup> "Letter Addressed to a magazine on Behalf of Dr. Pusey's Tracts on Holy Baptism, Tract LXXXII" [March, 1837], in *V.M.*, vol. II, pp. 142—194.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, cf. I Cor., 15, 39.



their sanctity. It is this which is rooted in the indwelling Spirit whose life "may be applied to the heart or to the head, as an inward habit or an external impression; for one purpose, not for another; for a time and for ever."<sup>149</sup>

It may be said that Newman's denial of the *miraculous* as designating the wonders of the Old Testament or the marvels of the first ages of the Church is not to be taken as evidence of a final and definitive state of his thought.<sup>150</sup> His denial of a distinction between the graces or gifts according as they were called *miraculous* and *moral*, or charismatic and sanctifying,<sup>151</sup> does not deny the reality which the terms had been framed to signify. Although he does not understand the former within the framework of scholastic thought, he does admit in fact the existence in the Church of functions which, outside of those especially pertaining to the Apostles, are undertaken under the influence of the Spirit for the good of the Church and for the sanctification of others.<sup>152</sup>

#### b. *Can Charismatic Grace be Identified?*

The first principles which determined the movement of Newman's thought and contributed to the formation of his fundamental view are to be found, according to J. Walgrave, in the triad: providence, the nature of things and analogy.<sup>153</sup> At an earlier date H. Tristram had written that the cardinal import of the illness which Newman suffered during his solitary trip through Sicily in the Spring of 1833 lay in the acuity of his realization of the fact and import of Divine Providence.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*; cf. *U.S.*, pp. 38, 79.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. "The Miracles of Ecclesiastical History," in *Two Essays on Scripture Miracles and on Ecclesiastical*, pp. 389—390: "If the occurrence of miraculous interpositions depends upon the presence of the Catholic Church, and if that Church is to remain on earth until the end of the world, it follows, of course, that . . . no prejudice will attend the medieval miracles . . .".

<sup>151</sup> And this, it would seem, is in distinction from some Anglican Tradition as illustrated by Lancelot Andrewes (1555—1626) whose *Preces Privatae* Newman has translated and used, even when Cardinal. Andrewes had written: "The Holy Ghost may be received more ways than one. He hath many spiramina: *polutrópos*, 'in many manners' He comes; and the *multiformis gratia* He comes with. He and they carry the name of their cause; and to receive them is to receive the Spirit. There is a *gratia gratum faciens*, the saving grace of the Spirit, for one to save himself by, received by each, without respect to others; and there is a *gratia gratis data* (whatever becomes of us) serving to save others . . ., without respect to ourselves. And this *châris diakonias*, the grace of a holy calling, for it is a grace to be a conduit of grace anyway" (*Sermons*, London, 1629, p. 695, cited in "Catena Patrum, Tract LXXIV," in *Tracts*, vol. V, p. 6).

<sup>152</sup> What has been said preciously concerning the link with the undivided Church of Antiquity through Apostolic Succession should be recalled as the sufficient guarantee of the continued presence of these Gifts in the English Church.

<sup>153</sup> J. Walgrave, *Newman the Theologian*, New York, 1960, p. 366.

Surrender to God's will would thenceforth be the foundation of his spirituality.<sup>154</sup> In more recent years G. Velocci has devoted a chapter of his study of Newman to what he terms Newman passivity.<sup>155</sup> The term *passivity* ought not to be considered as denoting in this context the mere submission or acquiescence to external influences or impressions without corresponding activity in the recipient. Rather should it be appreciated in the sense of an "active receptivity" whereby the individual is not "merely passive", but in positive relationship with another. In this sense he will respond to the other's initiatives either negatively by refusal, or positively by acceding and co-operating.<sup>156</sup> There is no clear definition of this in Newman's works, but what is said here will be illustrated in the matters to follow.

Newman expanded upon the description of saving faith given in Heb., 11, 1: "Now faith is the substance," that is, the realization, 'of things hoped for, the evidence,' that is, the ground of proof, 'of things not seen'."<sup>157</sup> It is the term *realizing* to which attention must be given, for it is this which specifically characterizes his own acceptance of Revelation.<sup>158</sup>

As background to this idea Newman's peculiar use of the term *image* must be considered. The image is both the product of the imagination as well as of mental abstraction. Following an example of Newman himself, it may be illustrated in the following way. A schoolboy may read about an event in the past and be able perfectly to apprehend and construe the meaning of each term used by the historian. Yet he

<sup>154</sup> H. Tristram, "With Newman at Prayer," in *John Henry Newman, Centenary Essays*, London, 1945, p. 105; cf. "My Illness in Sicily" in *Autobiographical Writings*, pp. 124—126; *Apo.*, pp. 34—35.

<sup>155</sup> G. Velocci, *Op. cit.*, pp. 135—157 *passim*.

<sup>156</sup> Newman gives only indirect indications of passivity in this sense, e. g., "[Christ] was about His Father's business . . . not thinking to be merely passive under the trial, but accounting it as if a great occasion for a noble and severe surrender of Himself to His Father's Will" (*P.S.*, vol. III, p. 149); "... the life of the Church lies . . . not in doing, but in suffering; in all those things which the world despises . . . in patience, in simplicity, in innocence, in concession, in passiveness . . ." (*S.S.D.*, p. 243).

<sup>157</sup> "The Ventures of Faith" [February, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 296—297; *Jfc.*, p. 252.

<sup>158</sup> In the sense of a truth which is present and actual in the whole person, not simply as an imagination or impression, or an exciting and enthusiastic stimulus, it is intellectual knowledge which penetrates the heart as a principle of action as practical and fruitful knowledge. Although it was not until the publication of his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* in 1870 that Newman gave formal expression to his thoughts concerning the mental and emotional processes influencing and attending the act of belief, this was the product of many years of thought which had found expression particularly in the University Sermons (e. g., *U.S.*, pp. 20, 29, 76, III, 124, 190, etc.).

is only able to have a notional, or abstract, knowledge of the event and the circumstances surrounding it. The author who had witnessed and recorded the event in question, however, had more than a notional knowledge. His was a living presence to what was happening whereby his imaging of it was richer, more vivid and characterized by a living quality. So also the historian in the present who has steeped himself in historical lore and dedicated himself to its study can perceive from the record of the same event an image of the same quality as that had by the author-witness. In an analogous way one may have an image of revealed truth, e. g., of Providence, of Christ, of the Trinity, which Newman qualifies as being an *idea*. The image-idea is that which flows from all the affective ways of knowing, in the case of Revelation, from the data of the Gospels, from personal inspiration and the experiences consequent therefrom, meditation upon revealed truth, fidelity to conscience. In brief, the image comes from total dedication to reality itself. All of these characteristics converge into what he would call a living concrete image of a reality, whether past or present, and to have this image is to *realize*.<sup>159</sup>

Providence, as manifested in the New Testament, is not concerned only with the divine governance of the world in an impersonal way. In the Old Testament, the type and foreshadowing of the New, the power of God had been perceived through the workings of nature and in the interplay of human affairs. Only to Moses and some few others did God show himself "face to face"; to the rest he did not. It was only in Christ that God revealed himself in a sensible form as a really existing individual being and began "to speak to *us* as individuals."<sup>160</sup> The difficulty inherent in this revelation is this: while it is more than possible to conceive of the works of God on a large scale, the truth that he is really present everywhere, wherever the human individual is, cannot be *believed* and *realized*.<sup>161</sup> The former is grasped by the majority of men as a purely mental notion, an abstraction; the latter needs to be taken in a real and concrete way as a truth full of life and an object of experience. Assent in the former manner is indeed unconditional acceptance of the proposition, but it is cold and ineffective; the latter, through the power of the images accompanying it, is belief which in

<sup>159</sup> Cf. *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (ed. 1947), pp. 7—9; Zeno, O.F.M.Cap., "Neman's Psychological Discovery: the Illative Sense," in *Franciscan Studies*, 11 (1951), pp. 42—49.

<sup>160</sup> "A Particular Providence as Revealed in the Gospel" [April, 1832], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 115.

<sup>161</sup> *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 216.

the force of the same images can induce action as the consequence of assent.<sup>162</sup> To state it briefly by way of example, in matters of revealed truth gained either through conscience or the Scriptures, the former may be termed the attitude of theology, the latter of religion.

It may be noted in passing that certain phrases descriptive of Newman's attitude during these years of probing for a solution to the problem of belief can bear the interpretation that belief can only occur in the individual who is able to realize the truth. To cite but three examples, one may confer sermons preached in 1836, 1837 and 1839. In the first, which treats of the reverence demanded when attending religious services, he states:

We must not aim at forms [of worship] for their own sake, but we must keep in mind where we are, and then forms will come into our service naturally. We must in all respects act as if we saw God; that is, if we believe that God is here, we shall keep silence . . .<sup>163</sup>

The second illustrates a particular fault of mind which a habit of prayer is recommended to cure:

. . . many a man seems to have no grasp at all of doctrinal truth . . . reasonings do not convince him; he *cannot* be convinced; he has no grasp of truth. Why? because the next world is not a reality to him; it only exists in his mind in the form of certain conclusions from certain reasonings. It is but an inference; and never can be more, never can be present to his mind, until he acts, instead of arguing. Let him but act as if the next world were before him . . .<sup>164</sup>

The third concerns "Unreal Words" and begins with the affirmation that in the New Testament the servants of God are enabled to see what had been before but shadows:

To be true and sincere is really to see with our minds those great wonders which He has wrought in order that we might see them. When God opened the eyes of the ass on which Balaam rode, she saw the Angel and acted upon the sight . . . And in like manner, Christians are now under the protection of a Divine Presence, and that more wonderful than any which was vouchsafed of old time . . . To us he reveals Himself not visibly, but more wonderfully and truly; not without the co-operation of our own will, but upon our faith, and for that very reason more truly; for faith is the special means of gaining spiritual blessings.<sup>165</sup>

<sup>162</sup> Cf. *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, p. 68; "Faith and Sight" [May, 1832], in *U.S.*, pp. 121—122, 128—129; "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason" [January, 1839], in *U.S.*, pp. 207—208, 220.

<sup>163</sup> "Reverence in Worship" [October, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. VIII, p. 8.

<sup>164</sup> "Moral Effects of Communion with God" [December, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 231.

<sup>165</sup> "Unreal Words" [June, 1839], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 29.



Is Newman a voluntarist or a subjectivist, the very attitudes he saw and complained of in the milieu of Protestant England? It would seem that faith can only be true according to the subjective intensity of the image accompanying it. In those of his *University Sermons* which are more directly concerned with the subject, the trend of his thought is more clearly delineated. Faith is reasonable. It is not that Faith follows upon a previous and distinct act of reason, rather is it that "Faith is the reasoning of a religious mind, of what Scripture calls a right or renewed heart, which acts upon presumptions rather than evidence, which speculates and ventures on the future when it cannot make sure of it."<sup>166</sup> To believe is an act of reason, but it does not imply the necessity of previous investigations and argumentative proofs. Newman did assert Faith is safeguarded, not by reason, but by a right state of heart, by "holiness, dutifulness, or the new creation, or the spiritual mind, however we word it."<sup>167</sup> And these are protection against bigotry, credulity and fanaticism. The fact is: although men may argue badly, they do not on the whole reason incorrectly. The act of simple assent is virtual certitude in that reflection upon itself will show the rational, though implicit, grounds upon which it rests. And, however full and precise such grounds may be, and however clear and tangible the evidence adduced, when argument is traced down to its most simple elements, "there must be something assumed ultimately which is incapable of proof, and without which our conclusion will be as illogical as Faith is apt to seem to men of the world."<sup>168</sup> Therefore, Newman could state: "... though the evidence with which Faith is content is apparently inadequate to its purpose, yet this is no proof of real weakness or imperfection in the reasoning. It seems contrary to Reason, yet is not; it is but independent of and distinct from what are called philosophical inquiries, intellectual systems, courses of argument, and the like."<sup>169</sup>

If the truth of an individual Providence is accepted by an act of realizing Faith, certain consequences deriving from the properties of the image and the fact that Faith is itself a "principle of action"<sup>170</sup> are to follow.

<sup>166</sup> "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason" [January, 1839], in *U.S.*, p. 203.

<sup>167</sup> "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition" [May, 1839], in *U.S.*, p. 234.

<sup>168</sup> "The Nature of Faith in relation to Reason" in *U.S.*, p. 213.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 212; cf. p. 254: "Faith cannot exist without grounds or without an object; but it does not follow that all who have faith should recognize, and be able to state what they believe and why."

<sup>170</sup> *U.S.*, p. 188; it should be noted that what follows relates to Newman's thought concerning "the state of mind to which vigorous prayer and watching tend" (*P.S.*, vol. I, p. 75).

Recalling what has already been mentioned concerning the concept of *awe* as the tension between fear and love responding to Divine Justice and Benevolence, the predominant influence seems to be on the side of fear as the characteristic quality of *the serious Christian*.<sup>171</sup> From this Newman was strengthened in his conviction that the unfolding of Divine Providence depends upon the activities and co-operation of *the few*. The Scriptures exemplify this. They mention those few who, in the sanctity of their lives, were enabled by divine grace to enforce a "sort of sensible conviction" of the imperfection of the present order and the unique importance of what is revealed and realized in Faith.<sup>172</sup>

Newman did not attempt an explanation concerning how the mystery of the Indwelling Spirit influences the lives of Christians. All that can be done is to attempt to detect his vision of the workings of grace in the individual. This entails certain dangers of inexactitude in the formulation of his thought, and the need to be satisfied with approximate and analogous explanations. This vision, however, can be elucidated by a brief consideration of Newman's thought concerning the actual workings of Divine Providence in the unfolding of events, and the consideration of what he calls the *Venture of Faith*.

It should first be noted that Newman states that there can be no rules given according to which the course of events or the agency through which God works his will might be predicted. It is true that *ordinarily* it is to be expected that he will work through the Saints. But Revelation has shown that he has worked both through those who, in the Old Testament, were not members of the Chosen People, and, in the New, through those whom he would number among the unregenerate and unchristian.<sup>173</sup> The power and activity of God cannot be limited or comprehended within the limits of any human law; he may intervene in creation as he wills.

<sup>171</sup> The "seriousness" which Newman espoused is described antithetically in the following: "... [the religion of the day] includes no true fear of God, no fervent zeal for His honour, no deep hatred of sin, no horror at the sight of sinners, no indignation and compassion at the blasphemies of heretics, no jealous adherence to doctrinal truth, no especial sensitiveness about particular means of gaining ends, provided the ends be good; no loyalty to the Holy Apostolic Church, of which the Creeds speak, no sense of authority of religion as external to the mind; in a word, no seriousness" (*P.S.*, vol. I, p. 314; cf. vol. V, p. 21).

<sup>172</sup> "The Reverence due to Her [the Blessed Virgin Mary]" [March, 1832], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 133; "The Greatness and Littleness of Human Life" [October, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 218—219.

<sup>173</sup> "Early Years of David" [August, 1830], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 65; "Divine Decrees" [February, 1832], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 118—123 *passim*;

Neither can there be a rule to determine with exact certitude if an act of the present moment contributes positively to the promotion of Divine Providence. There has been no assurance given that any particular action, except such as are conserving of primitive revelation, bears the stamp of divine approval.<sup>174</sup>

It is only after the event that a word or deed can be identified as in conformity or in discord with providence. The rule of Scripture is that God "dispenses His blessings, silently and secretly; so that we do not discern them at the time, except by faith, afterwards only."<sup>175</sup> Newman infers this from the New Testament which shows that the Apostles understood who had been with them only when the Holy Spirit had come upon them.<sup>176</sup> In religious matters, the past, as recorded in Scripture and history, is to be consulted as a guide for the present. The past is not brought back, but is a type and indication of what is to come. The past is where the future is seen in miniature and in outline.<sup>177</sup>

This is not to say that Newman was a man of inaction or diffident at the prospects of disturbing the established order. The study of his life and activities resolves such suspicions. The question is whether or not there are indications in his thought which might help identify as charismatic a judgment or decision to enter upon a certain course of action. The question is delicate and made difficult by the evolutionary nature of his thought during these years. It must refer both to his theory of knowledge, and to his conception of the activity of the Holy Spirit.

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"Wilfulness the Sin of Saul" [December, 1832], in *U.S.*, pp. 165—166; "The Glory of the Christian Church" [November-December, 1834], in *P.S.*, vol. II, pp. 82—83; "Prospects of the Anglican Church," in *Essays*, vol. I, p. 292.

<sup>174</sup> An example of this is Newman's observation about the division of the kingdom under Jeroboam, a "wicked man" whose fault was in gaining the kingdom for himself instead of waiting for the fulfillment of the divine promise (cf. "Jeroboam", in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 65).

<sup>175</sup> "Christ Manifested in Remembrance" [May, 1837], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 257; cf. *ibid.*, p. 256: "... the trace of a general principle, which comes before us again and again both in Scripture and in the world, that God's presence is not discerned at the time when it is upon us, but afterwards, when we look back upon what is gone and over;" "Prospects of the Anglican Church," in *Essays*, vol. I, pp. 273—274.

<sup>176</sup> *P.S.*, vol. IV, p. 256.

<sup>177</sup> "The State of Innocence" [February, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 100, pp. 101—102: "The garden of Eden, though long past away, is brought again and again to our nature in the progress of God's dealing with us, not only to instruct us by the past, but unavoidably, if I may so speak, from the resemblance which one condition of God's favour bears to another — of Adam's first state to the Law, and of the Law to the Gospel, and of the Gospel to the state of rest after death, and of that to heaven . . . Thus God takes away the less to give the greater, not reversing the past, but remedying and heightening it; preserving the pattern of it, and so keeping us from forgetting it."

The proprieties of each need to be respected. Although he would not write his definitive reflections on the relation of faith and reason until 1870, the central theme of his work, that assent and belief are not primarily the results of logical demonstration, but are the acts of the "concrete being and the whole man"<sup>178</sup> is threaded throughout his works from the time of the publication of *The Arians of the Fourth Century* in 1833. Since the main object of this investigation is only obliquely concerned with the theory of knowledge, what follows will be limited to such explanations as shall be useful in the development of the theme. Our concern is with Newman's understanding of the thinking process insofar as it is related to the faith-filled man.

Of prime interest is the use of the term *instinct*, which is found in works which span the whole period under study. In 1831 Newman described the long practised Christian as one in whom the Spirit dwells:

... he does not look out of doors for the traces of God; he is moved by God dwelling in him, and needs but to act on instinct. I do not say there is any man altogether such, for this is an angelic life; but it is the state of mind to which vigorous prayer and watching tend.<sup>179</sup>

In 1835, in relation to the duty of interceding for one another, he said:

The very instinct of faith, will lead a man to do this without set command . . . .<sup>180</sup>

In 1836, concerning the demeanor of the penitent before God, he stated:

... somehow I cannot content myself with this recurrence to one in God's favor to plead intercession; — no, terrible as it is I had rather go to God alone. I have an instinct within me which leads me to rise and go to my Father . . . .<sup>181</sup>

In a sermon concerning the object and effects of preaching which he delivered during March of 1831 and 1835, occur words which, though not properly related to instinct, bear, in the force of what is said, a like connotation:

... whether a Christian teacher preaches but half the gospel, or the whole gospel, or the gospel, or the gospel corrupted with much more besides (to suppose a case, which is scarcely fitting), still anyhow, guided and checked as he must be [by] the prayer book, the true sheep of Christ will

<sup>178</sup> Cf. *Apo.*, p. 169.

<sup>179</sup> "The Spiritual Mind" [December, 1831], in *P.S.*, vol. I, p. 75.

<sup>180</sup> "Intercession" [February, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. III, p. 359.

<sup>181</sup> "Shrinking from Christ's Coming" [December, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. V,



hear Christ's voice amid his preaching and follow Christ. They will separate the wheat from the chaff — and that not by any process of reasoning, much less by any highminded, selfconceited assumption of a critical power, but by *an honest and good heart*, as our Saviour says — unconsciously.<sup>182</sup>

As a final sample, Newman defined faith in his *Lectures on Justification* (1838) as:

... an original means of knowledge, not resolvable into sense, or the faculty of reason, confirmed indeed by experience, as they are, but founded on a supernaturally implanted instinct ...<sup>183</sup>

The immediately obvious problem is the predication of the term *instinct* (and the equivalent: *by an honest and good heart*) to activities which are intellectual, an objection which C. Maynell, of Oscott, would later bring to Newman's attention when he undertook a critical examination of the proofs of the *Grammar of Assent*.<sup>184</sup> It was only on being assured that Newman's use of the term reflected the ordinary understanding of "an act in which we grasp a conclusion without being able to assign the process by which we arrive at it,"<sup>185</sup> that he acceded to Newman's use of the term. Newman would posit a difference between the more simple operations of the mind, and the process of analysis and description which follows when the mind reflects upon itself. Reason, in the first meaning of the term, is a "living spontaneous energy within us, not an art."<sup>186</sup> Only upon reflection on what is initially without order and method and after its analysis do we discover the

<sup>182</sup> "Sermon no. 290" edited by R. O'Brien, *The Theology of Preaching in the Parochial and Plain Sermons of John Henry Newman*, Louvain: Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Theology, 1968, p. 460. The section cited is from the version of 1835, and is only incidentally from that of 1831.

<sup>183</sup> *Jfc.*, p. 253.

<sup>184</sup> Zeno, "The Newman-Maynell Correspondence," in *Franciscan Studies*, 12 (1952), p. 314: "I do not like *instincts* in philosophy . . . Instinct I say is not an intellectual act." Newman replied (August 17, 1869): "By instinct I mean a realization of a *particular*; by intuition, of a *general* fact — in both cases without *assignable*, or *recognizable* media of realization." The following day Newman wrote: "On second thought I can't see how I can change the word 'instinct' — I have not indeed anywhere used it for the *perception of God* from our experience, but in later chapters I speak of Catholic instincts. . . in all cases using the word 'instinct' to mean a spontaneous impulse, physical or intelligent, in the individual, leading to a result without assignable or recognizable intellectual media" (*ibid.*, p. 317; cf. W. Ward, *The Life of John Henry Newman*, London, 1913, vol. II, p. 258).

<sup>185</sup> Zeno, *Art. cit.*, p. 318; P. Flanagan, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 110—111; G. Velocci, *Op. cit.*, p. 148, attributes the following nuances to instinct: "intuizione, forza di anticipazione, conoscenza irriflessa, movimento spontaneo, quasi connaturato."

<sup>186</sup> "Implicit and Explicit Reason" [June, 1840], in *U.S.*, p. 257.

principles upon which it acted. Newman was adamant that the two functions of the mind be not confused or confounded, for the gift or talent for reasoning may be distinct in different individuals, but the process is the same.<sup>187</sup>

Instinct is the knowledge of particular facts or propositions "without any discursive reasoning."<sup>188</sup> The temptation is to equate the correlatives *instinct* and *intuition* with Newman's famous *Illative Sense*, or implicit reasoning. It should be noted, however, that acts of *instinct* or *intuition* are characterized by the lack of a recognizable or assignable discursive process, while the exercise of implicit reasoning is consequent upon antecedent premises which, though not recognized at the time, do exist and can later be analyzed.<sup>189</sup> Whether or not such precision can be attributed to Newman's use of the term *instinct* throughout the works of this period is open to question. There are indications that, even in the final delineation of his thought in the *Grammar of Assent*, there is a certain inexactitude in his use of *instinct* in relation to *Natural Inference*, or the *Illative Sense*. In this context he will note the difficulty of not calling acts of the *Illative Sense* by the term *instinct*.<sup>190</sup> And it is in this same context that he will state that such an equation can be legitimate, "if by instinct is understood, not a natural sense, one and the same in all, and incapable of cultivation, but a perception of facts without any assignable media of perceiving."<sup>191</sup>

It does seem that *instinct* may be taken to indicate the manner of implicit reasoning wherein the road to unconditional assent, though recondite and difficult to trace, if traceable at all, is the most important

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258.

<sup>188</sup> Zeno, "The Illative Sense," in *Franciscan Studies*, 12 (1952), p. 105.

<sup>189</sup> "Implicit and Explicit Reason," in *U.S.*, p. 263: "We believe certain things on certain grounds, through certain informants; and the analysis of these three, the why, the how, and the what, seems pretty nearly to constitute the science of divinity"; Zeno, "The Illative Sense," in *loc. cit.*, p. 106: "The conclusions of the illative sense require a process of thought, an aggregate of mental acts, which is apparently very simple, but in reality very complicated — hence not to be expressed in satisfactory mental formulas."

<sup>190</sup> Cf. *Grammar* (ed. 1947), where Newman cites as examples Napoleon who "by long experience joined to great natural quickness and precision of eye . . . had acquired the power of judging . . ." (p. 253), and Mother Margaret Hallahan whose "firm faith was so vivid in its character, that it was almost like an intuition of the entire prospect of the revealed truth" (p. 254).

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254; Cf. Zeno, "The Illative Sense," in *loc. cit.*, p. 106: "Nor does Newman teach that a kind of immediate perception, actuated, according to some philosophers by the will and by the feelings, complements our intellectual knowledge, a doctrine perhaps best qualified by the name of emotional intuition." Zeno also states that Newman would deny a form of intuition as "recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms . . . in order to vindicate the certainty of our knowledge" (p. 105).

of all the considerations on which conviction stands.<sup>192</sup> It seems legitimate to affirm that in Newman's perception of *instinct* a partial clue to understanding charismatic certitude may be found. This must be nuanced in view of Newman's understanding of the attitude of faith which he sees as characteristic of the Christian who has realized the indwelling of the Spirit.<sup>193</sup> This may be further clarified in the consideration of what Newman calls the *Venture of Faith*.

In treating of the certitude of faith in Newman's thought it should be understood that he refers to that assent to a proposition which is received on the authority of God Himself.<sup>194</sup> In his reaction against the then current opinion that faith was simply of a moral nature, dependent upon and following from a distinct act of reason, he stated that faith is "sole and elementary, and complete in itself, and depends on no process of mind previous to it."<sup>195</sup> Of particular interest are words which, taken from the same context, illustrate the significance of the term *venture*. "Thus Faith is," he wrote, "the reasoning of a religious mind, of what Scripture calls a right or renewed heart, which acts upon presumptions rather than evidence, which speculates and ventures on the future when it cannot make sure of it."<sup>196</sup> Whereas rational conviction demands strong proof from which to draw conclusions, faith which is a moral principle is influenced by "previous notices, prepossessions, and (in a good sense of the word) prejudices."<sup>197</sup> If this were not so, Paul would not have presented himself to the Athenians the way he did and appeal to convictions which had been lodged in their minds.<sup>198</sup>

What is there to prevent such views as this from being an excuse for all kinds of prejudice and bigotry? Antecedent probabilities can be

<sup>192</sup> Cf. *U.S.*, p. 272.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. "Elisha, a Type of Christ and His Followers" [August, 1836], in *S.S.D.*, p. 172: "And in all ages the Catholic Church is promised an instinctive perception of Christian truth, detecting the grosser or the more insidious forms of heresy, though at a distance, as if by some subtle sense; and thus transmitting the faith of the Gospel pure and inviolate to the latest times. 'The anointing,' says St. John, 'which you have received of Him abideth in you, and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in Him' [1 Jn., 2, 27]".

<sup>194</sup> Cf. *U.S.*, pp. 188, 190.

<sup>195</sup> "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason," in *U.S.*, p. 202.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203.

<sup>197</sup> "Faith and Reason Contrasted as Habits of Mind" [January, 1939], in *U.S.*, p. 189.

<sup>198</sup> "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason," in *U.S.*, p. 204: "No one will say it was strong evidence; yet aided by the novelty, and what may be called the originality of the claim . . . and supported by the full force of antecedent probabilities which existed, and which he stirred within them, it was enough."

available for truth or pretense. Depending on antecedents one may argue for Christianity or Paganism, the truth and falsehood. Such an objection, however, does not seem to meet Newman's thought on its own ground. It is true that faith is an act of reason, but Newman denies that "any intellectual act is necessary for right Faith besides itself."<sup>199</sup> And, although the guarantee of faith has already been mentioned as being the right state of heart, it bears repetition at this point in relation to the idea of venture:

It is holiness, or dutifulness, or *the new creation* or the spiritual mind, however we word it, which is the quickening and illuminating principle of true faith giving it eyes, hands, and feet. It is Love which forms it out of the rude chaos into an image of Christ; or, in scholastic language, justifying Faith, whether in Pagan, Jew, or Christian, is *fides formata charitate*.<sup>200</sup>

It is within this vision, with its elements of *instinct* and *intuition*, the concept of *realization* with reference to Divine Providence, and the special characteristics surrounding the reasoning of the faithful individual, that the notion of *venture* should be understood. This is the excellence and nobility of faith and typifies Christian attentiveness to inward Grace and to the external indications of Providence. To venture is to throw oneself forward in hope of the promise made by God; it is to risk present good with the *certainty* that such and such is to be done or omitted now, but without a reflectively reasoned assurance of success. It is exemplified in the lives of the ancient saints who, in the manner of Abraham, risked present happiness on the *chance* of the future. Such readiness did not seem for Newman to be exemplified in the lives of the majority of Christians. His analysis of the pseudo-Christian personality skilfully and delicately indicts that right and praiseworthy conduct of the many whose duty coincides with their interest as hardly betraying anything religious at all.<sup>201</sup> Such are influenced by habit and convenience, and they venture nothing.

The venture of faith is the mark of the religious man. It is he who sees Good in all things, whose vision encompasses not only the visible contingent realities of time, but those which are more real because they are spiritual. As habits and discipline mature in response to Grace, "reason, and self-discipline are unnecessary; a moral instinct takes their

<sup>199</sup> "Love, the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition," in *U.S.*, pp. 232, 234.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234 (*first emphasis added*).

<sup>201</sup> Cf. "The Ventures of Faith" [February, 1836], in *P.S.*, vol. IV, pp. 296, 301—302; "Mental Prayer" [December, 1829], in *P.S.*, vol. VII, pp. 205—206; "The Kingdom of Saints" [January, 1835], in *P.S.*, vol. II, p. 232; *V.M.*, vol. I, p. 92: "Revelation so melts into Providence, that we cannot draw the line between them."



place . . . to speak more reverently, the Spirit is sovereign there."<sup>202</sup> Thus the term *venture* is expressive of the following elements in the religious personality. There is real consent to God revealing himself through conscience and the Scriptures together with the recognition of his will operating in the ordinary works of Providence. This is enlivened faith. In proportion as faith's demands are fulfilled, it becomes the directive force and power which, as the action of the Holy Spirit in mystery, governs conscious activity. Depending upon the individual's co-operation with divine initiative as manifested in the strictness of a holy life, it may be expected that, in a way analogous to the implicit reasonings of the human mind and approximated by the term *instinct*, he will be enabled to judge with certitude a course of action to be undertaken, to detect the beginnings of religious error, and to direct with authority activities of others. This he will do with the assurance that, although unable to trace out or delineate the logical genesis of his judgment, it is right to do what is being done without, at the same time, a clear vision of the consequences.

### CONCLUSION

Whenever the role of the *Faithful* in the Church is mentioned, the name of Newman is immediately evoked. The question is: Does Newman's idea of the Gift of the Spirit in the Church help us to form an idea of charismatic grace? It is our opinion that we may find in Newman's vision notions which are not foreign to Catholic Theology and which may illustrate a Sense of the Faith and of Charismatic Grace in the Church.

A first observation concerns the parallelism existing between what *Lumen Gentium* states in Chapter II, § 12 and in Chapter V, §§ 40, 41. The very first sentence of the former: "The Holy People of God shares also in Christ's prophetic office. It spreads abroad a living witness to Him especially by means of a life of faith and charity . . ." seems to find an echo in the latter: ". . . all the faithful of Christ of whatever rank or status are called to the fullness of the Christian life and to the perfection of charity. By this holiness a more human way of life is promoted even in this earthly society."<sup>203</sup> Together with the emphasis upon the states in which the various orders of the Christian People are constituted,

<sup>202</sup> "The State of Innocence" [February, 1838], in *P.S.*, vol. V, p. 109 (the citation refers to 1 Jn., 2, 20).

<sup>203</sup> Cf. *A.A.S.*, 57 (1965), pp. 16, 45; *D.V.*, pp. 29, 67

the effectiveness of their common witness to Christ is affirmed as deriving in an altogether special way from the gift of sanctity given in Grace.<sup>204</sup> Although this statement occurs after Chapter II, § 12, it seems logically prior to and introductory to that which is stated earlier in the document. This is so not only because of the insistence on the central notion of sanctity, but in the quasi-numeration of graces found in Chapter V.<sup>205</sup> From what has been outlined above, there seems to be a general correspondence in the emphasis of the Conciliar Document and the thought of Newman.

The further question concerns the decision, under grace, of undertaking various tasks and offices advantageous for renewing and up-building the Church, and the discernment of Truth which the People of God, in the *unanimis pastorum ac fidelium consensio*,<sup>206</sup> manifest in their prophetic mission. We think the various elements which converge in the background of Newman's *theological* conception of *instinct* or *Implicit Reason* shed light upon this mysterious mechanism operative in the Church. We think his teaching is similar to that of St. Thomas concerning the Gift of Wisdom.<sup>207</sup> St. Thomas speaks of this gift as presupposing and manifesting faith.<sup>208</sup> More to the present point, he considers it to be that Gift by which the Holy Spirit grants the ability to judge correctly concerning the data of faith, not merely through the perfection of reason, but by a certain "co-naturality" with what is accepted in faith. Although the judgment of Wisdom is seated in the

<sup>204</sup> "Now this holiness of the Church is unceasingly manifested, as it ought to be, through those fruits of grace that the Spirit produces in the faithful. It is expressed in multiple ways by those individuals who, in their walk of life, strive for the perfection of charity, and thereby help others to grow" (*A.A.S.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 44; *D.V.*, p. 66).

<sup>205</sup> The general affirmation of *Lumen Gentium*, II, § 12, concerning the charismatic gifts, together with their judgment by competent authority seems to be developed as pertaining to the various states of life under what is more specifically concerned with the formal object of the Church, the striving toward sanctity in Chapter V, § 41 (with its complement in Chapter VI concerning Religious).

<sup>206</sup> Cf. J. H. Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine* (ed. J. Coulson), p. 65 where J. Perrone is cited; also G. Philips, *L'Eglise et Son Mystère au II<sup>e</sup> Concile du Vatican*, Paris, 1967, vol. I, pp. 168—174 *passim*.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. *S.Th.*, II, IIae, q. 45. A recent article of E. Schillebeeckx ("L'instinct de la foi selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," in *Rev. Sc. Phil. et Théol.*, 48 (1964), pp. 377—408) speaks of the Instinct of Faith, not, however in the meaning of Newman in this present context (who would find a Greek equivalent in *phrónima*), but pertaining to the "first assent" to faith expressed in the Greek equivalents *enthusiasmos* or *hormē* (p. 277).

<sup>208</sup> Cf. *S.Th.*, II, IIae, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2 et 3 and I, IIae, q. 111, a. 4, where the *Gratiae gratis datae* are those by which one is enabled, in a way beyond natural endowments, to instruct others in matters pertaining to faith.

intellect, its cause is charity.<sup>209</sup> Not everyone, however, who is possessed by the Gift of Grace shares in the perfection of the Gift of Wisdom which is the perfection of Charity leading to a deepening contemplation of Divine Mystery. This is not common to all, but pertains more especially to the *gratiae gratis datae*<sup>210</sup> which the Spirit gives as he wills.

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<sup>209</sup> *S.Th.*, II, IIae, q. 45, a. 2, resp.

<sup>210</sup> I Jn., 2, 27; cf. *S.Th.*, II, IIae, q. 45, a. 5, resp., ad 2.

## WILLIAM OF OCKHAM AND *SUPPOSITIO PERSONALIS*

Many have suggested that Ockham's theory of *suppositio* is in some sense an anticipation of contemporary quantification theory; usually this is qualified by the suggestion that Ockham quantifies over terms or qualities rather than individuals.<sup>1</sup> There is also some discussion as to whether the theory is semantical or syntactical in character.<sup>2</sup> Both these matters are, I think, tied together. If we must force a later distinction on Ockham: what he did was to develop roughly the same semantical theory which was later used to interpret contemporary quantification theory. He did so, however, in order to interpret the simple categoricals which have a quite different syntax.

If this is right it means that Ockham developed a semantics which was not well-reflected in the syntax of the categoricals which he wished to interpret. This is presumably why the theory withered in the renaissance save for the use of distribution as a syntactical device for formulating the syllogistic rules and why it waited upon the development of quantification theory for its independent rediscovery. So viewed the development, discard, and rediscovery, of *suppositio personalis* becomes an intriguing episode in the history of logic and, as we will see, the appearance of Ockham's third *Summa*, the *Elementarium*, was potentially a pivotal point in that history.

In order to give a clear account of these matters I will first give in contemporary materials a theory which would serve Ockham's purposes. What this amounts to is the presentation of a semantical interpretation for quantification over sorted individuals which emphasizes those features which are relevant to Ockham's account.<sup>3</sup> I will then present a rough outline of Ockham's theory as it appears in the first *Summa*

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., e.g., Philotheus Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, Manchester, 1952, and Gareth Mathews, "Ockham's suppositio theory and modern logic," *Phil. Rev.* 73 (1964), 91—99.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e.g., Ernest A. Moody, *Truth and consequences in mediaeval logic*, Amsterdam, 1953, and Manley Thompson, "Logic, philosophy, and history," *Rev. Meta.* 8 (1954—55), 91—97.

<sup>3</sup> The relevance of such a system to Aristotelian logics was established by Timothy Smiley in "Syllogism and quantification," *J.S.L.* 27 (1962), 58—72.



in order to stress the parallels between it and the previously presented theory. I will then turn to a discussion of historical developments along the lines already indicated.

# I

Suppose that we possess a semantics and epistemology which we deem adequate to the task of specifying the truth conditions of simple identities and of negations of identities (hereafter "negentities") such as ' $s = p$ ' and ' $s \neq p$ ' where ' $s$ ' and ' $p$ ' denote individuals. Suppose further that we suspect that treatments of the traditional simple categoricals involving 'all' and 'some' which take classes or properties or qualities as fundamental are at best obscure. We might then attempt to treat the simple categoricals in such a way that their truth conditions will be dependent upon the truth conditions of certain identities and negentities. I take this to be Ockham's situation; and his problem, then, to be one of reducing statements about the truth conditions of simple categoricals to statements about the truth conditions of identities and negentities.

The key to his solution is of course the recognition that classes are (at least sometimes) classes of individuals. To present it we, therefore, require lists of individual terms corresponding to such class terms as may be of interest. Accordingly if ' $S$ ' is an (apparent) class term, ' $s$ ', ' $s^1$ ', ' $s^2$ ', ... are individual terms denoting members of that class; if ' $P$ ' is a class term, ' $p$ ', ' $p^1$ ', ' $p^2$ ', ... are individual terms denoting members of that class, and so forth as needed. Note that: 1) no individual terms fail to denote an individual and so no classes are empty; 2) individual terms drawn from the same or different lists may denote the same individual; 3) no individual term is to appear on more than one list; where ' $M$ ' stands for the class of men and ' $M_s$ ' for the class of men excepting Sortes different individual terms will be used; 4) all lists are to be long enough; I will in fact assume that lists are denumerably infinite and that this is long enough.

We may now introduce quantification over individuals drawing our "variables" from individual terms already listed and restricting the values of any bound term (variable) to the individuals denoted by terms on the list from which it is drawn by appropriate restrictions in our quantification rules. As a matter of convenience I will use terms without superscripts in bound positions and terms with superscripts in free positions.<sup>4</sup> We may have then a sorted calculus of individuals with

<sup>4</sup> For the interpretation of quantification see my "Arbitrary individuals and natural deduction," *Analysis* 22 (1962), 94—96. Note that something more complex is needed if individual terms appear on more than one list.

identity as its only predicate of the type described by Meredith; the traditional simple categoricals have the following definitions:

All S is P = df (s) (Ep) (s = p)

Some S is P = df (Es) (Ep) (s = p)

Some S is not P = df (Es) (p) (s ≠ p)

No S is P = df (s) (p) (s ≠ p)

We can then readily indicate the truth conditions for sentences containing bound terms using sentences containing corresponding free terms in the usual way:

'(s) (... s ...)' is true if and only if every sentence of the form

'(... X ...)' is true where 'X' is any term on the same list as 's'.

'(Es) (... s ...)' is true if and only if some sentence of the form

'(... X ...)' is true where 'X' is any term on the same list as 's'.

The truth conditions for the simple categoricals may then be given in terms of identities and negentivities. E. g.:

'All S is P' is true if and only if for every term drawn from the same list as 's' some identity statement with that term as one of its terms and some term drawn from the same list as 'p' as its other term is true.

Should we have no objection to statements of infinite length in object- or meta-language we could have instead the following equivalents:

'All S is P' is true if and only if '[(s<sup>1</sup> = p<sup>1</sup>) ∨ (s<sup>1</sup> = p<sup>2</sup>)

∨ ...] & [(s<sup>2</sup> = p<sup>1</sup>) ∨ (s<sup>2</sup> = p<sup>2</sup>) ∨ ...] & ...' is true.

'All S is P' is true if and only if both 's<sup>1</sup> = p<sup>1</sup>' or

's<sup>1</sup> = p<sup>2</sup>' or ... and 's<sup>2</sup> = p<sup>1</sup>' or 's<sup>2</sup> = p<sup>2</sup>' or ... and ... are true.

The former of these two seems nearest to Ockham's choice; whichever we adopt, however, we will have succeeded in stating the truth conditions of the simple categoricals in terms of the truth conditions for identities and negentivities which was our problem.

I will have more to say about this solution in III after I have detailed Ockham's actual solution. Now I note only the following: 1) This treatment does not demand statements of infinite length; 2) This treatment does not render all simple categoricals logically determinate although some would be if some terms appeared on more than one list; this feature avoids, or at least postpones, a frequent charge against Ockhamistic reductions;<sup>5</sup> 3) Once the categoricals are expressed in the syntax of quantification theory the semantical procedures are closely related to the syntactically formulatable rules of inference in quantification theory.

<sup>5</sup> Cf., e.g., William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford, 1962, p. 268.

## II

The outcome of Ockham's own treatment is I think fairly similar but he lacks the syntactical device of quantification theory and so must proceed by different means. Since the problem, at least as I have formulated it, is basically a semantical problem it is not surprising that he attacks it directly with (somewhat clumsy) semantical devices.

I take his strategy to be the following: 1) ' $s = p$ ' and ' $s \neq p$ ' are true if and only if their individual terms denote, respectively, the same or different individuals; 2) the simple categoricals contain terms which stand for or denote collections of individuals in peculiar ways; 3) that they do so is indicated by the prefixing of 'all' or 'some' and by their positions in the sentences in which they appear; 4) we may therefore construe them as maintaining that some or all of the individuals peculiarly denoted by the terms are the same or different individuals; therefore 5) he replaces a complex syntax with an account of the variety of ways in which terms may stand for individuals.

This is doubtless prompted by features of the latin syntax not shared by our logical syntax. Two of these features deserve special mention: 1) 'All' and 'some' can be omitted in certain contexts; it is therefore tempting to construe their functions in such a way that these functions can sometimes be assigned directly to the following word; 2) general statements more closely share an apparent form with singular statements; where we use the singular term and prefix the quantifier they replace the singular term with a general term; this is doubtless because a natural language could not live with our arbitrary lists of individual terms but this is a matter to which I will return.

I will now detail Ockham's procedure limiting myself, as he seems to do in the texts with which I am familiar, to affirmatives and identity; the inclusion of negative categoricals would complicate the apparatus but would not require a change in approach.<sup>6</sup> Our problem then is to indicate the numerous ways in which general terms such as 'P', 'all P', 'some P', stand for or denote individuals and so to enumerate the various ways in which statements containing these terms are true if and only if certain individual terms stand for or denote in the ordinary way the same individuals. This was of course just the task of Ockham's theory of *suppositio personalis*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> But cf. William Ockham, *Elementarium Logicae*, f. 146 rb. in *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965). 211.

<sup>7</sup> William Ockham, *Summa Logicae* I, 64, 3 (65) is the defining passage. The above citation indicates that the passage intended begins at Part I, Ch. 64, line 3 of William Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Philotheus Boehner,

Ockham begins by contrasting the behavior of individual terms with that of apparent class terms. The former have *suppositio personalis discreta* (discrete personal supposition), i. e., stand directly for a certain individual; the latter have *suppositio personalis communis*, i. e., may stand (peculiarly) for more than one individual.<sup>8</sup> It is clear that common nouns are paradigm instances of terms having *suppositio personalis communis*. It is equally clear that something in 'All men are mortal,' has *suppositio personalis communis*; it is not clear whether 'all men' or 'men' is that thing. It is, however, clear that the *suppositio* of terms is dependent on their roles in sentences (or propositions) and that 'all' does not signify any fixed thing but that when added to 'men' it makes 'men' stand (*supponere*) as would a term with *suppositio personalis communis*.<sup>9</sup> It cannot therefore be much of a simplification to treat 'all' as an operator which makes terms out of terms and determines (differently in different sentential contexts) the *suppositio* of the resultant term although it is certainly something of a simplification.<sup>10</sup> I will therefore count 'all men' and 'some men' as further instances of terms with *suppositio personalis communis*.

Ockham further divides *suppositio personalis communis* into 1) *suppositio determinata*, 2) *suppositio confusa distributiva*, and 3) *suppositio confusa tantum*.<sup>11</sup> As these three varieties are all that are required for the affirmative simple categoricals I will limit my discussion to them; for this purpose it will be clear enough to refer to them as determinate, distributive, and confused supposition respectively. Here is Ockham's discussion of determinate supposition:

There is a determinate *suppositio* when it is possible to make the logical descent to singulars by a disjunctive proposition, as in the correct inference 'A man is running (*homo currit*), therefore this man is running, or that man is running . . . (and so on for every individual)'. It is called 'determinate' *suppositio* because such *suppositio* denotes that a proposition of this kind is true in the case of a determinate singular proposition, which determinate

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St. Bonaventure, 1951—7, and that it appears on p. 65 of *Ockham Philosophical Writings*, ed. and tr. Philotheus Boehner, Edinburgh, 1957. The latter text differs in some details and in chapter numbering from the former.

<sup>8</sup> Op. cit., I, 70, I (70). For the "may" see I, 63, 33 (65) on 'Sortes is white'. where: "If no other thing had whiteness but Sortes, then the predicate would stand for Sortes alone."

<sup>9</sup> Op. cit., I, 63, 2 (65) and I, 4, 15 (51).

<sup>10</sup> The important thing is that 'all' is a syncategorematic expression which helps to determinate the supposition of a term; it together with certain other devices could therefore be omitted without loss if we marked directly the type of supposition intended.

<sup>11</sup> Op. cit., I, 70 (70—74).



singular proposition by itself, without the truth of any other singular proposition, is sufficient to make such a proposition true. Thus for the truth of the proposition 'A man is running' it is required only that some determinate singular proposition be true; and any one would suffice, even if every other such singular proposition were false. Frequently however other also, or even all, of the singular propositions are true. Therefore it is a sure rule that when (1) the logical descent from a common term to its singular inferior terms can legitimately be made by a disjunctive proposition, and (2) from any singular proposition such a proposition is inferable, then this term has determinate personal *suppositio*.

*Summa Logicae* I, 70, 20—33 (71)

The most striking thing about this passage is of course that we are given no grammatical (i. e. syntactical) indications of the supposition of the term; the discussion is cast entirely in terms of the claims and the truth conditions of these claims made by the propositions in which the terms with determinate supposition appear. No indication whatever is given as to how we may determine the supposition of a particular term in a particular sentence unless we know what claim the speaker wishes to make. Ockham's remark in another context that a certain type of *suppositio* must be indicated by the "will of the speaker" could apparently be made here as well.<sup>12</sup>

Apart from this matter the first notion we encounter is that of the logical descent to singulars in which the notion of a singular inferior term plays a part. I assume that this latter notion is used so that singular inferior terms (with *suppositio discreta*) are to their superiors as the terms on our lists are to the names of the classes whose members they denote; certainly the present example in which 'iste homo' and 'ille homo' are inferior to 'homo' suggests this. Logical descent is more complex than this; it is done *by means of* a disjunctive proposition (*per propositionem disjunctivam*) and seems to occur when a proposition with a common term stands in a certain relation to a proposition (whose components are?) exactly like the given proposition except that a singular inferior term stands in place of the common term. If we take the sentence in which Ockham explains his predecessor's choice of terminology as definitive we may say that a term is in determinate supposition in a proposition when some logically inferior proposition is true if it is true and it may be inferred from any logically inferior proposition. I. e., 'Some S' in 'Some S is P' is in determinate supposition if and only if 'Some S is P' is true if and only if some sentence of the form 'X is P' is true where 'X' is a term inferior to 'S' ('Some S'?).

<sup>12</sup> Op. cit., I, 65, 3 (68).

Thus a term is said to be in determinate supposition if and only if the truth conditions of the sentence in which it appears may be reduced to the truth conditions of sentences containing inferior terms in much the same way in which, in the last section, the truth conditions of existentially quantified sentences could be reduced to the truth conditions of sentences with identities and negentities. It should now be added that, in the terminology of the previous section, terms will be in determinate supposition only where they are bound by an existential quantifier in subject position so far as we can as yet determine.

Distributive supposition is defined by Ockham in an analogous way; universally quantified terms have it under related conditions. The following paraphrase will do:

'All S' in 'All S is P' is in distributive supposition if and only if 'All S is P' is true if and only if all sentences of the form 'X is P' are true where 'X' is a term inferior to 'S'.

Given these two notions the means for reducing simple categoricals to identities and negentities are available except for one problem. Although it does not matter in what sequence we reduce the two existentially quantified terms of 'Some S is P' it does matter in what order we reduce the terms of 'All S is P'. Ockham handles this with the notion of confused supposition. 'All S' in 'All S is P' is said to be in distributive supposition because the truth conditions are as required; after this reduction 'P' is in determinate supposition precisely because the truth conditions of 's<sup>1</sup> is a P', 's<sup>2</sup> is a P', etc., are again as required. However, 'P' in 'All S is P' is in neither of these suppositions because, as we would say, '(s) (Ep) (s = p)' is not equivalent to '(Ep) (s) (s = p)' and so the truth conditions are not as required. Ockham therefore invents the new semantical category of confused supposition to handle these peculiar truth conditions; I give his statement in full:

*Suppositio confusa tantum* (confused supposition) occurs when (1) a common term has personal supposition; (2) we are unable to make the logical descent to the singulars by means of a disjunctive proposition, without any change of the other extreme; (3) we can, however, make the logical descent by way of a proposition with disjunctive predicate; (4) the original proposition can be inferred from any singular.

*Summa Logicae* I, 70, 47 (72)

The example given reduces 'Every man is an animal' to 'Every man is either this animal or that (and so on for every animal)'. This of course, although Ockham doesn't say so, contains a term in distributive supposition and so reduces to 'This man is either this animal or that . . .

and that man is either this animal or that ...' and so the notion of confused *suppositio* in effect determines the order of reduction in those cases in which both terms are common and the order matters. Presumably an analogous form of supposition will be conjured up to handle particular negatives.

We can now see that Ockham invokes supposition in such a way as to enable him to say how the truth conditions of the simple categoricals are dependent on the truth conditions for identity and negentivity. A few qualifications are required: 1) Although we have a text in which Ockham suggests that truth is ultimately a matter of identity and negentivity we have no texts which complete the reduction of categoricals to sentences with both terms singular; there is however an explicit text in which both terms in 'Some S is P' are said to be determinate supposition;<sup>13</sup> 2) The function of the syncategorematic term 'is' has been assumed to be the same regardless of whether the predicate term is common or singular; the previously cited passage suggests that this is Ockham's view; the doctrine of supposition is in fact the means by which he is able to collapse identity and inclusion just as we were able in the previous section to eliminate inclusion by means of quantification theory. 3) Ockham shifts between semantical talk about truth conditions and syntactical talk about valid inferences; but validity is for Ockham a truth relationship and even if syntactical has no syntactical correlate within the sentences under discussion.

### III

The relationship between quantification theory and Ockham's theory of supposition is now easily stated. The most obvious difference is that supposition is, in a later terminology, a semantical notion whereas quantification is initially a syntactical device. It is of course possible to clarify the syntax by adding a semantics as we have done in 1); it is also possible to mark supposition syntactically as some later logic texts do. Even so there is a clear sense in which Ockham is attempting the reduction of truth conditions for categoricals to the truth conditions for identities by direct semantical devices whereas quantification theory uses an intermediate syntactical device and thereby achieves a far greater flexibility. More simply put: the will of the speaker plays no role in contemporary quantification theory (at this level).

It is by now commonplace to note that Ockham quantified over terms whereas we quantify over individuals; it is also usually unintelligible.

<sup>13</sup> Op. cit., I, 70, 42 (72).

What is true and may now be stated clearly is that Ockham quantifies over sorted individuals; i. e., the range of the values of his variables is limited not simply to individuals but to individuals of certain kinds. At the least we may say that the syntactical device which best answers to supposition involves quantification of this type. Ockham would, I suppose, be more inclined to discuss it in terms of the peculiar *suppositio* of common nouns which assures that their eventual *designata* are individuals of a certain kind.

Some concluding remarks about the subsequent history of logic are perhaps warranted at this point. Given this reading of Ockham's purpose it is no accident that, save for identification of distributed and undistributed terms in connection with the theory of inference, the medieval theory of supposition was soon to disappear.

The theory of supposition began of course as a theory of terms. It is discussed by Ockham in that physical context although he is in the *Summa Logicae* already aware that supposition is a property of terms in propositions. His order of discussion here is a) term, b) proposition, c) syllogistic, which is the traditional order. In two later *Sums of logic* he was to change this order and discuss supposition after propositions and immediately prior to the discussion of syllogistic. I presume that this is a result of his becoming aware of the function of the doctrine in the reduction of the categoricals and so the syllogistic to identity although he does not say so in the later (introductory) texts. Certainly his treatment presupposes a discussion of propositions (and *consequentiae*) and lays the groundwork for an immediate treatment of syllogistic and is therefore most appropriate to the context in which it appears in the *Elementarium Logicae* and *Tractatus Logicae Minor*.<sup>14</sup>

Once, however, supposition is regarded as a theory immediately ancillary to syllogistic the collapse into distributed and undistributed was likely because together with quality they were sufficient for syllogistic. The distinction made by confused supposition, once it was separated from semantical motives, became for accidental reasons irrelevant to syllogistic. Although the distinction between, e. g., (s) (Ep) ( $s = p$ ) and (Ep) (s) ( $s = p$ ) is of overwhelming importance to contemporary quantification theory and the later De Morgan syllogistic, it is, so far as syntax is concerned, a distinction without a difference for the Aristo-

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Philotheus Boehner, "Three sums of logic attributed to William Ockham" in *Collected Articles on Ockham*, St. Bonaventure, 1958, pp. 70—95. Texts of the later Sums, edited by Eligius M. Buytaert appeared in *Franciscan Studies* 24 (1964), 34—100, 25 (1965), 151—276, and 26 (1966), 66—173.



telian syllogistic precisely because only the first of these forms is an Aristotelian simple categorical. Accordingly, although the rules require the distinction for their semantical elucidation they have no need of it for their syntactical employment. I take it that this is why the semantical notions involved soon seemed "mysterious" whereas the syntactical version (e.g., the subject of an A-proposition is distributed, etc.) survived into the twentieth century.

It is perhaps idle to speculate as to what might have happened had the point of view implicit in the *Elementarium* been fully appreciated. Certainly had it suggested the development of a syntax which reflected Ockham's semantical reduction the later history of logic would have been quite different. We can at least now appreciate how close Ockham came and regret the failure until very recently to appreciate the need for a "two-way street" between semantics and syntactics.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The phrase is used by Alan Ross Anderson in *The Logic of Decision and Action*, Pittsburgh, 1967, p. 63.

# THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH AND THE FUNCTION OF THE HIERARCHY ACCORDING TO ST. BERNARDINE OF SIENA

## I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH

The vastness of revealed truth and the limitations of the human mind being what they are, it is no surprise that the latter, at any given period, will focus on this or that aspect of the former, that many a great theologian will not adequately treat, even cursorily, the entire area of Christian truth (once a treatment is cursory it cannot, by definition, be entire), and that for one or another reason, even a great theologian will lose sight of what others consider a principal datum.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, because of their formation, their adversaries, their temperament or their function, the theologians of whatever time will address themselves more especially to some truths, and in their own way. Thus we have Trinitarian and Christological epochs in the history of theology, conditioned by heresy, the writings of a Teresa of Avila or a Julian of Norwich, or a Margaret Mary, conditioned by temperament, of a John Chrysostom conditioned by function, and whole recognizable schools of theologians conditioned by their formation.

Even theologians who are cognizant of a given body of doctrine will, for different reasons, choose to stress one or another aspect. If we might make the distinction between what these men hold, and what they taught, we could undoubtedly establish that they held a corpus of belief common to other theologians of other ages, but we could hardly insist that they taught it with the same emphases. For, in different ages, and to different men within an age, what is most important in theology will differ.

All of this is clear. We introduce it here not in order to give even the briefest sketch of the history of Theology, or even of the Theology of the fifteenth century, but in order to introduce what Bernardine of Siena had to say about the Church in its structure, and in order that we might appreciate the positive and negative aspects of his approach.

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<sup>1</sup> Thus P. Mersch in *Le Corps Mystique du Christ*, 2nd ed. (Louvain, 1936), vol. II, pp. 146—47 comments on the disappearance of the doctrine of the Mystical Body in the works of Saint Bernard.

Since the time of the Council of Trent<sup>2</sup> and certainly since the first Vatican Council, the standard treatise *De Ecclesia* has given great emphasis to the structure of the Church, to the proofs for its monarchical institution, the distinction between presbyterate and episcopate, and the distinction of both of these from the priesthood of the faithful. The prerogatives of the Pope especially, but also of bishops, have been much clarified. One is indeed tempted to say that, because of these developments, the very word 'Church' in a Catholic context, conjures up to many minds an image of the hierarchy, its privileges and powers in governing the faithful.<sup>3</sup> For, the defense of the structure of the Church was a need keenly felt in the face of assault from without. This development of doctrine had the natural consequence of centering the attention on certain aspects of the *depositum fidei* and resulted in definitions of many contested points. The truths defined, in turn, shaped the development of Ecclesiology. We find that the consideration of the Mystical Body is often assigned to the position of appendix, and that the fundamental theology which prepares for the *De Ecclesia* treatise is especially concerned with an exploration of the Scriptures in which special emphasis is placed on the exegesis of those texts which illumine the function of the hierarchy and the outward structure of the Church.<sup>4</sup>

What is generally admitted to be the post-tridentine bias of Ecclesiology, has, indeed, deep roots in the later Middle Ages. Indeed, it would be impossible to read the history of the Church in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries without being aware that the most constant theme of the canonist-theologians is related in one way or another to the problem of the Church's external structure. Among the powerful influences must be

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<sup>2</sup> On the effect the reformers had on the thinking of Catholic theologians, cf. Stanislaus Jaki, *Les Tendances nouvelles de l'Ecclesiologie*, (Roma, 1957) pp. 8—10.

<sup>3</sup> Gustave Thils, *L'Infaillibilité du Peuple chrétien "in credendo"* (Louvain, 1963, p. 10 notes the difference of attitude between our own day and even the theologians of the Counter Reform. Citing a text of M. Cano (*De locis theologicis* IV, 4) in which the Dominican begins by admonishing his reader that "the word Church does not only designate the assembly of Catholic faithful, the new and consecrated community of those who have been baptized in Christ, but also the heads and pastors of this community . . .", Thils notes: "Pareil réflexe ne se rencontre guère dans l'ecclesiologie du XXe siècle."

<sup>4</sup> S. Jaki, *op. cit.*, p. 12: "Mais en même temps l'exposition scolaire de l'idée de l'Eglise, telle quelle est présentée dans les manuels *De Ecclesia* est restée dans les mêmes cadres traditionnels depuis la Réforme, donc surtout apologétiques. Prenons au hasard quelques-uns parmi les manuels récents . . ." If this is true, and we think it is, how can the statement of P. Galtier, who says of the doctrine of the Mystical Body that "... les récents mouvements d'idées l'avaient fait passer au premier plan de l'enseignement distribué couramment aux fidèles," be cited with apparent agreement?

put not only the friends and adversaries of Ludwig of Bavaria in his conflict with John XXII<sup>5</sup> but the other and older spiritualizing movement which took its inspiration from Joachim of Flora.<sup>6</sup> The first of these movements has a primarily political overtone, whereas the second looked — if one considers the matter most generally — to a spiritual renewal of the Church. If the first led to a re-evaluation of the power of the Papacy in relation to the State, the second led to attacks on authority within the Church by some of its adherents, who saw in the Church of their time the very person of Anti-Christ.<sup>7</sup>

That this ecclesiological orientation of the theologians and canonists continued into the fifteenth century, and thus through the life-time of our author, is limpidly clear from the history of the councils of Constance, Basle and Ferrara-Firenze. For this period, the period of the mature life of Bernardine, saw the most violent discussions of Conciliarism, and may be said to have come to some kind of close only with the publication of John of Torquemada's treatise *Summa de Ecclesia* in 1453 in which a frankly polemical and cogent defense of the Papacy is set forth.<sup>8</sup>

What is important here, negatively, is that Bernardine of Siena who lived in the midst of this world in which the outer structure of the Church was so much the center of attention, made himself so little of it. It is true,

<sup>5</sup> Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, *Storia della Chiesa* (tr. ital. of Igino Rogger, Brescia, 1960) no. 139, Vol. III, pp. 39ss, gives a brief but telling description of the moment of this struggle, and provides us with an elenchus of the participants which shows us by itself the importance of the controversy.

<sup>6</sup> On Joachim: E. Jordan, "Joachim de Flore", D.T.C., VIII, 2 (Paris, 1925), cols. 1425—58. Also: Morton W. Bloomfield, "Joachim of Flora, a critical survey of his canon, teachings, sources, biography and influence" in *Traditio XIII* (1957), pp. 249—311.

<sup>7</sup> Whether Joachim himself ever used Babylon of the Rome of his day is uncertain Cf. Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 260. There is no doubt at all, however, that among the Spiritual Franciscans there were those who made strong attacks on the prelates of their time. Ubertino da Casale went to the extreme of calling Boniface VIII and Benedict XI Antichrist. The line of influence which ends in this outburst extends from Joachim through Pietro di Giovanni Olivi to da Casale. On Olivi, cf. P. F. Callaey, "Olieu (Olivi) Pierre de Jean, D.T.C., XI, i, (Paris, 1931) cols. 982—91. On Joachimite influences, cols. 987—88.

The same author's article in the *Enci. Catt.* IX (Città del Vaticano, 1952), cols. 103—05 adds nothing.

Such a pious man as Jacopone da Todi was also a violent assailant of the Popes. Cf. Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, *op. cit.*, no. 131, Vol. II, p. 339.

<sup>8</sup> The utterly polemical intent of Torquemada is clear right from his introduction: he announces that he is writing a book against the enemies of the Church and of the Primacy. As Pastor remarks, "Già da queste parole d'introduzione s'appalesa il carattere strettamente polemico dell'opera intera, in cui il cardinale, seguace fedele della tradizione tomistica, propugnò strenuamente il primato del pontefice contro le mire del sinodo di Basilea." Ludovico Pastor, *Storia dei Papi*, Trad. Ital. del Clemente Benetti, Vol. I (Trento, 1890), p. 300.



as we shall see, that he refers to the Hussites, but, as we shall also see, his concern with the hierarchy is less with defining privileges than duties. His image of the Church is as far from that of the Medieval Corporation — a parallel at the base of so much of the Canonist's thought in preceding controversy and speculation — as it possibly could be.<sup>9</sup> His lack of attention to this aspect is especially surprising since prominent amongst his sources are Ubertino da Casale and Pier di Giovanni Olivi, the first of whom engaged in a savage diatribe against the Pope, and the second of whom, while a spiritual, wrote a very important defense of papal powers. Though he leans heavily on these sources, Bernardine leaves their polemic completely behind. He has other concerns.<sup>10</sup>

It is therefore of some interest to see exactly what Bernardine taught. If we ask what he *held* about the external structure of the Church, we must answer, from indications in his works, that he held the Primacy of the Pope in all of the dimensions usually associated with the doctrine today, but we would note a difference: whereas today the external aspects of Church structure are taught to the people, we will not find such teaching in Bernardine's Latin works. Considering that he envisaged these works as an armament for preachers, and, as a consequence, as instructions against the evils of the hour, one can only conclude that he did not feel this a necessary part of his catechesis of the people with whom he dealt.

### A. One Method

Perhaps the easiest way of showing the utter unconcern of Bernardine for any sort of treatise approach to the Church will be to cite an author who has, for very legitimate purposes, moreover, seen fit to expose the

<sup>9</sup> The story of the influence of this theme in the Middle Ages is one of the main features of Tierney, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting that Ubertino's attacks are found in his *Arbor vitae crucifixae Iesu* (Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, *op. cit.*, no. 131, vol. II, p. 339), about which P. Godefroy: "Saint Bernardin de Sienne a puisé à pleines mains dans *L'Arbor* les thèmes de nombreux sermons ainsi que les éléments de la dévotion au saint nom et au Sacré Cœur de Jésus." Yet there is not a word of attack in Bernardine.

Olivi's defense of the Pope's power — specifically his power to renounce his office, and, implicitly, his independence from the Cardinals in his entire doctrinal function, is found in the thirteenth chapter of his *De Perfectione Evangelica*. The text of this chapter has been edited by L. Oliger, O.F.M. in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XI (1918) pp. 340—66. Of this work P. F. Callaey (D.T.C., XI, 1, col. 990) remarks: "La claire et droite démonstration que fit Olieu de l'inerrabilitas et potestas papae in constituendis et definendis et specialiter super substitutione sui successoris est d'autant plus méritoire qu'elle l'obligea à prendre position contre bon nombre de spirituels d'Italie, qui traitaient Boniface VIII d'antipape."

thought of Bernardine in a highly schematic form. A general criticism of this approach, in as much as it is related to an attempt to gain the perspective of Bernardine, is that what the author does is set out the content of the modern course *De Ecclesia* and intersperse quotations from Bernardine, drawn from various parts of his works, which tend to show that he taught the doctrine under discussion. At best, one can prove that he *held* the doctrine, not that it was a focus of his teaching, or occupied a very large place in his thought. For instance we read:

1. De Necessitate Magisterii Infallibilis. Tempora Bernardini luctuosa viderunt orta schismata, sicut etiam haereses quamplures, quae sub pallio pietatis errores et odia disseminarunt. Ex horum consideratione ostendit Sanctus necessitatem Magisterii vivi ac infallibilis doctrina Christi fideliter custodienda et exponenda. "Multi," inquit, "utique sunt erroribus et haeresibus pleni, tamen in apparentia iusti . . . Inter quos numerandi sunt quidam qui lapsi sunt in damnatum heresim de spiritu libertatis, quae doctrina ponitur in libro qui *De anima simplici* intitulari solet . . . His quoque possunt etiam superaddi multi alii haeretici et schismatici et iudaei pluries baptizati, insuper et secta Dulcini haeretici." (53) Frequentia haereticorum ostendit Sacram Scripturam per se minime sufficere ad veram religionem Christi tuto certeque conservandam. Unde enim "multitudo haereticorum habuit ortum nisi de Scripturis non intellectis (54)." <sup>11</sup>

Of this citation, we note first, that it is mostly commentary, that the words '*Magisterii Infallibilis*' of the paragraph are not Bernardine's. He did not think in these categories. The other significant thing is that the first quotation above comes from a sermon "*De Fide Viva et Mortua*" the object of which is not to describe a characteristic of the Magisterium, but to describe the dangers of faith without charity. The infallibility of the Church's teaching power is something Bernardine takes quite for granted. He assumes that his hearers do as well. Again:

A divina legatione Christi igitur recto tramite venit ad Ecclesiam catholicam, sine qua doctrina Salvatoris supervivere non posset. Hanc conclusionem, ex consideratione haeresum iam dictarum collectam, Bernardino vel maxime persuasit perniciose haeresis Ioannis Huss, cuius triginta articuli in Concilio Costantiensi (1415—1416) damnati, Ecclesiae veram notionem et divinam auctoritatem impugnabant. "Clarius," inquit, "atque utilius *de dignitate ecclesiastica* disseramus, cum necessario hoc exposcant infelicia tempora nostra, in quibus Hussianorum pestifera haeresis insurrexit atque in tanto robore, divino iudicio, in tam parvo tempore vires sumpsit" (56). In hoc sermone praeclara de auctoritate Ecclesiae proferens, Sanctus osten-

<sup>11</sup> P. Titus Szabo, *Sancti Bernardini Senensis, Doctrina Theologica* (Rome, 1960) p. 46—47. The quotations are: (53): *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo 6, a. 2, c. 2 (III, 109—10) (54): *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo I, a. 2, c. 2 (I, 12)

dit divinam auctoritatem etiam in pastoribus indignis vigere, et rationem prolixae expositionis assignans, concludit: "Hoc autem latius dixisse velim non ut per hoc maiorum crimina defendantur, sed *ut gradus ecclesiastici conserventur et defensentur*, quibus amotis perit christiana fides (57)."<sup>12</sup>

This paragraph cites a sermon on which our following section is largely based. The impression it gives of the content of that sermon is however quite wrong. It is certain that Bernardine defends the authority of prelates. But the mood of the sermon is quite other. It is, as we shall see, a sermon in which one whole section is dedicated to reasons for honoring Church buildings, another to describing the benefits we receive from the ministry of priests, and a third to showing the baleful effects of indiscriminate criticism of the clergy. The aim is not to demonstrate the authority of ecclesiastics. It is to prevent harm to the body of the faithful, to the holy society which is his idea of the Church. Indeed, the last remark above — that without ecclesiastical grades the Christian faith cannot endure, is, in context, not a defense or even an insinuation of the essential nature of the hierarchy to the structure of the Church, but an existential appreciation of the fact that even bad priests fulfill a function necessary for the communicating of the divine life of grace to the faithful. We might further add that the influence of Hussitism in Italy does not appear and that as we show in the next section, there are other reasons why Bernardine felt called upon to defend the clergy. The citing of Huss seems a peg with which to begin. The final quote given in the paragraph above therefore has a different object: that in view of the usefulness of the priesthood and prelates, people will not insist on preaching about their crimes, for so doing they will effectively destroy the confidence of people in their ministers, and this brings a consequent lapse of morals and religion so that "perit christiana fides". If we may consider just one more paragraph, we could turn to a fragment concerning the papal power:

Omnes istae praerogativae, cum ad Ecclesiae perennem stabilitatem pertineant in successorem Petri transeunt, (71) in Papam videlicet qui est "*amabilis Pater*" totius Ecclesiae (72). Eius status in Ecclesia ita summus est sicut sol in mundo (73), et ius divinitus acceptum in alios transferre non potest (74).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 47—48. Both quotations are from *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo XX, A. 2, Introduction, (I, 245) and Art. III, Cap. VII (I, 255).

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 51—52. The references are:

(71): *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo I, a. 3 c. 2 (I, 17—18)

(72): *ibid.*, Sermo 29, a. 1, c. 1 (I, 356)

(73): *Sermones de Tempore*, Sermo V, a. 2, c. 1 (VII, 416)

(74): *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XLI, a. 3, c. 3 (IV, 343)

This paragraph illustrates in a clearer way the danger of this process. It would be difficult to find a statement about the transfer of the prerogative of Peter, *qua* Pope, to his successor. I do not find this anywhere stated. It is obvious enough that Bernardine holds the doctrine but he is not interested in explaining it. Then the Pope is indeed called "amabilis Pater" but this in a sermon on honoring parents, and all those in a position of authority who contribute to our good, either materially or spiritually. The Pope is not there called 'papa totius Ecclesiae' though if he were, it would reflect Bernardine's more genuine idea of the Church as family, as the Body of Christ, and certainly would have no immediate juridical implications.

The position of the Pope is said to be "Summus . . . sicut solis in mundo", but associated with him in the text alleged are the Cardinals, and, moreover, the context is one of lament for the darkness in which one third of this highest rank finds itself — that is, a lament for the uselessness to the Body of even such high members.<sup>14</sup> It is therefore no exaltation of the Pope's supremacy. As for the Pope's inability to transfer the '*ius divinitus acceptum*', we find the text here cited at the end of a very long discourse on the illegitimacy of transferring interest-bearing notes to another in payment of debt when the interest is considered part of the payment. After he has discussed this arid subject at great length, Bernardine seeks examples to prove that not all rights are transferable. The first example he uses is the Pope's inability to transfer the papacy. It would be well to consider the whole context, since it is indicative:

Quod non liceat emere talia impraestita cum lucri intentione multiplici similitudine comprobatur.

Tertia est veritas confirmationis. Nam argumenta capituli praecedentis quae militant contra hanc tertiam conclusionem, licet sint sufficienter soluta, tamen pro maiori firmitate praedictae conclusionis et maiori infirmitate praedictorum argumentorum (i. e. in favor of the legitimacy of transfer) ponamus unam aliam conclusionem, quae talis est.

*Conclusio* — Potest homo aliquod ius in aliquam rem habere quod ius in quemlibet alium non potest transferre. Quod multipliciter probari potest . . .

Primo probo de Papa. Papa habet ius in papatum, nec potest illud ius in alium transmutare; ergo non quilibet habens ius aliquod in aliquam rem potest illud in alium transferre. Antecedens satis apertum est, quoniam

<sup>14</sup> The context of Bernardine reflects the medieval notion of associating the Cardinals with the head of the Church as "pars corporis papae". If it were a point developed by and insisted on by Bernardine, it would tell against him, for it is a dangerous formula. Cf. Joseph Lecler, S.J., "Pars Corporis Papae, Le Sacré Collège dans L'Ecclésiologie Médiévale" In *L'Homme devant Dieu*, Vol. II, (Coll. Théologie, Lyon, 1963). Confer Tierney, *op. cit. passim*, on the same theme and its ramifications.



volenti sibi obicere opponeret ius papatus et quidquid facit ex decretalibus et decretis et aliis magnis, excepta consecratione, ex iure papatus facit. Et secunda pars patet; quoniam per cardinales eligitur Papa, ut plene habetur in cap. Ubi periculum, *De electione*, lib. VI; ergo etc. Idem argumentum est de imperatore quoad officium suum . . .<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the non-transferability of the papal power is based simply on the fact that the Pope is elected by the Cardinals, a fact of canon law. Moreover, the only mention of this fact is found at the end of a very lengthy discourse on an entirely foreign matter and by way of example.

The reason for this consideration has been simply to show that there is no such thing as a tract — or even one article or one chapter of one article — in which Bernardine considers the hierarchical structure of the Church as such. There are indeed, many fleeting glances, which, subject to quite legitimate inference, will show that our author held what is taught in the manuals of our day. Yet, proving that what we hold can be found in an author forces him ineluctably into our categories. These might well falsify whatever originality or special emphasis he has, and so deprive us of the enrichment we might gain from the attempt to understand him as he is, in his setting, with his goal. As a matter of fact, it is the singular detachment from the wars concerning the structure of the Church which were being waged about him which is interesting. What Jaki remarks of the scholastics, is, in its own way, true on Bernardine: “On comprend donc que chez les scolastiques la notion du Corps Mystique est située avant tout au plan de la vie, non à celui de l’institution (structure de l’Eglise) . . .”<sup>16</sup> Although it is clear from what we have already seen of his works, and will become clearer still, that in a general way Bernardine conceives the Church in the medieval manner as a “principle

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<sup>15</sup> *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XLI, De Imprestitis Venetorum . . . , Art. 3, Cap. 3, (IV, 343). The Sermon is some 39 pages in length. The mention of the Pope is found after 36 pages. Another significant light on Bernardine’s attitude towards the papacy is the fact that in mentioning Amadeo of Savoy, the anti-Pope Felix V, he merely says that one should be careful not to be misled in following inspirations. Cf. *Tractatus de Spiritu Sancto et de Inspirationibus*, Sermo III, Art. II, Cap. III, (VI, 267): Dum per hanc illusionem ut manifesta indicia clamant, delusus (Amadeo, i.e.) antipata tam horribile et scandalosum monstrum in Ecclesia parturivit; quod est iniquitas maxima, et negatio contra Deum altissimum. This statement shows his horror of schism, and his attachment to the Pope of Rome beyond doubt, but he never enters a polemic about it.

<sup>16</sup> Jaki, *op. cit.*, p. 194. The author continues: “C’est pourquoi non seulement les catholiques sont ses membres mais aussi toutes les créatures rationnelles élevées à l’état de la grâce, les anges et tous les justes à partir du premier homme, Adam. En cela les docteurs scolastiques ne sont que l’écho fidèle de la tradition patristique, si riche et variée en ce qui concerne les différentes acceptions de l’expression de Corps Mystique.”

of order and of peace", his main concern for order and peace is because in such conditions the Church is able to flourish.<sup>17</sup> He does not construct a managerial concept of the Church's function, and he is far from those suspicious of theologizing about the interior life of the Church because of the excesses of heretics:

Plus tard Wicleff et Hus ne font qu'élargir et synthétiser ces erreurs et forcent les théologiens à mettre l'accent sur l'aspect extérieur de l'Eglise. C'est dans ce sens que se meuvent les idées du Carme Thomas Netter adversaire le plus en vue de ces hérésies. Les théories conciliaires en vogue au cours du XVe siècle n'ont pas tardé à contribuer à rendre suspect l'aspect intérieur de l'Eglise à tel point que le Cardinal Turrecremata limite sa *Summa de Ecclesia* au points suivants: L'Eglise universelle, l'Eglise romaine, la primauté du Souverain Pontife, les conciles oecuméniques, les schismatiques et les hérétiques... En somme nous pouvons dire que les résultats majeurs de cette première phase de l'Ecclésiologie catholique se ramènent à deux: une forte mise en avant-plan de l'aspect extérieur de l'Eglise et la tendance de la distinguer de l'ensemble de la civilisation médiévale.<sup>18</sup>

It is perhaps not too surprising that a preacher intent on inflaming souls with the love of God should let these discussions pass aside. Bernardine will spend pages proving that usury is sinful, because that directly affects the salvation of his hearers. He can be very arid in the process. But it seems that he did not wish to enter into any long or detailed arguments about the structure of the Church, precisely because to him they were not key matters in his catechesis. He took them for granted, and expected his hearers to do the same.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Jaki, *op. cit.*, p. 21. C'est un fait, d'ailleurs, assez universel que toutes les époques ont leurs propres idées sur l'Eglise... la même Eglise se reflète dans la pensée du Moyen Age comme le principe de l'ordre et de la paix." Bernardine has another emphasis:

*De Beatitudinibus Evangelicis*, Sermo VIII, Art. I, Cap. I (VI, 448): Tertium est bonum delectabile seu iucundum. Nam pacis tempore omnia laetitiam acclamare videntur... servatur religiosorum quies, Ecclesiae et Ecclesiastica officia florent; frequentantur opera pietatis, honoratur atque fructificat verbum Dei in frequentia populorum.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 7—8.

<sup>19</sup> Jaki, *op. cit.*, p. 192 provides an analysis of the scholastics which fits Bernardine excellently: "En fait la scolastique a plutôt supposé l'idée intégrale de l'Eglise, sans l'expliquer dans tous ses aspects. La raison en est, comme J. Ranft le fait justement remarquer, que la mentalité médiévale a été tellement plongée dans une atmosphère ecclésiale que l'idée de l'Eglise y devait figurer comme une loi générale d'architecture et non seulement comme une unique pierre dans un immense bâtiment. En outre il faut noter que l'Eglise, à l'encontre de la plupart de nos manuels *De Ecclesia*, est pour Saint Thomas une vie, un corps au sens biologique du mot, et doit être conçue non selon des catégories sociologiques, mais dans l'ordre de vie."

*B. A Kind of Apologetic*

Bernardine was ever conscious of the need of the Church as a rule of faith, as a guide to heaven. It is, due to his Canonist's bent, a need which he expresses especially by the bare citation of canons which regulate the conduct of the members. It is also seen in his horror of heretics — a horror springing from the fact that heretics do not possess the truth, err in faith, consequently do not belong to the Church or to Christ's Mystical Body.

If we turn to the Sermons which Bernardine has dedicated to the subject of Faith, and most especially to the first one, we shall find an elenchus of "arguments" for believing, which are at the same time arguments for the Church. Bainvel doubts that such arguments have ever been collected in one place before. While he finds the arguments lacking in that apologetic precision which he would have wished for, he is conscious that "Bernardine's position is not that of the apologete".<sup>20</sup> This is very true. For, what we have in this sermon are a collection of arguments destined for believing Christians, not for non-believers. They are designed to give a sense of solidarity to his hearers, and, as we shall see, the ideal of community is implicit in them, the community of God with man and man with man which is a major aspect of his outlook on the believing world.<sup>21</sup>

The first argument adduced to show the firmness of our faith is that it alone was foretold by the prophets:

... Propterea manifestum est fidem seu credulitatem quae fundamentum est verae religionis et principium divini cultus per se esse ex prophetia vel ex revelatione divina. Talis autem est christianorum catholica fides...

Quanta autem admiranda concordia sit impletorum et traditorum per Christum ad ea quae de ipso et de eius Ecclesia praedicta et praefigurata

<sup>20</sup> J. Bainvel, "L'idée de l'Eglise au moyen âge. L'enseignement populaire" in *La Science Catholique* XIV, (1900) p. 682: "Je ne sais si jamais jusque-là on avait ainsi groupé et mis en relief autour de la question de l'Eglise nos principales raisons de croire." — *ibid.* p. 682: "Ce n'est pas tout à fait, on le voit, ce que nous voudrions aujourd'hui et la position de Bernardin n'est pas nettement la position apologetique." That Bainvel in the current of the turn of the century regrets this is understandable. He did see, very acutely, that this sermon on faith is really about the Church. From the reasons a man proposes for belief in the Church it is not difficult to perceive something of what he considers her to be in herself. This is our process here.

<sup>21</sup> The chief source for all Bernardine's sermons on Faith is William of Auvergne, an author taxed as a prime example of the utter fideist position. Cf. S. Harent, "Foi" in D.T.C. VI, 1, (Paris, 1915) cols. 118—119 and 340. It is not difficult to understand, then, that one of the objections of the *Pro-motor Fidei* against granting Bernardine the title of doctor was his claim that Bernardine denied that one could know God's existence from reason. Cf. Piana, *op. cit.*, p. 153 ff. Though it is not our subject, we think that there is no system in Bernardine's presentation of the subject, and that texts can be urged to support any position.

fuerunt in Veteri Testamento, satis clarescere potest ei qui utrumque Testamentum perspexerit diligenter, ubi manifeste comprehendet quod a nullo humano ingenio talis impletio potuisset fieri vel cogitari . . .<sup>23</sup>

The point to be noted in this [rather standard] argument is its appeal to the witness of many — an argument, therefore, based on a kind of solidarity of holy men. This is a kind of community which reflects the community of the Church. The second argument is that faith is the result of the concordance of the Scriptures concerning it: All the divine writers under the guidance of the one God conspire to illumine the House of the Church of God as the sun enters through various windows to shed light within a dwelling:

Ratio huius concordiae etiam exemplo solis patere potest, qui cum per diversas fenestras domum ingreditur, cuiuslibet fenestrae sol ab altero alterius fenestrae nullo modo discordans est. Sic fuit in scriptoribus Scripturarum, qui, quasi fenestrae fuerunt luminum divinorum ad illuminandum domum Ecclesiae Dei. Nam sicut Deus est Sol illuminans universum, minime in semetipso discordat; sic et praedicti scriptores, eodem concordi lumine illustrati, in omnibus exstiterunt concordantes . . .<sup>23</sup>

This same concord of belief is also seen in all those who have lived in the Church from the very time of Christ right to his own day, and not only in word, but also in work. Though we find that amongst true and holy catholics there is no lack of discord on non-essential points, there is an extraordinary unity in what pertains to faith:

Unde per haec clarescere potest quod cum posterioribus et priores, in unum eundem Spiritum congregati, unam constituunt Ecclesiam sponsam unicam Domini Salvatoris, in unam et eandem fidem, in eandem spem atque in eandem caritatem spiritualiter adunatam, ut verificetur quod Matth. 21 cap., 9, scriptum est quod *turbae quae praecedebant et quae sequebantur clamabant, dicentes: Hosanna Filio David: benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini. Pax in terra et gloria in excelsis.*<sup>24</sup>

He then discusses the truth of faith from the probity of the Sacred writers. Certainly they could not lie, for this would be against their very profession. They could not be deluded, for they give a testimony which could only come from God. On the other hand, infidels would never write such a book, for by so doing, they would be fostering an alien cult.<sup>25</sup> The last argument in this first article he draws from the diligence

<sup>23</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo I (I, 5—19), Art. I, Cap. I, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, Art. I, Cap. II, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, p. 7—8.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, Art. I, Cap. III, p. 9: . . . idem Augustinus ait: "Si ad scripturas Sacras admissa fuerunt vel officiosa mendacia, quid in eis remanebit auctoritatis? Quae tandem de Scripturis illis sententia proferetur, cuius pondere contentiosae falsitatis conteretur improbitas?"



of those who received the faith, from the desire of the Jews to avoid false prophets, and the care of the early Christians to keep their faith pure.<sup>26</sup>

A common note in all of these arguments is the community of witness given to faith. What is common to so many, Bernardine is saying, cannot be wrong. His arguments are not the greatest apologetic proofs, for some of them, at least, could be invoked by no matter what sect. But their use reveals the direction of his thought: the Church is a holy society, and, as we shall see, it is this Holy Society which is the *tessera* of truth.

If we turn to the next section of this sermon, we find that he will argue for the truth of faith because of what faith does to man: how it uplifts him by putting him in contact with God. This is done by means of the three theological virtues. First of all, man has God as the object of his faith, and so, if, *per impossibile*, a man were to err in believing, this error would be imputed to God Himself.<sup>27</sup> Then, it is only Christian faith which breeds true hope of pardon, for it alone shows us that God so wished to commiserate man that He did not spare His own Son.<sup>28</sup> And lastly, and most importantly for our author, it is only catholic faith which inflames souls with true charity:

Sicut enim ignis ignem maxime generat atque contactu suo quae ignibilia sunt inflamat, sic ignis divinae dilectionis, beneficio dominicae Incarnationis per credulitatem cordibus hominum applicatus, ignem sanctae dilectionis in Deum in illis generat amoreque vivifico incendit atque inflamat. Cetera namque beneficia Dei velut scintillae sunt . . . ad inflammandum humana corda. Beneficium autem Incarnationis atque Redemptionis non solum est sicut mons igneus cordibus nostris inflammandis per credulitatem appositus, immo incomparabiliter maior ignis, quam esset totus mundus, si totus arderet . . .<sup>29</sup>

If one looks through the works of Bernardine for an idea of his image of the Church, one would have to weigh this passage carefully, for it shows at once that attachment to the Incarnate Lord which we have

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, Art. I, Cap. IV, p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, Art. II, Cap. I, p. 10: . . . Sane sola catholica fides credit Deo. Nam Christianae fidei solius Deus veritatis, immo Deus Veritas, testis est. Nam, sive credat per miracula seu per oracula Prophetarum, ubique et in omnibus illi credit cuius testimoniis credit. Qua de re in aliquo si erraret, quod tamen impossibile est, non ei esset imputandum, sed ipsi testificanti Deo, cuius fidei ipse est dator, testificator et doctor.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*: Sola enim christiana fides ad spem veniae, gratiae et gloriae sublevat humana corda . . . Quid enim magis ad spem veniae mentes erigere potuit et verisimilius ostendere valuit Deum velle misereri hominibus quam per hoc quod *Pater* (II Cor. I : 3) *misericordiarum proprio Filio*, ut parceret, *non pepercit* (Rom 8 : 32) . . .

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, Art. II, Cap. I, pp. 10—11.

already seen, and the response that he demands from the members of the Church to the love of God in Christ. He does not make the demand here, but by stating the effect of faith he already implicitly warns us what he will demand in many places from the faithful: love for love.

If we look for the great defect in other creeds, we find it precisely in the fact that this love is lacking in them in its fulness, that they have only mere sparks of it:

... Quia vero alia beneficia cordibus aliarum gentium implicantur, quae, ut diximus, quasi modicae scintillae sunt ad hunc ignem, manifestum est omnes alias gentes a divino amore frigiditas esse comparatione christianorum, et ideo mortuas cum calor ille solus sit vivificus et vitalis.<sup>30</sup>

Another argument collected here is taken from the sufferings of the martyrs. It is interesting to see that in this passage there is firstly an association of head and members, for Christ is listed first of those who died to give testimony to the faith,<sup>31</sup> and secondly, how faith and charity run together:

Tanto ardore fidei martyres illi fervebant, ut in omnibus opprobriis, vituperiis et suppliciis semper sentirent dulcorem ac iucunditatem... Unde in persona martyrum, ad Rom 8, cap., 35—39, Apostolus ait: *Quis non separabit a caritati Christi... Certus sum enim quia neque mors, neque vita... poterit nos separare a caritate Dei, quae est in Christo Iesu Domino nostro.*<sup>32</sup>

Again we see the Church as the center of the charity of Christ diffused in the hearts of men. It is this witness of charity — so meaningful to our author — which it is insane to deny. The blind man trusts his dog to show him the road, and his cane to keep him out of the ditch. We trust the expert in his field, but Christ and the martyrs who suffered such great torments for the faith are not believed.<sup>33</sup>

We then turn to an argument to show the truth of the Christian faith based on the limpid witness of miracles. The argument itself is not extraordinary: there are miracles only in the true Church. As long as the Synagogue was this Church, there were miracles, but when the Jews

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, Art. II, Cap. III, p. 13: Tertia fidei firmitas est martyrum asperitas. Per martyria namque veritas fidei clarius elucescit. "Quando paratus est homo mori pro veritate quam praedicat. Nam et Christus pro fidei testimonio mortuus est; similiter et Prophetæ ante Evangelium pro testimonio fidei mortui sunt, sicut Isaias, Ieremias, Ezechiel..."

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, Art. III, Cap. III, p. 14: "O dementia consummata! Credit caecus cani de via et baculo de aqua profunda, crediturque experto in arte sua et non creditur martyribus sanctis et Christo, qui tot et tanta supplicia atque mortem sustinuerunt pro fide sua!"

deserted the true faith then miracles deserted them, to be found now in the Apostles and those who believed with them. The interest here, which should not be pressed, is that it is again a question of people, of a *gens*, a collectivity which possesses this divine guarantee in as much as it is a society of the faithful.<sup>34</sup> Miracles are at once a testimony to the true faith and an effect of true faith in this society.<sup>35</sup> In all of these arguments we see little, indeed no preoccupation with the hierarchical Church as such. We have, in this "apologetic" a description of the singular beauty of faith which seems to be reducible in its content to the assertion that only the Catholic faith, hence only Catholics, form a society of believers, united to God in Christ. The faith is attested to either by the care of this society in transmitting and receiving it, their great love — together with the love of Christ Himself — in dying for it, and that fact that it, and it alone, conjoins all its members to God by the theological virtues and is attested to by miracles which the power of God uses to confirm this society in its beliefs.

Bernardine here shows himself to be outside the line of those taken up with attack on or defence of the hierarchical Church. What Hertling remarks in quite another context of the Pope, might well illustrate Bernardine's attitude to the consideration of the visibility of the Church as such: "La funzione fondamentale del Papa nella Chiesa, per quanto paradossale ci possa sembrare, non è quella di intraprendere *azioni* ufficiali, ma di *essere* presente."<sup>36</sup> For Bernardine, the Pope and the bishops are likewise present, and necessary as the air we breath. But like the air, we do not have them at the center of our consciousness.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, the

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<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, Art. II, Cap. IV, p. 14: "Nulla nempe gens, nulla secta miracula habet praeter christianam fidem, quam semper et comitata sunt miracula et secuta. Nam ab ipso Abel usque ad Legem datam per Moysen, et in gente Hebraeorum mirabiliter multiplicata atque ab exitu Aegypti usque ad ingressum terrae promissionis comitata atque consolata sunt gentem et populum Hebraeorum, nec deseruerunt eam, donec ipsa deseruit fidem veram..." p. 15: "... apparet quoque solidius testimonium de fidei veritate, dum et fideles etiam mortui miraculis attestantur et quam vivi tenuerunt, etiam post mortem miraculis approbant et confirmant."

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14: "... ita ut, ea posita, videantur et miracula poni, atque, ea remota, miracula removeri, ut quasi sint ipsius fidei testimonia et effectus inseparabiliter concomitantia illam..."

<sup>36</sup> Ludovico Hertling, S.J., *Communio, Chiesa e Papato nell' Antichità Cristiana* (Roma, 1961) p. 53.

<sup>37</sup> Jaki, *op. cit.*, p. 177 quoting P. du Manoir à propos of Saint Cyril: "... cette ecclésiologie est beaucoup plus vécue que pensée et exprimée explicitement. Les évêques, les métropolitains, le corps épiscopal tout entier sont au service de la communication et de la conversation de la vie divine dans les fidèles. La mission de la hiérarchie est une diaconie de l'Esprit." The same idea accounts for the same lack of explicitation on the "aspect extérieur de cette ecclésiologie".

only time he deals with hierarchy is when he wishes to remind us of our need to obey or the members of the hierarchy of their need to govern responsibly. We shall see this in the next section where we consider the function of hierarchy as Bernardine sees it.

In the first sermon on Faith which we have been considering, there is one argument in twelve in which there is a compact paragraph containing several of the classical ecclesiological texts from Scripture. He is arguing to the truth of faith from the permanence of the Church:

Secunda christianae fidei firmitas est Ecclesiae permanentia. Non enim potest deficere fides Ecclesiae Dei, quae supra firmam petram, Christum fundata est. Unde Matth. 16 cap., 18, ait Dominus ad Petrum: *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam, et portae inferi non praevalent adversus eam*. Nec etiam deficere potest fides quam Deus per praesentiam suam semper tuetur, sicut ipse, Matth. 28, 20, promisit, dicens: *Ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi*. Non potest, deficere fides, pro qua conservanda Filius Dei a Patre oravit; . . . Hinc Augustinus . . . ait: "Dubitamus nos eius Ecclesiae gremio credere quae usque ad consensionem generis humani ab apostolica sede per successionem episcoporum firmata, haeretici circumlatrantibus, culmen auctoritatis obtinuit? . . ."<sup>38</sup>

In this text we see, indeed, texts very familiar to the controversialists. But the use made of them here is not as a testimony included. The perspective is rather different: the guarantee given to the Church and to Peter are in favour of the Faith, a guarantee to the orthodox that God will not fail them, and that their commitment is sure. The quotation from Augustine which Bernardine includes in the citation given also reflects another argument from the idea of community, since the very multitude of bishops there mentioned are seen as witnessing to that true faith, which, under the guidance of the Spirit, and despite heretics, they succeed in establishing throughout the whole world.

### *C. The Authority of the Church*

Since we have already considered the very special stress which Bernardine puts on the teaching office, we might expect that he will also expound the correlative duty to heed the doctrine taught. And indeed he does. Besides the innumerable canons which are cited throughout his works, we shall see that in the moral sermons the authority of the Church is a constant argument. It is not developed, but simply stated. The

<sup>38</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo I, Art. III, Cap. II, (I, pp. 17—18).



Church says thus and so, and that is the end of it.<sup>39</sup> This is one of the indications that for him the idea of the "great Church" is in no contradiction to the visible, hierarchical Church. The first, wide vision is for him the total one, while the second is a part of the first, important for him precisely as part. That is to say that the community of the faithful on earth united in the profession of the one faith, is part of that body of Christ in which are joined also the Saints in heaven, the suffering souls in Purgatory and all the orders of the angels in glory. The Church Militant is the earthly part of this great society, the part with which our author is most concerned.

For Bernardine, the Church is the House of God, in which the Children of God receive their instruction. He conceives, as far as one can discern it in his writings, that from the beginning the Church has been conscious of all truth, which it received from Christ and from the apostles. Much of this truth is not found in Scripture, but that is no difficulty, since the Church has received these truths and practices from apostolic times.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, for the understanding of Scripture itself, the guidance of the Church is essential. For Bernardine the birth of heresy can be traced to the common origin of Scripture badly understood:

Quid enim asini Manichaei fabulantur primum malum, cum et ipsi, etsi non fuerint primi mali, tamen fuerunt multum mali, tantaque caecitate obtenebraverit eos malum, ut non intelligerent quod omne ens, in quantum

<sup>39</sup> There are innumerable texts of this kind: Thus, the Church excommunicates usury: *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo XXXV, Art. III, Cap. VI, (I, 447) The Church forbids praying for dead usurer, or one not communicating annually: *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo LIII, Art. I, Cap. V, (II, 168) The Church obliges us to fast: *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo V Art. II, Cap. V, (I, 57).

What is interesting in the innumerable citations of this kind is that the law is cited as a thing apart, not the tool of authority in ruling the Church, but a norm independent of authority, so to speak, and binding the holders of it as well as the simple faithful. We see an example of this in the text cited earlier on the Pope's inability to transfer his office. We see it also in places where our author discusses rules governing the reading of books, feasts and so on.

<sup>40</sup> *Sermones de Tempore*, Sermo IV, Introduction (VII, 50): Concerning conjunction of the celebration of the visit of the Magi, the baptism of Christ and the miracle of Cana, he says: that this is not in Scripture but: "haec tamen ab universali Ecclesia per solemnem celebrationem tradita sunt; sicut quod Christus natus sit octavo Kalendas Ianuarii, quia hoc etiam non habetur ex textu..." He then quotes Augustine in explanation: "Illa, inquit, quae non scripta sed tradita custodimus, quae quidem toto orbe terrarum servantur, datur intelligi vel ab ipsis Apostolis, vel conciliis plenariis, quorum est in Ecclesia saluberrima auctoritas commendata atque statuta, retineri; sicut quod Domini passio et resurrectio et in caelum ascensio... anniversaria solemnitate celebrantur; et si quid aliud tale occurrit, quod servatur ab universa Ecclesia, quacumque se diffundit." Cf. also *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XXVII, Art. I Cap. II (IV, 10) where he says that the Church holds many things from the Apostles which are not in Scripture.

ens, est bonum, nec cognoverint quod Vetus Testamentum in Novo fuerit authenticè approbatum. Unde etiam multitudo haereticorum habuit ortum nisi de Scripturis Sacris male interpretatis.<sup>41</sup>

He then goes on to say that it is only by comparing the parts of the entire Scripture with one another that we can see that they do not conflict, and indeed, come to an understanding of them. And he concludes with the famous phrase of Augustine: "I would not believe the Gospel, except that I believe the Catholic Church." And Bernardine gives us his comment that it is therefore unreasonable to pick and choose in the Canon of Scripture when the Catholic Church which I believe receives the whole Canon with equal certitude.<sup>42</sup>

A more interesting development — one showing again his idea of the Church — is what he has to say about various kinds of faith. Kinds of faith here refers to the content of faith. Bernardine asks what the content of the faith must be for different persons.

The first group he considers are prelates and teachers. They must have some knowledge of the three Scriptures — we should note this equivalence — the Old Testament, the New Testament and the third Scripture which is whatever is set down by the Roman Church in its decrees, decretals and other books of law. This third scripture is seen as equally normative with the other two, as well as being the interpreter of the other two, and adherence to this norm is found in the symbol where we profess belief in "one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church".<sup>43</sup>

The reason such explicit faith is necessary for prelates and doctors is that they must teach others:

Prima (fides) est explicita; et talis fides est credere omnes articulos fidei particulariter et expresse. Et haec secundum Bonaventuram, in III, dist. 25, exigitur de necessitate salutis iis qui habent alios edocere, sicut doctores

<sup>41</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo I, Art. II, Cap. II (I, 18—19).

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*: Nec etiam alia loca Scripturae contulerunt; unde haereses exortae sunt per se legendo, quae conferendo repulsae sunt, quia conferentes sententias diversas adduxerunt, quae ex se mutuo invicem videri potuerunt qualiter essent intelligendae. Contra quos est Augustini verbum . . . "Non crederem, inquit, Evangelio, nisi quia Ecclesiae catholicae credo." Igitur irrationabile est aliquid Canonis recipere et aliquid non, cum Ecclesia catholica, cui credo, totum Canonem aequaliter ut certum recipiat.

<sup>43</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo III, Articulus III, Cap. I (I, 34): Ex symbolo autem huiusmodi obligantur ad fidem et notitiam aliqualem trium scripturarum; ad maiorem tamen vel minorem, secundum quod expostulat hominis proprium officium seu status. — Prima scriptura est Novum Testamentum . . . — Secunda scriptura est Testamentum Vetus . . . Tertia scriptura credenda est quidquid a sancta Romana Ecclesia in decretis, decretalibus atque extravagantibus determinatur, quod etiam in Symbolo continetur cum dicitur: *Et unam, sanctam, catholicam et apostolicam Ecclesiam*.

et praelati, praedicatores et confessores, secundum tamen exigentiam sui status; nam si tales errant, non excusantur in iis quae pertinent ad statum suum, sicut patet Extra . . .<sup>44</sup>

But what is demanded of the ordinary Christian? Here Bernardine talks of what he calls "sufficient faith". For, he notes, there are many men who due to the limits of their intelligence or their lack of experience, learning or grace, cannot explicitly grasp all that is found in the Creed, that is to say, in the Catholic faith.<sup>45</sup> Yet there is no one so backward that he cannot grasp at least generally what pertains to the foundation of the true religion. One means of gaining such knowledge is by following learned and holy men in what they say is to be believed:

Sed Nullum est genus hominum in intellectu naturaliter adeo tardum, quod, saltem in universali et generali credulitate, quidquid ad fundamentum verae religionis pertinet, capere non possit. Nullus enim omnino in omnibus reperitur qui credere non possit verum esse quidquid sacris eloquiis continetur, quidquid Spiritu Dei edocti homines docuerunt credendum esse; similiter verum esse de Deo quidquid de ipso Prophetæ prædica-verunt. Nullus enim est adeo pertinax, qui non facile acquiescat ut credat imitandos esse sanctos et sapientes viros; imitandos, inquam, in fide et moribus . . .<sup>46</sup>

We see in this passage that the faith is learned from the society of the faithful, past and present, from whoever has the spirit of God, and that from heeding such witness, no one is excused. The type of ordinary Christian here considered will have a faith sufficient for salvation if he holds some of the articles of faith explicitly, and the others implicitly. What will be the test of those which he must hold explicitly? The answer is significant:

Articuli autem, quos oportet credere explicite, isti præcipue sunt: scilicet unitas essentialis et trinitas Personarum. Sed quia in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti se signant fideles et conferuntur ecclesiastica sacramenta, ideo ex ipso actu consignationis, hoc possunt scire fideles. Similiter de Redemptione oportet credere nativitatem, passionem, resurrectionem, peccatorum remissionem. Et hos quidem cognoscere possunt ex ipsis solemnitatibus quas Ecclesia solemnizat, atque ex actibus sacerdotum; propterea ab horum cognitione nullus excipitur qui utitur ratione. Similiter, tenetur credere futurum iudicium.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo XI, Art. I., Cap. I, (VII, 508).

<sup>45</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo III, Art. III, Cap. II (I, 36): Secunda autem dicitur fides sufficiens. Sunt in humano genere multi "qui propter brevitatem intellectus aut paucitatem experientiae, aut defectum doctrinae vel gratiae, non capiunt explicite et expresse, id est, in particulari, quae comprehenduntur in Symbolo, hoc est in catholica fide . . ."

<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo XI, Art. I, Cap. I, (VII, 509).

Thus we see that the test will be what a person who performs his duties of worship, and frequenting the sacraments, must necessarily know. It thus becomes clear that for Bernardine, such a participation in the rites of the Church is of the utmost importance, and this for two reasons. The first is that the Church has a teaching role which is all important, and which no one has a right to ignore. The second is his whole idea of the Church as a society. No one is excused from participating in this society, in the body of Christ. And if one absents himself he is guilty. Thus, when talking about "deficient faith", the faith not sufficient for the salvation of an adult, he tells us:

Tertia fides deficiens nuncupatur. Nam secundum Bonaventuram, ubi supra, "credere omnes articulos fidei implicate est fidei diminutae"; unde non sufficit in habentibus usum liberi arbitrii, quia omnino esse non potest quod conversatus inter fideles, nisi sit negligens et contempтор salutis suae, quin habeat explicitam cognitionem de aliquibus articulis supradictis . . .<sup>48</sup>

For the rest, the ordinary faithful who cannot have an explicit grasp of all the articles of faith may be held to have sufficient faith if he has explicit knowledge of some of the articles, as we have just seen, with one, important proviso: He must have the intention of believing always what the Catholic Church believes and with no dissent:

Alios vero articulos sufficit credere implicate . . . hoc modo ut per hos habeat homo propositum credendi quidquid romana Ecclesia credit in particulari dissentiendo a nullo, et, cum a catholicis et praelatis . . . explicantur, acquiescendo.<sup>49</sup>

For, one rule is certain: he who strays from the belief of the Church will err, seduced by the spirit of error. In his sermon *De Multiplici Mendacio* he returns to the norm of the Church as a guide to belief, and he makes it clear that he who does not hold what the Church teaches is in error and is deceived.<sup>50</sup> Although he mentions in the text last cited the function of prelates as teachers, it is interesting that he associates "*catholici*" with them in this function, and that the whole atmosphere of these texts

<sup>48</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo III, Art. III, Cap. III, (I, 36) cf. also note 47 reference for same doctrine.

<sup>49</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo III, Art. III, Cap. II (I, 36) cf. also *Sermones de diversis*, Sermo XI, Art. I, Cap. I, (VII, 509).

<sup>50</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo VII, Art. III, Cap. III, (VII, 447): Tertia deceptio mendacii perniciosi committitur in rebus spiritualibus, ut puta in doctrina religionis . . .

Primo, respectu sui, et hoc fit, cum homo male intelligendo scripturas sacras, erronee exponit eas, sicut faciunt haeretici. Item qui male sentit et id ore fatetur de Ecclesiae sacramentis vel de articulis fidei . . . Atque omnino censetur haereticus qui non tenet id quod docet sancta Romana Ecclesia . . .



presents us more with the idea of a Society whose orthodoxy is protected from the Spirit of Error, than with a teaching authority based on a well-defined hierarchical order of power.<sup>51</sup> We shall see that he is not forgetful of the duty of prelates to teach, as indeed it has been already shown, but the prominence of the other idea must not be overlooked.

#### D. The States of the Church

In order to make our consideration of what Bernardine has to say about the Church, we must consider what he says about its various stages. We do not find in our author a history of humanity, or a theology of the ages of the world, as is found in some of the Fathers. There is, indeed, but one incomplete sermon entitled *De Triplici Statu Ecclesiae* where he touches the question of history. And here he limits himself to a descriptive division of the history of the Church from its founding by Christ down to his own day and beyond.<sup>52</sup> The sources of the sermon are the Spiritual Franciscan Ubertino da Casale, and Pier di Giovanni Olivi. There is also material taken from Mathias of Sweden.<sup>53</sup> In all cases it is from commentaries on the Apocalypse that Bernardine draws his material, and once again it is interesting to see how he transforms them. It is known that Olivi's handling of the theme of the states of the Church

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<sup>51</sup> Yet there is no doubt that Bernardine holds that prelates and priests possess authority in the Church. Thus, Christ gave jurisdiction to His principal ministers who are priests: *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XXVII, Art. I, Cap. III (IV, 12) speaking of confession: . . . Propterea claves istae nihil aliud sunt quam potestas et iurisdictio a Christo Ecclesiae data, seu eius principalibus ministris qui sacerdotes sunt, scilicet ut communicent meritum suum inferioribus . . .

But even here, the jurisdiction looks to service of the Body.

<sup>52</sup> This short treatment is found in *Sermones Imperfecti*. Sermo XXI (VIII, 102—111). It is very important as forming a pendant to the idea of the great Church which we have found in Bernardine. The importance of this doctrine is in establishing the utter reality of the terrestrial Church with all that it implies. As Michael Hurley, S. J. has pointed out in "A Pre-Tridentine Theology of Tradition," *The Heythrop Journal* IV (1963), p. 350, the older concept of the great Church had dangers: ". . . Wyclif revealed the latent weakness and danger in the medieval concept and provoked a reaction which now stressed the visible hierarchical nature of the Church as beginning with Christ and the Apostles and as incorporating its members by means of the sacrament of baptism." The author credits Thomas Netter with giving currency to this more historical appreciation of the Church which was so popular in the sixteenth century. But an *ébauche* of the same idea can be found in Olivi, as here in Bernardine. We saw, moreover, in the first chapter, that, whatever his idea of the great Church and its import, Bernardine vigorously asserted the necessity of adherence to the Roman Church and the need of Baptism for salvation.

<sup>53</sup> On Mathias of Sweden: Augusto Guidi, "Mattia di Linköping, *Enci. Catt.* VIII, col. 501. The *Expositio in Apocalypsin* of the confessor of St. Bridget was known in both Italy and Germany.

was censured at the time of Pope John XXII, since he was charged with depreciating the earlier states of the Church to exalt the new era of the Spirituals, an idea certainly of Joachimite inspiration.<sup>54</sup> His disciple da Casale went far beyond him in identifying the figures of the Apocalypse with living persons.<sup>55</sup>

In Bernardine there is none of this. There is no exaltation of any age of the Church over another, in the sense that one age receives more gifts from God; on the other hand, he is rather hard on his own age as being unresponsive to the gifts received — quite the contrary of Olivi's supposed approach. Moreover, Bernardine makes non identification of Antichrist, or the temptress of the Apocalypse and he takes himself entirely out of the eschatological stream by insisting that how long his age — the sixth — was to last before the beginning of the final age was a thing he definitely did not know.<sup>56</sup>

We must remember before considering an outline of this sermon that it is incomplete and therefore, not surprisingly, it is not clear. If we consider that the originator of this way of thinking, Joachim of Flora, was by no means clear in his exposition, and that his terms and his meanings over-lap, then we will be less discomfited.<sup>57</sup>

### E. The General States

Bernardine will use the material he finds in his predecessors simply to present a spiritual history of the Church, a history of God's acts and man's response.

The work has two movements: a consideration of the three general states of the Church: the state of Grace, the state of fault (sin) and the

<sup>54</sup> The text of this condemnation is found in the *Opera Omnia* VIII, 31\*. The editors refrain from judgement on its validity.

<sup>55</sup> Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, *op. cit.*, no. 131, Vol. II, p. 339. Also cf. D.T.C., "Olivi" *loc. cit.* col. 988 where Callaey judges that the condemnation of Olivi is due not to what he himself wrote but to the applications made by his simple minded followers.

<sup>56</sup> Bernardine indeed rejects the idea that the end of the world is imminent as contrary to the teaching of the Church: *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XI, Art. I, Introduction (III, 199): Secundo autem probatur auctoritate. Nam prout status Ecclesiae sumitur in hac vita, in fine debet malis pessimis abundare; quod manifeste ostendit Dominus, Luc. 18 cap., 8, dicens: *Verumtamen Filius hominis veniens, putas inveniet fidem in terra?* Quasi dicat: Non, secundum Bedam . . . nempe si venerit ad iudicium immediate post Iudaeorum . . . magnam fidem reperiet in toto terrarum orbe; et iam tunc dies Domini ad iudicium non veniret tamquam *fur* . . . The question of the ultimate day was one which led Bernardine to do battle against one of the proponents of imminent doom, Manfred de Vercellis. Cf. Origo, *op. cit.*, pp. 211—12; *Opera Omnia* VIII, 18\* and references given.

<sup>57</sup> Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, part. II, pp. 260—261.

state of punishment. The states in this first movement have a certain chronological content, in as much as Grace stands at the beginning of the Church's history with the work of Christ the Founder, fault follows, and punishment shall evidently come last. But, it is clear that these states can, at least to some extent, coexist. They are seen to be less historical than moral states.

For example, the state of Grace is divided into three 'times'. These are: the time in which Grace was given to the world; the time of the binding up of the power of hell; the time of grace despised by the world.<sup>58</sup> The first state is associated with Christ's act of love in founding the Church and in redeeming mankind. This is pre-eminently the work of charity which Christ performs by taking on our humanity. The second state is the state of ungrateful mankind. This state of "Grace despised" Bernardine sees as existing in his own day.<sup>59</sup> At the same time he sees the second general state of the Church, the state of fault, as also flourishing in his day.<sup>60</sup>

Thus, these *general* states can be found existing simultaneously at a given epoch of history. These epochs Bernardine calls the seven *particular* states of the Church, and these are described more chronologically.

#### F. The particular States

Bernardine refers to his own time as the sixth particular state of the Church. The first state he calls the state of justice and it began with the birth of Christ (thus showing an inconsistency with his doctrine that the Church was born on Calvary) and lasted through the life of the apostles. The second state is the state of patience which extended from the stoning of Stephen through the entire centuries of martyrdom and persecution until the advent of Constantine. The period of wisdom follows, in which the first four ecumenical councils were held for the enlightenment of the Church. The fourth state is the state of grace, which begins with Gregory the Great and is characterized by the spread of priests, parishes and the instruction of the people. The state of innocence then follows, extending from Charlemagne and is the time of the founding of the monastic orders. The sixth state is the state of humility and Bernardine's

<sup>58</sup> *Sermones Imperfecti*, Sermo XXI (VIII, 103).

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*: Tertium est nunc tempus gratiae a mundo despectae. Contemnatur autem nunc gratia Christi quadruplici modo contemptu . . . p. 105: Hi contemptus gratiarum Christi quanto in hoc sexto Ecclesiae tempore multiplicati sint, qui oculos habet patentes advertit.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.* p. 106: Secundus generalis status Ecclesiae sanctae est status culpae, quae scilicet in hoc sexto Ecclesiae particulari statu multiplicata est . . .

own, characterized by the foundation of the two great mendicant orders. As we have noted, Bernardine protests that he does not know how long this state will last<sup>61</sup>, thus separating himself clearly from those who professed imminent doom in the seventh state which will be the state of final probation, beginning with the time of the Antichrist, and lasting until the end of the world.<sup>62</sup>

Given the very imperfect form in which we find this sermon (there is no development at all of the third general state, for example), it is impossible to draw fast conclusions about the use which Bernardine intended to make of his survey. Yet it would seem on the evidence of what we have that he merely uses these states as a means of spelling out God's benefits to His Church, benefits which are different in each state, but very great in all. Moreover, what interests him more than the chronology appears to be the virtues typical of these states. These virtues, as he notes, can be found in any one of the states, and can, indeed, be found in any one person "as is clear with the Apostle Peter who was just, a martyr, a doctor and so of the rest".<sup>63</sup>

The purely spiritual uses to which the material is put suggests again that for Bernardine questions of the structure of the Church, or of the advent of new revelations, or of impending doom were not his interest. It was his interest rather to bring the Church closer to its ideal of perfection, and this goal he pursues in his instructions to the people, and as we shall see in the next section, in his strictures on those in the Church who misused their office.

## II. THE FUNCTION OF THE HIERARCHY

In our investigation of Bernardine's thought on the Church, it is surely necessary to consider what he has to say about those who have special functions in it. Into this category fall especially prelates, but his remarks show that he sometimes takes this word in a very general sense, to include not only bishops, but also priests, and religious superiors. When he is talking about one, he seems to include the others as well,

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 106—107: We have digested his description of the states. After giving it he adds: — Sextus autem status, in quo nunc sumus dictus est humilitatis profundae . . . qui quantum adhuc sit duraturus ignoro. The same statement is made in *Sermones Imperfecti*, Sermo XXII (VIII, 113).

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, Septimus erit status probationis ultimae; et hic incipiet tempore, et in fine praesentis vitae habebit finem.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*: . . . sicut patet in Apostolo Petro, qui iustus, martyr, doctor, et sic de aliis. He further notes that one state, even of the particular states, begins before the end of the previous one. Otherwise, "desolaretur terra a lumine utriusque."



and sometimes he wanders from one to the other. Some argument might be made that he considered the religious life as the Christian life *par excellence*, and that in a parallel way, what he says of religious obedience is to be taken as his thought on the obedience of all Christians to ecclesiastical authorities, and on the reciprocal qualities demanded in an ecclesiastic vis-a-vis his subjects. We shall consider this at the end of this second section.

Of more immediate interest is the picture which Bernardine conveys of the 'prelate'. Does it have a juridical overtone, or does it fit in with the general picture of the Christian Society which we have seen in the foregoing chapter? The answer, happily, is the latter. For, while Bernardine will quote the Canon Law with vigor, his attitude is not that of a canonist but of a theologian of the Mystical Body.

The two chief places for discovering his doctrine are in the Sermon *Quanta veneratione honorari debent ecclesiastici gradus et sacra*,<sup>64</sup> and the Sermon *De rectoribus et praelatis*.<sup>65</sup> In both of these *loci* we have a collection of his thought on the subject of the nature of the prelatial dignity, the duties of the prelate, the honor due to him and the reasons for it, and a good mixture of criticism of abuses. The constant balance in his presentation shows the moderation of his mind and the charity of his outlook. It also makes it somewhat difficult to distill out his thought.

#### A. The Qualities of the Good Prelate

Using as his texts I Pet. 5: 2 "Tend the flock of God which is among you", and Eccl. 32: 1—2 "Have they made you a ruler? Be not puffed up; be among them as one of them. Have care of them," he draws from the second text, seven conditions necessary for a good prelate. They are, first of all, dignity: that the prelate be a ruler, not a robber, "as a father, not an executioner, as a servant, not a tyrant, as a dispenser, not a devourer."<sup>66</sup> For as Peter says, "governing not by constraint but willingly according to God; nor yet for the sake of base gain, but eagerly, nor yet as lording it over your charges, but becoming from the heart a pattern to the flock."<sup>67</sup>

Fitness: The one elected to a prelacy must be worthy. Here he insists that it is the individual who receives the office — "*Rectorem te posue-*

<sup>64</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo XX (I, 238—255).

<sup>65</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo V (VII, 408—420).

<sup>66</sup> *De rectoribus et praelatis*, Introduction, p. 408: Rector non raptor, quasi patrem, non carnificem; quasi ministrum, non tyrannum; quasi dispensatorem, non devoratozem.

<sup>67</sup> I Petr.: 5:2—3.

run” — not his family, nor his wealth. The accent against current abuses of nepotism is clear and explicit: “He who was formerly called the son of the carpenter or of Peter, is now known as the nephew of the Bishop.”<sup>68</sup>

The third condition for a worthy prelate is that his election be made canonically and freely, and that it be free from simony.<sup>69</sup> Humility is the next condition, and here he cites the “be not puffed up” of his text. It is not principally exterior vanity and pride but the interior state that he is after, and he quotes Gregory to the effect that a proud prelate falls into the fault of apostasy as often as he delights in being preferred to others.

The fifth condition — and here we see an influence of the religious life — is that the prelate have a sense of community. Thus the idea of community is seen again. The prelate should be “in the flock,” not above them as on the throne of power, nor separated from them in private chambers except when this is necessary. He should be among them, as the man of community, the ‘*communis homo*’, sustaining the community in its various activities.<sup>70</sup>

The phrase ‘*communis homo*’ used here evokes that passage where Bernardine is speaking of a priest celebrating Mass. He too is “*persona communis in Ecclesia*”, and it is for this reason we are told, that his action is of value, despite his personal limitations.<sup>71</sup> Here of course, we treat with the non-sacramental obligations of that communal character which are directly under the control of the prelate or priest. If he flees from the flock, he is a mercenary, who has no care of his sheep.

The next condition is that the prelate be kind, prompt to do good, and

<sup>68</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo V, Introduction, p. 408: . . . qui prius fabri filius dicebatur vel Petri, iam nepos episcopi nuncupatur.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, p. 409. He quotes Hebr. 5:4 and comments: *Nec quisquam sumit sibi honorem, sed qui vocatur a Deo*, scilicet per electionem.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.* . . . inter illos, scilicet tamquam communis homo communitatem tenendo in choro, in refectorio atque in dormitorio . . . *Mercenarius fugit*, scilicet a communitate, *quia mercenarius est et non pertinet ad eum de ovibus* (Jn 10:13). An allusion to absentee prelates?

<sup>71</sup> *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo LXIV, Art. III, Cap. V, p. 317. He gives Augustine's opinion that a bad priest can say Mass beneficial to the suffering souls. The core reason is that the act is done “in fide totius Ecclesiae”: — Secundo, ex virtute ecclesiastica; nam si talia bona fiant per hominem malum, ut ministerium publicum Dei vel totius Ecclesiae . . . intelligitur facere cuius fit vice . . . inde est quod talis sacerdotis suffragia, quamvis sit ipse peccator, defunctis prosunt . . .

*De Christiana Religione*, Sermo LIV, Art. II, Cap. III, p. 182: . . . quia vere sacerdos est persona publica et quasi os universalis Ecclesiae, propterea non solum in quantum est sacrificium pro multis oblatum, sed etiam in quantum est sacramentum a sacerdote sumptum, dicitur (Eucharistia) totum corpus Ecclesiae vegetare. Et sic pro eadem est satisfactivum.

attracting all with his sweetness. He should be, citing the text, "as one of them".<sup>72</sup>

The last condition for that worthy prelate is that he be useful, not to his own personal interests, but to his people — "have care of them". This care he should show by example and by the word of instruction, by correcting the wayward, by showing compassion for the weak, and by providing what is necessary for each one of them. Bernardine notes that if a man is to be deemed capable of caring for the flock of the Lord, it is first necessary that he know how to look after himself spiritually.<sup>73</sup>

After explaining the above seven elements which should be found in the good prelate, Bernardine moves on to describe from another angle the relation which should exist between pastor and people. One of the first duties a pastor has to his people is to give them good example. Indeed, bad example is nothing less than violence. And the first example is the example of Charity. If a mother loves her son, how much more should not the pastor love his spiritual son.<sup>74</sup> It is for this reason that Christ thrice questions Peter about his love for Him before giving him the pastoral office. For He wished to show that "charitable care and love of the neighbor" has its origins from God, that a pastor's motive force in the care of the flock should not be his own personal love, but solely the charity of Christ, and that He might show that a prerequisite for such a charge is a very great love of God.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, the questioning of Peter reveals the triple relation of the pastoral charge to the love of God: it is from the love of God that it

<sup>72</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo V, Introduction, p. 409: "Est enim benignitas virtus sponte ad benefaciendum exposita, lenis, blanda, colloquio dulcis et sua cunctos invitans dulcedine," quae omnia praelato maxime convenire probantur. Et de hoc subditur "quasi unus ex ipsis".

<sup>73</sup> *ibid.* p. 409—10: *Habe curam* non tantum multiplicandarum possessionum nec tantum tui ipsius, sed et *illorum*, exemplo et verbo instruendo eos, dissolutos corrigendo, infirmis compatiendo, necessaria providendo, mores uniuscuiusque considerando. Unde Act. cap. 20, 28 praelatis dictum est: *Attendite vobis et universo gregi, in quo vos Spiritus Sanctus posuit episcopos regere Ecclesiam Dei, quam acquisivit sanguine suo*. Notanter siquidem ait: *Attendite vobis*, deinde subdit: *et universo gregi*; ad mystice innuendum, quod qui seipsum curare nescit, quam curam subditorum habebit? Cf. also *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo LXIV (II, 428ss) Art. I, Cap. II. Only prelates who fulfill their preaching office will get the reward of a crown in heaven: . . . quia aureola non debetur habitui sed actui pugnae, iuxta illud Apostoli II Tim. 2,5: *non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit*.

<sup>74</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. I, p. 410. In the *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo XXIX, Art. I, Cap. I, p. 356 he gives as a motive for honouring priests and prelates their spiritual paternity: Papa, qui dicitur quasi 'amabilis pater'.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.* p. 411: . . . ut ostendat quod non ex privato sui ipsius amore, sed ex sola Christi caritate ad hoc ferri et moveri debet . . . ut doceat quod nullus tali auctoritate est dignus aut ad talem curam idoneus, nisi in Dei caritate praecellat.

receives its bent and motion; should be exercised always in accord with it, and is totally ordained to it as its ultimate end.<sup>76</sup> Peter is charged first to feed the lambs, because Christ wants to show that greater spiritual care should be had of the young and tender than of the mature.<sup>77</sup>

The second type of example that the prelate owes to his flock is sobriety. I Pet. 5: 8—9 is addressed most especially to them when it says: "Be sober, be watchful! For your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking someone to devour. Resist him steadfast in the faith." Thus is it that in eating the prelate should be temperate, in conversation charitable, and always reserved. He should beware of the company of seculars.<sup>78</sup>

Thirdly, the prelate should be a model of honest living, of probity: "So let your light shine . . ." Mt. 5: 16.<sup>79</sup>

### B. The Abuses of Prelates

While describing these duties of the prelate to give example, Bernardine indulges in comment upon the abuses of the time. These are his most stinging pages on the subject of clerical short-comings, and they show that he did not view the world with rose-colored glasses. "Woe, therefore", he cries, "to those who distort the example of charity into an example of cupidity, who are asleep to the needs of the soul but on the watch for wealth".<sup>80</sup> And he lists some of the abuses of canon law which occur: they sell tombs in which others have been buried, practice usury, play at dice, say mass for money, though it is clear that a priest who is wedded to the Church should receive nothing *ex facto* even on pretext of expenses. As against the required sobriety, how often is the cleric's table a scandal of guttony and drunkenness. For many get 'one over the mark'.<sup>81</sup> Others go off to banquets where there are jesters present, and others go off to drinking bouts. He illustrates these abuses with the story of a master in theology, who, anxious to become a bishop, courted the favor of influential persons. He wine-d them and dined them

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*: — Secundo notandum, quod ter de dilectione interrogat, ut ostendat quod delectio Dei se habet ad pastorem curam in triplici ratione causae: primo, ut ex sola ipsius inclinatione et motu suscipiatur; secundo, ut secundum ipsam et in ipsa exerceatur; tertio, ut ad ipsam tamquam ad finem ultimum totaliter ordinatur.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*: . . . quamvis idem possit per oves et agnos significari, et econverso.

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. II, p. 412.

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. III, p. 414.

<sup>80</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. I, p. 411—12. Cf. also the quotation from Gregory: "Exigimus quod nostro debetur corpori, sed non impendimus quod subditorum debetur cordi."

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. II, p. 413: Nam plerique sunt qui crapulantur.



so well that they forgot all decorum, and gave him a tanning, and that was the extent of his episcopal ambitions.<sup>82</sup> Without mincing words he speaks of carnal clerics and castigates them roundly. This danger to the church is so real for him that in a sermon on Confession, he feels obliged to warn women to avoid lascivious priests.<sup>83</sup>

In the second article of the same sermon, Bernardine considers the duty of the prelate to feed his sheep with the word of God. That this duty was one of the most neglected in his age is one of the clear facts of history.<sup>84</sup> That, for Bernardine, it is one of the most important functions of the priesthood, we have already seen. It is to be expected, then, that the prelate who ignores this duty will come in for harsh words, and he does.

Woe to the Church, he says, for the word of light has been turned to ignorance. For a full one-third of the three levels of ecclesiastics are lost in ignorance, and give no light. Whereas they should be learned in Scripture and theology, and ignorant persons should be dismissed. For how can ignorant people be helpful in cases of conscience? The burden of such priests is heavy, and that of the bishops who approve them, as well. A blind priest leads a blind people on his back to hell.<sup>85</sup>

Some priests, he says, practice incantations and magical arts, or use magic to find lost objects. They don't turn a hair about conceding eccle-

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.* More puerorum quando in scholis in posterioribus verberantur, iuvenes illi dissoluti et vani equestrem illum elevaverunt, posteriora eius inverecunde plectentes. Et hoc modo episcopatus est.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.* Art. I Cap. III, p. 414: Proinde Zach. 10 cap., 3, iratus Dominus ait: *Super pastores iratus est furor meus, et super hircos visitabo* "Est quippe hircus animal petulans atque foetidum, unde merito significat pastorem luxuriosum" atque infamem.

Cf. *Sermones Imperfecti*, Sermo XXIII (VIII, 1155s), p. 186 for the warning to women.

<sup>84</sup> At least in the radical sense that most priests were not equipped to do it. Cf. Philip Hughes, *The Reformation*, (Universe Books ed., London, 1960) p. 28: "The evidence seems to be conclusive that the average priest was not able really to preach to his parishioners. What sermons, in the real sense of the word, they ever heard were preached when the friars visited the village. Did every village church enjoy the opportunity of such sermons? How often? These questions stare us in the face, and so far we cannot answer them. Without, ever, a first foundation of systematic instruction, without the systematic reminder and development of this which is the business of the preacher as catechist, with nothing more than a kind of lore handed down from one generation of half-educated priests to another, and so to the faithful people, how shall the religion of the ordinary man, who more often than not is unable even to read, how shall his religion be to him a reality . . .?"

<sup>85</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo V, Art. II, Cap. I, p. 416: Unde huiusmodi essent examinandi et eiciendi. Quid enim tales ignorantes possunt intelligere de casibus conscientiarum? O grave et importabile onus talium sacerdotum, et episcoporum tales approbantium! cum de talibus Matth. 15, 14, Dominus dicat: *Caecus si caeco ducatum praestet, ambo in foveam cadunt*. Ex quo patet quod caecus sacerdos caecum populum super se ad inferos ducit.

siastical burial to those unsuited, and some even give the Body of Christ for the performance of witchcraft!<sup>86</sup>

How, he asks, can a pastor induce reverence for sacred things, when he himself is negligent, allowing even the reserved host to be gnawed by worms, and keeping the altar in filth?<sup>87</sup> And to the priest who fails to correct his flock, he scornfully addresses a commentary on Zach. 11: 15—16:

*"Sume tibi vasa pastoris stulti; quia ecce ego suscitabo, id est suscitari permittam, pastorem in terra qui derelicta non visitabit, dispersum non quaeret et contritum non sanabit, et id quod stat non enutriet, et carnes pinguium comedet, et ungulas eorum dissolvat."*<sup>88</sup>

### C. On Correcting Prelates

As we see, no one can suspect Bernardine of minimizing clerical abuses. Thus, of the two facile positions which he might have taken — either building up a vigorous and blind defense of the clergy as a way to insure his favor with authority, or instituting a stinging and unending attack against it, as a way of insuring his popularity with the people, we have seen that Bernardine rejects the former. He will also reject the latter. This is more significant. For it means that Bernardine was above that social game of the Middle Ages which was the merciless pillorying of the clergy.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.* Quidam faciunt brevia contra varias infirmitates; alii diversas incantationes frequentant et magicas artes . . . Quidam incantationibus suis inveniunt furta. Multi non faciunt sibi conscientiam sepelire excommunicatos, et eos qui semel in anno non suscipiunt Corpus Christi; . . . Et quod horrendum est audire, quidam dant chrisma et etiam Corpus Christi pro conficiendis maleficiis.

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. II, p. 418: Cum tanta negligentia quidam celebrant quod quandoque inter corporalia seu in calice pars hostiae reperitur!

Oh, cum quot et quantis horribilibus peccatis quidam celebrant Missas, nec verentur maledictiones et iudicia Dei . . . Alii negligunt habere breviarium, vel missale. Habent corporalia horrida et immunda; et tamen fulgent candore niveo tobaleae et linteamina. Offerunt hostiam fractam et quandoque putrefactam. Ponunt in calice sine aqua vinum vel econverso, vel ponunt plus de aqua quam de vino . . .

<sup>88</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. III, p. 420. Cf. Art. II, Cap. II, p. 418: . . . Quidam quoque ex avaritia fiunt sacerdotes, vel ut parentes ditent; . . . Alii quoque infames celebrant, . . . aut numquam seu raro celebrant . . . Quanta in quibusdam sit irreverentia circa divina, clarius manifestant dissolutiones et risus in officio . . .

<sup>89</sup> J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (Eng. trans., Garden City, 1954), p. 178: "Of all the contradictions which religious life of the period presents, perhaps the most insoluble is that of an avowed contempt of the clergy, a contempt seen as an undercurrent throughout the Middle Ages, side by side with the very great respect for the sanctity of the sacerdotal office. The soul of the masses, not yet completely Christianized, had never altogether forgotten the aversion felt by the savage for the man who may

Bernardine is conscious of the role of clerics in the Body of Christ, but he is also conscious that they are part of it, and need to be helped by the other members. Thus, in his sermon *De Fraterna Correctione* he is very explicit about the need to correct ecclesiastics, though he insists that it be done humbly, secretly and modestly.<sup>90</sup> When he comes to treat at some length "how great a fault and danger it is to disparage ecclesiastical persons and prelates",<sup>91</sup> we find that he does not deny the need for correction, but puts all his vigour into warning against correction which is indiscrete, which does no good either to the erring or to the Christian community. He is so conscious of this right and duty to correct that to a text showing the great divine punishment awaiting those who accuse clerics, he adds: "that is, when they do it by disparaging, and without following the order of charity and reverence".<sup>92</sup> His fear is that people who are busy correcting prelates will be led by their contempt to spurn the sacred.<sup>93</sup>

Bernardine begins his warning with a consideration of the role of the preacher. It is not his place to make a personal attack upon anyone. Let him preach against vice. It is understood that his strictures include erring clerics as well, and indeed, especially.<sup>94</sup> We see that under this heading,

not fight and must remain chaste. The feudal pride of the Knight, the champion of courage and of love, was at one, in this, with the primitive instinct of the people. The worldliness of the higher ranks of the clergy and the deterioration of the lower grades did the rest . . . Hatred is the right word to use in this context, for hatred it was, latent, but general and persistent."

<sup>90</sup> *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XXVIII (IV, 35ss) Art. II Cap. II p. 47: Nec constat tantam gloriam sequi post victoriam quantam ignominiam post ruina[m] et succurrendum est periculoso statui praelatorum et dominorum . . . Considerandum est tamen quod si praelatus est frater naturae conformitate, est tamen pater amore et caritate, et est superior ex officii potestate; si tamen peccat vilis conditionis efficitur . . .

<sup>91</sup> *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo XX, (I, 238ss), Art. III, Title, p. 251: Ostenditur septemplici via quantae culpae . . . The word 'indiscrete' appears *passim*.

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.* p. 252: "quod dum arca Domini reduceretur de Gabaa in Ierusalem, bobus recalcitrantibus, arca inclinata est. Cui dum Oza levites manum adhiberet ut eam erigeret a Domino percussus interiit. Per arcam praelati intelliguntur, per Ozam subditi, per inclinationem arcae casus intelliguntur praelatorum, per illum qui manum adhibuit intelliguntur reprehendentes vel accusantes vitam doctorum, qui a Domino percussi intereunt" scilicet cum id faciunt detrahendo, et caritatis ac reverentiae ordine non servato.

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.* . . . sed dum hypocritarum more plus illorum famam quam propriam vitam vel vitae negligentiam diiudicant, spernunt sancta monita et spiritualia dona . . . cf. *De Christiana Religione*, Sermo XXVII, Art. III, Cap. IV, p. 342: Secunda affectio est odium, sicut de praelatis manifeste patet. Sunt nempe plerique, qui propter quod habent contra illos, Deo, non homini obediendum putant. Et propter eorum quodcumque vitium indiscrete Dei despiciunt gradum, iustificantque seipsos in comparatione defectuum clericorum . . .

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.* Art. III, Cap. I, p. 252: Prima, inquam, via est exceptuatio nullo[m], quia quando praedicator vitia reprehendit, sicut nullum nominare



Bernardine asks merely for the same charity which he demands for all Christians.

He then gives various reasons for care which apply especially to correcting clerics. The most significant one is that one should not expose one's father's shame.<sup>95</sup> This sense of solidarity in the family of God we have seen repeated over and over. There are as well practical considerations. As St. Francis told his followers, the danger in attacking prelates harshly is that their friends will malign the attacker, and so destroy his force for good.<sup>96</sup> Then, there is the old danger that people will insist on hearing a harsh word against priests, so that their own vices will not be treated. And, while they remain impassive to attacks on their own worst vices, one word touching the faults of the clergy is enough to gain instant attention from any audience!<sup>97</sup> And there is the final irony that those who lure a preacher into such attacks will fly to the very priests they wanted upbraided the moment it serves their purpose.<sup>98</sup> And, says Bernardine, this kind of attack is never useful:

Numquam vidi ex tali indiscreta correctione communiter nisi scandalum sequi et obnubilationem; immo quandoque confusionem veritatis et supernae salutis.<sup>99</sup>

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debet nec etiam inculpate, sic nullum exceptuans, cum invehit contra superbiam, contra luxuriam atque avaritiam et cetera huiusmodi, de praelatis et sacerdotibus et religiosis intelligi habet . . . immo amplius . . .

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.* Art. III, Cap. II, p. 253: . . . in hoc siquidem manifestans quanta reverentia veritus sit Patrum crimina vel convicia publicare et Cham reprobi filii maledictionem incurrere, qui patris verenda non texit ut scribitur Gen. 9, 22—25.

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.* Cap. III, p. 253: Franciscus . . . contra clerum dum ab Ecclesia tolerantur, dicens: Si contra feceritis, habebunt sacerdotes amicos et adhaerentes suos, et detrahent vobis et dictis vestris; et ubi quaerebatis animarum fructum atque salutem, totum vertitur in scandalum et confusionem.

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.* Cap. VII, p. 254: Septima via est deterioratio populorum; nam ex hac indiscreta praedicatione seu detractioe, peccatores populi deteriores fiunt. Praedicet quilibet gratus in verbo Dei, redarguat scelera gravia peccatorum, intonet contra errantes . . . interserat aliquid quod tangat clerum; statim quae gravissime tangunt peccatores sceleratos, oblitus sunt. Sola memoria remanet eius quod tetigit sacerdotem; illud quasi faba versatur in ore vulgi; id perpetua memoria retinetur; immo, quod ridiculosius est, si populus in sermone taedio, calore seu frigore cruciatur et praedicator contra sacerdotes et praelatos seu religiosos verbum proferat, aut annuntiet se dicturum, statim evigilant dormientes, affecti taedio hilaescent . . . fames quoque et situs a memoria evanescent; et, quod deterius est, scleratisimi peccatores respectu cleri coram propriis oculis fiunt sancti et iusti. Cf. also De Verbo Dei, *Sermones Imperfecti*, Sermo III (VIII, 22).

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.* Cap. V, p. 254: . . . Et nisi praedicator sit cautus, cum a saecularibus, ut fieri solet impingitur detrahere clero, de facili in scandalum ruit. Nam primi saeculares, qui ad hoc agendum eum impellent, suadente eis aliquo commodo temporali, totum contrarium agent; immo ipsis sacerdotibus adhaerebunt.

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.* Cap. VI, p. 254.



There are two things which Bernardine has in mind in condemning such indiscrete attacks. One is the danger of Hus' error, and this leads him to insist that as long as a cleric is tolerated by the Church he should be honored.<sup>100</sup> The other is the necessity of the clerical state for the Church, even though the members of it are a scandal.<sup>101</sup> Thus it is that for the good of the community one should honor those who have not been rejected by the heads of the community. Honoring them for the sake of God is a way to strong faith, humility and grace.<sup>102</sup>

### *D. Motives For Honoring Clerics*

After considering Bernardine's image of the prelate as he should be, and his criticism of the prelate as he sometimes is, we have dealt with his reaction to criticism of him which is harmful. Now we may turn to his more positive reasons for honouring him. As his positive picture is pastoral, his criticism based on lack of concern for the flock, and his concern in preventing criticism by the indiscreet based on the harm it does to the flock, so will his positive reasons for paying respect be based on ideas rooted in his concept of Christian community, of the Church.

<sup>100</sup> cf. note 96 p. 171; cf. *ibid.*, Art. II, Introduction, p. 245: Pro tuenda igitur catholica veritate, firmiter tenendum est quod quilibet sacerdotes, dum ab Ecclesia tolerantur, licet non sint iusti ut decet, debent ab omnibus honorari . . . cf. *ibid.* Introduction to the whole sermon, p. 238: . . . dum permittente Ecclesia clerici perseverant, omnia quaecumque dixerint vobis . . . et facite . . .

cf. *ibid.* Art. II, p. 145: . . . clarius tamen et utilius de dignitate ecclesiastica disseramus, cum necessario hoc exposcant infelicia tempora nostra, in quibus Hussianorum pestifera haeresis insurrexit atque in tanto robore, divino iudicio, in tam parvo tempore vires sumpsit. However, that Hus held the doctrine here ascribed to him has been denied by de Vooght, *Hussiana*, pp. 428s; 2118s; 415ss. The doctrine is much more like that of Origen who censures ecclesiastics on practically all the points which Bernardine raises. Origen, unlike Hus, does however fall into a donatist conclusion. Cf. Gustave Bardy, *La Théologie de l'Eglise de S. Irénée au Concile de Nicée* (Paris, 1947), Ch. II, especially pp. 141—143 and Ch. III, p. 168—169.

<sup>101</sup> *ibid.* Cap. VII, p. 255: Hoc autem latius dixisse vellim, non ut per hoc crimina defendantur, sed ut gradus ecclesiastici conserventur et defendentur, quibus amotis perit christiana fides. Cf. *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. IV, p. 247 where a propos of priests he cites Eccli. 38:11: *Honora medicum; propter necessitatem enim creavit illum Dominus*. He continues: Nec a tua utilitate retrahat quorundam clericorum deformis vita, cum non despicias in tua necessitate candelam alios quidem illuminantem seque continue consumentem . . . Vir utique discretus et prudens a quolibet suscipit si quod bonum exemplum praestet, impio relinquens impietatem suam . . . Et ad hoc Dominus, Luc. 16,9, hortabatur dicens: *Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis* . . .

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.* art. III, Cap. VII, p. 255: Nemo igitur dubium esse debet quod reverentia propter Deum circa praedicta sacra, et mentem in soliditate fidei firmat et Deo humilem atque subiectam servat, necnon et divinam gratiam impetrat.

By way of arriving at his main theme, Bernardine discusses in seven chapters seven reasons for honoring Church buildings. These are: reverence for the presence of God, reverence for the Blessed Sacrament, respect for the presence of the Angels, the fact that in Church we receive multiple divine benefits, the example of our elders, and especially of Christ in honoring the church building,<sup>103</sup> the presence of sacred objects, and lastly, that in Church are celebrated the divine offices.

In the third chapter where he treats of the presence of the angels, he interprets the angels mentioned in I Cor. 11: 10 following Lombard. They are the angels of the faithful present, the angels attending the sacramental Lord, or they may be taken to be the priests who are called angels and who must not be scandalized by the lascivious gazes of women, especially when engaged in their sacred task.<sup>104</sup> Thus, even in these first arguments, we have a sense of community — whence the insistence on modesty — and a sort of transit to the section on the honoring of persons, since it is they who administer the sacraments and perform the sacred rites. As Bernardine says quoting II Mach. 5: 19, *Non propter locum gentem, sed propter gentem locum elegit Dominus.*<sup>105</sup>

The first reason for honoring priests is that they hold the place of God on earth, and are given to us to care for and nourish with spiritual food the souls won by Christ's blood.<sup>106</sup> The commission to Peter he sees as given to all priests. Since they are vicars of Christ, spurning them is spurning Him. And he illustrates this by the response Alexander is said to have given to those asking why he honored the High Priest of

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. V, p. 243: Denique, ad omnium nostrum inflammanda corda ad zelum divini cultus in templis Dei, maiorem zelum ostendit contra inhonorantes dominicum templum quam contra suos crucifixo- res duos aut quoslibet alios sceleratos. Nec alicui alteri sceleri corrigendo legimus posuisse manum, nisi contra dehonora-ntes Deum in templo suo.

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. VII, p. 242: Tertio vero propter angelos, id est propter ecclesiasticos sacerdotes, qui 'angeli' nuncupantur, ne scilicet ex feminarum lascivo aspectu scandalizentur, maxime dum occupantur in officiis sacris.

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Introduction, p. 245: Secundo consideremus, circa venerationem sacrorum, sacrum gradum, scilicet sacerdotalem et per consequens et maiorem. Licet enim multa in praecedentibus in honorem materialium ecclesiarum sint tacta, quae quidem in honorem personarum ecclesiasticarum satis aperte tendunt, secundum quod II Mach. cap. 5, 19, scriptum est . . .

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. I, p. 245: Primo enim honorandi sunt sacerdotes ratione dignitatis. Sunt enim vicarii Dei in terris, ut animas sanguine Christi redemptas servent, curent et maxime spiritualiter pascant . . . Ecce quod Petro in persona aliorum sacerdotum commissa est a Domino animarum cura. Magna est igitur dignitas sacerdotis, qui vicem Dei in animabus pascendis atque regendis gerit in terris.

*ibid.*, p. 246: . . . Et contra spernentes in sacerdotibus ecclesiasticum gradum, Luc. 10, 16, Dominus ait: *Qui vos spernit, me spernit.*

the Jews: "I did not adore this man, but God Whose High Priest he is."<sup>107</sup>

Then, priests have the office of mediator. They are in the position of angels between God and man. For a priest is a public person in the Church, and as it were, "the mouth" of the whole Church which is one body in the union of charity. Thus it is that not only priestly prayer but the offering and receiving of the Blessed Sacrament is said to nourish the whole body of the Church. The nourishment comes through the mouth. And even though the priest is a sinner, he nonetheless mediates grace for others because of his office.<sup>108</sup>

The next reason for honoring priests likewise flows from the Mystical Body: they have the position of headship in the body, and as the head of the physical body communicates life and feeling to the members, so the priest dispenses to the people the "*sensus Dei*" and the life of grace. Thus, though it is true that an injury to the head harms the whole body, it is much better to have a wounded head than no head at all. And in the same way, it is not so great an evil to have bad religious and priests as to be without them. For even with their defects they provide essential elements in the life of the Church: preaching, the Mass, the sacrament of Penance.<sup>109</sup> As in the body, the reaction of the members of the Church when the head is damaged should not be to attack it, but to defend it, even by exposing oneself, and when the head is hurt, the members should diligently seek to restore it to health.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.* "petentibus autem quare sacerdotem Iudaeorum adorasset, ait: Non hunc adoravi, sed Deum cuius principatum sacerdotii tenet . . ."

<sup>108</sup> cf. note 71, p. 165. In Art. II, Cap. II, p. 246 of this sermon he adds: Hinc, Mal. 2, 7, *Angelus Domini exercituum* nuncupatur. Sicut enim angelus medius est inter Deum et ipsam animam seu populum, sic et sacerdos huius medietatis officium tenet atque exercere debet. Hic dicitur 'sacerdos' quasi 'sacrum dans' quia a Domino sacra suscipere debet, quae et ipse populo suo dispenset. Et licet ipse peccator sit, gratiam tamen in alios ipso transfundit pro suae officio dignitatis . . .

<sup>109</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. III, p. 246: Tertio sunt sacerdotes etiam honorandi ratione principalitatis; officium nempe capitis in populo habent, quod membris et vitam et sensum continue administrat; sic sacerdos et sensum Dei et vitam gratiae populo suo dispensat, propter quod dicitur sacerdos quasi 'sacer dux'. Et licet verum sit quod quando caput dolet, cetera membra languent, nihilominus incomparabiliter maius malum est 'capo mozzo che capo rotto' ut vulgariter dici potest, hoc est dicere quod deterius est homini habere caput praecisum quam caput vulneratum et fractum. . . . Sic utique incomparabiliter christianis populis periculosius et damnosius est, licet haeretici Hussiani contrarium credant, non habere moderno tempore malos religiosos et sacerdotes, quam illos habere, etsi in multis iustitiae adversantur. Quid enim modernis temporibus sequeretur, si cessaret in populis verbum Dei, quod hodie a multis non iustus in Ecclesia praedicatur? Quid si cessarent consimiles confessores et celebrantes, ceteraque sacramenta ecclesiastica ministrantes.

<sup>110</sup> *ibid.* Hinc . . . dictum est quod etiam praelatis inutilibus sit debita reverentia exhibenda. Nam ad membra non pertinet caput laedere vel



Priest are 'kings' for they serve him "Whom to serve is to reign".<sup>111</sup> Christ Himself gives us an example of the honor due to them when, addressing His mother, Lc. 2: 49ss, he showed that by remaining in the temple in the midst of even sinful doctors, he was more fully about "His Father's business" than he would have been in His Mother's company.<sup>112</sup> The last argument in this section on the honoring of priests is based on a consideration of the priestly power, and specifically the power of consecrating at Mass. The power of the priest exceeds that of the angels, the archangels and our Lady herself. It is, in fine, like to the divine power in creating.<sup>113</sup>

The development of the argument here has a curious bent. The priest can do more, faster and better than any other creature and can do it repeatedly. If we stop with this, it will seem that this argument is out of joint with the social implications of the other arguments. But, if we consider it in relation to what has been said about the Eucharist as the sacrament of union of the Body of Christ, we will see that the exaltation of priests on the basis of their power to offer sacrifice is once again a relation of them to the whole body of the faithful.

The closing of this entire section is typical of all that Bernardine has to say on the subject of clerics. Quoting St. Francis, he at once exalts priests, and exhorts them to be worthy of their office:

... gloriosus Franciscus, suis fratribus ait: "Audite fratres mei: Si beata Virgo honoratur, ut dignum est, quia Filium Dei portavit in sanctissimo utero suo; si Baptista beatus contremuit, et non audet contingere sanctum Dei verticem; si sepulcrum in quo per aliquod tempus iacuit, tanta reverentia veneratur; quantum debet esse sanctus et iustus et dignus qui iam non

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impugnare, sed a laesione protegere et defensare, seque pro eo, ne laedatur, exponere, laesoque sanitatem omni diligentia procurare, sicut naturaliter hoc agunt corporalia membra.

<sup>111</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. V, p. 248: ... In cuius siquidem signum tonsura quasi coronam in capite gestant. Cur denique non dici merentur reges, cum illi serviant "cui servire regnare est" ...

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.* Cap. VI, p. 248: Cur tamen per multa vagamur? Nonne et Dominus Iesus Christus adhuc in tenera aetate, dum staret in medio doctorum et transgressorum divinae legis matri eum quaerenti respondit, Luc. 2, 49: *Quid est quod me quaerebatis? Nesciebatis quod in iis quae Patris mei sunt, oportet me esse?* In hoc manifeste ostendens quod esse in medio doctorum, adhuc tamen, licet peccantium, tenentium locum Dei in terris amplius erat esse in iis quae Patris sui erant quam stare in cohabitatione materna, considerata figura carnalis generationis quam Mater ipsa tenebat ...

<sup>113</sup> *ibid.* Cap. VII, p. 249 Title: Quod sacerdotis potestas est infinita, et quod cunctorum creatorum superat potestatem. The chapter is a very long proof of this statement. For example, the doctors agree that finite power is not enough for consecrating so: Ex quo sequitur quod sacerdotis potestas est sicut potestas Personarum divinarum quia in panis transubstantiatione tanta requiritur virtus, quanta in mundi creatione.



mortuum sed glorificatum et in aeternum victurum, *in quem desiderant angeli prospicere* (I Pet. 1, 12), et contrectat manibus et corde atque ore assumit, et aliis quoque porrigit ad sumendum? Quapropter sicut super omne hominum genus propter hoc ministerium vos sacerdotes Dominus honoravit, ita et vos eum super omnes diligere, revereri et honorare curate."<sup>114</sup>

### *E. Authority and Obedience*

The substantive position of Bernardine towards the problem of obedience and authority in the Church has already appeared in the preceding discussion. It is implicit in his description of the cleric and in the reasons he gives for honoring him. We have seen that one cardinal rule in giving obedience to clerics is not the individual judgment as to his worthiness, but the judgment of the Church. But, while the Church allows the cleric to function, what are the limits to his power? The answer Bernardine gives to this question is very general, but it is coherent with his whole attitude. Speaking of the Pope in the Sermon *De Christiana Justitia* he tells us that we should obey him "in all that belongs to his office",<sup>115</sup> and in another place, he avers that such authority is "for the most part in spiritual matters."<sup>116</sup> The reason for obeying in this sphere is that clerics must give an account of our souls,<sup>117</sup> and thus obedience is seen in counterpoint to the fatherly responsibility of the pastor.

But, as we have mentioned, it is perhaps possible to throw more light on the subject-superior relationship in the Church if we consider the two sermons which Bernardine has left us on the subject of religious obedience. These are *De obedientia evangelica* and *Disputatio contra obedientiam*. These sermons both in the Critical Edition and in the Codices<sup>118</sup> immediately precede *De rectoribus et praelatis*, and the order suggests that Bernardine's thought flows from the consideration of the place of authority in religious life, to that of its position in the whole Church. We know that for him the ideal of Christian life was religion<sup>119</sup> and it would

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. VII, p. 251.

<sup>115</sup> *Tractatus de vita christiana*, Sermo II, (VI, 20ss) Art. II, Cap. I, p. 32: in omnibus quae ad officium eorum spectant.

<sup>116</sup> Variant, VI, 509: "quod maxime in spiritualibus est".

<sup>117</sup> *loc. cit.* note 2.

<sup>118</sup> Pacetti, *Ratio*, p. 42.

<sup>119</sup> The religious life is compared to laying down the life for the neighbour: *Tractatus de octo beatitudinibus evangelicis*, Sermo VI, Art. II, Cap. III, p. 426. In *Sermones de Tempore*, Sermo XII, Art. I., Cap. III, p. 195 he thus describes the states of life in the Church: — Primo quidem in Ecclesia Dei est primus status qui nihil habere potest in proprio vel communi, sicut patet in Regula Fratrum Minorum . . . Secundus est status Monachorum et aliarum Religionum . . . Tertius vero status est saecularium personarum vel cleri-

seem, reading these sermons, that the ideal of religious obedience was the model for the whole superior-subject relation in the Church. Whether or not this idea needs further nuances, it is striking that his attitude towards the function of obedience in religious life is in complete accord with everything he says about the Church in general. It will be worth a brief consideration.

In the sermon *De obedientia evangelica*, one of the prime benefits of obedience is said to be that it gives unity to the religious family, and to any others who are associated together. Without it, it is impossible to have the unity of the flock with the head. For in the absence of obedience not only a well-run society is impossible but any society at all. It is obedience which causes all the members to regard themselves as brothers, united in will and spirit.<sup>120</sup> This obedience is based on the example of the obedience of the Apostles first to Christ, and then to Peter.<sup>121</sup> Thus even here when talking professedly of religious obedience we see that Bernardine reflects on the place of obedience and authority in Christian life as a whole. The further reason given is that by obedience the subject is helped to all manner of virtue by the superior.<sup>122</sup> And the supreme motive for it is the obedience of Christ out of love for us. It is this which moves us to obey those who are in His place.<sup>123</sup>

In another place Bernardine puts down obedience as one of the fruits of the beatitude "Blessed are those who thirst" and says that it is a mark of total dedication to God when we obey not only God whom we must obey, but even man, for the sake of God,<sup>124</sup> and he extends the scope of

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corum; et hic status, licet duobus praecedentibus inferior sit, tamen utilis est. Cf. *De Evangelio Aeterno*, Sermo XXIV (III, 392—437), "De Sacra Religione".

<sup>120</sup> *Sermones de diversis*, Sermo III (VII, 335ss), Art. I, Cap. III, p. 358: Secundo autem obedientia evangelica est in summo unitiva. Tenet siquidem principatum in connectendo regularem statum et societatem quorumcumque insimul convenientium . . . Unde sine ea non potest in aliquo esse sublimitas et singularis unitas gregis et capitis, et ita ne optimum regiminis genus, nec etiam regni . . .

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.* Proinde Religio illa quae summe est una, unum habet generale caput, super omnes omnibus praesidens ordinarie et immediate. Sicut enim Apostoli tenebantur obedire Christo, et post mortem eius Petro.

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Cap. III, p. 358—359.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. I, p. 365: Quotidie igitur recogitandus est talis obedientiae pro nobis amor ut erubescamus praelato, qui loco est Christi inobedientes fieri, quando ille pro nobis obediens dignatus est mori. Denique, secundum Bernardum, credentibus nihil impossibile, nihil amantibus . . . quibus gratia fert auxilium . . .

<sup>124</sup> *Tractatus de Octo Beatitudinibus*, Sermo VI (VI, 414ss) Art. II, Cap. III, p. 403: "Proinde, si vult perfectus esse, et maximam virtutem acquirere quae est in abundanti et esurienti iustitia, oportet ut se, non solum cui se debet, subiciat, sed etiam homini, propter Deum . . ."

this obedience with Augustine to obeying prohibitions of things which are not evil in themselves.<sup>125</sup>

Bernardine then turns again to the manner of ruling. The model again is to be our Lord. He does not shout orders. He requests. And this is a direct rebuff to prelates who mortify their subjects with imperious commands and hardly know how to ask kindly. This imperious superior is like a mad man with a sword in his hand. What is wanted is not power-plays but charity, exhortation rather than threats. The priest who must correct his people should act thus "since no one of us lives without fault or sin."<sup>126</sup>

A superior must be one who knows how to obey. It is to Simon Peter which is interpreted "obedient" that the Lord gives the charge of the other Apostles and the Keys of the Kingdom.<sup>127</sup> For there are many difficulties in this prelate-inferior relation. Bernardine discusses them in a rather extensive tract which is largely borrowed from Olivi.<sup>128</sup> His defense of obedience is in concord, once again, with his whole attitude towards authority. Does obedience destroy our liberty to do good? No, he replies; rather it helps it on, for the prelate has no power over his brothers which would inhibit what is good, but only in fostering it. Thus the superior is more servant than master.

Considering the objection that a subject may be provoked to anger by a Superior, he finds his answer in the motive of obedience, and says that if we keep this where it should be, in the fear and love of God, we will not be tempted. The trouble comes from our imperfections.<sup>129</sup> Tak-

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.* "Non potuit Deus perfectius demonstrare quantum sit obedientiae bonum nisi cum prohibuit ab ea re quae non erat mala; sola ibi obedientia tenuit palmam . . ." (In Paradiso). Bernardine adds that this is especially true of religious.

<sup>126</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo III, Art. II, Cap. II, p. 368: . . . Unde et Dominus non praecepit Petro ut navem a terra subduceret, sed rogavit, ut patet Luc. cap. 5, 3. In hoc enim confunditur superbia praelatorum mortificantium subditos suos, qui tamquam domini imperiose praeciipiunt et per obedientiam mandant, et vix aut numquam rogant, cum profecto gladius sit in manu furiosi praeceptum praeceps in ore praelati . . . "Licet plerumque accidant sacerdotibus quae sunt reprehendenda, plus tamen erga corrigendos agat benevolentia quam severitas; plus cohortatio quam comminatio . . . cum nemo nostrum sine reprehensione aut sine peccato vivat."

<sup>127</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Cap. III, p. 370: . . . In vita beati Gilberti dicitur: Praeesse non audeat qui subesse non didicerit; nec a subiectis obedientiam imploret qui eam praelatis exhibere non novit. In cuius mysterium Matt. 16, 19, Simonem, qui interpretatur 'obediens' Dominus aliis Apostolis praefecit, dicens, ut dictum est: *Tibi dabo claves regni caelorum.*

<sup>128</sup> *Sermones de Diversis*, Sermo IV (VII, 382—407).

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.* Art. II, Arg. Septimum, p. 391: "... obedientia non faciat obedire praelato, nisi solum propter timorem Dei atque propter eius amorem; illa ergo vitia non sequuntur in subdito ex obedientiae voto, sed ex subditi imperfectione, occasione a praelato data atque a subdito vitiose assumpta . . ."

ing the opposite tack, he then deals with the objection that the power to command is bad, since it exposes the prelate to presumption. Here he presents reasons why this is not so, or should not be.

It is true that a prelate in as much as prelate does not have the chance to exercise the virtue of obedience, but he shares in the benefit of it through the good he brings to the community. Secondly, no one should command unless he has been exercised in obedience. If this is true his love of obedience will not grow tepid. Thirdly, no ruler should aspire to the post. He should be rather forced into it by God through the agency of others and for the sole motive of procuring the benefits brought by obedience, charity and the good of the brethren. Lastly, any prelate with a clear eye will see that his position is a cause more for humility than for pride, because in truth his power really has the nature of service, not dominion. Of course, unless these considerations are kept in mind the prelate will indeed lose much of the merit of obedience and humility. But, even in this case, the harm which comes to him is a minor matter in comparison with the great good which obedience gives to the subject.<sup>130</sup>

Taking hold of yet another aspect, is it then better to command than to obey? If one considers only the perfection of authority as such, clearly this is true. But if one considers the perfection of sanctity, this is not true, except in the sense that both before and after his election greater sanctity is demanded in the one appointed to rule. And he adds that we should realize that dignity and authority are not creatures which we may seek for their own sake, but only for the good to others and the honor of God.<sup>131</sup>

### *Conclusion*

It is sufficiently clear that in all the parts of the foregoing section we have various manifestations of a constant point of view. Whether in describing the good prelate, castigating the bad, providing motivation for respecting him, or discussing the nature of obedience to him, Bernardine is concerned with the social dimension of authority, conceived solely in terms of service to the Mystical Body. What he says about obedience in religious life is a perfect pendant to what he says about it in the Church as a whole. And what is it he does, if not apply that view to the one Body

<sup>130</sup> *ibid.* Art. I, Arg. Tertium, p. 384—85. "His autem quatuor non observatis fateor quod multum perdet de merito obedientiae et humilitatis. Sed tunc nihilominus damnum unius parvipendendum esset pro tanto multitudinis bono."

<sup>131</sup> *ibid.* Art. III, Arg. Nonum, p. 394: "Sciendum autem quod, quia dignitas et auctoritas non est creaturae appetibilis propter se, sed solum propter aliorum utilitatem et Dei honorem; . . ."



of the Lord which is the Church? His treatment of authority is very practical, but it is rooted in his theology.

He demands no lavish respect for pomp and pagentry, and insists even more on the duty of those in authority to be humble, and worthy of their charge than he does on the reciprocal duty of the subject to obey. As authority is given solely for the good of the Body, woe to the bad pastor who disperses the sheep whom he has in trust from the Lord. His task is rather to foster unity and to help the flock to the fulness of divine life. It is only because of his usefulness in fulfilling this function that obedience to him is presented as a good — as a means of union in Christ. And it is only to protect this function that the faithful are warned not to disparage him, even when his defects are great. For by so attacking him, they will destroy his usefulness to the Body, and this is the great evil.

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## A NEW PRESENTATION OF OCKHAM'S THEORY OF SUPPOSITION WITH AN EVALUATION OF SOME CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS<sup>1</sup>

We will not recount here the external facts of William Ockham's biography. These are readily available in numerous reliable secondary sources. Our concern here is to discuss the corpus of Ockham's logical works upon which we will draw in our attempt to elucidate his theory of supposition. Our main source will of course be Ockham's *Summa logicae*. The authenticity of this work is well established, and the patient scholarly labor of Philotheus Boehner has provided us with a reliable working edition of the entire first part plus the first section of the second part.<sup>2</sup> This is the work upon which most previous scholars have based their understanding of Ockham's theory of supposition.

In addition to this major work, however, contemporary scholars have uncovered two additional shorter works on logic which also appear to be authentic works of Ockham. The longer of these two works has come to be referred to as the *Elementarium logicae*, and the shorter is merely called the *Tractatus minor*.<sup>3</sup> Eligius M. Buytaert has provided us with excellent editions of both of these works.

In addition the combined scholarship of Boehner and Buytaert has provided us with historical and textual evidence which strongly indicates that both of these works are in fact authentic works of Ockham.<sup>4</sup> This is not to say, however, that the authenticity of these two shorter logic texts is as firmly established as that of the major work, the *Summa logicae*. It is conceivable that future research might militate against our

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<sup>1</sup> This article is an excerpt from a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of State University of New York at Buffalo in May, 1970. Latin translations not followed by any citation are by the author.

<sup>2</sup> Ockham, William, *Summa logicae, pars prima* and *Summa logicae, pars secunda et tertia prima*. Ed. Philotheus Boehner, Franciscan Institute.

<sup>3</sup> Buytaert, Eligius, "The *Elementarium logicae* of Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*. Vol. XXV, Annual III (1965) and Buytaert, Eligius, "Ockham: *Tractatus minor*," *Franciscan Studies*. Vol. XXIV, Annual II (1964).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Boehner, Philotheus, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, Ed. Eligius Buytaert, Franciscan Institute (1958), 70—96; and Buytaert, Eligius, "Ockham: *Tractatus minor*, *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. XXIV, Annual II (1964), 43—53.

firm acceptance of the authenticity of the lesser works. We, however, shall proceed on the working hypothesis that these works are in fact authentic.

Concerning the relative dating of the three logic texts we accept the conclusions of Buytaert which are based on a careful reevaluation of the results of Boehner's research.<sup>5</sup> According to Buytaert the following are probable dates of composition of the texts with which we are now concerned:

1. *Summa logicae* between 1324 and 1327.
2. *Tractatus minor* between 1342 and 1345.
3. *Elementarium logicae* between 1342 and 1347, but after the *Tractatus minor*.

That the shorter texts were composed some time after the major text is rather firmly established. That the *Elementarium logicae* was composed after the *Tractatus minor* is probable.

All three of the above logic texts do have sections devoted explicitly to the theory of supposition. The amount of space given over to this concern varies, however, from one text to another:

1. In the *Summa*, Part One, there are 39 pages.<sup>6</sup>
2. In the *Tractatus minor*, Tract three, there are only three pages.<sup>7</sup>
3. In the *Elementarium*, Book Three, there are 19 pages.<sup>8</sup>

Even in terms of number of pages devoted to the topic it can be seen that Ockham's most complete treatment of supposition is that which he presented in the *Summa*. This is not to say that the passages which concern supposition in the other two texts are merely condensations or abbreviations of issues treated more fully in the *Summa*. In each of the minor texts the topic is as it were taken up anew and the material is presented in a relatively fresh manner. Moreover, each of the minor texts does contain some material which can serve as a supplement and elucidation of topics and issues treated in the major text.

The above remarks should not be taken to indicate that the present author has found any serious contradictions among the theses contained in the various texts. Such is not the case. Although various particular problems receive more attention in one text rather than another, the

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* Buytaert.

<sup>6</sup> Ockham, William, *Summa logicae, pars prima*. Ed. Philotheus Boehner, Franciscan Institute, (1951), 175—214.

<sup>7</sup> Buytaert, Eligius, "Ockham: *Tractatus minor*," *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. XXIV, Annual II (1964), 66—69.

<sup>8</sup> Buytaert, Eligius, "The *Elementarium logicae* of Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. XXV, Annual III (1965), 201—219.

overall theory put forth would appear to be the same in spite of stylistic variations in the modes of presentation. Nor does the present author contend that the theory of supposition as presented in the historically later works necessarily represents a more mature or definitive view than that which Ockham developed in his *Summa*. In regard to certain particular issues it may perhaps be true that Ockham is presenting a more well considered position in his later works. In regard to the theory as a whole, however, the earlier version would appear to be both more definitive and also more complete than that found in the later ones.

In the section immediately following, we will consider the main outlines of the theory of supposition which Ockham presents in his *Summa*. In the section following that we will consider only those materials from the *Tractatus minor* and the *Elementarium* which can supplement and elucidate the main body of the theory which will have already been presented.

#### Section One: *The Summa Logicae*

In order to attain a comprehensive understanding of Ockham's theory of supposition, it will first be necessary to consider his theory of signification and some of his distinctions of different kinds of terms on the basis of different kinds of signification. Next we will consider his general theory of supposition, and finally we will give special attention to his theory of personal supposition.

#### *Ockham's Theory of Signification*

In the opening chapters of his *Summa*, Ockham discusses the notion of a term. He indicates that terms are the constituents into which propositions are resolved. Since propositions may be either written, spoken, or mental; terms also may be either written, spoken, or mental. He goes on to indicate, however, that 'term' can be understood either in a broad sense, or else in more narrow and precise senses. In a very broad sense the copula is included in the notion of a term, but in a narrower sense it is only the subject and predicate which are referred to as the terms of a proposition. Again in a broad sense a whole proposition, or what Ockham would call a complex term, is included in the notion of a term; since a whole proposition can stand as the subject of a larger proposition. In a narrower sense, however, it is only non-complex (i. e. non-propositional) constituents functioning as subject or predicate to which we apply the notion of a term. It is in this last sense that we will be using the word 'term' in the discussion which follows.



In his very first chapter, Ockham explains his position concerning the relationships among written, spoken, and mental terms. He indicates that the written term is subordinate to the spoken term, which in turn is subordinate to the mental term. Although he does give some sort of primacy to the mental term, he insists that this primacy should not be misunderstood.

Dico autem voces signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significant ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem, quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter aliquid significat, et secundario vox significat illud idem . . .<sup>9</sup>

I say vocal words are signs subordinated to mental concepts or contents. By this I do not mean that if the word 'sign' is taken in its proper meaning, spoken words are properly and primarily signs of mental concepts; I rather mean that words are applied in order to signify the very same things which are signified by mental concepts. Hence the concept signifies something primarily and naturally, whilst the word signifies the same thing secondarily.<sup>10</sup>

The main contrast which Ockham makes between written and spoken terms on the one hand, and mental terms on the other hand is that the former signify a referent arbitrarily and by convention whereas the latter signify a referent naturally and necessarily. He does not maintain that written or spoken terms signify mental terms, which in turn signify referents. To express Ockham's position in Frege's terminology we might say that the mental term constitutes the sense of the written or spoken term, but we must not forget that for Ockham this sense itself functions as a term in the mental proposition. Moreover, Ockham is cautioning us not to confuse sense and references, for he insists that the written and spoken terms which are subordinated to a given mental term have the same reference or signification as does the mental term itself. To express this point entirely in Frege's terminology we would have to say that the reference of a written or spoken term is identical with the reference of the sense of the term. The phrase 'reference of the sense' is admittedly awkward, and it reveals clearly that, although Ockham's theory can be coordinated with Frege's, the two views are in the main significantly divergent.

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<sup>9</sup> Boehner, Philotheus, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, Ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute, (1958), 9.

<sup>10</sup> Boehner, Philotheus, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, (1964), 52.

After discussing various distinctions which apply both to mental terms and also to spoken and written terms, Ockham then goes on to discuss certain distinctions which apply only to spoken or written terms and not to mental terms.<sup>11</sup> He insists, for example, that the distinction between univocal and equivocal terms does not apply to mental terms but only to spoken and written terms.<sup>12</sup> Throughout these chapters Ockham uses the word 'name' rather than the word 'term' in order to indicate that what he says applies only to spoken and written terms and not to mental terms.

It is in this section of his work that Ockham explains his distinctions between names of first and second imposition, and names of first and second intention. Names of second imposition are, according to Ockham, "names which are applied to signify conventional signs, and also what goes with such signs, but only as long as they are signs."<sup>13</sup> By the phrase "what goes along with such signs" Ockham is referring to case, number, tense, etc. By the qualification "but only as long as they are signs" he is indicating that we ought to exclude from this category names such as 'audible thing' which do refer to spoken signs but also can refer to other things, mere noises for example.

Furthermore, Ockham alerts us to the fact that the phrase 'name of second imposition' can be taken in a broad sense or in a narrow sense. In the broad sense it includes names which can be applied indifferently to other names and also to mental terms. The word 'predicate' for example would be a name of second imposition in the broad sense. In the narrow or strict sense, however, 'name of second imposition' applies to grammatical or linguistic terminology which refers only to names and characteristics of names and not to mental terms or characteristics of mental terms.

Stricte autem dicitur 'nomen secundae impositionis' illud, quod non significat nisi signa ad placitum instituta, ita quod non potest competere intentionibus animae, quae sunt naturalia signa, cuiusmodi sunt talia: 'figura,' 'coniugatio,' et huiusmodi.<sup>14</sup>

In the strict sense, however, 'name of the second imposition' is that which signifies only a conventional sign, and therefore does not refer to mental contents, which are natural signs. Such names are 'figure', 'conjugation' and the like.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Ockham, *Summa, pars prima*, chs. 11, 12, & 13.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>13</sup> Boehner, Philotheus, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 60.

<sup>14</sup> Ockham, *Summa, pars prima*, 37.

<sup>15</sup> Boehner, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 61.

Ockham then goes on to indicate that all names which are not names of second imposition in either the broad sense or the strict sense are names of first imposition. The phrase 'name of first imposition', however, can also be taken in either a broad or a strict sense. In the broad sense it includes syncategorematic as well as categorematic names. In the strict sense it includes only categorematic names. When taken in the strict sense names of first imposition are divided into those which are names of first intention and those which are names of second intention.

The phrase 'name of second intention' in turn may be taken in a broad sense or in a strict sense. In a broad sense a name of second intention is one that can be applied indifferently to either names or mental terms. This broad sense of the phrase 'name of second intention' overlaps with the broad sense of the phrase 'name of second imposition.' Again the word 'predicate' can serve as an example. In the strict sense, however, the phrase 'name of second intention' applies only to names which signify precisely mental terms. The phrase 'mental term' itself is a clear example of a name of second intention in the strict sense. If we understand the phrases 'name of second intention' and 'name of second imposition' both in their strict senses, then the two categories will be mutually exclusive. If, on the other hand, we understand both of these terms in the broad sense, then the categories will not be mutually exclusive.


Finally names of first intention are all names which do not fall into any of the above categories. They are names which do not signify names or mental terms, but rather they are names which refer to entities which are neither names nor mental terms. Ordinary substantives like 'man' or 'animal' are names of first intention. Even in this category, however, it is necessary to distinguish a broad and a strict sense. The phrase 'name of first intention' understood in a broad sense would include words that can signify indifferently entities which are not terms of any kind whatsoever and also entities which are terms of one kind or another. The word 'thing' for example would be a name of first intention broadly understood. In the strict sense, however, only names like the substantives given above are to be understood as names of first intention, for such names signify only entities which are not terms of any kind whatsoever.<sup>16</sup>

The diagram below indicates all of the complex branchings of Ockham's multiple distinctions, and provides examples of each kind of name which Ockham specifies.

<sup>16</sup> For Ockham's exposition of these distinctions see *Summa, pars prima*, ch. 11; for Boehner's most complete discussion of this topic see *Collected Articles*, 224—229.

## DISTINCTIONS

## EXAMPLES

*Ockham's General Theory of Supposition*

According to Ockham terms have signification whether they occur in a proposition or not; they have supposition, however, only when they occur in the context of a proposition. Ockham employs only one preliminary distinction in his theory of supposition, and that is the distinction between proper and improper supposition. In his *Summa* as well as his *Elementarium logicae*, this distinction, which is logically a preliminary one, is included at the very end of his discussion as an addendum to his other distinctions.<sup>17</sup> In the *Tractatus minor* the distinction is omitted entirely.

<sup>17</sup> *Summa*, pars prima. Ch. 77; and Buytaert, "The *Elementarium logicae* of Ockham," 217.



In each case where Ockham treats of this topic, improper supposition is indicated as that kind of supposition which results from the figurative or metaphorical use of language whereas proper supposition results from a literal or scientific use of language.

Ockham distinguishes three major kinds of proper supposition: Personal, simple, and material. His definitions of these are clear and exact:

1. Suppositio personalis universaliter est illa, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato, sive illud significatum sit res extra animam, sive sit vox sive intentio animae, sive sit scriptum, sive quodcumque aliud imaginabile, ita quod quodcumque subiectum vel praedicatum supponit pro suo significato, ita quod significative tenetur, semper est suppositio personalis.<sup>18</sup>

Personal supposition is in all instances that in which a term supposits for the referent which it signifies, whether that referent be a thing outside of the mind, or whether it be a vocal sign or an intention in the mind, or whether it be a written sign, or whether it be anything imaginable whatsoever; whenever this occurs in such a way that the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits for the referent which it signifies and in such a way that it is taken significatively, then the supposition is always personal.

2. Suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative. Verbi gratia sic dicendo: 'Homo est species', iste 'homo' supponit pro intentione animae, quia illa intentio est species, et tamen iste terminus 'homo' non significat proprie loquendo illam intentionem, sed illa vox et illa intentio animae sunt tantum signa subordinata in significando idem . . .<sup>19</sup>

Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention in the mind, but is not taken significatively. For example when we say 'man is a species', 'man' supposits for an intention in the mind, for it is this intention which is a species, but this term 'man', however, does not properly speaking signify this intention, but rather this word and this intention of the mind are both signs subordinate to each other which signify the same thing. . . .

3. Suppositio materialis est, quando terminus non supponit significative, sed supponit vel pro voce vel pro scripto. Sicut patet hic: 'Homo est nomen'; li 'homo' supponit pro seipso, et tamen non significat seipsam.<sup>20</sup>

Material supposition occurs when a term does not supposit significatively, but rather supposits for a spoken sign or a written sign. This is evident in the proposition 'man is a noun'; for this word 'man' supposits for itself as a sign, and it does not, however, signify itself as a sign.

Ockham's threefold division of proper supposition can be easily summarized. If a term is taken significatively, that is if a term supposits for a referent which it signifies, then it has personal supposition. If it is not taken significatively, then it has either simple or material supposition. If the term is a mental term suppositing for itself or else a written or

<sup>18</sup> Ockham, *Summa, pars prima*, 177.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

spoken term suppositing for the mental term to which it is subordinated, then the term has simple supposition. Finally, if the term is either a spoken or a written term suppositing for itself or else a mental term suppositing for the written or spoken term subordinated to that mental term, then the term has material supposition.

Having given his major distinction and definitions, Ockham then proceeds to explain how to determine what kind of supposition a term has in particular kinds of propositions.<sup>21</sup> He first alerts us to the fact that "in whatever kind of proposition a term is placed, it may have personal supposition, if it is not arbitrarily limited to another kind of supposition by those who use it."<sup>22</sup> Personal supposition, therefore, is taken to be the ordinary case, and we are justified in assuming that a term has personal supposition unless there is some reason to assume otherwise. Ockham then proceeds to indicate that "a term cannot have simple and material supposition in every kind of proposition."<sup>23</sup> It can have simple supposition if and only if the other term in the proposition is one which signifies mental terms, that is, if the other term is of second intention either strictly or broadly understood. A term can have material supposition if and only if the other term is of second imposition either strictly or broadly understood.<sup>24</sup>

It would seem that according to the position which Ockham is taking at least one of the terms in a proposition must have personal supposition, and that the kind of term which this term is determines the kind of supposition allowable to the other term. It is not clear, however, whether it must always be the predicate term which is taken according to personal supposition thereby limiting the kind of supposition allowable to the subject term. If we were to assume that this is Ockham's position then his rules would be in accord with William of Sherwood's dictum: "Subjects are of such sorts as the predicates may have allowed (*Talia sunt subiecta, qualia permiserint predicata*)."<sup>25</sup> This assumption, however, does not appear to be warranted. It can neither be supported by anything which Ockham says nor by the examples which he gives.

Consider as a case in point the following instance:

Similiter, ista propositio est distinguenda: 'Animal rationale est definitio hominis,' quia si habeat suppositionem simplicem, est vera, si personalem, est falsa.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 65.

<sup>22</sup> Boehner, Philotheus, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 73.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 74—75.

<sup>25</sup> Kretzmann, Norman, *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic*, 113.

<sup>26</sup> Ockham, *Summa, pars prima*, 180.

Likewise, in regard to the following proposition a distinction must be made: 'Rational animal is the definition of man,' for if it (the subject term ?) has simple supposition, then the proposition is true, if it has personal supposition, then, the proposition is false.

If we understand the whole predicate term expressed by the phrase 'the definition of man' to be a name of second intention strictly understood, then this would require that the subject term be taken according to simple rather than personal or material supposition. In this case then the subject would have simple supposition and the predicate would have personal supposition, and the nature of the predicate would determine the kind of supposition allowed to the subject term. But the proposition in question can be simply converted so as to yield: 'This definition of man is rational animal.' If, in regard to this converted proposition, we insist that the predicate be taken according to personal supposition, then the proposition will be false no matter what kind of supposition we attribute to the subject term. For neither the written term itself, nor the mental term to which it is subordinated, nor what the term signifies (if the term is in fact a name of second intention) can possibly be a rational animal. Nor will this conclusion be in any way affected by the kind of supposition which might be attributed to the word 'man' which is part of the phrase 'the definition of man'. For whether you take the definition to be of the entity man, or of the word 'man', or of the intention in the mind which signifies man, in none of these cases will it be true that the *definition* of man is a rational animal.


Although we do not have an explicit analysis by Ockham of the converted proposition given above, we can certainly make a probable conjecture as to the position which he would take. He would not insist that the predicate be taken according to personal supposition, nor in this case would he hold that the nature of the predicate term determines the kind of supposition allowable to the subject term. It is likely that he would give the reverse of the analysis which was given above in regard to the original proposition, namely, that it is the subject term in this case that must be taken to have personal supposition, and that in this case the subject term determines that the predicate term be taken according to simple supposition.

It is reasonably clear at this point that Ockham would not countenance the assumptions by means of which we assimilated his rules to the more general rule formulated by William of Sherwood. If some such assumptions are not made, however, then the procedure which Ockham intended for the application of his rules does not appear to be sufficiently clear;

for different conclusions will sometimes follow from their application depending on whether we begin with the subject term or with the predicate term. This difficulty itself might, however, be part of the general point that Ockham is trying to drive home. Perhaps he intended that his rules are to be applied both ways in order to reveal the full multiplicity of senses to which certain ambiguous (amphibolous) propositions are prone.

*Ockham's Theory of Personal Supposition*

Ockham incorporates into his theory of personal supposition all of the distinctions which had been developed by his thirteenth century predecessors. His explanations of the various kinds of personal supposition are, however, more clear and precise than those which we found in the texts of the earlier logicians. Ockham coordinates the various distinctions as illustrated in the following tree-diagram:



Personal supposition is first divided into discrete and common. A term has discrete personal supposition if it is a proper name or a common term modified by a demonstrative adjective. The subjects of both of the following singular propositions have discrete supposition:

'Socrates is a man.'

'This man is an animal.'<sup>27</sup>

A term has common personal supposition if it is a common term exercising its significative function. This type of supposition is subdivided into determinate and confused. A term is said to have determinate supposition if it is possible to analyze the proposition in which it occurs into a disjunction of propositions in which the term has discrete supposition. For example, the proposition 'Some man is running' can be analyzed

<sup>27</sup> Boehner, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 75.



into 'Either this man is running, or that man is running, and so on for all men.' In such a case the term 'man' in the original proposition has determinate supposition, and this sort of analysis is called a logical descent. This type of supposition is called determinate because if any determinate one of the singular propositions which results from the descent is true then the original proposition is also true. Ockham specifies two rules for identifying a case of determinate supposition: "... (1) The logical descent from a common term to its singular inferior terms can legitimately be made by a disjunctive proposition, and (2) from any such singular proposition the proposition is inferable ..."<sup>28</sup>

Now let us turn to confused supposition. According to Ockham "confused personal supposition is any supposition of a common term which is not determinate supposition."<sup>29</sup> Confused supposition is subdivided into purely confused and distributively confused. Purely confused supposition occurs when you cannot make a logical descent to a disjunction of propositions, but you can make a logical descent to a proposition with a disjunctive predicate. Whereas Peter of Spain had maintained that the predicate of a universal affirmative proposition has simple supposition, Ockham maintains (as did William of Sherwood) that the predicate of a universal affirmative proposition has purely confused personal supposition. For although you cannot descend from 'Every man is an animal' to 'Every man is this animal, or every man is that animal, etc.', you can descend to 'Every man is either this animal, or that animal, or that animal, and so on for all animals.'

A term has distributively confused supposition, on the other hand, if the proposition in which it occurs can be analyzed into a conjunction of singular propositions in which the term has discrete supposition. Such is the case in regard to the subject term of a universal affirmative proposition. The proposition 'Every man is an animal' can be analyzed into 'This man is an animal, and that man is an animal, and that man is an animal, and so on for all men.' In this case every conjunct must be true in order for the original proposition to be true.<sup>30</sup>

Finally we find that distributively confused supposition is divided into mobile and immobile. When the ordinary descent to a conjunction of singular propositions is possible, then the supposition is called mobile. If for any reason additional alteration is necessary in order to make the descent, then the supposition is called immobile. The example of immo-

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

bile supposition which Ockham gives is the proposition 'Every man except Socrates is running.' In this proposition the term 'man' is said to have immobile supposition because in making the descent to a conjunction of singular propositions the qualification indicated by the phrase 'except Socrates' must be included in each conjunct. If we were to make the descent the result would be 'This man who is not Socrates is running, and that man who is not Socrates is running, and that man who is not Socrates is running, and so on for all men who are not Socrates.' In other words the whole descent is immobilized for in every case you must indicate that the man who is running is not Socrates.<sup>31</sup>

### Section Two: *The Tractatus Minor and the Elementarium Logicae*

Ockham's treatment of supposition in the *Tractatus minor* is very brief, and there are only a few points which we wish to note. In this work Ockham points out that even syncategorematic terms or non-significant syllables can have supposition in a proposition if they are understood to have material supposition.<sup>32</sup> The examples which he gives are: "'bu' is a non-significant syllable" and "'Every' is a sign of universality". He immediately goes on to point out, however, that only categorematic terms can have personal supposition.

Ockham then proceeds to a discussion of the various kinds of personal supposition. His discussions of discrete supposition and determinate supposition contain nothing which we have not already considered. In his treatment of the various kinds of confused supposition, however, a certain tension arises. In one place Ockham says:

Est itaque suppositio confusa quando non contingit descendere per disiunctivam ad singularia vel non contingit ab uno solo singulari ascendere ad terminum communem.<sup>33</sup>

And therefore confused supposition is such that it does not allow a descent to a disjunction of singular propositions, nor does it allow an ascent from any such singular proposition to the common term (as contained in the general proposition).

From this passage it would be natural to assume that Ockham takes impossibility of logical ascent from the singular to the general as characteristic of confused supposition in all of its kinds. Later passages in this work indicate, however, that this is not Ockham's position. He does hold this view in regard to distributively confused supposition but not

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>32</sup> Buytaert, "Ockham: *Tractatus minor*," 66—67.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

in regard to purely confused supposition. That the latter part of this contention is true is clear from the following passage:

Suppositio confusa tantum est quando non contingit descendere ad singularia nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam, licet conveniat ascendere de singulari quocumque, sicut ista: Omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est hoc animal et omnis homo est istud animal, licet contingat ascendere sic: Omnis homo est hoc animal, quocumque demonstrato, ergo omnis homo est animal.<sup>34</sup>

Purely confused supposition is had when it is not proper to descend to either a disjunction or a conjunction of singular propositions, but nevertheless an ascent from any singular proposition is proper; although the following descent is improper: 'Every man is an animal, therefore every man is this animal or that animal', the following ascent is nevertheless proper: 'Every man is this animal (pointing out some particular individual), therefore every man is an animal'.

From this passage we can see that Ockham holds that in the case of purely confused supposition an ascent can be made from a proposition in which the term has discrete supposition. That such an ascent cannot be made in the case of distributively confused supposition is obvious. In regard to the propriety of logical ascent, therefore, purely confused supposition is more closely related to determinate supposition, than it is to distributively confused supposition.

It is noteworthy that nowhere in this section of the *Tractatus minor* does Ockham characterize purely confused supposition by means of the notion of analysis into a disjunctive predicate rather than a disjunction of propositions as is the case with determinate supposition. It is difficult to say whether this fact should be taken as some sort of indication that Ockham was dissatisfied with the notion of a disjunctive predicate and was attempting to abandon it. It is just as credible to assume that Ockham believed that the introduction of this notion into such a condensed treatment of the topic of supposition would be more confusing than helpful.

Now let us turn our attention to Ockham's treatment of supposition in the *Elementarium logicae*. The first thing to be noted in regard to this work is that Ockham appears to have shifted his emphasis somewhat. In both the *Summa* and the *Tractatus minor* Ockham considers the topic of supposition without any special attention given to mental propositions. In the *Elementarium*, however, he is more concerned with the mental proposition, and he brings out certain special problems in regard to supposition which arise when we consider the supposition of mental terms.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

In this work Ockham does not immediately proceed to his triple distinction between material, simple, and personal supposition. He begins rather by pointing out that in some cases a term supposits for itself and in other cases it supposits for something other than itself.<sup>35</sup> In the *Summa* Ockham had indicated that when a spoken or written term supposits for itself we have material supposition. In the *Elementarium* Ockham indicates that when a mental term supposits for itself we should be careful not to consider this as material supposition but rather as simple supposition:

Si supponit pro seipso, aut supponit pro seipso in propositione mentali et comprehenditur sub suppositione *simplici*, quia tunc supponit pro intentione animae . . .<sup>36</sup>

If a term supposits for itself, that is if it supposits for itself in a mental proposition, it is then comprehended under *simple* supposition, because in this case it supposits for an intention of the soul. . .

At this point two questions arise: First, is not Ockham introducing an unnecessary complication into his theory; and, secondly, does he intend to maintain that terms in mental propositions can only have either simple or personal supposition and not material supposition? These questions can only be properly answered if we move on a few paragraphs into Ockham's discussion in order to become more fully aware of the problem which is perplexing him.

In the third paragraph of this section he writes:

Si autem supponit pro vocibus vel scriptis sicut pro signis secundariis, non supponit significative proprie; tamen tali suppositioni non habemus proprium nomen impositum, nisi vocetur suppositio materialis. Unde omnis suppositio pro vocibus et scriptis, quae non est significativa, vocetur suppositio materialis. Sic supponit terminus in huiusmodi propositionibus etiam mentalibus: 'Homo' est nominativi casus, et 'animal' est singularis numeri.<sup>37</sup>

If, however, there is supposition for a spoken term or a written term such that the supposition is for a secondary sign, then the supposition is not properly significative; however, we have no appropriate name for such a case, unless it is to be called material supposition. If we do so, then every supposition for a spoken or written term which is not significative will be called material supposition. Thus it is the case that the terms in the following mental propositions supposit in the manner just described: 'man' is nominative case and 'animal' is singular in number'.

It is now clear why Ockham did not want to call the case of a mental term standing for itself an instance of material supposition. For, if he had done so, then he would not have had a label available for the case

<sup>35</sup> Buytaert, "The *Elementarium logicae* of Ockham," 204.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 204.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*



in which a mental term supposits for the spoken or written term which designates it and signifies in a secondary manner the same referent which the mental term signifies in a primary manner. Consider the following two written propositions understanding each as though it were actually a mental proposition or judgment:

1. 'Man' is a species.
2. 'Man' is a noun.

In the case of the first proposition the mental analogue of the word 'man' will stand in the mental proposition as a mental term suppositing for itself. It is such cases which Ockham wishes to subsume under his notion of simple supposition rather than under his notion of material supposition. In the case of the second proposition the mental analogue of the word 'man' will stand for or supposit for the written word 'man' which is something other than itself. It is cases of this kind that Ockham wishes to subsume under his notion of material supposition.

We can see now that both of our above questions must be answered in the negative. On the one hand, Ockham is not unnecessarily complicating his theory. There are two logically distinct kinds of supposition which he wishes to distinguish, and he employs his previously formulated terminology in such a way as to avoid the need for introducing any new terms. On the other hand, he is not maintaining that a mental term cannot have material supposition; he is rather attempting to clarify the fact that when a mental term has material supposition it does not supposit for itself but rather for something other than itself.

That a term supposits for itself cannot, therefore, be taken as one of the criteria by which we distinguish material supposition from other kinds. Ockham is clearly aware of this, since the definition which he offered as a characterization of material supposition avoids the specification of this criterion as a requirement for this kind of supposition.

At the very end of this rather lengthy introductory section, Ockham makes some remarks which are both of logical and also of historical interest:

Causa autem quare una vocatur simplex, alia materialis, alia personalis non est curiose investiganda. Voces sunt ad placitum. Et ideo quid moverit illos qui primo sic diversis nominibus diversas suppositiones appellabant, est nobis ignotum. Ipsa autem sic vocari ab *Aristotele* non memini me legisse. De suppositione tamen significativa patens est ratio quare sic congrue appellatur, quia tunc scilicet terminus supponit significative quando supponit pro suo significato.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 208—209.

The reason why one kind of supposition is called simple, and another kind material, and another kind personal should not be curiously inquired into. Spoken words are arbitrary. And so what it was which motivated those who first used these various names to designate the various kinds of supposition is not known by me. I do know that I have no memory of having read that they were thus labeled by *Aristotle* himself. There is, however, an evident reason why the term 'significative supposition' is appropriate, since when a term supposits significatively it supposits for the referent which it signifies.

This passage is important because it indicates that Ockham is unaware of many of the historical minutiae which we are aware of today. He is, for example, unaware of the development of the term '*persona*', and he also appears to be ignorant of the fact that the term 'material supposition' was used by William of Sherwood as a contrast term to 'formal supposition'. In the light of this we must be very cautious in forming any conclusions as to the extent of Ockham's direct acquaintance with earlier works. Moreover, we can see from this passage that Ockham has no intention of quibbling about terminology. On the one hand, he is willing to accept traditional terminology when it will serve his purpose without introducing undue confusion; on the other hand, he is willing to coin new terminology when he believes it will be helpful. It should be noted, however, that because of certain controversies surrounding the notion of personal supposition, Ockham's suggestion that this kind of supposition should be called 'significative supposition' was not generally accepted by either his contemporaries or his historical successors.

Now, let us turn to some points which Ockham makes in the course of his treatment of personal supposition in this section of the *Elementarium*. First, we must indicate that in his discussion of purely confused supposition Ockham does indicate that it is proper to make a descent to a disjunctive predicate:

Verumtamen bene contingit descendere ad disiunctum predicatum; bene sequitur: Omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud et sic de aliis.<sup>39</sup>

It is, however, true that a proper descent can be made to a disjunctive predicate; the following is a valid inference: 'Every man is an animal, therefore every man is this animal or that animal and so on for all other animals.'

If we accept that the *Elementarium* was in fact composed at a later time than the *Tractatus minor*, then we must conclude that Ockham did not decide to abandon the notion of a disjunctive predicate.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 210—211.

In the paragraph immediately following the one which we have just considered, Ockham enunciates an important principle:

Variatio enim seu mutatio rei non variat speciem suppositionis in eadem propositione . . .<sup>40</sup>

A variation or mutation of existing things does not cause a variation in the kinds of supposition which are had by the terms in a proposition. . . .

The point that Ockham is making is that we must be able to specify the different kinds of supposition which are had by the various terms in a proposition, in such a way that the specification does not depend on whether or not certain numbers and kinds of entities do or do not in fact exist. Since the suppositional structure of a proposition helps to constitute its sense, it must be determinable independent of whether the proposition itself or any other proposition on the same logical level is or is not in fact true.

This remark is preparatory to a certain set of problems which Ockham considers in the paragraphs which follow. He introduces this portion of his discussion with the following statement:

Viso quot sunt modi supponendi significative, videndum est quando terminus communis habet unam suppositionem et quando aliam.<sup>41</sup>

We have seen what are the various kinds of significative (i. e. personal) supposition; it now remains to be seen when a term has one kind of supposition and when it has another.

In the paragraphs which follow Ockham formulates various syntactical rules by means of which it is possible to determine the kind of personal supposition which is had by a particular term in a particular kind of propositional context. Instead of going through his detailed discussion let us try to abstract some of the more significant rules which he presents.

The rule which Ockham gives for determinate supposition is very involved and we will not go into the details of it.<sup>42</sup> The general import of the rule is that a term has determinate supposition in every case in which it is not influenced by an affirmative or negative sign of universality, or by a sign of negation which is constitutive of the proposition and not constitutive merely of one of the terms. The examples which Ockham gives make the intent of his rule clear:

. . . sicut in ista 'homo est animal' sive 'aliquis homo est animal' tam subiectum quam praedicatum supponunt determinate; et similiter in ista 'aliquis

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

non homo est animal' et in ista 'non animal est non homo.' In ista autem 'omnis homo est animal' neuter terminus supponit determinate. In ista autem 'homo non est animal' subiectum supponit determinate, sed non praedicatum propter negationem praecedentem.<sup>43</sup>

... in this proposition 'man is an animal' or in this proposition 'some man is an animal' both the subject and the predicate supposit determinately; and likewise in this proposition 'some non-man is an animal' and also in this one 'a non-animal is a non-man'. In the following proposition, however, 'every man is an animal' neither term supposits determinately. In the following, however, 'a man is not an animal' the subject has determinate supposition, but the predicate does not because of the sign of negation which precedes it.

These examples make it clear that in regard to the kinds of propositions on the traditional square of opposition Ockham only assigns determinate supposition in three cases, namely, he assigns determinate supposition to the subject of the I, to the predicate of the I, and to the subject of the O.

Ockham's first rule for distributively confused supposition is clear and direct:

Supponit autem terminus confuse et distributive quando est subiectum vel praedicatum in propositione categorica et sibi immediate praeponitur universale signum affirmativum. . . .<sup>44</sup>

A term has distributively confused supposition when it is a subject or a predicate in a categorical proposition and it is immediately preceded by a universal affirmative sign. . . .

Ockham's next rule concerning distributively confused supposition is equally clear:

Item, quando signum universale negativum praeponitur subiecto, tam subiectum quam praedicatum supponit confuse et distributive. . . .<sup>45</sup>

Likewise, when a universal negative sign precedes the subject, then both the subject and also the predicate have distributively confused supposition. . . .

From these two rules it is clear that Ockham attributes distributively confused supposition to the subject of the A, and to both the subject and the predicate of the E. We are immediately inclined to ask whether he does explicitly attribute this same kind of supposition to the predicate of the O. A little further on in the text we discover that he does do so:

Si vero negatio huiusmodi praeponitur subiecto distributo signo universali affirmativo, facit solummodo praedicatum stare confuse et distributive, sicut

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*



in ista 'non omnis homo est asinus,' quia aequipollet isti 'aliquis homo non est asinus'.<sup>46</sup>

If, however a negation of this kind (i. e. one which negates the entire proposition) precedes a subject distributed by a universal affirmative sign, then it is the case that only the predicate stands in a distributively confused manner, and such is the case in the following proposition 'not every man is an ass', because this proposition is logically equivalent to 'some man is not an ass'.

This passage makes it clear that Ockham does in fact attribute distributively confused supposition to the predicates of O propositions. It also alerts us to the fact that Ockham is presupposing that terms which stand in logically equivalent propositions must have identical kinds of supposition attributed to them.

A little further on, Ockham formulates a De Morgan-like rule concerning the influence of negations which negate an entire proposition and not just one of the terms:

Unde de tali negatione est regula talis: Negatio, quae mobilitat immobilitatum, immobilitat mobilitatum, hoc est, sicut negatio praeposita termino stante determinate facit ipsum stare confuse et distributive, ita si praepositur termino stante confuse et distributive facit ipsum stare determinate.<sup>47</sup>

And therefore the following rule can be given concerning negations of this kind: Negation which mobilizes what is immobile, immobilizes what is mobile, that is, when such a negation precedes a term which supposits determinately it causes the term to supposit in a distributively confused manner, and when it precedes a term suppositing in a distributively confused manner it causes the term to supposit determinately.

It would seem that Ockham had this rule in mind when he asserted the logical equivalence between the negation of an A proposition and the affirmation of the corresponding O proposition. But this particular application of the above rule ought to have been problematic for Ockham. A little further on in his discussion he explicitly attributes purely confused supposition to the predicates of A propositions, but a literal application of the above rule would require that such predicates have determinate supposition. In other words, the following statement, which Ockham makes concerning the kind of supposition to be attributed to the predicates of A propositions, is clearly inconsistent with the application which he makes of his explicitly formulated rule concerning negation:

Terminus autem supponit confuse tantum quando est predicatum in propositione universali affirmativa. . . .<sup>48</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

A term supposits in a purely confused manner when it is the predicate of a universal affirmative proposition . . .

Ockham even goes on to state that it is only the predicates of universal affirmative propositions which supposit in a purely confused manner:

Si propositio non sit universalis affirmativa, praedicatum non supponit confuse tantum.<sup>49</sup>

If a proposition is not a universal affirmative one, then the predicate does not supposit in a purely confused manner.

He then goes on to explain the attribution of purely confused supposition to the subject of an exclusive proposition, by maintaining that such a proposition is always logically equivalent to an A proposition in which the subject term of the original proposition occurs as a predicate:

. . . in ista 'tantum homo currit' iste terminus 'homo' supponit confuse tantum, quia aequipollet isti 'omne currens est homo', in qua supponit confuse tantum.<sup>50</sup>

. . . in this proposition 'only man runs' the term 'man' supposits in a purely confused manner, because the proposition is logically equivalent to the proposition 'Every running thing is a man', in which the term in question supposits in a purely confused manner.

There is, however, one other case in which many of the medieval logicians attribute purely confused supposition, and this also must be explained by Ockham if he is to defend the view that only the predicates of A propositions have this kind of supposition. Ockham takes up this problem in the following paragraph:

Amplius, quamvis terminus non supponat proprie quando est pars extremi, tamen large sumendo vocabulum 'suppositionis,' terminus supponit confuse tantum interdum, quamvis non sequatur signum universale affirmativum; sicut in talibus: 'Promitto tibi equum,' 'iste debet tibi centum libras,' quia sub 'equo' et sub hoc termino 'centum librae' non contingit descendere nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam sed ad disiunctum copulativum ex interioribus.<sup>51</sup>

Furthermore, even though a term does not properly speaking have supposition when it is only part of an extreme, if we take the term 'supposition' in a broader sense, then a term can have purely confused supposition even when it does not follow upon a universal affirmative sign; such is the case in the following kinds of propositions: 'I promise you a horse,' and 'he owes you a hundred pounds' for in these cases neither beneath the term 'horse' nor beneath the term 'hundred pounds' is it possible to make a descent either by

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

means of a disjunction of propositions or by means of a conjunction of propositions but it is only possible to make a descent to a disjunction with conjunctions contained within.

This passage is interesting for several reasons. First of all, we see that Ockham skirts the initial issue by distinguishing between a strict sense of supposition and a broader sense. Taking the term in the strict sense only predicates of A propositions have, according to Ockham, purely confused supposition; taking the term in its broader sense, however, he admits that there are other instances of this kind of supposition. Secondly, it is tempting to speculate on exactly what Ockham might have meant by the phrase '*disiunctum copulativum ex interioribus*'. The translation which was given is at best an approximation.

Let us approach the problem of explaining this phrase by considering a simplified version of the second proposition which Ockham gives as an example. Instead of some one owing a hundred pounds, let us specify that some person X gives to some person Y a total of two books. Let us further assume that only three books exist (A, B, and C). We can now display the intent of Ockham's phrase by means of the following equivalency schema: X gives Y two books = X gives Y A-and-B or A-and-C or B-and-C. Although this schema works fairly well in analyzing the import of a proposition similar to the second example which Ockham gives, it is difficult to see how it can be applied to his first example, namely, 'I promise you a horse'. One way to do so is to consider the proposition 'I promise you a horse' as having the same logical import as 'I promise you one horse', and then to consider this proposition as a special case of 'I promise you X number of horses.' Now, on the assumption that only three horses exist (A, B, and C) the following equivalency schemata will hold: I promise you two horses. = I promise you A-and-B or A-and-C or B-and-C. I promise you a horse = I promise you A or B or C. It is difficult to determine if these are the kind of analyses which Ockham did in fact have in mind when he wrote the passage quoted above. These analyses do, however, fit in quite appropriately both with what he says and also with the other theses which he maintains concerning the correct analysis of instances of purely confused supposition.

Although there is additional material concerning supposition in Ockham's *Elementarium*, we will consider what we have explained above sufficient for our present purpose. We will take up the problems surrounding Ockham's notion of purely confused supposition once again in a later section of this study in which we will consider some contemporary criticisms of Ockham's theory of supposition.

Section Three: *A Comparison of Ockham's Theory With Those of His Predecessors*

Let us now apply Ockham's rules for determining instances of the various kinds of personal supposition to all of the standard form propositions on the traditional square of opposition. In this way we can see clearly how Ockham's theory of personal supposition differs from the theories which were formulated by various thirteenth century logicians.

A. *Every man is an animal.*

Subj. = Dist. Confused

Pred. = Purely Confused

I. *Some man is an animal*

Subj. = Determinate

Pred. = Determinate

E. *No man is an animal.*

Subj. = Dist. Confused

Pred. = Dist. Confused

O. *Some man is not an animal.*

Subj. = Determinate

Pred. = Dist. Confused

In regard to the subject terms of the various standard form propositions, Ockham adheres to views which were common among his thirteenth century predecessors. In regard to the predicate terms, however, he has a position which as a whole is distinctly his own, even though all of its constituents are similar to views which were held by various of his predecessors. This later point becomes evident when we construct a set of diagrams for the sake of comparison.

KINDS OF SUPPOSITION ATTRIBUTED TO PREDICATES

*13th Century Theories*

*William of Sherwood*

A = Purely confused

I = Purely confused

E = Dist. confused

O = Dist. confused

*Peter of Spain*

A = Simple

I = Simple

E = Dist. confused

O = Dist. confused

*Roger Bacon*

A = Determinate

I = Determinate

E = Simple

O = Simple

*Ockham's Theory*

A = Purely confused

I = Determinate

E = Dist. confused

O = Dist. confused



In regard to the negative propositions Ockham accepted a doctrine which had been commonly held by Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood, but he rejects the kind of doctrine held by Roger Bacon. In regard to affirmative propositions, Ockham appears to accept a doctrine similar to Sherwood's in the case of the A proposition, and a doctrine similar to Bacon's in the case of the I proposition. The actual situation, however, is not really that simple. What Ockham actually does is to clarify Bacon's doctrine in such a way as to assimilate Sherwood's position. It must be noted that when Bacon introduces the notion of disjunction into his analysis of determinate supposition, he does not make clear whether he intends a disjunction of predicates or a disjunction of propositions. Ockham saw clearly that these alternative kinds of disjunctive analysis must be distinguished, for there are some cases in which the one is possible but the other is not.

Sherwood, on the other hand, takes impossibility of descent as characteristic of purely confused supposition, but he does not consider the possibility of a descent to a proposition containing a disjunctive predicate. Ockham uses the term 'purely confused supposition', but unlike Sherwood he does not take impossibility of any kind of descent whatsoever as characteristic of this kind of supposition. Ockham specifies that in the case of purely confused supposition it is not possible to descend to either a conjunction or disjunction of propositions, but it is possible to descend to a proposition with a disjunctive predicate.

Furthermore, Ockham accepts Bacon's notion that determinate supposition allows a disjunctive descent, but he makes clear that in this case the kind of descent allowed is to a disjunction of propositions and not merely to a disjunctive predicate. Whenever a descent to a disjunction of propositions is valid, a descent to a disjunctive predicate will also be valid; but the converse of this rule does not hold. In regard to the I proposition you can descend under the predicate not only to a disjunctive predicate but also to a disjunction of propositions. In this case the supposition of the predicate is determinate according to Ockham. In regard to the A proposition, although a descent to a disjunctive predicate is valid, a descent to a disjunction of propositions is not valid. In this case the predicate has, according to Ockham's view, purely confused and not determinate supposition.

It would be incorrect to say that Ockham merely combined in an eclectic way views which ultimately derive from two of his predecessors. It would be more proper to say that he availed himself of their insights and distinctions, while reaching a resolution of the disagreement between

them by means of even more keen insights and distinctions of his own. We have here a good example of thoughtful synthesis rather than casual amalgamation.

In regard to the kind of supposition to be attributed to the predicate of the A proposition, Ockham accepts something from both William of Sherwood and Roger Bacon. Concerning this same issue, however, he rejects entirely the position taken by Peter of Spain. Ockham's rejection of Peter's treatment of the predicate of the A proposition is, however, grounded in a total rejection by Ockham of Peter's theory regarding the nature of simple supposition. According to Peter of Spain, simple supposition is properly defined as follows:

Suppositio simplex est acceptio termini communis pro re universali figurata per ipsum, ut cum dicitur 'homo est species' . . .<sup>52</sup>

Simple supposition is the acceptance of a common term for the universal thing which is designated by it as when we say 'Man is a species' . . .

This definition is unacceptable to Ockham; for him the proper definition of simple supposition is:

Suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative. Verbi gratia sic dicendo: 'Homo est species' . . .<sup>53</sup>

Simple supposition is that in which the term stands for a mental content, but is not used in its significative function. For instance 'Man is a species'.<sup>54</sup>

For Peter of Spain the term 'man' with simple supposition stands for an extramental universal of which the term 'species' can be predicated to indicate that it is a universal participated in by many individuals. For Ockham the term 'man' with simple supposition stands for an individual mental content of which we predicate the second intention term 'species' in order to indicate that it is a mental content which signifies many individuals which exist outside of the mind.

Ockham's disagreement with the realists on this point is expressed clearly in his own words:

Ex hoc patet falsitas opinionis communiter dicentium, quod suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro suo significato; quia suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae proprie non est significatum termini, quia terminus talis significat veras res et non intentiones animae.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Mullally, Joseph P., *The Summulae logicae of Peter of Spain*, Notre Dame Publications in Medieval Studies, (1945), 4.

<sup>53</sup> Ockham, *Summa, pars prima*, 178.

<sup>54</sup> Boehner, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 71.

<sup>55</sup> Ockham, *Summa, pars prima*, 178.

This shows the falsity of the opinion held by those who say (as is commonly accepted) that simple supposition occurs when a term stands for the object it signifies. For simple supposition obtains when a term stands for a mental content which is not properly speaking the object signified by the term, because the term signifies real things not mental contents.<sup>56</sup>

It is clear from the passages which we have cited that Ockham rejects Peter's attribution of simple supposition to the predicates of A propositions because he rejects Peter's notion of simple supposition. Ockham's rejection of Peter's notion of simple supposition is in turn based on his rejection of what he takes to be Peter's realist ontological position. Whether Peter did in fact hold the kind of ontological view of which Ockham was so severely critical is difficult to determine in a definitive manner. Furthermore, if we maintain that Peter's theory is nonetheless slanted toward a realist ontological view, we would have to balance this contention by the observation that Ockham's theory is not only slanted but consciously formulated so as to favor a nominalist ontological view.

#### Section Four: *Some Contemporary Criticisms of Ockham's Theory*

There are two negative criticisms of Ockham's theory of supposition which we will consider in this section. The first is to be found in Chapter Four of William and Martha Kneale's *The Development of Logic*.<sup>57</sup> The second is contained in Chapter Seven of Peter Geach's *Reference and Generality*.<sup>58</sup> Both of these critics attack Ockham's views regarding personal supposition. The Kneales are critical of Ockham's notion of logical descent and the manner in which he utilizes this notion in analyzing the various kinds of personal supposition. Their objections are of a general nature and if correct would invalidate a good deal of what is most distinctive in Ockham's theory of personal supposition. Geach's criticism is less general and does not apply to Ockham's theory of personal supposition as a whole but only to his position in regard to purely confused personal supposition.

Let us take up the Kneales' criticism first:

Clearly what he (Ockham) means by descent in each of these cases is a transition to an equivalent statement which does not contain the original general term but contains instead singular terms linked either conjunctively or dis-

<sup>56</sup> Boehner, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 72.

<sup>57</sup> Kneale, William and Martha, *The Development of Logic*, Clarendon Press, (1962), 265—270.

<sup>58</sup> Geach, Peter Thomas, *Reference and Generality*, Cornell University Press, (1962).

junctively. It is impossible, however, even in principle to make such a descent. For if every general term were merely an abbreviation for a list of proper names linked by 'and' or by 'or', every statement would be necessarily true or necessarily false, which is absurd. When we say that 'Socrates is a man' we do not mean that 'Socrates is either Socrates or Plato or Aristotle or . . .'. On the contrary we mean that he has a certain character, and our use of the word 'man' to signify or express that character is logically prior to our use of the word to stand for individuals.<sup>59</sup>

In order to counter this reduction to absurdity to which Ockham's views are supposedly open, we must first of all notice that the term 'singular term' in the context of Ockham's usage is ambiguous. Ockham recognizes two distinct kinds of singular terms: proper names, such as 'Socrates', and commons terms modified by a demonstrative adjective, such as 'this man'. This latter kind of singular term is called by Ockham 'a common term with discrete supposition'. The basic procedure of logical descent which is employed by Ockham involved the replacement of a common term which has some other kind of supposition by the same common term having discrete supposition. If we want a paradigm case of logical descent it would be 'Every man is an animal, therefore this man is an animal'.

Now it is true that at times Ockham does make a descent to propositions containing proper names rather than to propositions containing a series of terms with discrete supposition. Some of his examples of logical descent might suggest the kind of analysis which is given by the Kneales, namely, 'Socrates is a man and therefore Socrates is Socrates or Socrates is Plato or Socrates is Aristotle or . . .' It should be noted, however, that it is only in regard to the term 'man' that Ockham ever makes an analysis into proper names rather than a series of propositions containing discrete suppositions. Moreover, in these cases the proper names which he uses are always those which in the medieval logic texts are used as stock names for particular men, and in some of the cases where he does so he adds the phrase 'and so on for other men'. The point of such analyses is not to analyze out the term 'man' as such, but rather analyze the term 'man' having some form of confused supposition into the term 'man' having discrete supposition.

It is clear that the Kneales have misunderstood both the notion of logical descent and also the use which Ockham makes of this notion. In contrast to the way in which they suppose that Ockham would analyze the proposition 'Socrates is a man', the following analysis is offered as

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<sup>59</sup> Kneales, 268.



being more in conformity both with Ockham's intent and also with the procedures which he does in fact employ: 'Socrates is a man; therefore either Socrates is this man, or Socrates is that man, or Socrates is that man . . .'. In terms of a many-sorted logic with identity this analysis could be schematized as follows:

$$(\exists m): S = m \equiv (S = m_1) \vee (S = m_2) \vee (S = m_3) \vee \dots (S = m_n)$$

It should be clear at this point that a common term with discrete supposition is not logically equivalent to a proper name; it is rather more like a definite description composed of common terms. Moreover, the medieval logicians assume that phrases such as 'this man' or 'that man' would actually be accompanied by some sort of physical gesture or pointing (*demonstrando*) in terms of which the unique referent being referred to would be made clear. This logical procedure of analyzing a common term with confused supposition into a series of common terms with discrete supposition can be likened to the procedure which a scientist employs when he labels three samples of uranium as 'uranium sample one', 'uranium sample two', and 'uranium sample three'.

The criticism offered by the Kneales would have some residual force if it could be shown that Ockham did not realize that there is a significant difference between the semantic function of proper names and the semantic function of common terms. Such, however, is not the case. Ockham, like most other medieval logicians, does realize that there is a difference. In Ockham's discussion of *appellatio* in the *Elementarium*, for example, we find an indication of his awareness of this difference:

Ideo nomina propria non sunt appellativa, quia nullum eorum significat plura, nisi forte aequivoce.<sup>60</sup>

Therefore proper names are not appellative, because none of them signify a plurality of individuals, unless by accidental equivocation.

The most that can justly be maintained is that Ockham does not sufficiently stress this distinction, and that at times he does not abide by it. That Ockham might fairly be accused of carelessness in this regard is certainly true. Ockham's carelessness in this respect is not, however, sufficient grounds for attempting to reduce certain portions of his theory of personal supposition to absurdity. To do so, in my opinion, is to go too far.

Concerning the concluding remark in the passage which we cited above, two comments might be made. First, it is not entirely clear what the Kneales are attempting to maintain. That is, it is not clear what they mean

<sup>60</sup> Buytaert, "The *Elementarium logicae* of Ockham," 218.

by saying that one kind of use of a term is logically prior to another kind of use. Secondly, it is not at all clear that Ockham would want, or would have to deny the claim which they are making. There is no reason why Ockham would have to deny that a certain kind of recognition of similarity among a set of particulars is logically prior to the employment of a common term to refer to the set of particulars in question. Ockham is by no means such a radical nominalist that he is forced to make such a denial.

Now let us turn our attention to Geach's criticism of Ockham's theory of purely confused personal supposition. The relevant passage which we will take as our starting point is the following:

As we have seen, Ockham used the idea of a disjunction of singular terms to explain *suppositio confusa*; and Russell thought that in "F ( $a_1$  and  $a_2$  and . . .)" and "F ( $a_1$  or  $a_2$  or . . .)" we had to do with two different nonrelational ways of combining the objects  $a_1, a_2, \dots$ . But in some cases, as we have just seen, the difference between joining the items with "or" and with "and" is not a logical difference at all, but only a matter of idiom and suggestion; and where a difference is made, we can 'separate the function' from the 'all', the list, by turning "F ( $a_1$  and  $a_2$  and . . .)" into "F (every  $a_1, a_2, \dots$ )" and "F ( $a_1$  or  $a_2$  or . . .)" into "F (some  $a_1, a_2, \dots$ )".<sup>61</sup>

The main import of Geach's criticism is that there is no need for more than two kinds of quantification, i.e. universal quantification and existential quantification; and that introduction of other kinds of quantification is based on some sort of misunderstanding. In applying this contention to doubly quantified formulae, Geach admits elsewhere that there must be some rule or understanding as to which term is to be given priority in the procedure of analysis.<sup>62</sup>

If we correlate the modern notion of universal quantification with Ockham's notion of distributively confused supposition, and also correlate the modern notion of existential quantification with Ockham's notion of determinate supposition, then we can express Geach's criticism of Ockham in a more direct manner. What Geach is in effect maintaining is that Ockham's notion of purely confused supposition is an unnecessary ramification of his general theory of personal supposition.

There is one sense in which Geach's claim is obviously true; namely, if Ockham had specified a rule demanding that subject terms always be analyzed prior to predicate terms, then he would have had no need to introduce the notion of purely confused supposition. In order to see this point, let us take the proposition 'Every man is an animal' and make a descent under the subject term. When we do so the proposition is

<sup>61</sup> Geach, 175—176.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 102—104.

analyzed into 'This man is an animal, and that man is an animal, and . . .'. Now if we take one of the conjuncts out of this analysis and make a descent under the predicate, the conjunct becomes 'Either this man is this animal, or this man is that animal, or . . .'. It is clear that the predicates of all the conjuncts have determinate supposition. In terms of such a compound analytic procedure, we might be willing to say that the predicate of a universal affirmative proposition has determinate supposition and not purely confused supposition as Ockham so staunchly maintained.

But we must stress (and Geach is willing to admit) that the whole procedure given above depends on the adoption of the priority rule that the subject must be analyzed before we perform an analysis of the predicate. If we had begun our analysis with the predicate term, the analysis could not proceed properly at all. For if we began our analysis by first attempting a descent under the predicate term then the above proposition would have to have been analyzed into 'Either every man is this animal, or every man is that animal, or . . .' Now, on the assumption that more than one man exists, each of the disjuncts in the above analysis must be false; and therefore, the attempted analysis is blocked at the very first step.

Now, it is a simple fact that Ockham did not adopt or maintain any sort of priority of analysis rule. It appears that he wanted to develop his theory of personal supposition in such a way that the subjects and predicates of propositions could be analyzed independently. We might even say that Ockham implicitly adopted and maintained a non-priority of analysis rule.

It would appear that whether a logician adopts a priority of analysis rule or a non-priority of analysis rule is in and of itself an arbitrary option. If it could be shown that Ockham accomplishes the same logical clarifications by means of a non-priority of analysis rule plus a notion of purely confused supposition as does Geach by means of a priority of analysis rule plus no notion of purely confused supposition, then it would be difficult to judge which of the two is in a more advantageous position. As will be shown below, however, the antecedent in the above conditional cannot be fully maintained, and it is, therefore, Geach who is in the more advantageous position.

We will now attempt to show that there is a certain problem inherent in Ockham's theory of personal supposition which cannot be adequately handled unless Ockham were willing to adopt a priority of analysis rule. Curiously enough, the problem which we wish to expose does not concern directly the predicates of universal affirmative propositions. In regard to this problem of analysis, Ockham's analytic procedures work just as

well as those proposed by Geach. In this case Ockham's attribution of purely confused supposition to the predicate term accomplishes much the same result as does Geach's insistence that there must be a priority of analysis rule. In either case we are sufficiently guarded against making an improper analysis of the proposition.

The crucial problem which we have in mind concerns an application of Ockham's analytic procedures to negative particular propositions. Let us take as our locus of discussion the obviously false O proposition: 'Some man is not a man.' Further, let us assume that only two men exist, namely, Plato and Socrates. If we analyze this proposition commencing with a descent under the subject term we arrive at the following analysis:

- I Some man is not a man,  
therefore  
either Socrates is not a man  
or Plato is not a man;  
therefore  
either Socrates is not Socrates  
and Socrates is not Plato,  
or  
Plato is not Socrates  
and Plato is not Plato.

We might perhaps find this an acceptable analysis of the proposition. Let us now present the analysis which results if we begin our analytic procedure with a descent under the predicate:

- II Some man is not a man,  
therefore  
some man is not Socrates  
and some man is not Plato;  
therefore  
either Socrates is not Socrates  
or Plato is not Socrates.  
and  
either Socrates is not Plato  
or Plato is not Plato.

This analysis is certainly not acceptable; for according to it the proposition analyzed would have to be evaluated as true, and not as false which is the obviously correct evaluation.

What the above analyses demonstrate is that Ockham's analytic procedure can lead to erroneous conclusions when applied to negative particular



propositions. These analyses also show that the deficiency in Ockham's analytic procedure could be remedied if he were to adopt a priority of analysis rule stipulating that the subject must be analyzed before the predicate is subjected to analysis. If, however, Ockham had adopted such a rule, then he would have had no need for his notion of purely confused supposition; and this is the main brunt of Geach's criticism.

There would, however, seem to be another alternative open to Ockham. Could he not perhaps remedy the above deficiency in his theory by attributing a special kind of supposition to the predicates of O propositions in much the same way as he had attributed purely confused supposition to the predicates of A propositions. At first sight this proposal appears to be practicable, but as we shall soon see the actual implementation of it leads to serious difficulties.

For the sake of ease of reference let us call this new kind of supposition which we are searching for 'impurely confused supposition'. In order to determine what sort of supposition impurely confused supposition would have to be, let us review the other three types which Ockham employs to see if there is a fourth alternative.

1. Determinate supposition involves an analysis into a disjunction of propositions.

2. Distributively confused supposition involves an analysis into a conjunction of propositions.

3. Purely confused supposition involves an analysis into a disjunctive predicate.

It is evident from an examination of these three kinds of supposition that the only alternative which has not already been employed by Ockham is an analysis into a conjunctive predicate. This then is the only possible analytical procedure which can be correlated with the fourth kind of supposition. Let us therefore conclude that impurely confused supposition involves an analysis into a conjunctive predicate, and that it is this kind of supposition which is to be attributed to the predicates of all O propositions.

Let us now see whether or not a notion of impurely confused supposition will extricate Ockham from the difficulty which we encountered above. On the basis of our newly formulated notion of impurely confused supposition, the proposition 'Some man is not a man' should be able to be correctly analyzed by means of an analysis which begins with a descent under the predicate. If we attempt this descent, however, we arrive immediately at the following problematic proposition: 'Some man is not this man and that man and . . .'; or if we make the assumption which

we did above regarding the existence of only Socrates and Plato we have: 'Some man is not Socrates and Plato.' The reason I call the results of the above descent problematic is that the conjunctive predicate suggests collective supposition. In the sense of collective supposition the results of the descent would have to be evaluated as true. It is certainly true that 'some man is not both Socrates and Plato', for it is obviously true that 'Socrates is not both Socrates and Plato'. Again we must recall that our original proposition 'Some man is not a man' is obviously false; and therefore an analysis which can lead us to evaluate it as true cannot be accepted as a correct analysis.

The purpose of the preceding analysis was to show that the only possible notion of impurely confused supposition which we could construct was not adequate to remedy the deficiency in Ockham's analytic procedure which we uncovered earlier. This leaves us with but one way to remedy that deficiency and that is to adopt a priority of analysis rule. As we saw earlier, however, the adoption of such a rule makes Ockham's notion of purely confused supposition unnecessary. Since this final conclusion is the substance of Geach's criticism which we cited above, we are forced to admit that his position is correct for more reasons, perhaps, than Geach himself realized. In conclusion we might say that Geach was successful in shaving Ockham with his own razor.

#### Section Five: *Summary and Conclusions*

The author of the present study finds it surprising that the Kneales conclude their section concerning the historical development of the theories of supposition with a paragraph which is almost totally negative both in tone and also in content:

The distinction between *significatio* and *suppositio*, which may perhaps have been suggested by some of Abelard's reflections about the use of general terms, was a good beginning. But the notion of *suppositio* was never sufficiently clarified. For the word was used to mean both the designation of an individual by a proper name or definite description and also the use of a general term in such a way as to cover certain individuals.

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The unclarity might have been harmless if no great emphasis had been laid on the word, but it became a serious matter when the old notion of *significatio* was rejected by Ockham. For now the whole theory of language was made to rest on an imperfectly conceived metaphor. And the trouble was worse because the doctrine of *suppositio* had been extended to cover on the one hand oddities like *Homo est nomen* and *Homo est species* and on the other hand the distinctions of universal and existential quantification. In each case the

extension was suggested by peculiarities of the Latin in which philosophers conducted their thinking. If Aristotle had not started a queer fashion in the use of general terms, there would have been no problem of *suppositio simplex*. And similarly if Latin had possessed an indefinite article there might have been no theory of *suppositio determinata*. For when *Homo currit* must be understood in an existential sense, it is not surprising that the whole mystery of existential assertion should be assumed to be contained in a special use of the word *homo*, nor yet that within the theory of *suppositio* this term should be said to stand disjunctively for all men. But to those who are not obsessed by the notion of *suppositio* and the peculiarities of the Latin language the explanation is no explanation at all.<sup>63</sup>

Although there is a germ of truth in many of the remarks which the Kneales make, most of the statements which they make in the passage just quoted are literally false. Most of them fail to be correct either because they evidence an inadequate understanding of the material referred to or else because they exaggerate the importance of an otherwise harmless observation. The authors claim that the notion of supposition was never sufficiently clarified, and then they proceed to give a most clear description of what is supposed to be unclear. They unfairly criticize the medieval logicians for grouping together problems which modern logicians prefer to keep separate. Surely it is not how problems are grouped which should be critized, but rather how they are resolved. It is hard to determine which "old notion of *significatio*" Ockham supposedly rejected, for as can be documented the twelfth and thirteenth century logicians developed many and diverse theories of signification. Ockham himself spends a great deal of time considering problems that have to do with signification.

The metaphor that "the whole theory of language was made to rest on an imperfectly conceived metaphor" is itself a bad metaphor, and the literal statement for which it does service is certainly false. If the Kneales were really interested in studying the general theories of language propounded by the medieval philosophers, it would seem more appropriate to search for these in the many studies which go by the title: *Grammatica speculativa*. It seems rather pointless to criticize the medieval logicians for doing something incorrectly which they never claimed to be doing at all.

There is some truth in saying that certain problems treated in the theories of supposition came to be considered because of peculiarities in Aristotle's philosophical usage of language and also because of peculiarities in the syntax of the Latin language. But to say that the problems came to be considered in these ways is not to say that the problems themselves

<sup>63</sup> Kneales, 274.

were, or are, illegitimate or that the resolutions which were developed were, or are, incorrect. Moreover, it is hard to see why sentences such as 'Man is a noun' or 'Man is a species' are referred to as 'oddities'. It is true that we do not use such sentences very often in the course of ordinary everyday discussions; yet in their own proper domains, grammar and philosophy respectively, they are rather typical kinds of statements.

Finally, it is certainly an exaggeration to say that for the medieval logicians "the whole mystery of existential assertion" was "assumed to be contained somehow in a special use of the word *homo*". Problems concerning the existential import of terms are considered in various places within the medieval logic texts; and although their resolutions of such problems are markedly different from contemporary ones, this is no reason to say that they are necessarily inconsistent or logically inadequate.

The general evaluation which the Kneales make concerning the import and significance of the medieval theories of supposition is certainly inadequate. A much more insightful and balanced evaluation is presented by Ernest A. Moody in his 1966 article titled: "The Medieval Contribution to Logic."<sup>64</sup> In this work Moody stresses the fact that the Medieval logicians were concerned primarily with semantical problems arising out of tensions in the logical theory which they had received from Aristotle.

It was in this exploration of the semantical foundations of Aristotelian logic, rather than in the development of a more general formal logic in abstraction from semantical interpretation, that medieval logicians and philosophers made their most original and interesting contributions.<sup>65</sup>

Moody's claim is assuredly correct and it puts into proper focus the kinds of materials which have been presented in the present study.

In regard to the theories of supposition in particular Moody writes:

The doctrine of supposition was an attempt to achieve a coherent interpretation of the Aristotelian categorical proposition of subject predicate form, in which the relation of general terms to singular terms, and the relation of predicate terms to subject terms, could be exhibited. The significance of the supposition doctrine was not that it succeeded in doing this, but rather that it revealed the impossibility of formulating a general theory of reference that would satisfy all the requirements of Aristotle's formal system.<sup>66</sup>

With the first remark in this quotation the present author fully concurs. The second claim, however, warrants some reservation. It is difficult to understand what would constitute a revealing of impossibility in

<sup>64</sup> Moody, Ernest A., "The Medieval Contribution to Logic," *Studium Generale*, Jahrgang 19, Heft. VIII, (1966).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 450.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 451.



the case in question. Furthermore, even though the Medieval logicians may not have fully accomplished the endeavor to which Moody refers, they did carry out the project to a very considerable extent. The present author would be disinclined to say that the project in question has been shown to be impossible to complete. That anyone will ever attempt to do so is perhaps improbable.

In regard to the first problem which Moody indicates, the present study has given us enough insight to construct a general answer which applies on the propositional level. The problem is to specify the relationship between general terms and singular terms. If by general terms Moody means terms having either determinate or distributively confused personal supposition, and if by singular terms he means common terms having discrete supposition, then it is possible to present a general answer in terms of the notion of logical descent or what today would be called entailment. The general answer can take the form of an expanded square of opposition in which the entailment relationships among propositions having the same subjects and predicates but modified by the three different kinds of supposition are exhibited. In order to construct such a diagram let us employ the following abbreviations:

Let 's' stand for subject term.

Let 'p' stand for predicate term.

Let '=' stand for an affirmative copula.

Let '≠' stand for a negative copula.


Let 'E' stand for 'every' and be an indicator of distributively confused supposition.

Let 'S' stand for 'some' and be an indicator of determinate supposition.

Let 'T' stand for the demonstrative adjectives 'this' or 'that' and be an indicator of discrete supposition.

Let '→' stand for the relationship of entailment.

*Entailment Relationships Among Affirmative Propositions*<sup>67</sup>



<sup>67</sup> Greek letters used in this and the following diagram are those which have been assigned to the respective kinds of propositions in Parry, William T.

*Entailment Relationships Among Negative Propositions*

E			$\eta$
(Es $\neq$ Ep)	$\rightarrow$	(Es $\neq$ Tp)	$\rightarrow$ (Es $\neq$ Sp)
$\downarrow$		$\downarrow$	$\downarrow$
(Ts $\neq$ Ep)	$\rightarrow$	(Ts $\neq$ Tp)	$\rightarrow$ (Ts $\neq$ Sp)
$\downarrow$		$\downarrow$	$\downarrow$
(Ss $\neq$ Ep)	$\rightarrow$	(Ss $\neq$ Tp)	$\rightarrow$ (Ss $\neq$ Sp)
O			$\omega$

One general answer to the second problem which Moody indicates is that given by Ockham. The problem is to state or exhibit "the relation of predicate terms to subject terms." Ockham's answer to this question is direct and clear: in a true affirmative proposition the subject and predicate terms must supposit for the same entity or entities, whereas in a true negative proposition the subject and predicate terms must supposit for entities which are distant.<sup>68</sup> We do not mean to suggest that Moody is ignorant of this answer to his own question.<sup>69</sup> He probably ignores it in this context because he considers it too general and too highly controversial.

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"Quantification and Many-Sorted Logic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XXVI, (1965—6), 347.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Boehner, *William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, 83—85; Buytaert, "The *Elementarium logicae* of Ockham," 219; and Boehner *Collected Articles*, 174—200.

<sup>69</sup> Moody, Ernest A., *Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic*, North-Holland, (1953), 32 ff.

## ROBERT GROSSETESTE'S TREATISE ON CONFESSION, "DEUS EST."

Among the sermons attributed to Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1235—1253), occurs a longer work variously entitled *Summa magistralis de vitiis et virtutibus* or *Quomodo examinandus est penitens quando venerit ad confessionem*. It can, however, hardly be called a sermon, for it is by far too long and too compact for oral delivery and lacks the features one would usually find in a sermon, such as theme and rhetorical devices of persuasion. On the contrary, its author refers to his audience as *legens* (see epilogue, p. 293), to himself as *scribens* (epilogue, p. 293), and to his work as a *liber* (p. 293). The work is, therefore, a technical treatise on the questions to be asked in confession. As such, it belongs to the vast body of pastoral manuals which sprang up in response to the emphasis placed by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215—1216) on the reformation of Christian morals and especially on the sacrament of Penance. Grosseteste's treatise, however, has so far not received the attention it justly deserves. The work is not analyzed and hardly noticed in the standard works on confessional literature or the history of Penance.<sup>1</sup> Yet it is an important work, possessing a number of features that are highly interesting and even unique.

In contrast to the much larger contemporary *Summae confessorum*, which include plenty of canonical material and frequently use a casuistic approach,<sup>2</sup> and in contrast to the equally long contemporary catechetical handbooks, which survey the entire field of popular religious instruction

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\* I wish to express my gratitude to the Bodleian Library for permission, to edit part of MS. Rawlinson A. 446; and to the University Research Council of the University of North Carolina for a grant permitting the purchase of microfilms.

<sup>1</sup> S. H. Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235—1253* (Cambridge, 1940), discusses the work briefly (pp. 125 and 176). P. Michaud-Quantin, *Sommes casuistiques et manuels de confession au moyen âge (XII<sup>e</sup>—XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles)* ("Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia," 13; Louvain, 1962), only lists it among relevant works ("Index," no page). Father L. E. Boyle, in his unpublished D. Phil. thesis, "A Study of the Works Attributed to William of Pagula" (Oxford University, 1956), mentions it briefly in a footnote (I, 231, note 86) and lists the manuscripts (II, 29—30).

<sup>2</sup> For example, Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum*, ed. F. Broomfield ("Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia," 25; Louvain, 1896); or Robert of Flamborough, *Summa confessorum*, ed. in progress by F. Firth.

including confession,<sup>3</sup> “*Deus est*” is a specialized treatise dealing exclusively with the subject-matter a confessor should ask his penitent about in confession, i.e., the virtues and vices. On the other hand, in contrast to the shorter confessional questionnaires,<sup>4</sup> it is a genuine scholastic treatise which develops a rational system and places it neatly into the wider frame of Christian theology. An especially outstanding feature in this respect is Grosseteste's attempt to present a logical rationale for the virtues and the vices he discusses.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the work is of great interest in terms of its genre, its ideas, and its structure and style.

### *Contents and Structure*

The contents of this treatise may best be summarized in the following table:

- I. PREAMBLE: Theology of redemption (p. 239)
  - 1. God—Creation—Man
  - 2. The Fall
  - 3. Redemption
    - a) Incarnation
    - b) The seven sacraments
- II. THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE
  - A. CONFESSION (p. 247)
    - I. Qualities. Need for inquiry
    - II. Order of inquiry — the seven virtues
      - 1. Sins against Faith (p. 250)
        - a) Belief in the twelve Articles of Faith (p. 250)
        - b) Acts or words against Faith (p. 252)
        - c) Practice of the Articles of Faith (p. 253)
        - d) Breaking faith; informing the infidel (p. 258)
        - e) Faith without works — the seven works of mercy (p. 258)
        - f) Other sins against Faith (p. 259)
      - 2. Sins against Hope: Despair and Presumption (p. 260)

<sup>3</sup> For example, Richard Wethersett, *Summa brevis* (“Qui bene presunt presbyteri”).

<sup>4</sup> See the discussion in my book, *The Sin of Sloth. Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill, 1967), pp. 83 and 197. One such questionnaire frequently found in English manuscripts is often ascribed to Grosseteste.

<sup>5</sup> For scholastic rationales of the seven chief vices, see S. Wenzel, “The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research,” *Speculum*, XLIII (1968), 3—10.



3. Sins against Charity (p. 261)
  - a) Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins (p. 261)
  - b) Sins against Humility — Pride and Hypocrisy (p. 265)
  - c) Sins against Spiritual Joy — Envy and Pusillanimity (p. 269)
  - d) Sins against Patience — Wrath and Negligence (p. 271)
  - e) Sins against Spiritual Activity — Sloth and Exaggerated Zeal (p. 273)
  - f) Sins against Generosity — Avarice and Prodigality (p. 275)
  - g) Sins against Abstinence — Gluttony and Exaggerated Fasting (p. 278)
  - h) Sins against Continence — Impurity and Insensitivity (p. 281)
4. Sins against Prudence (p. 286)
5. Sins against Justice (p. 287)
6. Sins against Moderation (p. 290)
7. Sins against Fortitude (p. 291)

B. CONTRITION — how to induce it (p. 292)

C. SATISFACTION (p. 292)

### III. EPILOGUE (p. 293)

Beginning with a definition of God, the Preamble proceeds to furnish a logical introduction to the work's main concern — what sins a confessor should ask his penitent about —, which is thus neatly placed within the total economy of salvation. God, "than whom nothing better can be thought," created all things because of His overflowing goodness, in which they are called to participate. This overflow of goodness and being extended through various degrees of closeness to the fountain of being and thus established a hierarchy of beings, in which those closer to God pass on the divine light and power to those farther removed. Last (in the work of Creation) God made man as the *exemplar* of all other creatures. In him all things are reflected; he is their final cause and can therefore be called a microcosm (*minor mundus*). Man and the angels possess free will so that without coercion they might tend towards Him from whom they have their origin, as the order of being requires it. But both fell, the angel led astray by his own beauty, man seduced by the suggestion of the bad angel and the persuasion of Eve.

After determining the question whether Adam sinned more than Lucifer, Grosseteste continues by touching upon Original Sin and its transmission to all mankind. Man, however, gained deliverance from hell by the incarnation of Christ, in whom three natures are united “*quadam dulci contrarietate*.” This way of redeeming mankind was not the only one God could have chosen, but it was the best one, “than which none better could be thought of.” Through His Passion Christ freed those worthy from hell and opened the gates of heaven. But since He cannot die a second time, He will not be able to free those who might fall into death again. For them He established the sacraments.

Grosseteste then discusses the seven sacraments at some length but concentrates on their function in saving man. He eventually turns to Penance, “the beginning of good in the sinner on his return” to God, whose first main part is confession, “the sufficient narration of all sins.” With this we have reached the main part of the treatise, and by tracing the history of salvation to this point Grosseteste has made it quite clear how important it is for the confessor to interrogate his penitent about all his sins. To help the priest in this task, Grosseteste will now “enumerate in due order the genera and species of all sins, and what sort of men are more affected by what kind of sins. For this has been the main concern” of the treatise. But since evil has no order in itself except in relation to the good, “of which it is the excess or lack,” Grosseteste will have to enumerate the sins by discussing the order of the virtues.

What follows is a most interesting rationale for the seven chief virtues. Man is considered a septenary, whose soul consists of three parts (vegetative, sensible, and rational) and whose body is made up of four “elemental properties,” which are equated with the four cardinal virtues.<sup>6</sup> In the Fall, human nature became corrupted in all of these seven parts. Eve tainted man’s soul, that is, reason, will (or sensuality), and vegetability, while Adam corrupted the body by falling into injustice, weakness, imprudence, and immoderation. Now, those who “wish to cast off the old Adam and put on the new” must cling to seven virtues that are opposed to these seven vices. They are: Faith, hope, and love, prudence, justice, moderation, and fortitude. It is precisely the failures in practicing these virtues which constitute the matter to be dealt with in confession.

In the following exposition, therefore, Grosseteste takes up one virtue after another and shows in detail what sins are directed against it. In

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<sup>6</sup> For Christian sources of this conception, see *ibidem*, p. 9.

doing so, he fully adopts the Aristotelian principle that a virtue is the mean between two vices, and consistently examines sins that consist in the lack of a certain virtue, and those that consist in its excess. While this view is applied throughout the seven virtues, it becomes especially operative in the discussion of Charity, because here occurs the centerpiece of medieval confessional literature, the treatment of the seven chief vices or "Seven Deadly Sins." In order to find "what virtues are contained under Charity," Grosseteste starts from the biblical injunction, "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole soul, and with thy whole heart, and with thy whole mind" (Matt. 22: 37). Instead of following the standard, Augustinian interpretation of soul, heart, and mind as will, intellect, and memory,<sup>7</sup> Grosseteste equates the biblical triad with the Aristotelian *anima* (or *potentia*) *vegetabilis*, *sensibilis*, and *rationalis*. After a brief enumeration of the various *vires* belonging to these three powers of the soul and their respective functions, Grosseteste singles out seven *vires* which he relates to seven virtues. The latter are not the traditional chief virtues (theological and cardinal), but rather the so-called Christian or remedial virtues: Humility, exultation, patience, generosity, spiritual activity, abstinence, and continence. By practicing these, man does indeed love God with all his soul, heart, and mind. On the contrary, each of these virtues is negated by two vices that oppose it, one by excess, the other by lack. The seven vices thus opposed to the remedial virtues by lack are the Seven Deadly Sins. This somewhat complicated scheme may be clarified by the following example: To love God with one's whole mind means to love Him with the rational powers of the soul. These are *vis apprehensiva* and *vis passiva*. Now, God is loved fully with the *vis apprehensiva* when we practice humility, because, "if you hold before your *mind* God as He is, *contemplating* His power and *desiring* His goodness, you will no doubt *humble* yourself before Him." Humility, however, may be negated by too little or none of it, which is pride, or by too much, which is hypocrisy.<sup>8</sup>

The resulting scheme of virtues and vices contained under Charity can therefore be tabulated as follows:

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. *De spiritu et anima*, 35 (PL 40: 805); *De diligendo Deo*, 2 (PL 40: 859). This interpretation was still followed by Richard Wethersett: "In scholis solet hoc verbum sic exponi: *Diliges Deum ex toto corde*, i. e. intellectu sine errore; *ex tota anima*, i. e. voluntate sine contrarietate; *ex tota mente*, i. e. memoria sine oblivione," ("Qui bene presunt presbyteri," MS. Bodl. 64, fol. 137v). It continued in use throughout the later middle ages.

<sup>8</sup> Notice that in the actual discussion of hypocrisy Grosseteste includes not only the excess of humility but also the mere appearance of it.

God must be loved with all the powers of the soul:		by practicing the virtues:	to which are opposed the vices:
vires {	apprehensiva	humilitas	superbia — hypocrisis
	passiva	exultatio <sup>9</sup>	invidia — pusillanimitas
	irascibilis	patientia	ira — negligentia
	concupiscibilis	largitas	avaritia <sup>10</sup> — prodigalitas
	motiva	occupatio	accidia — curiositas
	attractiva	abstinentia	gula — evacuatio <sup>11</sup>
	expulsiva	continentia	luxuria — insensibilitas

The strong urge to build a rational, logically consistent system we find here at work, which is such a prominent aspect of Scholasticism, is matched by an equally strong desire to present the forms of sinfulness in a clear and comprehensive account. This is achieved by the use of another characteristic feature of scholastic thought: the analysis of a concept by means of definition and division into its species. All through the main part of this treatise, Grosseteste divides and subdivides the main virtues and vices, often to the point where the reader may well have lost his way, and thereby creates a network of logical relations in which he can catch any form of immorality and misconduct. Again, one example will demonstrate this method as well as the style of the treatise. The chief vice of Wrath is defined as “the desire to inflict evil on another person, for the sake of revenge or punishment.” This is divided into wrath against God and against one’s neighbor. The latter kind is further divided according to whether wrath against one’s neighbor exists in one’s heart, mouth, or deed, and accordingly we get hatred, insult, and destruction (*pestiferatio*). The last kind can be divided into two branches, according to the degree of harm that is done. Thus we have injury or lesion, and complete extinction. Extinction, finally, may have two objects: the good reputation of my neighbor, and his very life. Thus we get the sins of scandal and of homicide, and “scandal” is subjected to some further analysis.

The result of such analysis by further and further division is, of course, a high degree of inclusiveness. This can best be seen in the section on sins against Faith. The lack of the virtue, or *infidelitas*, is divided into five kinds: Not believing the Articles of Faith; acting or speaking against the Faith (i.e., idolatry, excommunication, fortune-telling); failure to execute the Articles of Faith correctly (i.e., by administering and receiving the sacraments properly); not keeping faith (i.e., false

<sup>9</sup> Also called *iucunditas* (text, p. 269).

<sup>10</sup> Also called *cupiditas* (text, p. 264).

<sup>11</sup> Also called *extenuatio* (text, p. 280).



oaths, broken vows and promises, and the like); and finally, not keeping one's Faith alive by doing good works. It will be seen that in this section on the first virtue alone Grosseteste manages to discuss sins against the twelve Articles of Faith, against the seven sacraments, and against the seven deeds of mercy, corporal as well as spiritual. All these basic schemes of catechetical instruction (together with the Seven Deadly Sins) occur again and again in popular handbooks on confession during the later middle ages. But in contrast to those which place them unrelatedly side by side, Grosseteste's treatise builds them neatly and logically into his controlling scheme of the seven chief virtues.

After treating thus the sins against the theological and cardinal virtues which are to be investigated in confession, Grosseteste finally turns to the other two main parts of Penance, viz., contrition and satisfaction. But with these he deals in only a few lines, since neither of them constitutes his main concern. A final paragraph concludes the work by restating the opening *sententia*: "God is He than whom nothing better can be thought." The circular structure of the treatise thus betrays a consciousness of rhetorical precept. It also, as it were, symbolizes the theology which Grosseteste had chosen as the frame for his *summa de vitiis et virtutibus*: As all things have flown out of God's goodness in the beginning, so they will return to Him in the end in man, whose nature is redeemed and united with divine nature in Christ.

### *Manuscripts*

The treatise has been preserved in ten known manuscripts.<sup>12</sup> They are:

R. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson A. 446, fol. 3r—20r. Written in an English Gothic bookhand of about 1250 or a little later.<sup>13</sup> The treatise is anonymous and entitled *Summa magistralis de Vitiis et Virtutibus*. The volume contains, besides a fragment of the *Roman de la Rose*, various theological treatises by Hugh of St. Victor, John Belet (De ecclesiasticis officiis), Peter Lombard (Book IV of the *Sentences*), and others, and once belonged to Nicholas Kempston (who died in 1477).

J. Oxford, St. John's College, MS. 190, fol. 127r—142r. Written in

<sup>12</sup> Thomson, *The Writings*, listed seven manuscripts (p. 176). M. V. Bloomfield, in his "A Preliminary List of Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices, mainly of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries" (*Traditio*, XI 1955, 291), added two more. Manuscript R was kindly brought to my attention by Father Servus Gieben, OFM Cap.; it is also noticed in Father Boyle's doctoral thesis (see note 1, above).

<sup>13</sup> I am grateful to Dr. R. W. Hunt and to Dr. I. A. Doyle for giving me their opinions on this manuscript and on J. In dating the other manuscripts I follow S. H. Thomson, *op. cit.* Indications of date and handwriting refer only to the part of the manuscript in which "Deus est" appears.

two columns, in an English *notula* of the end of the thirteenth century. The treatise is anonymous and bears no title. The entire volume is apparently made up of a least two manuscripts. The second, consisting of fol. 125—308, is written in several hands. It was irregularly foliated 1—173 by a medieval hand and is preceded by a table of contents (fol. 124v), which however omits “Deus est.” Folios 125—308 contain a number of sermons in Latin and two treatises in Anglo-Norman.<sup>14</sup> The volume bears an inscription on fol. 1, according to which it was procured for the monks of Westminster by Frater Willelmus de Hasele and once belonged to one Dominus Willelmus de Feltham. William of Haseley, a monk at Westminster, was dead by 1283.<sup>15</sup>

*H. Hereford Cathedral Library, MS. P. 3. xii*, fol. 177r—186r. Written in two columns, in a late thirteenth-century hand. “Deus est” begins without title in col. a, but in the upper margin above col. b a different (later) hand has written “tractatus domini lincolniensis de X preceptis.” At the end of “Deus est” appears: “Explicit. [Space of several lines. Then at foot of column:] Incipit tractatus domini lincolniensis episcopi de decem preceptis” (fol. 186r, a). In column b begins Grosseteste's *De decem mandatis* (fol. 186r—206r), preceded by the title “De X preceptis” in the upper margin. The same title is written across the upper margins of all folios, to 206r. The hand of the *explicit* and *incipit* on fol. 186r seems to me the same as that of the text. It may be inferred that the (erroneous) ascription of “Deus est” on fol. 177r was put in later by a careless scribe or reader, on the basis of the incipit of the following treatise. The original scribe of the text could apparently not identify “Deus est,” since the first line of col. a on fol. 177r is left blank, presumably for a rubric. — The whole volume contains various theological treatises, including some works by St. Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor, written in several hands.<sup>16</sup> It belonged to the Franciscan convent of Hereford and bears the inscription: “Iste liber tradatur fratri ph[ilippo] de landu ex parte fratris Walteri de land-” (front flyleaf).<sup>17</sup> A Friar Walterus de Landen was in the

<sup>14</sup> On the Anglo-Norman treatises, see M.D. Legge, “St. Edmund's *Merure de Sainte Eglise*,” *MLR*, XXIII (1928), 475 f.; “The Anglo-Norman Sermon of Thomas of Hales,” *MLR*, XXX (1935), 212—218; and *Anglo-Norman Literature and Its Background* (Oxford, 1963), esp. p. 227.

<sup>15</sup> See *DNB*, and E. H. Pearce, *The Monks of Westminster* (Cambridge, 1916), p. 56.

<sup>16</sup> Notice that the description given by A. T. Bannister, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Hereford Cathedral Library* (Hereford, 1927), pp. 136—138, is erroneous on several points. Folios 177—186 are probably not in the same hand as fol. 1—67.

<sup>17</sup> A correct transcription is given by N. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain* (second ed., London, 1964), p. 269.

Franciscan house at Oxford in 1269 and appears in the report of the broil between Franciscans and Dominicans in that year.<sup>18</sup> A Philip de Landowe was vicar of Westbury in 1341.<sup>19</sup> But I do not know if these two men are indeed the persons named in the manuscript.

*P. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. lat. 1727, fol. 125r—134v.* Written in two columns, ca. 1300. "Deus est" is anonymous, but begins with the rubric "Incipit liber quomodo examinandus est penitens quando venerit ad confessionem." At the end, the following rubric occurs: "Explicit liber de examinatione penitentis. Incipit sermo Roberti episcopi lincolniensis super Scriptum est de levitis," and Grosseteste's sermon "Scriptum est de levitis" follows. The rest of the volume contains various works by St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Bernard and Pseudo-Bernardina, and William of St. Thierry.<sup>20</sup>

*A. London, British Museum, MS. Royal 7.F.ii, fol. 83v—96v.* Written in two columns, in the mid-fourteenth century. "Deus est" bears the rubric "Quomodo examinandus est . . ." The whole volume, which belonged to Westminster Abbey, is a collection of Grossetestiana. "Deus est" appears in the section of *Sermones lincolniensis* and is thus ascribed in the top margins.

*B. London, British Museum, MS. Royal 7.E.ii, fol. 348v—364v.* Written in two columns, in the second half of the fourteenth century. "Deus est" is rubriced "Quomodo examinandus est . . ." The volume, which once belonged to Brasenose College, contains works by John Waldeby, Richard Rolle, and Grosseteste. "Deus est" occurs within a collection of sermons collectively ascribed to Grosseteste.

*C. London, British Museum, MS. Royal 6.E.v, fol. 112v—119v.* Written in two columns, in the mid-fourteenth century. "Deus est" is rubriced "Quomodo examinandus est . . ." This volume is the *de luxe* collection of Grosseteste's *Dicta*, sermons, *Hexaëmeron*, *De cessatione legalium*, and other works, bearing the portrait of a bishop (Grosseteste's?) in the illuminated initial on fol. 1. It belonged to Merton Priory, Sussex. "Deus est" occurs in the collection of sermons, but is set off by an illuminated initial. Similar illuminated initials are used to set off the main sections of

<sup>18</sup> A. G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* ("Oxford Historical Society," 20; Oxford, 1892), pp. 212 and 320—335.

<sup>19</sup> *Registrum Thome de Charlton, Episcopi Herefordensis, A. D. 1327—1344*, ed. W. W. Capes (The Canterbury and York Society, "Canterbury and York Series," 11; London, 1913), p. 82.

<sup>20</sup> P. Lauer, *Bibliothèque Nationale. Catalogue général des manuscrits latins*, II (Paris, 1940), 145—146.

the volume (i.e., *Dicta*, sermons, *Hexaemeron*, etc.). Within the sermon collection, besides the first sermon (“Pauper et inops,” fol. 70r), only “Quoniam cogitatio” (fol. 97r; called *Sermo* 17) and “Deus est” are thus distinguished.

L. London, British Museum, MS. Landowne 458, fol. 161r—169r. Written in two columns, in the second half of the fourteenth century. “Deus est” bears no title, but is marked “Sermo 31” in a collection of 48 sermons collectively ascribed to Master Robert Grosseteste in the colophon (fol. 180v). These are preceded by an incomplete copy of St. Gregory’s *Moralia* and by Grosseteste’s *Dicta* (acephalous), and are followed by eight *sermones de sanctis*. The volume is written by different hands, dating from the fourteenth and early fifteenth century.

O. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. 801, fol. 173r—193r. “Deus est” occurs in the third of the four manuscripts which make up this volume, all written in the first half of the fifteenth century. The volume was given by John Blacman to Witham Abbey (Carthusian). “Deus est” appears anonymously and without title. It is followed by Grosseteste’s “Scriptum est de leuitis,” here also anonymous; by a questionnaire on the Seven Deadly Sins; and by Petrus Alphonsus’ *Contra Iudeos*.

Y. York Minster Library, MS. XVI.A.6, fol. 123r—144r. Written ca. 1500. S.H. Thomson thought the manuscript was “almost certainly” a copy of B, although the sermons occur in a different order.<sup>21</sup> Collation shows that, indeed, the text of Y is almost fully identical with B. “Deus est” bears the rubric “Quomodo examinandus est . . .”


In addition to these manuscripts, two extracts from “Deus est” appear in MS. Lambeth Palace Library 523, fol. 122v—123r. The first is “Primo ergo examinandus est penitens de fide . . . — . . . presumunt tractare” (see text, pp. 250—252) and adds: “Hec lincolniensis in sermone qui sic incipit: Deus est quo nihil melius cogitari potest” (fol. 122v). The second extract is “Sunt enim opera misericordie . . . — . . . dene-ganda est hospitalitas” (see text, pp. 258—259). The volume is made up of at least two manuscripts written in a variety of fifteenth-century hands and containing, among many other things, Grosseteste’s “Scriptum est de leuitis” as well as two other treatises ascribed to Grosseteste but spurious.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Thomson, *The Writings*, p. 160.

<sup>22</sup> See M.R. James and C. Jenkins, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Lambeth Palace* (Cambridge, 1930—1932), pp. 723 ff.



Extensive collation of the ten manuscripts<sup>23</sup> shows that these texts fall into three major groups, which I shall call  $\alpha$  (RJ),  $\beta$  (HP), and  $\gamma$  (ABCLOY). The relations between them may be represented in the following stemma:



Of the various textual relations involved, the situation  $\alpha : \beta\gamma$  is the most obvious one. Group  $\alpha$  has a number of longer omissions evidently due to eyeskip; see for example variants 36, 71, 116, 128, and others, below. On the other hand,  $\alpha$  contains several longer additions which may or may not have been in the archetype (e.g., variant 265 and three sets of mnemonic verses, discussed below). Finally, either  $\alpha$  or  $\beta\gamma$  frequently furnishes a reading where the other group is meaningless and clearly wrong. For example:

ordo est *colligatio* ( $\alpha$ , correct) : *collectio* ( $\beta\gamma$ ) principii cum fine (p. 242);  
 desiderio *unitionis* ( $\alpha$ , correct) : *intentionis* ( $\beta\gamma$ ) cum deo (variant 192;  
 [fasting] propter pestem delendam ut ieiunatur in *regionibus* ( $\alpha$ ) : in *roga-*  
*tionibus* ( $\beta\gamma$ , correct) (variant 142);

demerendo *numerus* (R)/*merium* (J) : *meritum* ( $\beta\gamma$ , correct) eius  
 diminuimus (variant 38).

Many other cases of this type will be found in the apparatus, although by no means all of them are here printed.

The situation  $\alpha\beta : \gamma$  occurs much less frequently and is limited to simple scribal errors. Two good examples are:

hostia accipitur spiritualiter per *veram* fidem ( $\alpha\beta$ ) : per *verba* fidem ( $\gamma$ )  
 (p. 246);

nutrimenta sunt secundum Deum *evacuanda* ( $\alpha\beta$ ) : *evitanda* ( $\gamma$ ) super-  
 flua . . . (p. 263).

The situation  $\alpha : \beta : \gamma$  also occurs a few times and is limited to simple scribal errors. For example:

cum solum *ordinatis* ( $\alpha$ , correct) : *celebrans* ( $\beta$ ) : *celebranti* ( $\gamma$ ) licet  
 conficere (variant 51);

<sup>23</sup> I exclude the extracts in MS. Lambeth 523 from further consideration because they are too short to yield significant evidence. Their text seems to belong to Group  $\gamma$ .

[it is forbidden to give alms] *scaccatoribus* ( $\alpha$ ) : *leccatoribus* ( $\beta$ ) : *ioculatoribus* ( $\gamma$ ; seemingly the best reading) (variant 315);

For the situation  $\alpha\gamma:\gamma$  I have not found any clear case.

Each manuscript, of course, also has its peculiar readings within its group, and consequently the relations of the  $\gamma$  manuscripts are susceptible of further analysis. Here it is worth pointing out only that Y follows B closely, and that LO stand somewhat apart from ABCY.<sup>24</sup> For example:

iudicat esse nocivum vel conveniens, sicut agnus iudicat lupum esse nocivum, non percipiens . . . ( $\alpha\beta$ . ABCY): iudicat esse nocivum, non percipiens . . . (LO) (p. 262);

ut desiderio intentionis (*read* unitionis) cum Deo singulis utatur virtutibus et singulis usibus (*read* viribus) in ipsum tendatur (ABYC) : ut (de, O) desiderio intentionis cum Deo tendatur (LO) (p. 263).

It should be added that in several cases LO show evidence of “smoothing” or emendation. It is even possible that their text was contaminated from a lost manuscript that was close to Group  $\alpha$ . Good examples are the following:

qui non vult *pedem referre* ( $\alpha\beta$ ) : *referre* (ABCY) : *recedere* a culpa (LO) (p. 245);

de secunda dicitur ( $\alpha$ LO) : *om.* ( $\beta$ ABCY) (p. 272);

quidam *temeritati* ( $\alpha$ LO) : *temerati* ( $\beta$ ABCY) gula satisfaciens (p. 278);

nihil valet *eius apertio* (R) | *eius apperitio* (J) : *oris operatio* ( $\beta$ ABCY) *oris apertio* (LO; best sense) (variant 433).

The relative position of the manuscripts in the above stemma, which has been arrived at on the basis of textual comparison alone, agrees very well with their dates. It appears, then, that the treatise “Deus est” existed first as an isolated and anonymous work, as in R and J. At a second stage, the work is found in proximity to another treatise by Grosseteste, which is ascribed to the bishop, as in H and P. At the third stage, in manuscripts produced about the middle of the fourteenth century and later, “Deus est” appears incorporated into the collection of sermons by the Bishop of Lincoln, as in manuscripts A,B,C, L, and Y. It may be thought that some scribes experienced some uneasiness at considering “Deus est” a sermon, an uneasiness expressed by the use of an illuminated initial in C. Manuscript O, finally, would represent the second stage, although it is textually close to L.

<sup>24</sup> The peculiar position of LO is further shown in the treatment of scriptural quotations. Groups  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  usually omit references to biblical books, while ABCY usually quote book and chapter. (Occasionally, AC have a lacuna, where BY give the complete reference.) LO sometimes side with  $\alpha\beta$ , sometimes with ABCY, and sometimes quote only the book but not the chapter.

None of these manuscripts presents a really "good" text. They all have plenty of individual errors, such as eyeskips, omissions, ditto-graphies, mistaken expansions, and other blunders. It is safe to infer that the hand of the archetype of all extant manuscripts used a great number of abbreviations and contractions, as well as a long, "insular" *r*. Subsequent scribes frequently misread their exemplar, either because they were careless (RJ) or because they did not understand the text. The result are misreadings like *cupiositas* or *impiositas* for *curiositas* (variant 207), or wrong expansions like *operatur* for *comparatur* (variant 175), *virilis* for *humilis* (variant 415), *verba* for *ubera* (p. 291), etc., which appear with approximately the same degree of frequency in all manuscripts.

The logical choice for a base text would be Group  $\alpha$ . However, both Rand J share a considerable number of longer omissions due to eyeskip, as against  $\beta\gamma$ . They are both highly idiosyncratic and irregular in their spelling and seem to be the work of scribes more prone to nodding than any other who has left us a copy of "Deus est." On the other hand, Group  $\alpha$  has several additions not found in  $\beta\gamma$ . But of these, three are sets of mnemonic verses taken from the *Summa brevis* ("Qui bene praesunt presbyteri") by Richard Whethersett,<sup>25</sup> which can hardly have been present in the original text. This is quite clear, because the verses on the Articles of Faith, while giving twelve articles as does "Deus est," distribute them in a quite different way (see the following section, and text, pp. 251—252). Despite these shortcomings, Group  $\alpha$  does present better, meaningful, and seemingly original readings in a number of crucial places, and it is mainly for this reason that I have chosen the base text from it.

The differences between R and J are numerous but minor. On the whole one can say that, in comparison with each other, R is characterized by more erratic spellings (*comtensit*, *helementales*, *noscium*, etc.) and frequent misspellings (*munire* for *minuere*, *enucii* for *ethnici*, *putrio* for *putrido*, etc.), while J more often omits one or more words. In addition, J presents evidence of scribal emendation. For example, in the sentence: "Quia cum ante baptismum *non fuerit membrum ecclesiae, solum deo tenetur satisfacere. Si vero post baptismum offendimus . . . , non solum deo sed etiam ecclesiae rei sumus*" (text, p. 245; variant 36), both R and J omit the italicized words, obviously due to eyeskip. J, in which *ante*

<sup>25</sup> See variants 112, 125, and 148. Verses from "Qui bene praesunt presbyteri" intruded similarly into early copies of Grosseteste's *Templum Domini*.

begins a new line, has expuncted *ante* and evidently supplied *post* at the end of the preceding line, which now extends a little into the margin. A different case of emendation could be J's reading of "XIV vitia" (variant 205) where all other manuscripts have "VII vitia," which seems to be logically required, though the text enumerates indeed fourteen vices.

With these observations in mind, I have chosen to adopt R as the base text and to correct obvious errors in it, as will be further explained in the section "The Text."

### *Date, Authorship, and Sources*

The only direct evidence I can find for dating the treatise is the remark made in it that "ludus talorum et scaccorum . . . non solum mali sunt sed in concilio prohibiti clericis" (p. 285). If the reference is to Canon 16 of the Fourth Lateran Council, which was repeated in English synodal decrees from 1222 on,<sup>26</sup> the *terminus post quem* for "Deus est" would be 1215. The earliest MS. dates from about 1250. Since it seems to be at least two stages removed from the original and presents a rather corrupt text, the original may have been written a good number of years earlier.

The question of authorship is more vexing. In the Epilogue the author hides his identity behind a quibbling wordplay: "Since the matter of a book furnishes a name to its author, this author cannot be named after one book, but after several that have put it together, for this book has as many authors as authorities" (p. 293).<sup>27</sup> This seems to be nothing but a variant of the commonplace, "I have compiled this book as a bee gathers honey." The early manuscripts, before the middle of the fourteenth century, do not ascribe the treatise, and the early title *Summa magistralis de vitiis et virtutibus* is silent about the master's name.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. F. M. Powicke and C.R. Cheney, *Councils and Synods, with other documents relating to the English Church*. Vol. II, A. D. 1205—1313 (Oxford, 1964), p. 151, § 65: "Ad aleas vel taxillos non ludant, nec huiusmodi ludis intersint."

<sup>27</sup> The last clause, "tot habet auctores quot auctoritates," is reminiscent of the beginning of the *Poenitential* by Peter of Poitiers, Canon of St. Victor: "Compilatio praesens materiam habens confessionem nullum operis profitetur auctorem, sed tot habet auctores quot continet auctoritates"; MS. Laud Misc. 375, fol. 2r. This treatise was discussed by A. Teetaert, "Le *Liber Poenitentialis* de Pierre de Poitiers," *Beiträge Baeumker*, Suppl. III, 1 (1935), 310—331; P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Washington, 1936), pp. 22—23 and 168; and C.R. Cheney, "La date de composition du *Liber Poenitentialis* attribué à Pierre de Poitiers," *RTAM*, IX (1937), 401—404. The work also exists in British Museum MS. Addit. 29882.



If we turn to other writings by Grosseteste for comparison, which were early ascribed to him, we find that he was deeply concerned with the religious instruction of his flock and the improvement of their morals by means of preaching and administering the sacrament of Penance, a concern expressed in his diocesan constitutions<sup>28</sup> and a number of works dealing with the pastoral office, especially with confession, such as "Quoniam cogitatio"<sup>29</sup> or the *Sermo de leuitis*,<sup>30</sup> about whose authorship there can be little doubt. In an interesting sermon which he had written at the request of the papal legate, Cardinal Otto, to be delivered at a Council in London, Grosseteste quotes the sentence "Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari potest,"<sup>31</sup> but nothing else here is very reminiscent of our treatise. A longer close parallel in phrasing occurs in his *Hexaëmeron*, speaking of the divine ray which is distributed among single things, in terms identical with "Deus est." This passage, however, which comes

<sup>28</sup> The Statutes of 1239(?), printed as Letter 52\* in *Roberti Grosseteste . . . Epistolae*, ed. H. R. Luard ("Rolls Series," 25; London, 1861), p. 155; and by Powicke and Cheney, *Councils and Synods*, II, 267—278. It is worth noting that several English bishops during the thirteenth century wrote treatises on confession in order to supplement their own diocesan decrees. The best known of these is the *Summula* of Peter Quinel (or Quivel) Bishop of Exeter, written ca. 1287 and referred to in the *Statutes of Exeter* of 1287 (cf. Powicke and Cheney, *Councils and Synods*, II, 1060—77 and 984 ff.). The *Summula* contains a detailed treatment of the Seven Deadly Sins. Walter of Cantilupe also said he had written a *tractatus de confessione*, but this seems now lost (Powicke and Cheney, *ibid.*, p. 305 and n. 1).

<sup>29</sup> "Quoniam cogitatio" (Sermon 15 in Thomson's list) gives instruction to the penitent rather than the confessor. Grosseteste counsels to examine one's past life year by year, according to the places one has been at, and according to the seven circumstances. In order to confess all sins fully, one should examine the faculties of one's mind, one's speech, one's external acts (including the five senses, hands and feet). Then follow instructions on how to examine one's conscience according to the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sins.

<sup>30</sup> "Scriptum est de leuitis" (Sermon 31) begins with a discussion of the priestly office under the three subjects of *doctrina verbi*, *ostensio exempli*, and *administratio sacramentorum* (MS. Digby 191, fol. 168r). The third part contains a section "Quomodo se habere debeat sacerdos" in confession (fol. 171r), in which Grosseteste discusses sins according to the Seven Deadly Sins and the Ten Commandments. The Seven Deadly Sins are here derived from the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit (fol. 168r—172r; end apparently lacking). On this sermon, see also S. Gieben, "Robert Grosseteste on Preaching, with an Edition of the Sermon 'Ex rerum initiatarum' on Redemption," *Collectanea Franciscana*, XXXVII (1967), III—II2.

<sup>31</sup> Sermon 19; MS. Bod. 830, fol. 184r, b. Cf. *De cessatione legalium*: "Deus est summa potentia et sapientia et bonitas, et magis bonus quam etiam possit excogitari"; MS. Bod. lat. theol. c. 17, fol. 176r, a. The sentence had a long history, reaching back to Boethius (*Consolatio*, III, pr. 10), St. Augustine (*Confessions*, VII, iv, 6; PL 32: 735; cf. *De doctrina Christiana*, I, 7; PL 34: 22), and even Seneca (*Natural. quaest.*, I, prol., 13; ed. F. Haase, II, 159). Grosseteste most probably received it from St. Bernard, *De consideratione*, V, vii, 15 (PL 182: 797).

from Hugh of St. Victor,<sup>32</sup> is absent from the earliest extant version of Grosseteste's *Hexaëmeron*, which bears his own annotations and corrections, and apparently slipped into the text by mistake at a later stage.

There is, however, one work by Grosseteste which contains a number of precise verbal parallels with “Deus est,” the *Templum Domini*. This extremely popular handbook for priests is very often found ascribed to Grosseteste, and its earliest ascribed versions date from the bishop's own lifetime. It was certainly written before 1246.<sup>33</sup> *Templum Domini* and “Deus est” agree precisely in several passages which, in subject-matter or wording, are most peculiar and even *sui generis*.<sup>34</sup> We saw earlier that in “Deus est” seven remedial virtues appear flanked by fourteen vices, of which those by lack are the Seven Deadly Sins. That a virtue is the mean between two vices was of course a common view in the early thirteenth century, but the consistent elaboration of this idea into a scheme which includes the Seven Deadly Sins is quite rare. The scheme found in “Deus est” occurs also in *Templum Domini* and, to my knowledge, nowhere else. Of the 21 terms involved, all but two are the same in the two works.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the fact that the vice opposed to *occupatio* by excess is called *curiositas* in both works — an extraordinary use of the word for the notion of exaggerated zeal — is quite unique.<sup>36</sup> Also, the explicit division of *accidia* into a spiritual and a carnal species, called *desidia* and *otium* respectively, is without close parallel outside these two works.<sup>37</sup> Other very close parallels are the division of Justice into four kinds according to the four debts man owes to God, himself, his neighbor, and the devil; and the curious division of the Twelve Articles of Faith into articles 1—5 and 6—12, the latter dealing with the seven sacraments.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Hugh of St. Victor, *Expositio in Hierarchiam celestem S. Dionysii*, II, 1 (PL 175: 943 f.). I owe this identification to Father Gieben.

<sup>33</sup> Walter of St. Edmund, Abbot of Peterborough, who seems to have died in 1246, bequeathed a book called “*Templum Domini cum arte confessionaria*” to Peterborough Abbey. M. R. James, *Lists of Manuscripts Formerly in Peterborough Abbey Library* (“Supplement to the Bibliographical Society's Transactions,” 5; Oxford, 1926), p. 22.

<sup>34</sup> Parallel passages will be given in the notes to the text, below.

<sup>35</sup> The scheme is summarized above, p. 223. The two exceptions are *exultatio* and *insensibilitas*, which in *Templum Domini* are called *hilaritas* and *immobilitas*.

<sup>36</sup> See my study *The Sin of Sloth*, pp. 76 and 226, n. 41.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 164—174.

<sup>38</sup> The seven sacraments are included in the Twelve Articles of Faith (as articles 6—12) also in: St. Edmund's *Speculum ecclesiae* (ed. M. de la Bigne, *Bibliotheca patrum et veterum auctorum ecclesiae*, Paris, 1610, vol. V, col. 990—991); the *Speculum Christiani* (ed. G. Holmstedt, “Early English Text Society, Original Series,” 182, London, 1933, pp. 10—13); Peter Quinel's

However, the parallels between the two treatises are far from consistent and complete. While the peculiar division of the Articles of Faith with inclusion of the sacraments is the same in both works, the distribution of the subject-matter of articles 1—5 and the order in which the seven sacraments appear are different.<sup>39</sup> Likewise, the similarities observed in the cases of *accidia* and Justice do not extend to the other vices and virtues. Where *Templum Domini* offers a division of a chief vice and defines its species, the members of the division are only in part identical with "Deus est," whereas the definitions are usually quite different.

A synopsis of *Templum Domini* will help to realize the similarities and differences between the two works more fully. *Templum Domini* is clearly written for priests. St. Paul's injunction, "the temple of the Lord is holy, which are you," is said to refer especially to priests, whose bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit since Christ enters them daily. The image of the temple is then further allegorized by considering its foundations, walls, and roof and applying these to man's bodily and to his spiritual nature. This allows Grosseteste to treat the three theological and three cardinal virtues. The virtue of Faith leads to a listing of the Articles of Faith and the sacraments; while under the virtue of Love the author manages to derive the Ten Commandments from the injunction to love God with one's whole soul, etc. But he also brings in the Seven Deadly Sins, which — differently from "Deus est" — are here related to the three objects of love (God, neighbor, oneself). They are then further related with the Three Enemies of Man, with seven diseases and seven wounds, and finally with what Grosseteste calls seven *coadiutores*, which are the seven days of the week called by their planetary names.<sup>40</sup> He then goes on to allegorizing the history of the (Jewish) temple and introduces another set of images, in which God appears as the healer of spiritually sick mankind, the priest as His *minister*, the petitions of the *Pater Noster* as the sick man's cries, the remedial virtues as the medicine, and so forth, all leading to a table of seven septenaries set in correspondence, in which, says Grosseteste, "est tota pastoralis officii cura."

*Summula* (ed. Powicke and Cheney, *Councils and Synods*, II, 1076); the penitential treatise "Omnis aetas hominis," attributed to William Badby or William of Blois, Bishop of Worcester (Ms. Bod. 828, fol. 215v—224s); and a theological miscellany contained in MS. Bod. 857 (fol. 113v). All these works are either identical with or very similar to *Templum Domini*, rather than "Deus est." For various schemes of the Articles of Faith, see J. D. Gordon, "The Articles of the Creed and the Apostles," *Speculum*, XL (1965), 634—640.

<sup>39</sup> See text, pp. 251—252, and note i.

<sup>40</sup> The table which appears in the manuscripts has been reproduced by M. W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins* (East Lansing, 1952), p. 437.

Having thus arrived at the main concern of the pastoral office, Grosseteste sets out to detail how “the servant of the highest physician” should examine the spiritually sick, which is now done — just as in “Deus est” — by following the chief virtues from Faith to Moderation. To this fairly long section is added an equally long section on what Grosseteste calls “difficult matters,” which include detailed lists of cases concerning simony, usury, tithes, restitution, and various canonical aspects of Matrimony, Holy Orders, and some other sacraments. As a conclusion to the whole, the seven chief virtues are once more related to the petitions of the Lord's Prayer, by which the virtues may be obtained.

It is evident that both *Templum Domini* and “Deus est” have the same main concern, examination of the penitent, and share a number of schemes and approaches in which the relevant subject-matter is introduced. But the author of *Templum Domini* seems compelled to be more comprehensive, to pack into his treatise as many blocks and schemes of popular instruction as possible, so that his reader finds not only vices and virtues, Articles of Faith and sacraments, but also the Our Father, the Ten Commandments, the beatitudes, all of them neatly related in a number of septenaries, of which Hugh of St. Victor and other twelfth-century theologians were so fond and which retained their popularity at Grosseteste's time as well as later on. In contrast, “Deus est” is much more sharply focussed on the confession of sins.

The inclusion of such diverse matter in *Templum Domini* gives this treatise a certain lack of logical structure, which shows up in several cases of repetition and inconsistency. For example, the seven chief virtues are first considered as constituent parts of the allegorical temple, but later appear as the tools with which man is to build this temple and to ward off the Three Enemies. Similarly, the three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, are not only discussed twice, in different places, but also subdivided in two different manners. In contrast, „Deus est“ follows a tight and coherent structure, which may be complex but is never tortuous or repetitious. Much of the material which in *Templum Domini* appears dispersed outside the main section on the chief virtues is at least touched upon in “Deus est” as well. But here it is built into the main line of development in a completely rational and structurally satisfying manner. For instance, many cases of excommunication or irregularities are here incorporated in the discussion of Faith and of Holy Orders, respectively.

The greater sense for structure manifest throughout “Deus est” also shows up in the firm articulation of the main part to the preamble by



deriving the subject-matter of confession — vices and virtues — directly and in detail from the Fall of Adam and Eve. In contrast, the transition in *Templum Domini* is abrupt and less organic. It is true that the controlling image of the temple runs through this treatise, but its parts are simply not linked together as intelligently as in “Deus est.”

Furthermore, the entire treatment in “Deus est” is much more sophisticated than in *Templum Domini*. In contrast to the introductory allegory of the temple in *Templum Domini*, the preamble of “Deus est” with its Dionysian theology stands on a decidedly higher intellectual level. This is true of many smaller points as well. For example, *Templum Domini* introduces Penance and the Eucharist, together with the other sacraments, merely as “remedies against sins,” whereas “Deus est” shows in detail what function the sacraments have in the plan of salvation and discusses the relation between Penance and the Eucharist at some length. Similarly, *Templum Domini* makes only passing mention of the circumstances of sin, whereas “Deus est” applies them to individual sins in detail and with care and sophistication. Even the style of the two works is quite different. Whereas “Deus est” is discursive, *Templum Domini* presents a large amount of its material in the form of lists, *schemata*, and tables. In comparison with *Templum Domini*, “Deus est” may well be likened to a literary epistle as compared with an office memorandum.

The evidence for Grosseteste’s authorship of “Deus est” is, therefore, far from convincing. Even if one dismisses the differences in style and level of sophistication between the two works as not forming a serious argument against common authorship (because Grosseteste was indeed capable of a variety of styles, as can be seen when one compares the wooden allegories of some of his *Dicta* and shorter sermons with the much more polished, refined discourses in several longer sermons) — the fact that the early manuscripts (Groups  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ) preserve the treatise anonymous and unascribed continues to shed doubt on Grosseteste’s authorship of “Deus est”. On the other hand, “Deus est” uses several unique elements also found — and only found — in *Templum Domini*, as shown above. Because of the peculiarity and unpopularity of these elements, and because *these* elements occur in both treatises rather than others that one would more readily expect to have been borrowed if the two works had been written by different men (such as, the definitions of the virtues and the vices), I find the alternatives to common authorship rather improbable, viz., that Grosseteste in *Templum Domini* could have borrowed these elements from the unknown author of “Deus est,” or

that an unknown author in “Deus est” could have borrowed them from *Templum Domini*. Until further evidence appears to shed fresh light on this question, I would consider Grosseteste's authorship of “Deus est” highly probable.

Besides *Templum Domini*, no other major sources have been identified. The account of creation and of the hierarchy of being at the beginning of the Preamble is strongly reminiscent of Pseudo-Dionysius, but at the moment I cannot find any substantial evidence that “Deus est” depends on his works or intermediate authors (such as, Hugh of St. Victor, William of Auxerre, William of Auvergne). The system of virtues and vices with its many divisions and definitions is of course reminiscent of similar attempts made in *Moralium dogma philosophorum*,<sup>41</sup> *De fructibus carnis et spiritus*,<sup>42</sup> *Ysagoge in theologiam*,<sup>43</sup> or Alanus of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus Sancti*,<sup>44</sup> but none of these is a direct source for “Deus est.” Many definitions of the cardinal virtues and their branches used by Grosseteste occur in *Moralium dogma* (ultimately taken from Cicero and Macrobius), but we can be certain that Grosseteste did not copy them from it, since his definitions have undergone a process of expansion. A good example is the following:

*Moralium dogma*: “Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpressio.”<sup>45</sup>

“Deus est”: Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum firma et grata propter spem boni perpressio.” (p. 291).

Grosseteste's expanded version should be compared with the definition found in a collection of *Definitiones verborum*: “Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum firma et grata perpressio propter spem boni.”<sup>46</sup> Collections of this kind exist in many forms and manuscripts and have hardly been studied so far, so that nothing definite can be said about their relation to “Deus est,” except that several of them contain definitions also found in Grosseteste's treatise.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Ed. J. Holmberg (Uppsala, 1929).

<sup>42</sup> PL 176: 997—1006.

<sup>43</sup> Ed. A. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (“Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense,” 14; Louvain, 1934).

<sup>44</sup> Ed. O. Lottin, in *Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, VI (Gembloux, 1960), 27—92. Earlier ed. in MS, XII (1950), 20—56.

<sup>45</sup> Ed. cit., p. 7, line 20.

<sup>46</sup> MS. Merton 257, fol. 122r. The manuscript, which Thomson dated in the first half of the thirteenth century (p. 139), contains various works by William de Montibus and Grosseteste's *Templum Domini*.

<sup>47</sup> MS. Merton 257 also gives identical definitions for *ordo* and *adulterium*; MS. Laud Misc. 544 contains a *Tractatus de vitiis principalibus* (“Superbia est elatio vitiosa”) with identical definitions of *invidia in Deum* and of *gula*; cf. Thomson, *The Writings*, pp. 267 f.

As one reads through the treatise, especially the section on the chief vices, the impression grows that much of the homiletic material, such as scriptural "authorities," exemplary figures and episodes, quotations and proverbial sayings signaled by an introductory "unde," is commonplace and may well have been taken from a moral *florilegium*. The remark made in the Epilogue, that the treatise "has as many authors as it has authorities," is certainly not a mere formula. Other readers may therefore be able to identify many more quotations beyond the few for which I have been able to give a source. Many of the exhortatory examples and quotations given for the vices are, of course, floating material which appeared in any number of treatises of this kind.

An interesting passage in the discussion of sources is the page in which Grosseteste deals with psychology, describing the three powers of the soul with their respective *vires*. The system involved and several of its terms are — up to a point — reminiscent of Avicenna's *De anima*<sup>48</sup> and its immediate followers. But comparison shows that in this treatise Grosseteste's interest in Avicenna's psychology was only superficial and pragmatic: He took from it what he needed to interpret the biblical triad of soul, heart, and mind in order to arrive at seven virtues. This is quite clear from "Deus est" itself, where some eighteen *vires* are described, but only seven are utilized for the system Grosseteste builds. Here and elsewhere we realize that, although "Deus est" echoes many of the great theological and philosophical questions debated in the schools during the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, it merely touches them without development.<sup>49</sup> Pieces like Avicenna's psychology or Pseudo-Dionysian theology are only used to introduce and to frame Grosseteste's main concern, the treatment of vices and virtues for purposes of confession. That Grosseteste should have done this, however, and produced a successful, logical, and harmonious *summa*, constitutes the major structural beauty of the treatise and raises it far above many works of similar intent and scope.

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<sup>48</sup> Like "Deus est" Avicenna divides the soul into three parts (*vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis*). Also the complete division of *anima sensibilis* is exactly the same in both treatises. See Avicenna, *De anima* (or, *Liber sextus naturalium*), I, 5 (*Opera*, 1508).

<sup>49</sup> More extensive development, however, is given to the discussion of whether Adam's sin was greater than Satan's (text, pp. 242—243), and whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin (text, pp. 282—283). These passages approach the form of a *quaestio* and were felt to be so by some scribes, who marked them thus in the margin.

*The Text*

The following text is based on manuscript R, with emendations from Groups  $\beta$  and/or  $\gamma$  as the sense of the passage seems to require. The majority of these emendations are readings which supply a more or less obvious omission in R or  $\alpha$ . In several cases, readings in R and/or J which are meaningless have been rejected in favor of  $\beta$  and/or  $\gamma$ . Examples of such cases have been given above, in the section on “Manuscripts.” I have tried to use the criterion of “meaning” with restraint, in order to produce a text that is fairly readable yet preserves the grammatical, stylistic, and logical peculiarities and, in several instances, the apparent roughness or minor flaws of the base text. In some cases, my preference for certain readings will be open to debate.

All rejected readings of R appear in the variant notes, so that the printed text together with the variant notes furnishes an accurate record of R, with the exception of its peculiar spellings (discussed above), which have been neglected. In addition, the apparatus contains a selection of variants from J,  $\beta$ , and  $\gamma$  which have seemed significant either because they may preserve the original reading or because they may have some interest for the history of theology or for medieval Latin philology. Where a variant is noted, it can be assumed that the note is complete, i.e., that all manuscripts are accounted for. Differences in word order have been neglected.

The punctuation and paragraph division of the text are my own. I have also normalized the spelling by using that of “classical” Latin.

INCIPIT<sup>1</sup> SUMMA MAGISTRALIS DE VITIIS ET VIRTUTIBUS

## [I. PRAEAMBULUM]

[R, fol. 3r] Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari<sup>2</sup> potest,<sup>a</sup> cuius posse maximum, scire verissimum, et velle optimum. Est enim aeternus in essentia, simplex simpliciter, et invariabilis in manentia, alio non indigens sed sibi et aliis sufficiens in gloria. Igitur propter exuberantiam bonitatis propriae placuit ei alia a non esse in sui praesentiam vocare, ut

<sup>1</sup> incipit . . . virtutibus] *om.*, J.H.L.O; incipit liber quomodo examinandus est poenitens quando venerit ad confessionem, P; quomodo examinandus est poenitens quando venerit ad confessionem, A.B.C.Y.

<sup>2</sup> excogitari potest] potest excogitari, R.

<sup>a</sup> See above, p. 232 and n. 31.



haberent tantae excellentiae participationem. Multa quidem et varia fecit, quia non erat unum ex universis quod capere posset totum suae pulchritudinis. Hauserunt ergo gratia<sup>3</sup> ex virtute exuberante existentiam, ut merito suo participarent bonitatem. Unde dicit Augustinus in libro *Contra*<sup>4</sup> *Felicianum*: "Omne quod est, in eo, quod ex nihilo exivit in esse, ad nihilum de qualitate naturae propriae vertendum est, nisi divina gratia sustineret."<sup>5</sup> Sic divinus radius unus in se permanens varia participatione distribuitur in singulis, ut perfectus esse possit simul in universis.<sup>6</sup> Et quia tanta est suae virtutis exuberantia, ut in proximis<sup>7</sup> recipientibus non staret, verumtamen ut ulterius flueret, est<sup>8</sup> fluxus rerum,<sup>d</sup> quarundam ab ipso secundum immediationem, quarundam vero secundum mediationem, ita ut inferiora semper ab ipso per superiora<sup>7</sup> veritatis susciperent existentiam. Ob hoc nominantur "angeli" creaturae celestes, id est nuntii, quia superiores ordines divinam illuminationem et virtutem quam desuper accipiunt transmittendo et nuntiando inferioribus manifestant. Et non dicuntur angeli, quia omnes officium exterioris nuntii exercent; hoc enim ministerium ad ultimos ordines spectat. Sic igitur est omnium rerum ordo, ut semper<sup>8</sup> magis remota minus de fonte verae existentiae hauriant propter elongationem ipsorum a verissimo. Verissime ergo existunt intelligentiae, deinde corpora caelestia, post haec corpora habentia contrarietatem et composita ex contrariis, deinde vegetabilia, et post haec sensibilia, quae inter haec omnia minimam habent veritatem existendo.

<sup>3</sup> gratia] singuli, J; om., O.

<sup>4</sup> contra] ad, α.

<sup>5</sup> proximis] proximo, α; propriis, α. γ.

<sup>6</sup> est fluxus . . . mediationem] om., α.

<sup>7</sup> ab ipso per superiora] ab ipso superiora, R; ab ipsis superioribus, J.

<sup>8</sup> semper] per, α.

<sup>b</sup> Augustine, *Contra Felicianum*, 7 (PL 42: 1162).

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *Expositio in Hierarchiam caelestem S. Dionysii*, II, 1 (PL 175: 943—44): "Divinae claritatis radius, qui spiritualiter lucentes illuminat, quamvis in se unus permaneat, participatione tamen et distributione donorum varie multiplicatur . . . Non enim unum aliquod ex universis diversis capere potuit quod erat pulchritudinis totum. Et idcirco summa pulchritudo varia participatione distributa est in singulis, ut perfecta esse posset simul in universis." This passage also occurs in some manuscripts of Grosseteste's *Hexaëmeron*: Royal 6. E. v., Cotton Otho D.X, Harley 3858, and Prague Nat. Mus., XII. E. 5. — Grosseteste also speaks of *participatio divini radii* in Sermon 30 ("Ecclesia sancta"), where however it refers to man's participation in God's supernatural life, beginning in baptism, etc. (MS. Royal 6.E.v, fol. 107v and f.).

<sup>d</sup> The expression "fluxus rerum" is also used by William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate*, 5 (*Opera*, Orléans and Paris, 1674, vol. II, p. 6), and by William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, I, cap. i, part 1 (ed. 1518, fol. 1v, b), with a reference to John Damascene.

Ultimo namque facturam quandam, hominem scilicet, statuit Altissimus quasi praedictorum omnium exemplar et ex omnibus acceptam ad<sup>9</sup> modum facientis singulas editiones suae sapientiae et in summam unam redigentis. Parificatur quidem angelis per animam, animalibus similiter per sensibilitatem, crescentibus per vegetationem; cum ceteris corporibus in quibusdam corporis partibus habet<sup>10</sup> similitudinem. Secundum<sup>11</sup> corpus ergo vilissimo simile est sicut imperfectissimum, secundum animam aequale optimae creaturae et ita nobilissimum, secundum vero se totum omnium creaturarum dignissimum. Haec inquam creatura inter ceteras creaturas creatori est simillima, quia sicut in Deo omnia stant per causam, sic in homine relucent universa per effectum. Et ob hoc est quod homo minor mundus appellatur. Et quoniam inter cuncta optimus est, cum singulis sit impar et omnibus aequatus, obediunt ei naturaliter universa, et sic Dei imago est. Et hoc est quod dixit Dominus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram* [Gen. 1: 26]. Dedit ei Dominus cunctorum dominium, quorum fuit factus exemplum.

Tria ergo considerantur in fluxu rerum: Gradus in creatione, quia prioribus omnibus indigent posteriora;<sup>12</sup> una finalis causa,<sup>13</sup> cum propter hominem facta sunt singula; omniumque creaturarum in uno<sup>14</sup> relucet. Quod enim gradatim processerunt omnia, manifestatio est quod<sup>15</sup> ab uno exierunt; et quod in uno cuncta relucent, probatio est quod per illum a quo sunt stant; quod<sup>16</sup> enim propter unum sunt cetera signum est quod in illud per quod stant tendere debent universa. Et hoc est quod dicitur: *Ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia* [Rom. 11: 36]. *Ex quo omnia*: non semine sed creatione; *per quem omnia*:<sup>17</sup> firma conservatione; *in quo omnia*: aeterna scilicet salvatione. Cum ergo<sup>18</sup> non propter se sed propter alia facta sunt, non in se sed in illis pro quibus facta sunt salvari necesse est. A quo enim aliquorum pendet perfectio, in eodem erit eorundem salvatio.

<sup>9</sup> ad modum . . . redigentis] ad modum sapientis singulas editiones totius suae sapientiae in summam unam redigentis, β. γ.

<sup>10</sup> habet] habent, α.

<sup>11</sup> secundum corpus . . . imperfectissimum] secundum corpus vilissimo simile, α.

<sup>12</sup> posteriora] *add.* semper, β. γ.

<sup>13</sup> causa] creationis causa, β. γ.

<sup>14</sup> uno] una, J.

<sup>15</sup> manifestatio est quod] manifestum est quia, α.

<sup>16</sup> quod (quia, R) enim . . . universa] et ideo in ipsum tendere debent universa, J.

<sup>17</sup> per quem omnia] per quem haec omnia, R.

<sup>18</sup> ergo] *add.* quaedam, β. γ.

Manebunt igitur secundum se in praesentia salvatoris extrema suae creationis, scilicet homo et angelus, et media in extremis. Et quia non nisi merito proprio permanentem poterant obtinere bonitatem, dedit eis liberum arbitrium, ut non coacti ordinate tenderent in ipsum a quo processerunt. Est enim ordo colligatio principii cum fine. Qui enim in omnibus agendis tendit in suum principium, ordinate dicitur agere. Sed deviauit angelus obductus propria pulchritudine per stimulum suae malitiae, et ideo ut perpetua damnatione puniretur iustum fuit. Peccavit homo quidem, sed suggestionem mali angeli et suasionem mulieris suae, et ideo damnauit eum Dei iustitia exilio.

Sed videtur quod magis peccasset Adam quam Lucifer, et ita graviori damnatione sit dignus. Fuit prohibitum Adae a Domino ne gustaret de fructu scientiae boni et mali, et ita gustando factus est transgressor praecepti domini. Sed Lucifer propriam pulchri-/ [3 v] tudinem respiciens voluit domino suo parificari non cognoscens<sup>19</sup> naturam propriam. Si enim cognovisset se in tantam deformitatem posse labi, non utique desiderasset Domino fieri similis. Vel si forte excusatur Adam per Evam, quis excusabit eam? Et praeterea non<sup>20</sup> se per Evam excusavit, sed in Dominum crimen refudit. Et praeterea, si Lucifer amavit propriam excellentiam, nullus<sup>21</sup> in hoc intellexit conditionem esse deterioratam; sed Adam sciens gustum pomi esse prohibitum a Domino, intellexit in gustu speciem mali.

Ad hoc dicendum quod plus peccavit Lucifer quam Adam. Contempsit enim creatoris sui dominium in eo quod triste gerebat decorem Dei. Unde dicitur quod "ut vidit Filium, invidit ei." Tantam enim dederat ei Dominus pulchritudinem, quod invidit Dominum habere maiorem. Iustum ergo fuit ut reciperet in propria persona quod desiderabat fieri in Domino suo sua<sup>22</sup> malitia. Sed Adam comedit de vetito, ne coadiutricem quam ei Dominus dederat molestaret; scivit enim promissa diaboli esse falsa. Unde dicit Apostolus: *Adam enim non fuit seductus* sed Eva [I Tim. 2: 14]. Unde non comedit ut esset sicut Deus, sed ne mulieri suadenti contradiceret. Unde dicit Augustinus: "Adam minus peccavit, quia de misericordia cogitavit."<sup>e</sup> In hoc ergo peccavit, quod amorem mulieris obedientiae quam Domino debebat<sup>23</sup> praetulit. Et ideo dixit ei Dominus:

<sup>19</sup> cognoscens] cognoscendo, α.

<sup>20</sup> non se per Evam excusavit, sed in . . .] si se excusavit per Evam sed (om., J) in . . ., α.

<sup>21</sup> nullus] nullius, R. β. γ.

<sup>22</sup> sua] sola, β. γ.

<sup>23</sup> quam Domino debebat] quam Dominus celebrat (celebrarat, J), α.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Summa sententiarum*, II, 6 (PL 176: 98).

*In labore et sudore vesceris pane tuo* [Gen. 3: 19], quasi diceret, quia fuisti inobediens mihi, erunt omnia inobedientia tibi, ut nihil eorum quibus indiges sine labore habeas. Maiora enim facta sunt ei inobedientia ad reprimendum superbiam; minora ad impotentiae recordationem; media ei serviunt ad fragilitatis remedium. Et quia mulierem falsum suadentem non corripuerat, factus est insipiens qui ante fuerat naturas singulorum vere intelligens; unde: *Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis* [Ps. 48: 13]. Quia cum delectatione gustavit, expulsus est ab amenitate, ut sentiret angustias tam in anima quam in corpore, quia commisit utroque. Et quia voluit mulieri satisfacere, intelligens se peccare sed sperans per misericordiam Dei resurgere, non erat ei confirmatum liberum arbitrium in malo sicut angelo, sed permissum permanere ad utrumque, ut de commisso penitentiam duceret. De hoc autem quod obicitur Adam refudisse crimen in Dominum, falsum est, sed hoc dicendo in tantum erravit, quod se falso excusavit quando misericordiam petere debuit. Sed Eva plus peccavit quia diabolo credidit, deificari voluit, gustavit, et virum gustare fecit. Pro nullo tamen aeternaliter damnanda fuit, quia alterius suggestionem deliquit. Unde sub conditione viri permansit et debitam peccatis penitentiam duxit.

Cum ergo factus esset Adam in medio immortalitatis et mortis<sup>24</sup> (quia, si natura mortalis<sup>25</sup> esset, morte eum non infestasset — dixit: *Quacunque hora comederitis, morte moriemini* [Gen. 2: 17] —; et si immortalem fecisset, non cibo indigens esset), prohibuit et gustum fructus<sup>26</sup> scientiae boni et mali, cuius natura fuit ut omnis gustans ex eo naturam propriam cognosceret, ne forte gustans ex eo propriam fragilitatem cognoscens vacaret corporalibus amittendo spiritualia, aut forte, sicut quibusdam sanctis placet, ut non gustando mereretur sibi et toti posteritati eius in bono confirmari liberum arbitrium. Et quia omnes<sup>27</sup> seminaliter fuimus in Adam, omnes peccato eius maculam contraximus. Sed cum totam substantiam nostram ab Adam non receperimus, sed corpus solum, animam autem a Deo mun-/[4r] dam,<sup>28</sup> maculatur magis anima a corpore quam corpus mundetur per puritatem animae, quia nunc infusa, si statim dissolvitur, damnatur, id est claritate aeterna privatur, et hoc ideo est, ut dicunt quidam, quia anima in infusione intrat corpus cum

<sup>24</sup> in medio immortalitatis et mortis] in medio mortis, α.

<sup>25</sup> mortalis] immortalis, α.

<sup>26</sup> fructus] om., α.

<sup>27</sup> omnes] om., α.

<sup>28</sup> mundam] mundatur, R; om., γ.



delectatione quadam, et ita ab ipso polluitur.<sup>†</sup> Alii dicunt quod quia<sup>29</sup> Adam delectatione carnali maculavit animam, maculantur animae posteritatis a macula corporis. Item et alii dicunt quod ideo damnatur, quia nihil boni in ipso meruit. Cum igitur peccato meruisset mortem, fuit haec eius conditio, ut ipse sicut unusquisque de posteritate sua pro illo peccato aeternaliter puniretur, nisi in aliquo mereretur. Nec meritum tantum potuit<sup>30</sup> eos ponere in caelo, sed dignos facere ut emerentur<sup>31</sup> ab inferno.

Post multa ergo tempora, cum Adam et magnam partem posteritatis eius detineret infernus, placuit Altissimo humano generi subvenire et a carcere detentos eripere. Assumpsit sibi humanam naturam unione quadam mirabili et singulari, non confusione<sup>32</sup> nec commixtione. Commixta enim sunt quae in naturis propriis manent sed alterantur. Divina vero natura nullam in unione passa est alterationem, sicut anima a corpore patitur unita corpori, sed sic uniebatur quod melior deteriore roborabat, nullam ab illo passa laesionem. Confusa sunt illa quae simul iuncta cedunt in naturam tertii propriis<sup>33</sup> amissis. Sic enim uniri Deum homini nefas est asserere. Sed quadam dulci contrarietate erant tres essentiae in unitate personae, natura scilicet divina, caelestis, et corporea. Sic enim uniri quia ad divinam spectabat naturam, assumpsit hominem in natura et non in persona, sed mansit eadem personalitas in Christo, quae fuit in Filio, et iure<sup>34</sup> in persona Filii assumpsit Deus humanitatem, quia Filio invidebat angelus per quem cecidit homo in eius subiectionem. Non erat itaque modus iste redimendi per incarnationem redimendis necessarius, ita quod non posset esse alius, sed Deo redimenti opportunissimus. Oportet enim optimum optime facere. Unde modus melior non poterit excogitari. Meruit igitur Christus homini in humanitate propria quod homo non poterat sibi mereri impediante sua culpa, quia passionis merito dignos ab infernis eripuit et ianuas caeli eis<sup>35</sup> aperuit. Et quia post mortem glorificatus resurrexit, mors illi ultra dominari non potuit. Unde morte iterum succedentes liberare nequivit. Ideoque statuit sacramenta, quibus poterant sufficienter sibi beatitudinem mereri.

Sacramentum enim Baptismi mundat a peccato originali et confert gratiam, unde, ut quidam dicunt, per solam contritionem mundat ab

<sup>29</sup> quod quia] quod, α; quia, γ.

<sup>30</sup> nec meritum tantum potuit] nec Deus ex iustitia sua tales potuit, J.

<sup>31</sup> emerentur] eruerentur, β. γ.

<sup>32</sup> et singulari, non confusione] et singulari confusione, R; non singulari confusione, J.

<sup>33</sup> propriis] proprietatibus, J.

<sup>34</sup> iure] naturaliter, β; modo, γ.

<sup>35</sup> eis] om., α.

<sup>†</sup> Cf. *Summa sententiarum*, III, 12 (PL 176: 109).

actuali. Quia cum ante baptismum non<sup>36</sup> fuerit membrum ecclesiae, solum Deo tenetur satisfacere. Si vero post baptismum offendimus per pronitatem peccandi quam a peccato originali duximus, non solum Deo sed etiam<sup>37</sup> ecclesiae rei sumus, quia demerendo meritum<sup>38</sup> eius diminui-mus; Deo [rei sumus<sup>39</sup>], quia quod maxime diligit auferimus. Et ideo statuit nobis duo sacramenta quae nos Deo et ecclesiae reconciliant, Poenitentiam scilicet et Sacramentum Altaris. Per Poenitentiam quidem ad ecclesiam prius oportet nos reduci, ut ipsa nos Deo possit per Sacra-mentum Altaris reconciliare. Sed quia ecclesia militans secundum faciem iudicat, oportet ut reus a peccato redire desiderans secundum legem ecclesiae in apparentia satisfaciat. Sed satisfactionem ei non poterit imponere nisi praecognoscendo in quibus deliquerit./[4 v] Unde et prius oportet ipsum confiteri per quae ab ecclesia recessit. Sed quia non est dignus misericordia qui non vult pedem referre a culpa, oportet ut quoad ecclesiam triumphantem veram habeat de peccatis<sup>40</sup> contritionem, quia ecclesia<sup>41</sup> militans verae contritionis signa habentem secundum exteriora iudicat. Sunt igitur partes essentielles Poenitaniae oris confessio, cordis contritio, operis satisfactio, per quas ecclesiae restitui oportet ut ipsi Deo reconcilietur,<sup>42</sup> quia “si is qui displicet<sup>43</sup> ad intercedendum mittitur, irati animus ad deteriora provocatur.”<sup>g</sup> Oportet igitur ut Dei iustitiae satisfaciat in reconciliatione peccatoris pro peccato quo Deo dilectum ipse<sup>44</sup> abstulit, et deinde restituere ablatum in quo Deum offendit. Sed quia non habet ecclesia unde Deo satisfaciat pro peccato, dedit se ipsum Filius<sup>45</sup> ecclesiae ut eum offerret hostiam placabilem iustitiae Dei Patris pro peccato poenitentis. Et quia peccato homo Deo abstulit se ipsum, voluit ut eodem quo peccatum dimittitur ablatum restitueretur. Et ideo dimisso peccato poenitentis per sanctissimam hostiam restituitur poeni-tens<sup>46</sup> per eiusdem hostiae susceptionem. Sic ergo in nullo reliquit nos

<sup>36</sup> non fuerit . . . si vero post baptismum] *om.*, α.

<sup>37</sup> etiam] *om.*, α.

<sup>38</sup> meritum] numerum, R; merium, J.

<sup>39</sup> rei sumus] *om. all MSS.*

<sup>40</sup> peccatis] praeteritis, β. γ.

<sup>41</sup> ecclesia militans . . . iudicat] ecclesia militans respicit verae contritionis signa habentem cum secundum exteriora iudicet, β. γ.

<sup>42</sup> per quas ecclesiae restitui oportet ut ipsi Deo reconcilietur] per quas ecclesiae restitutum oportet ut ipsa (ipsi, R) Deo reconciliet, R. β; per quas ecclesiae restitutum oportet ut per ipsa Deo reconcilietur, A.B.Y.C (per ipsas). L (per ipsam). O (per ipsam).

<sup>43</sup> displicet] Deo displicet, R.

<sup>44</sup> ipse] et ipse, R; etiam ipse, J.

<sup>45</sup> Filius] *add.* Dei, β. γ.

<sup>46</sup> poenitens] ablatum, J; ablatus, β. γ.

indigentes, unde: *Copiosa apud eum redemptio, quia redemit Israel ex omnibus iniquitatibus eius* [Ps. 129: 7—8], id est, ex omni genere peccatorum, originali scilicet, actuali et singulari.

Salva igitur pace multorum sunt haec sacramenta necessaria ad salutem omnium. Dicunt enim Sacramentum Altaris non esse necessarium, et hac ratione: Quia quaecunque necessaria sunt ad salutem, ab omnibus conferri possunt in necessitate, unde unusquisque baptizare potest in necessitate et poenitentiam audire<sup>47</sup> in articulo, sed conficere non unusquisque sed sacerdos solum. Ad hoc dicendum<sup>48</sup> quod nunquam ut credimus deficient in ecclesia militante immolationes<sup>49</sup> huius sanctissimae hostiae. Si forte opponitur quod deficiet morientibus hostia, dicendum<sup>50</sup> quod non, quia dupliciter accipitur, et sacramentaliter et spiritualiter tantum — sacramentaliter sub forma panis, spiritualiter per veram fidem et spem certam et caritatem ferventem —, et ita omnibus confertur, nisi per eos stet. Si quis igitur ulterius opponat quod Ordo similiter est sacramentum sine quo non est salus, cum solum ordinatis<sup>51</sup> liceat conficere corpus Christi, concedimus quod sit necessarium, sed non propter se sed propter Sacramentum Altaris; unde ab ipso non dependet salus nisi per accidens.

Matrimonium est sacramentum, quo si careret<sup>52</sup> ecclesia, affecta<sup>53</sup> esset ad mortaliter peccandum, cum necesse est genus humanum multiplicari, nec multiplicari poterit, nisi per propagationem seminalem hominis in homine. Aufert enim Matrimonium peccatum quod contrahunt non coniugati ex carnis delectatione in<sup>54</sup> effusione seminis, si coeunt coniugati recta intentione, ut causa prolis procreandae<sup>55</sup> vel causa libidinis in alterutro illorum extinguendae.

Cetera vero sacramenta, scilicet Confirmatio et Extrema Unctio, non [*sic*]<sup>56</sup> sunt necessaria ad salutem,<sup>h</sup> quia Spiritus Sanctus qui in Baptismo

<sup>47</sup> baptizare potest in necessitate et poenitentiam audire] baptizare potest, confessionem audire, et poenitentiam iniungere, γ; baptizare potest et poenitentiam audire, β.

<sup>48</sup> dicendum] dicimus, J.β.γ.

<sup>49</sup> immolationes] immolatores, β.γ.

<sup>50</sup> dicendum] dicimus, J.

<sup>51</sup> ordinatis] celebrans, β; celebranti, γ.

<sup>52</sup> careret] caret, α.

<sup>53</sup> affecta] astricta, β.γ.

<sup>54</sup> in] et, α.

<sup>55</sup> procreandae] creandae, R. β.

<sup>56</sup> non sunt] (unctio)num sit [?], H; non sint, P; ideo sunt, L.O.

<sup>h</sup> The Synodal Statutes of Bishop Peter Quinel (or Quivel) of Exeter, 1287, similarly state that Baptism is necessary to all, Penance to adults who after baptism commit mortal sin, while "cetera vero, scil. confirmatio, eucaristia, et extrema unctio, non ita sunt necessaria ut precedentia." Powicke and Cheney, *Councils and Synods*, II, 986.

recipitur, in Confirmatione roboratur vel principaliter datur. Quia Baptismus de virtute sua mundat, sed ex incidenti dat gratiam, et ideo fit in aqua, Confirmatio fit in oleo. Inde merito sunt diversa sacramenta, quia non est eadem medicina curatio aegritudinis et conservatio sanitatis. Quia<sup>57</sup> ergo principaliter Confirmatio dat gratiam, idem est de eo qui in mortali ad Confirmationem accedit quod de ficto accedente ad Baptismum. Extrema vero Unctione ecclesiae triumphanti poenitens ab ecclesia militanti iungitur et Deo commen-/[5r] datur, et ideo in omnibus membris per quae solitum est ungitur, ne peccato impediatur, quin electorum consortio associetur.

## [II. SACRAMENTUM POENITENTIAE]

### [A. CONFESSIO]

Est igitur principium boni in<sup>58</sup> peccatore revertente Poenitentia, cuius ut praeostenditur est pars prima omnium peccatorem sufficiens narratio.<sup>59</sup> Sufficiens quidem erit narratio cum vera fuerit, integra, plana,<sup>60</sup> nuda, amara, verecunda. Vera quidem est, si ea quae fecerit se fecisse confiteatur et non ea quae non fecerit. Integra, ut omnia quae fecit uni dicat. Plana,<sup>61</sup> non solum peccata numerando sed etiam peccati circumstantias omnes ipsum peccatum augentes et minuentes detegendo. Nuda, non in circumlocutionibus peccatum dealbantibus. Amara, se in quolibet accusando non excusando. Verecunda, ut causa purgationis et non ostentationis<sup>62</sup> peccata enumerare praesumat.

In quo quia multi delinquant diminute dicendo tum propter oblivionem, tum propter ignorantiam, tum propter verecundiam, opportunum iudicatur ut<sup>63</sup> reconciliator ecclesiae coram peccatore singula peccata ordinate enumeret sub interrogatione, ne poenitens verecundia confusus aut ignorantia seductus sive negligentia memorandi excusatus recedat<sup>64</sup> irreconciliatus. Occulta tamen peccata caute circumlocutionibus significet, ut si quo talium maculatus fuerit poenitens, quid sacerdos dicat intelligat, si vero non, ignoratum remaneat. Sunt tamen multi qui inter-

<sup>57</sup> quia] sic, α.

<sup>58</sup> in] om., α.

<sup>59</sup> sufficiens narratio] narratio quod est confessio, α.

<sup>60</sup> plana] plena, β. γ.

<sup>61</sup> plana] plena, β. γ.

<sup>62</sup> ostentationis] ostensionis, α.

<sup>63</sup> ut reconciliator ecclesiae . . . sub interrogatione] ut reconciliato ecclesiae peccatore singula peccata ordinate enumeret sacerdos sub interrogatione, α.

<sup>64</sup> excusatus recedat] om., β; excecatus recedat, γ.



rogare nolunt, ne sint audientibus occasio malignandi, instruendo eos in malis quae prius non noverunt. Sed certe ad hoc ducit eos potius negligentia quam peritia, quia interrogare non generat offensionem, sed modus incaute interrogandi, et ita interrogare omittentes peccare certum est negligentia sive ignorantia.

Quia ergo de singulis interrogare utile est tam audienti poenitentiam quam poenitenti, ne quem ignorantia excuset vel<sup>65</sup> impediat, ordine peccatorum omnium genera et species enumerabimus et cuiusmodi homines quibus magis maculentur peccatis. Hoc enim fuit principale intentum. Sed quia malum in se ordinem non habet nisi respectu boni, cuius vel superabundantia vel diminutio est,<sup>66</sup> oportet virtutes ordinare secundum originem,<sup>67</sup> ut in ipsarum ordine pateat sufficiens vitiorum enumeratio iuxta ipsas sumptorum. Sic enim ipsorum vitiorum<sup>68</sup> ordinem sumere necesse est.

Primi ergo parentes, si totam naturam humanam transgrediendo, ut dicunt sancti, peccato polluerunt, totam animam et totum corpus maculis affecerunt. Anima quidem totum potentiale est ad suas partes, quae sunt vegetabile, sensibile,<sup>69</sup> rationabile. Corpus quidem humanum totum integrale est,<sup>70</sup> cuius partes sunt qualitates quattuor elementales. Igitur per has partes corrupta remansit humana natura. In eo enim quod Eva diabolo sine persuasione rationali crediderat, rationem violavit. Sensualitatem<sup>71</sup> vero in eo quod deificari voluit; velle enim per se eius est,<sup>72</sup> cuius est sensus. In eo vero quod vetitum gustavit, vegetabilem<sup>73</sup> sorduit; ipsum enim<sup>74</sup> quo deliquit violavit. Sic ergo Eva totam animam<sup>75</sup> maculavit, et ideo imposuit et Dominus poenam doloris. Adam vero mulieris falso suadentis errorem non coercens in iniustitiam cecidit non tribuens indigenti correctionem, sed<sup>76</sup> quam falsam esse scivit suasionem succubuit, et ita in debilitatem/[5v] lapsus est. Amorem vero mulieris obedientiae Dei preferens imprudentiam incurrit. In intemperantiam vero cecidit eo quod nocivum sciens esse gustavit. Sic igitur totam naturam<sup>77</sup>

<sup>65</sup> excuset vel] *om.*, β. γ.

<sup>66</sup> est] *om.*, α.

<sup>67</sup> originem] ordinem, α.

<sup>68</sup> vitiorum] inordinatum, β. γ.

<sup>69</sup> sensibile] *om.*, α.

<sup>70</sup> est] ad suas partes, α.

<sup>71</sup> sensualitatem . . . voluit] *om.*, α.

<sup>72</sup> eius est] *om.*, α.

<sup>73</sup> vegetabilem] vegetantibus, R; vegetabilitatem, *apparently corrected from* vegetabilitas, P; vegetabilitas, H. γ.

<sup>74</sup> ipsum enim] *add.* scilicet corpus, α.

<sup>75</sup> totam animam] se totam, J.

<sup>76</sup> sed quam . . . succubuit et] *om.*, α.

<sup>77</sup> naturam] substantiam, γ.

corpoream violavit, et ideo dictum est ei: *In sudore et erumna*<sup>78</sup> *vultus tui vesceris pane tuo* [Gen. 3: 19].

His igitur septem vitiis totam naturam humanam corrumpentibus opponuntur septem virtutes, quibus oportet adhaerere qui veterem Adam volunt exuere et novum induere. Quae sunt fides, spes, caritas, prudentia, iustitia, temperantia, fortitudo. Quia sine ratione credidit Eva, oportet ut nos<sup>79</sup> ratione ducti credamus quae ad salutem<sup>80</sup> pertinent et sic mereamur. Et quia deificari speravit, oportet ut spem certam de non visis habeamus. Et quia desiderio ferventi gustavit, ideo oportet ut ferventi animo Deum diligamus quem non videmus et omnia quae ab eo sunt quia<sup>81</sup> ab ipso sunt et sicut ab ipso sunt ordinate, scilicet prout ordine ab ipso sunt. Sic vivimus in caritate, sentimus in spe, in fide rationamus. Est ergo fides<sup>82</sup> fundamentum virtutum et caritas perfectio. Non enim desideramus uniri Deo nisi postquam cognoverimus quid per fidem habemus, nec cognoscimus nisi pro possibili habeamus posse uniri quod accipimus per spem. Initiatur<sup>83</sup> ergo caritas per haec, sed durat post<sup>84</sup> haec. Sic ergo his tribus tota anima renovatur, corpus vero totum quattuor sequentibus. Quid enim prudentia nisi ignis congregans unigena et segregans non unigena? Et ita bonum a malo et utraque ad invicem decernens<sup>85</sup> et in ceteras lucem transfundens<sup>86</sup> ipsas informat. Iustitia enim aëreae naturae est. Aër enim maxime fluidum et communicabile est, et ita unicuique quod suum est, id est in<sup>87</sup> quantum ad esse eius conservandum pertinet, distribuit. Unde a cholera subtilitas et<sup>88</sup> a sanguine contrahitur largitas. Temperantia vero omnem appetitum illicitum mortificans frigiditati, quae per se aquae est, comparatur. Haec enim sordidum mundat fluxuque<sup>89</sup> continuo se ipsam subtiliat. Est enim modesta in fluxu continuo, verecunda in silentio, abstinens in malorum<sup>90</sup> abiectioe, pudica in sui ipsius aliena clausione.<sup>91</sup> Fortitudo quidem in

<sup>78</sup> et erumna] *om.*, β. γ.

<sup>79</sup> nos] non, α.

<sup>80</sup> salutem] fidem, γ.

<sup>81</sup> ab eo sunt quia] *om.*, α.

<sup>82</sup> fides . . . caritas perfectio] fides fundamentum virtutum et caritas perfecta, β.A.B.C.Y; fides fundamentum virtutum, spes firmaculum, et caritas perfectio, L.O.

<sup>83</sup> initiatur] incausatur, α.

<sup>84</sup> post] per, α.

<sup>85</sup> decernens] discernens, J.

<sup>86</sup> transfundens] diffundens, β. γ.

<sup>87</sup> id est in] *om.*, α.

<sup>88</sup> et] *om.*, α.

<sup>89</sup> fluxuque] fluxu, α.

<sup>90</sup> malorum] alienorum, β.A.C.L.O; aliorum, B.Y.

<sup>91</sup> aliena clausione] elatione, J.

adversis patiens difficilia terra est sustinens singula. In stabilitate est fortitudinis constantia, in ponderositate magnificentia, in soliditate securitas, in amplitudine fiducia, in fructificatione magnanimitas. Igitur sicut singulae virtutes sub hoc suo septenario continentur, ita et vitia singula sub suo, quae eis opponuntur.

Sed non vos lateat quod est virtus materialis, formalis,<sup>92</sup> agens, et perfecta. Verbi gratia: Fides materialis est virtus animae quae dicitur credulitas; fides formalis<sup>93</sup> est ipsum creditum, scilicet articuli fidei; fides agens est anima ipsa credens articulos fidei; perfectio fidei est gratia divina accepta per fidem agentem. Similiter de aliis.

### [I. Peccata contra Fidem]

Primo<sup>94</sup> igitur examinandus est poenitens de fide, ne sit infidelis. Sed nota quod infidelis multipliciter dicitur. Est enim infidelis qui fidei articulos non credit; et qui contra fidem facit vel dicit, ut idolatra<sup>95</sup> aut excommunicatus sive sortilegus; et qui fidei articulos fideliter non exequitur; et qui fidem non servat cum possit vel infidelem non informat; et etiam<sup>96</sup> qui fidem operibus non vivificat infidelis dicitur, quia si *fides sine operibus mortua est* [Jac. 2: 20], fidelis [6r] sine operibus mortuus fidelis est. Ergo simplex fidelis non est. De unoquoque igitur istorum modorum diligenter inquirendum est.

Primo an credat articulos fidei, ne saltem in aliquo discredat. Et si nesciat, debet sacerdos<sup>97</sup> omnes enumerare, ut dicunt quidam. Tutius tamen est ut sciat, quia cum non possit simplex laicus salvari in caritate praelati, qualiter salvabitur in fide eius? Sunt quidem articuli fidei duodecim, quorum primus quidem est ut credat unum esse Deum sine principio et fine, et ipsum esse Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Secundus, quod credat ipsum esse potentem omnino, sapientem omnino,<sup>98</sup> benignum omnino, et quod fecit caelum et terram et omnia quae in eis sunt. Ad hunc articulum pertinet quod credat casum angeli et peccatum primorum parentum, neve in aliquo discredat<sup>99</sup> quod dicit ecclesia. Tertius articulus est quod credat Filium Dei incarnari sine semine virili a virgine conceptum, natum sine dolore, secundum legem circumcisum, in

<sup>92</sup> formalis] finalis, α.

<sup>93</sup> formalis] finalis, α.

<sup>94</sup> primo] prius, α.

<sup>95</sup> ut idolatra] vel idolatur, α; ubi idolatra, H.

<sup>96</sup> etiam] om., α.

<sup>97</sup> debet sacerdos] om., β. γ.

<sup>98</sup> sapientem omnino] om., α.

<sup>99</sup> discredat] om., R.

templo oblatum, in aquis baptizatum. Quartus articulus est quod idem Filius Dei passus est pro nobis, mortuus et sepultus, ad infernum descendit. Quintus, quod resurrexit glorificatus, quod ascendit in caelum, quod Spiritum Sanctum in apostolos misit, et quod nos resurgemus, quidam ad salvationem aeternam, quidam ad damnationem. Sextus articulus est quod credat<sup>100</sup> unitatem ecclesiae militantis et triumphantis, et quod Baptismus est initiale sacramentum eius, sine quo non est salus. Hic debet sacerdos docere poenitentem formam baptizandi, quae solum est sub hac forma verborum:<sup>101</sup> “Ego baptizo te, N.,<sup>102</sup> in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen,” et in liquore aquae. Septimus articulus<sup>103</sup> est quod Spiritum Sanctum in Confirmatione dari ad robur credat. Octavus est de Ordine, quod credat sacerdotalem<sup>104</sup> ordinem conferre potestatem corpus Christi conficiendi<sup>105</sup> et dignitatem ministrandi in aliis sacramentis<sup>106</sup> et potestatem solvendi atque ligandi. Nonus articulus<sup>107</sup> est quod credat Sacramentum Altaris, quod scilicet Christus verus Deus et integer homo latet sub fracti panis specie<sup>108</sup> per formam verborum traditam prolatorum a sacerdote non in hoc haeretico vel contra fidem<sup>109</sup> ecclesiae agente. Decimus articulus est quod credat per virtutem Matrimonii carnali coitu non mortaliter peccare contrahentes, si coeunt aut intentione procreandi aut causa libidinis extinguendae in alterutro, et quod omnes non coniugati mortaliter peccant coeundo. Undecimus articulus est quod credat per virtutem Poenitentiae de filio diaboli effici filium Dei. Duodecimus articulus est quod credat<sup>110</sup> quod Extrema Unctio valet ad remissionem peccati<sup>111</sup> et ad alleviationem morbi.<sup>112</sup> In his diligenter

<sup>100</sup> credat] *om.*, R.

<sup>101</sup> verborum] *om.*, α. P.

<sup>102</sup> N.] *om.*, β. γ.

<sup>103</sup> articulus] *om.*, α.

<sup>104</sup> sacerdotalem] *om.*, β. α.

<sup>105</sup> conficiendi] *add.* ordinato, β. γ.

<sup>106</sup> sacramentis] ordinibus et sacramentis, α.

<sup>107</sup> articulus] *om.*, α.

<sup>108</sup> sub fracti panis specie] sub forma panis, β. γ.

<sup>109</sup> fidem] formam, β. γ.

<sup>110</sup> quod credat] *om.*, α.

<sup>111</sup> peccati] peccati venialis, J; peccatorum, P. γ.

<sup>112</sup> morbi] *add.* Unde versus:

Hii sunt articuli, quod sit trinus Deus unus,  
Christus homo factus, natus, passusque sepultus,  
Descendit, surgat, quod scandalat, iudicet, et quod  
Praemia det, surgant homines, quod sacra sacrum de[n]t, α.

From the *Summa brevis* (“Qui bene presunt presbiteri”) of Richard Wethersett; MS. Digby 103, fol. 2r.

<sup>1</sup> On the Twelve Articles of Faith, see above, p. 233 and n. 38. *Templum Domini* lists the articles as follows: “[1] Quod [est] Deus unus in essentia, in persona trinus, eternus sine principio [et sine fine, MS. Univ. Coll. 58],



examinandus est poenitens ut virtutem sacramentorum firmiter credat et ceterorum articulorum fidem habeat veracem, et maxime, si laicus est, in resurrectione carnis humanae et Sacramento Altaris, in quibus multi quam plurimum haesitant, nec mi-/ [6 v] nus sacerdotes — impossibile enim <sup>113</sup> est eos firmiter credere, qui corpus Christi ita inhoneste tam nefariis manibus praesumunt tractare.

Deinde inquirendum est si quid poenitens contra fidem fecerit vel dixerit, ut si idolatizaverit, hoc est si quid adoraverit ut Deum aliud a Deo, vel si sacrificium diaboli fecerit, aut si apostataverit. Post hoc quaerendum est si excommunicatus fuerit. Sed quia multi peccata pro quibus excommunicantur ignorant, de unoquoque talium inquirendum est, ut si manus violentas iniecerit in clericum aut in parentes, aut si fuerit incendiarius, vel si male decimaverit, vel aliquo alio commisso ab unitate ecclesiae segregatus fuerit. Deinde, si sortilegus fuerit. Fit enim sortilegium multis modis: Invocando scilicet Deum vel sanctorum aliquem ad auxiliandum in malo, sive creaturam aliam; aut si aliud quam Deum vel sanctos in bono; vel invocando diabolum sive ad bonum sive ad malum. Et iterum fit cum re sancta, ut chrismate vel corpore Christi;<sup>114</sup> item cum re non sancta, quod minus peccatum est; aut sine re, adiurationibus scilicet vel falsa credulitate, sicut multi credunt non esse bonum obviare sacerdoti primo arrepto itinere. Creditur etiam a multis quod ab uno venditore melior fortuna lucri habetur quam ab alio. Alii quidem credunt quidquid homini accadat de necessitate ei<sup>115</sup> accidere, quod haereticum est. Alii quidem, si mulier cum puero suo

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<sup>113</sup> enim] *om.*, *α.*

<sup>114</sup> vel corpore Christi] et cetera, J.

<sup>115</sup> de necessitate ei] necessitate homini, *α.*

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omnia creans ex nihilo. [2] Quod Filius Dei carnem sumpsit de Virgine Maria, de ea natus verus Deus ens et homo. [3] Quod idem Filius Dei et Virginis crucifixus est, mortuus et sepultus, non necessitate sed sponte, ut nos redimeret. [4] Quod idem Deus et homo a morte resurrexit carne glorificata post resurrectionem, et quod nos resurgemus omnes. [5] Quod idem Deus et homo Jesus Christus ascendit ad celos in sua humanitate, et quod nos per ipsum ascendemus. [6] Quod Baptismus mundat ab originali peccato et dat gratiam salvantem [purgans contra originale peccatum, conservans contra actuale peccatum, MS. Univ. Coll. 58]. [7] Quod Confirmatio episcopi confirmat Spiritum Sanctum in homine baptizato. [8] Quod vera Penitentia delet peccatum actuale, mortale et veniale. [9] Quod Sacramentum Altaris confirmat et conservat penitentem, ne recidivet, reconciliando et sustentando. [10] Quod Ordines collatis conferunt potestates officiorum et sacramentorum celebrandorum. [11] Quod Matrimonium legitime contractum excludit mortale peccatum in opere generationis inter virum et mulierem. [12] Quod Extrema Unctio alleviat a poena corporali et spirituali." MS. Rowl. A. 384, fol. 98 v; collated against MS. Oxford, Univ. Coll. 58, of which some major variants are given.

primo mortuo ad sepulturam vadit, omnes alii in brevi moriuntur. Alii,<sup>116</sup> si sacerdos retro aspexerit cum mortuus ad sepeliendum fertur, alius in brevi morietur. Talia multa creduntur, quorum non est numerus nec scribi debent. Huius quidem peccati reatus frequenter invenitur<sup>117</sup> in mulieribus. Ideo diligentius examinandae.

Deinde quaerendum est de tertio modo infidelitatis, scilicet si fidei articulos fideliter omnes fuerit executus.<sup>‡</sup> Primo de Baptismo: Si baptizatus fuerit, si baptismum distulerit, aut si accesserit in mortali actuali existens, vel si negligentia eius aut ignorantia baptizandi aut si dilatione aliquis decesserit non baptizatus, aut si rebaptizatus fuerit,<sup>118</sup> vel aliquam rebaptizaverit,<sup>119</sup> aut si aliud aliquid ab homine sub forma baptismi immeriserit. Et iterum, si in fide eius parvulus baptizatus fuerit, quaerendum si tunc orationem dominicam et symbolum<sup>120</sup> scivisset, quia ignorantem haec non debet sacerdos recipere nec parentes pueri, ut multiplicitur caritas, nisi in necessitate. Et iterum, si puerum, cuius vicarius in baptismo fuerit, symbolum et orationem dominicam docuerit vel per se vel per alium. Ad hoc enim tenetur.

Deinde de Confirmatione: Si confirmatus fuerit et ad confirmationem in mortali accesserit, si diu confirmari distulerit, si bis confirmatus fuerit, aut si quos pueros habet ad confirmandum ducere neglexerit, et si Ordinem ante Confirmationem susceperit.

Tertio de Ordine: Si<sup>121</sup> poenitens ordinatus fuerit, an accesserit regularis. Ad regularitatem enim exiguntur quod sit de legitimo toro,<sup>122</sup> quod non sit homicida, quod non sit simoniacus, quod non fuerit excommunicatus, quod non sit sortilegus, quod non fuerit solemniter poenitens, quod non sit servilis conditionis, quod non sit infamis aliquo enormi peccato vel recidivatus<sup>123</sup> aut truncatim<sup>124</sup> ordinatus aut simul suscipiens ordines aut in tempore non statuto. De unoquoque istorum dicetur plenius in

<sup>116</sup> alii si sacerdos . . . morietur] *om.*, α.

<sup>117</sup> invenitur] *om.*, R; accidit (*after* mulieribus), J.

<sup>118</sup> aut si rebaptizatus fuerit] *om.*, α.

<sup>119</sup> rebaptizaverit] baptizaverit, α.

<sup>120</sup> et symbolum] *om.*, α.

<sup>121</sup> si poenitens . . . regularis] an scilicet poenitens ordinatus fuerit irregulariter aut accesserit regularis, β. γ.

<sup>122</sup> toro] matrimonio, H. γ; *om.*, P.

<sup>123</sup> recidivatus] reordinatus, β. γ.

<sup>124</sup> truncatim] truncatus, α; truncatum, A.L.

<sup>‡</sup> Some of the following material also appears in *Templum Domini*, where it constitutes the *opera* of Articles of Faith 6—12 (MS. Rawl. A. 384, fol. 101v—102r).

suo loco.<sup>125k</sup>/[71] Item<sup>126</sup> quaerendum si causa lucris temporalis ad ordines accesserit, si in mortali peccato, sive insufficiens in scientia, si ordinis officium fideliter non fuerit executus. Officium enim sacerdotis est digne conficere corpus Christi, poenitentias iniungere, et gregem suum in quantum poterit ab erroribus revocare, baptizare parvulos, languidos Extrema Unctione ungere.<sup>127</sup> Officium diaconi est ministrare sacerdoti<sup>128</sup> in praedictis sacramentis et legem evangelicam populo praedicare. Officium subdiaconi est ministrare in ecclesia Dei ad altare, scilicet praeponere calicem et patenam, vasa cum aqua et vino, et vetus testamentum gentibus exponere. De unoquoque istorum diligenter inquirendum est,<sup>129</sup> si aliquid horum ad eum spectantium negligentia aut ignorantia omiserit<sup>130</sup> aut intentione mala executus fuerit, ut<sup>131</sup> si propter nummum non propter Deum celebraverit, vel si propter vanam gloriam non propter salutem animarum praedicaverit, sive si non ad Dei laudem sed ad humanam delectationem in ecclesia Dei cantaverit vel legerit.

Quarto de Sacramento Altaris: An scilicet poenitens indigne accesserit in mortali existens, aut si perseveraverit in mortali, aut interfuerit celebrationi divinae cum non deberet interesse, aut si sacerdos celebrans in adulterio publico manserit, et iterum si recenter ante communionem mortale commiserit vel statim post, aut si vomitum provocaverit superflua sumptione cibi vel potus aut aliquo alio modo.

Quinto de Coniugio:<sup>132</sup> Si fuerit poenitens coniugatus, quaerendum qua intentione contraxerit, aut causa prolis procreandae, aut causa libidinis in se vel in alio extinguendae, aut causa pacis firmandae, aut amicitiae conservandae. Hae solae intentiones sanae sunt. Si vero causa libidinis

<sup>125</sup> loco] *add.* Unde versus:

Corporis integritas, vitio sine, sexus et aetas,  
Littera, baptismus, libertas, vita, voluntas,  
Forma, fides, titulus, intentio, forma (fama, J), potestas,  
Tempus in ordinibus praestandis, ista requiras. α.

From the *Summa brevis* ("Qui bene presunt presbyteri") of Richard Wethersett; MS. Digby 103, fol. 27r.

<sup>126</sup> item] *infra*, α.

<sup>127</sup> ungere] sanctificare, β. γ.

<sup>128</sup> sacerdoti . . . subdiaconi est ministrare] *om.*, α.

<sup>129</sup> est] *om.*, α.

<sup>130</sup> omiserit] commiserit, α.

<sup>131</sup> ut] vel, α.

<sup>132</sup> coniugio] matrimonio, β. γ.

<sup>k</sup> No further treatment of irregularities which impede the reception of Holy Orders is given. Notice that in *Templum Domini* such irregularities are first mentioned among the sins against Holy Orders, in the discussion of Faith (MS. Rawl. 384, fol. 102r), and later developed more fully in a special section to irregularities (fol. 105r).

implendae aut census aut pecuniae obtinendae,<sup>133</sup> mortaliter peccat. Item quaerendum si in aliquam personam consenserit et per verba de praesenti expresserit, et si hoc dolose vel non, aut si aliquam sponsonem dederit alicui. Item<sup>134</sup> si personae legitimae sint quaerendum, ne scilicet sint infra quartum gradum consanguinitatis, neve sint in ordine affinitatis aut aliquo vitio illegitimati. Item quaerendum si causa libidinis aut cupiditatis aut alterius vitii matrimonium personarum legitimarum extinxerit auxilio vel consilio vel consensu, aut faciendum<sup>135</sup> divortium inter illegitimas personas distulerit aut non legitimas contrahere fecerit.

De Poenitentia quaerendum an poenitens prius sufficienter peccata narrasset: Vere scilicet, integre, plane, nude, amare, verecunde, de quibus prius dictum est; et an cum cordis contritione accessisset quae debet esse sancta, frequens, firma, discreta, devota. Sancta, ut doleat se peccasse propter Deum et non solum propter vilitatem peccati, quod multi faciunt. Frequens, ut non semel doleat se peccasse, sed quotiens peccatorum memor est. Tunc enim poenitens vere conteritur, cum contritio peccatorum memoria acuitur. Firma, scilicet cum proposito non amplius peccandi. Devota, ut non solum se peccasse doleat, sed et se prius non penituisse. Discreta, ut non sic conteratur se peccasse quod se ipsum velit suspendere<sup>136</sup> aut membra minuere vel aliquid tale facere, sed secundum iudicium ecclesiae satisfacere. / [7v] Tertio de satisfactione quaerendum: An poenitens secundum quod ei iniunctum fuerit satisfecisset in omnibus, ut in ieiuniis, orationibus, et ceteris abstinentiis, eleemosynarum largitionibus, in laboribus corporalibus, ut in vigiliis, fletibus, peregrinationibus, disciplinis. De unoquoque quaerendum<sup>137</sup> an fecerit, quantum, et quando, et ubi, et quomodo, et qua causa faciendum sacerdos iniunxerit. Ut<sup>138</sup> an ieiunasset quantum sacerdos praecepit; et in eisdem diebus, non propria auctoritate commutando; et ubi ieiunandum fuerit, non fugiendo de loco ad locum propter taedium ieiunandi; et eodem modo, ut, si in pane et aqua iniunxerit, non sunt herbae sumendae vel electuaria aut panis confectus cum speciebus vel vino madefactus aut aqua sapida facta artificio, sed sicut natura paravit sumenda; etiam

<sup>133</sup> obtinendae] *om.*, α. β.

<sup>134</sup> item si personae . . . aliquo vitio illegitimati] *om.*, α.

<sup>135</sup> faciendum divortium inter illegitimas . . .] f. d. inter legitimas . . ., R. β; faciendo se d. inter legitimas . . ., A.C.; faciendo si d. inter legitimas . . ., B.Y; faciendo d. inter se aut inter personas legitimas matrimonium distulerit aut non legitimas contrahere fecerit, O; faciendo inter se d. aut inter personas legitimas contrahere fecerit, L.

<sup>136</sup> suspendere] suspendi, α.

<sup>137</sup> quaerendum] *add.* scilicet, α.

<sup>138</sup> ut] *om.*, α.



si aliquid<sup>139</sup> sumendum odio habuit et potius diligit in illo die nihil potare. Et iterum quaerendum qua de causa ieiunasset, an propter paritatem ut avarus, an propter apparentiam ut hypocrita, an propter impotentiam<sup>140</sup> ut prius ultra modum refectus, an propter sanitatem ut infirmus, an propter necessitatem ut pauper, an propter Deum ut corpus domet et largius<sup>141</sup> pauperibus eroget. Iste quidem finis meritorius est, ceterorum quidem duo primi demeritorii sunt — et ideo prohibet eos Dominus in evangelio —, alii vero indifferentes. Sunt et alii fines ieiunii boni: ut cum ieiunatur propter gratiam habendam, sicut apostoli [Act. 13: 3, 14: 22]; aut propter nequitiam delendam, sicut dicit Dominus in evangelio: *Hoc genus daemonii non eicitur nisi in ieiunio et oratione* [Marc. 9: 28]; aut propter munditiam habendam et retinendam, sicut Daniel et tres pueri [Daniel 1]; aut propter ignorantiam vitandam, ut Paulus [Act. 9: 9]; aut propter pestem delendum, ut ieiunatur in rogationibus;<sup>142</sup> et propter poenam devitandam, ut Esther consilio Mardochoaei ieiunavit [Esth. 14]. Sic de ieiunio quaesito, quaerendum eodem modo de aliis iniunctis, ut de orationibus, quia debet oratio esse devota, ut dicitur in evangelio, item continua, matura, recta, integra. Devota, ne mens sit in foro dum os psallit in choro, quia qui indevote orat, ad damnum suum orat. Et iterum temeraria oratio non confert gratiam, sed reportat collatam. Non<sup>143</sup> enim est oratio nisi sit in ore ratio. Unde qui corde tacet et ore loquitur, non in orationem sed in blasphemiam prorumpit. Propter hoc dicit Dominus: *Nolite solliciti esse* [Matt. 6: 25] et cetera, et iterum: *Nolite orare sicut ethnici*<sup>144</sup> [Matt. 6: 7], quasi dicat,<sup>145</sup> ne cogitet mens de cibo dum os loquitur Deo. Continua debet esse, non commixta aliis sermonibus sicut oratio usurarii dicentis: “*Pater noster* — Robertus faber —, *qui es in caelis* — a festo sancti Michaelis —, *sanctificetur nomen tuum* — pro usura debet centum.” Hos duos modos orandi, scilicet devote et continue, praecipit Dominus ubi dicit: *Tu cum oraveris, intra in cubiculum tuum et clauso ostio tuo ora patrem tuum* [Matt. 6: 6]. Matura debet esse, hoc est ut sit in loco convenienti et tempore idoneo dicta. Quorundam enim clericorum mos est orationes suas in lecto dicere et se vestiendo et calciando et aliis vacando. Quorundam quoque mos est omnes horas summo mane dicere, quandoque post prandium, et quandoque cum ad-

<sup>139</sup> aliquid] ad, α.

<sup>140</sup> impotentiam] naturae impotentiam, β. γ.

<sup>141</sup> largius] largus, α; largissimus, B.C.Y; om., A.L.O.

<sup>142</sup> rogationibus] regionibus, α.

<sup>143</sup> non enim . . . ratio] non (talis, J) enim est nisi sit in oratione ratio, α.

<sup>144</sup> ethnici] enucii, R; thimo, A.C.L.O.

<sup>145</sup> quasi dicat] om., α.

vesperascit. Hii vero Deum cibant, / [8r] sed cibo immaturo aut putrido. In necessitate tamen, si talis cibus aqua lacrimarum et igne contritionis decoquatur, Deo aliquo modo acceptabilis efficitur. Item integra debet esse oratio, non syncopata dictione vel syllaba nec confusis vocibus prolata, si a duobus profertur, ut psalmodia. Hanc quidem integritatem multi negligunt observare. Item recta debet esse, ut ad Deum propter Deum solum dirigatur. Eisdem etiam causis, quibus recte ieiunatur, orari potest. Hanc rectitudinem docet Dominus ubi dicit: *Orate*<sup>146</sup> *Patrem qui in caelis est* [Matt. 6: 9]. Docet enim pro quibus orandum ubi dicit: *Pater noster*, et cetera, quia pro bonis ut conserventur, et pro malis ut convertantur ad Dominum. De aliis etiam partibus poenitentiae, ut de eleemosynarum largitionibus, vigiliis, peregrinationibus, et ceteris, is ordo in inquirendo observandus est: ut scilicet primo quaerat an fecerit poenitentiam. Secundo, quis fecerit, an scilicet fecerit in mortali existens, an extra mortale; non enim poterit satisfacere dum in mortali existit. Tertio, quantum, ut si<sup>147</sup> eleemosynas largitus fuerit in quantum facultati suae competit aut iniunctum fuerit. Quarto, quibus, scilicet non accipiendo personas, ut parentes vel divites vel non indigentes in dando eleemosynam. Quinto, quomodo, ut si occulte datur, detur sic ut vitetur vana gloria, *ne sciat sinistra quid faciat dextera* [Matt. 6: 3]; si aperte, detur ad exemplum aliis, ut *luceat sic lux vestra coram hominibus ut glorificetur pater vester qui in caelis est* [Matt. 5: 16] et non tu hominum inde accipias gloriam. Sexto, ubi, ut satisfactio fiat in locis competentibus et debitibus. Septimo, quando, scilicet ut fiat eleemosyna aut aliud bonum in tempore necessario.<sup>148</sup>

Si igitur de his sufficienter quaesito, restat de Extrema Unctione quaerendum, an scilicet poenitens maculam contraxerit per insufficientem ministrationem vel susceptionem<sup>149</sup> huius sacramenti. Multorum enim mos est sacerdotum istud sacramentum infirmis denegare quousque nulla fuerit spes de vita, et hoc malum et periculosum est, quia multi ob hoc decedunt hoc sacramento non prius alleviati. Aliorum opinio

<sup>146</sup> orate Patrem . . . ubi dicit] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>147</sup> si] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>148</sup> necessario] *add.* Unde versus:

Sunt fructus digni, si carnem luxuriosus

Edom't, elatus oret, sua fundet avarus,

Carnis delicias castiget virga flagellans,

Sobrietas gulam, patientia reprimat iram.  $\alpha$

From the *Summa brevis* ("Qui bene praesunt presbiteri") of Richard Wetherstett; MS. Digby 103, fol. 23 v. Cf. Peter of Blois, "Poeniteas cito," PL 207: 1155 f.

<sup>149</sup> susceptionem] perceptionem,  $\alpha$ . $\beta$ ; per depositionem,  $\gamma$ .

est quod post huius sacramenti susceptionem, si convaluerint,<sup>150</sup> non possint habere accessum ad uxores proprias infra septennium, et ob hoc differunt suscipere hoc sacramentum usque ad mortem, et hoc malum est. Quaerendum est etiam si quis non necessitatis causa illud suscepit<sup>151</sup> (id est,<sup>152</sup> non oppressus infirmitate gravi), aut si crebro (non enim saepe dari solet), aut si non prius vere confessus, aut [si] poenitentis segnitie<sup>153</sup> decesserit non inunctus.

Consequenter quaerendum est de quarto genere infidelitatis, an scilicet fidem leserit et an scilicet infidelem non informaverit. Laeditur autem fides falso iuramento, sponsione, voto. Falso iuramento multipliciter, ut sollemniter, dolose, consuetudinaliter. Sollemniter enim, si falsum iuraverit, nimis peccat. Similiter si causa fraudis, nimis. Si consuetudinaliter, hoc est si nesciat os aperire sine iuramento, / [8v] mortaliter tunc<sup>154</sup> peccat. Sponsione frangitur fides, quando aliquis fidem impignorat pro aliquo debito vel promisso simpliciter vel conditionaliter et non solvit. Hac specie vitii<sup>155</sup> multi laborant, qui in quolibet conditionis<sup>156</sup> verbo fideiussione intermedia solutioni debiti alicuius nominati<sup>157</sup> subiacent, si falsa fuerit eorum dictio. Voto laeditur fides, si quid votum<sup>158</sup> factum et licitum frangitur. Item quaerendum si votum fecerit poenitens, et hoc aut per se aut praelati consilio, et iterum cuiusmodi votum, ut<sup>159</sup> aut sollemne aut simplex, aut publicum aut privatum. Et iterum si turpe quid voverit, et qua causa, quantum, aut quo statu, et quis, quia si in articulo mortis et timore voverit, ad observationem<sup>160</sup> non tenetur, ut dicitur. Item si reddiderit, quaerendum an in mortali existens, an extra, quia si in mortali, iterum reddere tenetur.

Post haec de quinto genere infidelitatis quaerendum, quod est cum fides poenitentis mortua est. Vivificant enim fidem opera bona secundum Apostolum [Jac. 2: 17 ff.], quae sunt opera misericordiae, et propter hoc de unoquoque quaerendum quomodo, et quantum, et quotiens, qua causa, et quibus fecerit. Sunt enim opera misericordiae sex, scilicet in-

<sup>150</sup> convaluerint] convaluerunt, R.

<sup>151</sup> suscepit] receperit, J.

<sup>152</sup> id est] scilicet, α.

<sup>153</sup> [si] poenitentis segnitie] poenitentis segnitie, R; poenitens segnitie, J; poenitens se gre, β. B.C; poenitens se gre, Y; poenitens, L.O; poenitenter se gre, A.

<sup>154</sup> tunc] tamen, H. γ; tantum, P.

<sup>155</sup> hac specie vitii] hac ipse vitii, R; hoc ipso vitio, J.

<sup>156</sup> conditionis] contradictionis, β. γ.

<sup>157</sup> nominati] nominatiui se (?), R; nomina scivisse, J.

<sup>158</sup> quid votum] quod ratum, α.

<sup>159</sup> ut] om., α.

<sup>160</sup> ad observationem] om., α.

duere nudum, cibare esurientem, potum dare sitiēti, hospitio suscipere peregrinum,<sup>161</sup> visitare infirmum, solvere incarceratum, et septimum, secundum Tobiam [Tob. 1: 20], sepelire mortuum. Fit enim unumquodque istorum dupliciter, scilicet spiritualiter et corporaliter. Spiritualiter enim nudus induitur, cum exemplo bonae vitae anima virtutibus informatur.<sup>162</sup> Esuriens cibatur,<sup>163</sup> cum verbis sacrae scripturae ignorans instruitur. Potus sitiēti datur, cum orationibus intervenientibus anima desiccata divina gratia irrigatur. Peregrinus quidem suscipitur in domo, cum peccator ab aestu carnalium vitiorum et a frigore tempestatum spiritualium protegendo sub tecto meritorum nostrorum colligitur. Infirmus namque visitatur, cum propriis iniquitatibus laborans medicinis sanantibus aut saltem verbis confortantibus et cor tuum<sup>164</sup> condolere experientibus ad melius vocatur. Incarceratus solvitur, si in spiritu lenitatis corripiendo in tenebris peccatorum proiectus affectibus timoris et amoris huius mundi pedibus ligatis a tali carcere eripitur. Et mortuus sepelitur, quando foetida vitia proximi nemini proponuntur, sed tibi detecta celantur. Utrum ergo sic opera misericordiae in proximo fecerit quaerendum, et maxime si clericus fuerit poenitens, quia sic explere ad eos spectat. Nec minus tamen si intelligantur ad litteram facienda sunt,<sup>165</sup> quia quicumque viderit proximum pro defectu alicuius praedictorum operum morientem nec voluerit ei succurrere cum possit, occidit. Non enim propter suspicionem<sup>166</sup> latrocinii deneganda est hospitalitas. Et praeterea cum sint plures modi faciendi eleemosynam, hos maxime praecipit Dominus ut faciamus.

Post haec quaerendum si ea quae ab ecclesia statuta sunt fecerit, ut oblationes annuales, et maxime a clericis, qui nescio quo privilegio nunquam offerunt. Et in his sicut in aliis quantum, qua causa, qua intentione, et quibus, et cetera.

De superabundantiis horum non oportet quaerere, nisi sit<sup>167</sup> in casu, quia pauci sunt qui in hoc faciendo superflue peccant, sicut in pascendo pauperem nimium deliciose, vel fidei articulos rationibus investigando subtilibus, vel satisfactionem nimiam vel indiscretam ducendo, de quo ple-/ [9r]nius inferius.<sup>1</sup> Sed de articulis fidei sunt quidam qui non

<sup>161</sup> hospitio suscipere peregrinum] *om.*, α.

<sup>162</sup> anima virtutibus informatur] opera virtutibus informantur, α.

<sup>163</sup> esuriens cibatur] esurientes cibantur, R.

<sup>164</sup> cor tuum] tuum, R. β; mitibus (nutibus?), J.

<sup>165</sup> sunt] *om.*, α. β.

<sup>166</sup> suspicionem] suspicionem, β. γ.

<sup>167</sup> sit] *om.*, α.

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 274, under *curiositas*.



sunt contenti credere quoniam sic est, sed propter quid sic debeat esse investigant et peccant, quia "fides non habet meritum, ubi<sup>168</sup> humana ratio praebebat experimentum,"<sup>m</sup> nisi sit causa convincendi haereticos vel instruendi infideles aut tardos ad credendum. Contra quos Paulus dicit: *Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere* [Rom. 12: 3]. Item Salomon *Perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria* [Prov. 25: 27]. Unde et haec praesumptio perscrutatio dicitur. Item praesumunt quidam Deum temptando cum se fatue confidendo in Deo praecipitant in aliquid magnum periculum aut sua. Item, cum Deum circumveniunt ut miracula operetur nulla necessitate cogente aut periculo imminente, et huiusmodi peccatum dicitur temptatio.

## [2. Peccata contra Spem]

Sic quaesito de peccatis contra fidem, consequenter quaerendum de peccatis contra spem, quae sunt desperatio, praesumptio: desperatio in diminutione, praesumptio in superfluitate.<sup>n</sup> Desperant enim homines multis de causis diffidendo de posse Dei, cum scilicet opinantur Deum non posse tanta et tot peccata dimittere; alii, quod non sit tam misericors qui,<sup>169</sup> etsi possit, non velit tanta dimittere; alii propter rigorem iustitiae Dei, qui ponunt ipsum ita<sup>170</sup> rigidum esse in iustitia, quod nihil velit dimittere de poena debita. Alii autem a se ipsis trahunt causam desperationis, quia quidam opinantur, quod non possint mereri veniam prae multitudine et magnitudine peccatorum, et ita desperant. Quidam dicunt se non posse abstinere a malo respiciendo<sup>171</sup> se omnino in hac vita confirmatos in malo, cum tamen neminem patiatur Deus temptari ultra posse resistendi. Quidam tamen timent poenam poenitentiae, tum propter acerbiteriam, tum propter diuturnitatem, in tantum quod recedunt a spe. Ergo diligenter est eximandus, si aliqua harum causarum in desperationem inciderit. Quod si fecerit, est diligenter revocandus, scilicet auctoritatibus et exemplis sanctorum,<sup>o</sup> ut David, qui adulter erat et

<sup>168</sup> ubi] unde, α.

<sup>169</sup> qui] om., α.

<sup>170</sup> ita] om., α.

<sup>171</sup> respiciendo] reputando, J. γ.

<sup>m</sup> Gregory, *In Ezech.*, hom. II, 26 (PL 76: 1197).

<sup>n</sup> The discussion of despair and its causes is closely paralleled in *Templum Domini* (fol. 102r). Verbal parallels are: "Habet duo contraria, scil. desperationem et praesumptionem. Desperatio quaedam . . . propter impotentiam [Dei], scil. quod non possit tot vel tanta peccata dimittere . . . propter rigorem iustitiae Dei, quod scil. nihil velit remittere de poena debita pro peccatis . . . propter impotentiam cohibendi, scil. quod [peccator] non possit abstinere se a peccatis . . . propter diuturnam poenitentiam."

<sup>o</sup> Cf. *Templum Domini* (fol. 102r): "Notandum quod desperantes per auctoritatem sacrae scripturae et exempla sanctorum sunt revocandi et confor-

homicida et postea factus est prophetiae summus nuntius; et Magdalena post tot peccata facta apostolorum apostola; et Petrus, qui ter negavit Dominum, post factus princeps apostolorum; et latro reus sanguinis et seditionis paradisu[m] primus<sup>172</sup> intravit; et Paulus de persecutore factus est praedicator. Item auctoritatibus, ut: *Nolo mortem peccatoris* [Ez. 33: 11]; et iterum: “In quacunque hora ingemuerit peccator [salvus erit]”; et iterum: *Misericordia eius super*<sup>173</sup> *omnia opera eius* [Ps. 144: 9].

Praesumptio est quando praesumit quis de misericordia Dei nihil timens propter peccatum propriu[m]. Talis credit Deum neminem velle damnare, dicendo, “Non me fecisset, si damnum me cognovisset.” Sic quidem praesumentibus dicendum est quod neminem damnat Deus sed damnati malitia. Unde: *Omnem hominem vult salvu[m] fieri* [I Tim. 2: 4], et salvat quantum in ipso est, sed homo se damnat.<sup>174</sup>

### [3. Peccata contra Caritatem]

#### [a] Fundamentum septem Vitiorum Capitalium]

Sequitur de peccatis quae sunt contra caritatem, quae ut melius pateant, videndum est quid sit caritas, et quot virtutes sub se contineat. Caritas est dilectio Dei et proximi. Quomodo autem uterque diligendus sit, Dominus docet in evangelio Matthaei: *Diliges Dominu[m] Deu[m] tuu[m] ex tota anima tua et ex toto corde tuo et ex tota mente tua*, et *proximu[m] tuu[m] sicut te ipsum* [Matt. 22: 37, 39]. Ab hoc quidem praecepto *dependet tota lex et prophetae*, et ideo diligentius perscrutandum est. *Dominus* enim est, ad cuius honorem subditus comparatur;<sup>175</sup> *Deus* est, in quantum cuncta ab ipso proces-/ [9v] serunt. Sic ergo ut dominus cui honor, et ut Deus<sup>176</sup> cui debetur<sup>177</sup> reverentia diligendus est et ita cum timore filiali. Per hoc ergo quod dicit *dominu[m]*, docet quod ab omnibus est eligendus et super omnia, et in hoc est dilectio. Per hoc quod dicit *Deu[m]*, docet quod frequenter et ferventer diligendus sit, et in hoc est amor. Per hoc quod dicit *tuu[m]*, docet quod omnia pro eo parvipendenda sunt, et in hoc est caritas.

<sup>172</sup> primus] post, R; primo J.

<sup>173</sup> eius super] sunt, R.

<sup>174</sup> sed homo se damnat] sed non damnat, β.γ.

<sup>175</sup> comparatur] operatur, β.γ.

<sup>176</sup> ut Deus] Deus ut, R.P; Deus, J.γ; (H *has lacuna*).

<sup>177</sup> debetur] om., α.

tandi.” The examples of David, Magdalen, Peter, the penitent thief, and Paul follow, and others are added (the manuscripts show much variation here). The first two scriptural quotes also occur in *Templum Domini*, followed by others not in “Deus est.”

Sed quod sequitur sententia non vacat, hoc scilicet, *ex tota anima et ex toto corde et ex tota mente*. Anima quidem proprie vegetabilium est, cor sensibilibum, mens rationabilium,<sup>178</sup> quae prout diversa perficiunt, animae sunt, sed in eodem potentiae dicuntur. Unde a philosophis dicitur anima vegetabilis, anima sensibilis, anima rationalis.<sup>p</sup> In homine quidem sunt hae potentiae animae humanae, quarum quaelibet totum quoddam<sup>179</sup> est ad suas vires.<sup>180</sup> Vires vegetabiles sunt attractiva,<sup>181</sup> digestiva, distributiva, expulsiva.<sup>q</sup> Vi attractiva<sup>182</sup> attrahit vegetabile nutrimentum; vi digestiva convertit nutrimentum in sui naturam res nutrienda; vi distributiva distribuitur digestum in diversas partes nutriendi secundum quod exigit determinata partium quantitas a natura; vi expulsiva expellitur superfluum, similiter et nocivum. Vires sensibiles sunt duae; motiva et apprehensiva. Motiva dividitur in vim imperantem motui et in vim efficientem motum. Vis efficiens motus sita est in nervis et in musculis contrahens et expellens<sup>183</sup> ligamenta membrorum. Vis imperans motui quaedam est concupiscibilis, quaedam irascibilis, quaedam iudicativa. Iudicativa iudicat<sup>184</sup> inter nocivum et conveniens, concupiscibilis appetit conveniens, irascibilis expellit inconveniens. Virium apprehensivarum quaedam est apprehensiva de intus, quaedam de foris. De foris quinque sensus. De intus: sensus communis, quo iudicatur album esse dulce aut rubeum odoriferum; memoria, qua non praesentis recordatur; aestimatio, qua non prius exterius perceptum iudicat esse nocivum vel conveniens, sicut agnus iudicat lupum esse nocivum non percipiens signum nocivi extra, similiter et matrem iudicat esse convenientem; imaginatio receptiva<sup>185</sup> est formarum immutantium<sup>186</sup> sensum communem; unde et in eadem concavitate cerebri cum<sup>187</sup> ea ordinatur, aestimatio in media, memoria in posteriori. Animae rationalis vires sunt duae: passio scilicet et apprehensiva.<sup>188</sup> Passiones sunt gaudium, dolor, odium, amor.<sup>189</sup> Apprehen-

<sup>178</sup> rationabilium] R. has -bi- expuncted.

<sup>179</sup> quoddam] quidem, α.

<sup>180</sup> vires] res, α.

<sup>181</sup> attractiva] activa, α.

<sup>182</sup> attractiva] activa, α.

<sup>183</sup> et expellens] om., γ.

<sup>184</sup> iudicat] discernit, β. γ.

<sup>185</sup> receptiva] receptum, α.

<sup>186</sup> immutantium] imitentium, R; imitantium, J.

<sup>187</sup> cum ea . . . posteriori] cum ipso ordinatur, aestimatio in medio, memoria in superiori, β. γ.

<sup>188</sup> apprehensiva] apprehensio, β. γ.

<sup>189</sup> gaudium dolor odium amor] gaudium et dolor, timor et desiderium, β. γ.

<sup>p</sup> Cf. above, p. 238 and note 48.

<sup>q</sup> Grosseteste's *Hexaëmeron* gives four virtues of the *vita vegetativa*: *virtus attractiva*, *retentiva*, *digestiva*, and *expulsiva* (MS. Bod. lat. theol. c. 17, fol. 213r, a).

sivae sunt opinio, credulitas, intellectus, ratio. Opinio est acceptio alicuius in appendiciis materialibus<sup>190</sup> absque materia, credulitas vel fides talium est in collatione, intellectus est acceptio<sup>191</sup> alicuius absque materia et materialibus dispositionibus, qualium in collatione est ratio acceptio.

Respectu igitur harum virtutum dicitur anima totum, quibus omnibus diligendus est Deus ut Deus, ut dominus, et ut tuus, ita ut desiderio unionis<sup>192</sup> cum Deo singulis utatur virtutibus et singulis viribus<sup>193</sup> tendatur in ipsum. Et hoc est quod dicit legis peritus in Luca: *Ex omnibus viribus tuis* [Luc. 10: 27]. Igitur propter Deum sumenda sunt nutrimenta et secundum Deum evacuanda superflua; et ad honorem eius membris singulis movendum et apprehensivis utendum, et cunctis affec-/ [10r] tibus in ipsum aspirandum. Et hoc est Deum diligere ex omnibus viribus. Quod si fiat, in omnibus observanda est mediocritas, et contemnetur tam diminutio quam superfluitas. Unde diversa officia<sup>194</sup> diversarum virium generant diversitatem virtutum. Nam ex apprehensione rationali<sup>195</sup> generatur humiliatio, ex passione exultatio, patientia ex irascibili, largitas ex concupiscibili, occupatio ex motiva, abstinencia ex attractiva, continentia ex expulsiva. Nam si de Deo sicut est ad intelligentiam reducis, scilicet credendo<sup>196</sup> potentiam, desiderando bonitatem, proculdubio te ipsi subiciendo humiliabis. Et iterum si propriam recognoscis fragilitatem, nullam de te fingendo falsam opinionem, in eo solo exultabis. Haec quidem proprie sunt utentis anima rationali. Quod si propter propria delicta adversitatibus diversis te dignum iudicas, patienter sustinebis quidquid ab ipso conferri videbis. Et si utilem tibi ipsum solum intellexeris, ut ipsi placeas in laude eius et honore, ad tui ipsius utilitatem persistere conaberis, et ceterorum omnium parvipendes abundantiam. Ecce quibus hae virtutes habentur. Sunt illa quae de Deo asserendo clamat omnis prophetia, scilicet quod sit immunis omni malo, plenus omni bono,<sup>197</sup> utilis bonis, nocivus malis. In hoc quoque bonos remunerat et malos punit. Duae ultimae virtutes, scilicet abstinencia et continentia, sunt ad harum<sup>198</sup> salvationem.

Igitur his septem virtutibus perficitur caritatis primus ramus, scilicet dilectio Dei. Secundus ramus est *diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum*

<sup>190</sup> materialibus] mortalibus, α.

<sup>191</sup> acceptio] om., α.

<sup>192</sup> unionis] intentionis, β. γ.

<sup>193</sup> viribus] usibus, β. A. B. C. Y; om. with lacuna, L. O.

<sup>194</sup> diversa officia] om., α.

<sup>195</sup> rationali] boni, J.

<sup>196</sup> scilicet credendo] attendendo, β. γ.

<sup>197</sup> omni bono] omnis boni, R.

<sup>198</sup> harum] aliarum, β. γ.



[Matt. 22: 39]. Ab hoc precepto habetur quod<sup>199</sup> debes te diligere, et non te alium, sed te ipsum; et quod debes diligere proximum, et non minus te sed sicut te, et non sicut te in tuis sed sicut te ipsum. Et sic idem qui prius septenarius virtutum occurrit, et propterea dicitur in evangelio quod est *simile* priori.<sup>200</sup> Quia si te diligis, abstinens eris et continens. Qualiter autem se ipsum diligit qui sibi cibum superflue aut nimis diminute sumit? Defectus quidem et superfluitates corrumpunt. Item si proximum tuum debes diligere, debes personam eius velle salvari et bonum eius desiderare et malum detestari, in quibus benignitas et patientia et exultatio consistunt. Item si sicut tu ipse est diligendus, non debes te efferre sed humiliare te ipsi. Item si diligere debes proximum ut te ipsum, tua non plus illo diligenda sunt sed ei impertienda et quae illius sunt non cupienda. Item si sicut te ipsum debes diligere, ergo in officiis sicut tibi ipsi<sup>201</sup> illi eris obnoxius.<sup>202</sup> Igitur dilige *te ipsum* per ab continentiam; et *proximum tuum* per patientiam et exultationem; *sicut te ipsum* per humilitatem, occupationem, et largitatem.<sup>203</sup> Et sic crescit<sup>204</sup> in te secundus ramus caritatis.

His ergo septem virtutibus opponuntur septem<sup>205</sup> vitia, sed in genere, scilicet aequalitatis et inaequalitatis, secundum partem adversantia<sup>206</sup> per diminutionem et superabundantiam. Humilitati quidem opponuntur superbia et hypocrisis; patientiae, ira et negligentia; exultationi, invidia et pusillanimitas; occupationi, accidia et curiositas;<sup>207</sup> largitati, cupiditas et prodigalitas; abstinentiae, gula et evacuatio; continentiae, luxuria et insensibilitas.<sup>r</sup> Haec sunt septem capita bestiae [Apoc. 13: 1], id est vitia capitalia. Et non dicuntur capitalia quia sunt radices vitiorum, sed quia capitalem virtutem, scilicet caritatem, impugnant,<sup>s</sup> ut prius monstratum est. Quia sicut nutrimentum ad cetera/ [10v] membra per caput transmittitur, et viribus apprehensivis in capite ordinatis eorum officium<sup>208</sup> regulatur, ita caritatis radio ceterae virtutes in officiis suis diriguntur

<sup>199</sup> quod debes . . . sicut te ipsum] quod debes diligere proximum tuum et non minus te et non sicut te in tuis sed sicut te ipsum, α.

<sup>200</sup> est simile priori] *om.*, α.

<sup>201</sup> ipsi] *om.*, R.

<sup>202</sup> obnoxius] obnoxias, α; obnixus, A.C.L.; subnixus, B.Y.

<sup>203</sup> largitatem] largitionem, α.

<sup>204</sup> crescit] crescit, α.

<sup>205</sup> septem] 14, J; R has VII in text, but XIII in margin.

<sup>206</sup> adversantia] adversantiam, R; adversantem, J.

<sup>207</sup> curiositas] cupiositas, R.H; impiositas, P.

<sup>208</sup> officium] officia, R; effectum, H.B.C.Y.L; effectui, P; effectui, A.O.

<sup>r</sup> The same scheme in *Templum Domini* (fol. 103v); see above, p. 233 and n. 35.

<sup>s</sup> Cf. *Templum Domini* (fol. 100r): "Et dicuntur capitalia quia capitalem virtutem impugnant, scil. caritatem."

et ipsius desidero in agendis<sup>209</sup> nutriuntur. Sic ergo speciales<sup>210</sup> vires distinguuntur et speciales virtutes et vitia.

Quod si fiat status in prima divisione harum virium, scilicet rationale, sensibile, vegetabile, tunc sumuntur solum tres virtutes, scilicet superbia, cupiditas, et luxuria. Et sic sub superbia comprehenditur omne illicitum quod contrahitur abutendo vi rationali; sub cupiditate comprehenditur omne illicitum quod contrahitur abutendo vi sensibili, sive motiva sive apprehensiva; sub luxuria omne illicitum abutendo vi vegetabili. Et secundum hanc divisionem sumuntur tria genera inimicorum, scilicet demones, mundus, et caro. Demones impugnant animae rationalitatem<sup>211</sup> per superbiam, et hoc est quia in sui optimo, id est in ratione, cum angelis communicamus. Mundus impugnat sensibilitatem per cupiditatem, et hoc est quia cum mundo in sui optimo, id est in sensibilitate,<sup>212</sup> communicamus. Caro vegetabilitatem per luxuriam, et hoc est quia cum vegetabilibus in sui optimo communicamus. Nec hoc dico de nostra sed de aliena, scilicet de illa quae est ad nostram vel cum nostra. Hii tres<sup>213</sup> inimici quasi quadam afficiuntur invidia,<sup>214</sup> quia vegetabilia nostram iuvant vegetabilitatem et sensibilia sensibilitatem et rationabilia<sup>215</sup> ad nostram sunt exercendam rationem. Sic ergo diligendus est Deus ut dominus ex toto corde, ne cupias; Deus amandus est quia Deus, ne superbias, tuus ut tuus appretiandus et appetendus, ne luxu defluas.

Sed quid est quod prius dicitur *ex toto corde* quam *ex mente* vel *anima*, cum<sup>216</sup> non sic procedat ordo existendi? Quia Dominum intrantem in quoddam castellum recepit Martha in domum suam, et non legitur quod Maria. Vivificat<sup>217</sup> Martha, sed vivit Maria. Martha imperat, ista informat. Illa exit et conqueritur occurrendo<sup>218</sup> Domino, haec sedet domi cum hospitibus consolando [cf. Luc. 10: 38 ff.; Jo. 11: 20 ff.].

#### [b] Peccata contra Humilitatem — Superbia et Hypocrisis]

Quia ergo virtutum praedictarum quaelibet duas habet facies propter duos ramos caritatis, ideo et vitia singula minutius dividere contingit. Primo ergo de vitio humilitati opposito quaerendum, quod est superbia,

<sup>209</sup> agendis] augendis, α.

<sup>210</sup> speciales vires . . . vitia] secundum speciales vires distinguuntur speciales . . . vitia, β. γ.

<sup>211</sup> rationalitatem] rationali, R; rationabili, J.

<sup>212</sup> id est in sensibilitate] om., α.

<sup>213</sup> tres] om., α.

<sup>214</sup> quadam afficiuntur invidia] quandam efficiunt invidiam, α.

<sup>215</sup> rationabilia] add. rationalitatem, α.

<sup>216</sup> cum] cur, R.

<sup>217</sup> vivificat] convivat, J.

<sup>218</sup> occurrendo] exeundo, α.

quae dividitur in superbiam in Deum et in proximum, et iterum in superbiam in mente, sermone, et opere. Superbia apud Deum in mente inobedientia<sup>219</sup> dicitur, in sermone arrogantia, in opere irreverentia; apud proximum in mente elatio<sup>220</sup> est, in sermone iactantia, in opere presumptio. Item unaquaeque istarum divisiones habet. Est autem obedientia mortificata voluntate propria consensus in superioris placitum ratione deductus; contra quam contingit dupliciter venire, scilicet vel non mortificare propriam voluntatem, vel ipsa mortificata non consentire. Similiter arrogantia est falsa laudis ascriptio, et hoc potest esse dupliciter, vel falso vel de falsis. Falso dupliciter: vel quia ascribi sibi ipsi laudem ab his quae a Deo recepit cui debet laus reddi, sicut philosophi dicentes: *Labia nostra a nobis sunt, quis noster dominus est?* [Ps. 11: 5]. (Hoc est duplex vitium, scilicet ingratitude quantum ad Deum, usurpatio ad ipsum.) Item falso ascribit quando quis confitetur a Deo habere sed propriis meritis, et hoc est astutia. De falsis dupliciter: vel quando commendat quis se ipsum de his quae non habet, vel quando de aliquibus commendat plus quam verum sit quod<sup>221</sup> habet, quod temeritas / [111] dicitur. Eodem modo de irreverentia, quae est operibus in Deum praelatio, dicendum quod fit multipliciter: ut si quis opera propria praefert operibus Dei, aut si cum intentione est contra Deum in operibus, aut non constituendo Deum finem operum sed se ipsum, aut non subiciendo se in operibus divinae voluntati. Primum dicitur audacia, secundum nomen retinet irreverentiae, tertium confusio, quartum contumacia. Elatio est cum quis credit se plus aliis valere, et hoc dupliciter est: vel plura in aliis mala suspicando, quod est despectus; vel plura in se ipso bona coniecturando, quod est singularitas. Utrumque habuit publicamus [*sic*] dicens: *Non sum sicut ceteri hominum, raptores*, et cetera; et<sup>222</sup> iterum: *Ieiuno bis in sabbato, decimas do*, et cetera [Luc. 18: 11—12]. Singularitas autem fit vel per bona gratuita, naturalia, vel temporalia. Despectus vero per eorundem defectum. Iactantia est sui ipsius in proximum verbosa praepositio, et hoc fit dupliciter: scilicet delectatione vel lite, et utrumque fieri potest vel deprimendo proximum vel preferendo se ipsum. Deprimere proximum potest vel diminuendo vel negando, et hoc vel bona gratuita, naturalia, vel temporalia, quod est contentio;<sup>223</sup> vel, ut quorundam mos est, in fine laudis adversationem addere, vel aggravando mala vitia, privationes, et defectus si fecit, vel non facta asseren-

<sup>219</sup> inobedientia . . . apud proximum in mente] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>220</sup> elatio] oblatio, H (P has longer *eyeskip*); ambitio vel inobedientia,  $\gamma$ .

<sup>221</sup> quod] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>222</sup> et iterum . . . et cetera] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>223</sup> contentio] intentio,  $\alpha$ .

do<sup>224</sup> fecisse, quod est infamia. Item praeferendo se ipsum vel in bonis factis vel non factis, asserendo fecisse non facta vel facta augendo, quod dicitur vana gloria; aut si non in bonis, in malis saltem factis vel non factis ampliando vel asserendo. Praesumptio est contra proximum superba comparatio.<sup>225</sup> Haec fit vel opera propria extollendo vel opera proximi opprimendo. Et sive hoc sive illud, quaerendum utrum bona vel mala. Si bona, utrum gratuita vel temporalia; si mala, utrum vitia, privationes, vel defectus.

Sic quaesito de superbia dividendo materiam in qua est et in qua fit, quaerendum est causas alias, scilicet finalem et efficientem, quia utraque multiplex.<sup>226</sup> Per multa quidam efficitur quis superbus, ut per naturalia bona, gratuita, et temporalia. Propter naturalia: ut per fortitudinem, facundiam, speciem, parentelem, et prolem. Propter gratuita: ut per scientiam, virtutem, gratiam, bonam famam, et dignitatem. Propter temporalia: ut per vestes, domos, redditus, possessiones, clientelam, equitaturam, pecuniam, et similia.<sup>t</sup> Propter mala: ut per peccata, ignorantiam, et ingratitude, privationes. Singulas igitur causas singulis speciebus addendo diligenter est poenitens examinandus et dissuadendus, signando ei<sup>227</sup> quod plus ei deest quam habeat et id quod habet ab alio habet, et quod id quod habet cito amittere potest nec diu retinere.

Fines etiam superborum diversi sunt, quia quidam superbiunt ut magis aliis placeant, quidam ut alios ad peccandum eo facilius provocent, quidam ut spectabiliores appareant, quidam ut alii despectabiliores, quidam ut alii<sup>228</sup> contemptibiliores. Pessimus vero finis est effectus poenitentis peccandi et in pluribus contingit,<sup>229</sup> et maxime in mulieribus quae, etsi desiderium non habeant peccandi, desiderant tamen desiderari.

Item tempus superbiendi quaerendum est, quia quorundam miserorum mos est superbire maxime in diebus festivis, et hoc propter congregationem, unde et in magis festivis diebus maior superbia et in locis magis

<sup>224</sup> asserendo . . . fecisse non facta] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>225</sup> comparatio] operatio,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>226</sup> multiplex] *om.* with lacuna, R; ut sciatur est necessarium, J.

<sup>227</sup> signando ei] *om.* with lacuna, R; et ad memoriam ducendus, J; signandum ei,  $\beta$ .

<sup>228</sup> alii] aliis, R.

<sup>229</sup> contingit] continetur,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>t</sup> *Templum Domini* has this division (fol. 102v): “Materia superbiae: Bona naturalia, ut fortitudo, ingenium, speciositas [*var. species*], facundia, nobilitas, proles; bona temporalia, ut vestis, domus, redditus, possessio, clientela, equitatura, praepositura; bona gratuita, ut scientia, virtus, gloria [*var. gratia*], bona fama, dignitas.”



sacris, quia in illis plures conveniunt. / [IIV] Hii quidem non solum de domo Domini faciunt speluncam latronum [Matt. 21: 13, etc.], verum etiam de thalamo virginis faciunt contubernium platonium<sup>230</sup> et lupanar meretricularum. Horrendum est dictu, sed multo turpius actu.

Ne conturbetur quis in eo quod dixi peccatum habere causam.<sup>231</sup> Quia<sup>232</sup> solum ea quae sunt, causam habent; peccatum vero non est. Et iterum: si praedicta essent<sup>233</sup> causae peccandi, necesse esset quemque illa habentem peccare. Ad quod dicendum quod peccatum non habet causam efficientem sed deficientem,<sup>u</sup> quia maxima causa peccandi est in peccatore defectus boni. Et iterum: illa causa quam dixi efficientem, etsi sit aliquo modo efficiens motus elationis, non tamen dicitur sufficiens.

Sequitur de vitio opposito superbiae quae se habet<sup>234</sup> ad medium<sup>235</sup> humilitatis per diminutionem [*sic*] et superfluitatem, et dicitur hypocrisis. Quae fit duobus modis, aut in apparentia aut in superfluitate. Superfluit quidem humilitas cum se subdit quis illis quibus non est subdendus. Et hoc maxime faciunt quidam sacerdotes qui in tam vili habitu et in tam contemptibili statu degunt, quod vix venerantur in officio, nec quicquam defertur sacerdotio. Et propter hoc dictum est: "Fili, addisce sanctam superbiam, non praeferendo hominem sed sacerdotem, non personam sed Dei familiarem." Sunt et alii in quibus superfluit humilitas, qui homines manifeste peccantes eo minus familiares non habent, unde non contradicendo consentire videntur et peccant, quia peccans non serviens separandus est nisi causa correptionis patiatur. Unde: *Non habitabit in medio domus meae*<sup>236</sup> *qui facit superbiam* [Ps. 100: 7].

Hypocrisis in apparentia est<sup>237</sup> quae est exterioris gestus humiliatio propter ambitionem laudis humanae. Palliatur autem humilitas aut faciendo bona coram hominibus ut videatur, aut occultando mala propter eandem causam, aut fingendo bona facere quae non facit. Fiunt autem bona coram hominibus dupliciter: aut in facie hominum, aut bona occultando ut non apparendo appareant. Haec est subtilis hypocrisis,

<sup>230</sup> platonium] *om.* with lacuna, R; nephandorum, J; plutonium, O.

<sup>231</sup> causam] *om.*, α.

<sup>232</sup> quia solum . . . vero non est] quia non solum hii qui talia faciunt habent peccatum verum etiam consentientes et occasionem praebentes digni sunt morte secundum sanctos, J.

<sup>233</sup> essent] erant, α.

<sup>234</sup> quae se habet] in se, β; vite, γ.

<sup>235</sup> medium] modum, α.

<sup>236</sup> meae] vestrae, α.

<sup>237</sup> in apparentia est] est apparentia, α.

<sup>u</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XII, 7 (PL 41: 355).

scilicet clericorum et maxime religiosorum. Propter primum dictum est: *Nesciat sinistra quid faciat dextera* [Matt. 6: 3]. Propter secundum dicitur: *Vae vobis hypocritae, quae comeditis domos viduarum* oratione proluxa [Matt. 23: 14; Marc. 12: 40]. Propter tertium dictum est: *Cum ieiunatis, nolite exterminare facies vestras, ut appareatis homines ieiunantes* [Matt. 6: 16]. Hoc vitium maxime detestatur Dominus, nec mirum, quia in hypocritis latet interius falsitas et exterius fingitur apparens veritas. In Christo apparuit exterius fragilitas, interius latuit omnis veritas.<sup>238</sup> Ecce summa contrarietas! Ergo si vera est contrariorum consideratio,<sup>239</sup> uno contrariorum existente optimo reliquum erit pessimum necessario. Caveat igitur unusquisque in hac linea contrarietatis stare, quia omnes tales *mercedem receperunt*, eo quod est *regnum eorum de hoc mundo* [Matt. 6: 2. 5, 16, and Jo. 18: 36]. Numquid depraedari desiderat qui thesaurum in publico portat? Quod si aliquando fit opus<sup>240</sup> bonum in publico, tamen maneat intentio in occulto.<sup>v</sup>

[c] Peccata contra Exultationem — Invidia et Pusillanimitas]

Sic quaesito de humilitate, consequenter quaerendum est quomodo se habuerit poenitens circa iucunditatem sive exultationem, quae est in alterius successibus pia affectio. Unde<sup>241</sup> in *Ecclesiastico*: *Iucunditas cordis haec est vita hominis*, quae est ex vera caritate, *exultatio viri longaeuitas* [Eccli. 30: 23]. Et continet sub se duas virtutes: gloriam scilicet et compassionem. Gloria est exultatio de bonis alterius, compassio est afflic-/ [12r] tio de malis alterius. Huic virtuti, scilicet iucunditati, opponentur invidia et pusillanimitas.

Invidia est de alterius successibus impius affectus, quae dividitur in invidiam<sup>242</sup> in Deum et in proximum. Invidia in Deum sic describitur: Invidia est in suum auctorem reciprocus de eis quae confert tabescentis animi contrarius cruciatur. Invidia in proximum est contrarius in proximum<sup>243</sup> pro collatis affectus. Et utraque fit aut gaudento de malis aut de bonis dolendo. Sed quia Deo neque bonum neque malum succedit in se sed in suis, Deo<sup>244</sup> invidere est dolere quod bona confert vel gaudere

<sup>238</sup> veritas] veritatis veritas, α.

<sup>239</sup> consideratio] desideratio, α.

<sup>240</sup> opus] om., J. β. γ.

<sup>241</sup> unde in *Ecclesiastico* . . . longaeuitas] om., α.

<sup>242</sup> in invidiam] om., α.

<sup>243</sup> est contrarius in proximum] om., α. H.

<sup>244</sup> Deo] unde, α.

<sup>v</sup> Cf. Gregory, *Hom. in Evang.*, XI, 1 (PL 76: 1115).

quod mala. Proximo<sup>245</sup> invidere est eo quod ipsi conferuntur bona dolere vel mala gaudere. Quae si in <sup>246</sup>solo corde clauditur, tabescentia dicitur; si in verba prorumpit, detractio; si usque ad actum perducitur, iniuria dicitur. De prima dicitur: "Quid miserius est invidis, qui aliena exultatione tabescunt, alieno profectu deficiunt, et tam malum quam bonum eos reddit nequiores?" Isidorus: "Unde bonus proficit, invidus<sup>247</sup> contabescit."<sup>w</sup> De secunda dicitur: *Cibabo carnibus tuis hostes, et quasi musto sanguine tuo inebriabuntur* [Is. 49: 26]. Item in *Proverbiis*: *Remove a te os pravum, et labia detrahentia longe sint a te* [Prov. 4: 24]. Item: *Qui proximo detrahit, ipse in futurum se obligat* [Prov. 13: 13]. Item: *Detrahentem secreto*<sup>248</sup> *proximo suo hunc persequerbar* [Ps. 100: 5]. Item: *Cum detractoribus non commiscearis, quia repente consurgit eorum perditio* [Prov. 24: 21—22]. Item: *Detractores Deo odibiles* [Rom. 1: 30]. De tertia dicitur: "Manus invidi ad violentiam proiecte,<sup>249</sup> quae etsi fuerint gladio vacuae, non sunt minus plenae malitiae."<sup>250</sup> Item: "Iniurias ad invicem ne feceritis, quia *fratres estis* [cf. Matt. 23: 8]" Si vero de bonis dolet, quaerendum utrum de bonis gratuitis, naturalibus, vel temporalibus, quia quanto meliora sunt bona, tanto<sup>251</sup> peior invidia et maior malitia. Similiter si de malis gaudet. Item si in proximum, quaerendum utrum proximus fuerit superior vel par<sup>252</sup> vel inferior, et sive sic sive sic, utrum fuerit in ecclesiastica dignitate (qualis est ordo, status, professio) aut in seculari potestate (quale est dominium, conditio, divitiae), quia quanto meliori invidet, tanto magis peccat. Finis autem invidiae omnis superbia est.

Pusillanimitas est de alterius successibus remissus affectus, quando nec de bonis gaudet, nec de malis dolet.<sup>253</sup> Hanc<sup>254</sup> quidem dividendo sicut invidia divisa est, poenitenti manifestandum est quanta fuerit eius peccati malitia, quia non poterit inveniri quid in mente humana eius operetur originem. Nam<sup>255</sup> si quis sui ipsius profectum appetit, omnium

<sup>245</sup> proximo] *om.*,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>246</sup> in] non,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>247</sup> invidus] mundus, R; malus, J.

<sup>248</sup> secreto] *om.*, R.

<sup>249</sup> proiecte] porrecte,  $\beta$ .  $\gamma$ .

<sup>250</sup> malitiae] malitiis, J; nequitiae,  $\beta$ .  $\gamma$ .

<sup>251</sup> tanto] tradita,  $\alpha$ .

<sup>252</sup> par] prior, R; *om.*, J.

<sup>253</sup> dolet] tristatur, J.

<sup>254</sup> hanc quidem . . . manifestandum est] hanc quidem dividendum (*add.* est,  $\alpha$ ) sicut i. d. est et poenitenti manifestandum,  $\alpha$ .  $\beta$ ; hec quidem dividenda est sicut i. d. est. Poenitenti manifestandum est, O.

<sup>255</sup> nam si quis . . . desiderabit] nam quia si quis sui ipsius profectum (pro-ficient, R) appetit, omnium sibi similium desiderabit,  $\alpha$ ; nam si quis sui ipsius

sibi similibus bonum desiderabit. Hoc est vitium sine delectatione,<sup>256</sup> quia quanto plus boni alicui acciderit, tanto maior cruciatus<sup>257</sup> mentem invidentis afficit. O innaturalis malitia, quae bonum facit occasionem mali, cuius contrarium asserit omnis sapientia! O abominabilis iniquitas! Haec Abel mortem introduxit in hominem et diversos languores. Haec Abel occidit [Gen. 4], Ioseph vendidit [Gen. 37], necnon et ipsum verum Ioseph et verum Abel vendidit, damnavit, et ad ultimum ad patibulum traxit.

[d) Peccata contra Patientiam — Ira et Negligentia]

De patientia qualiter se habuerit poenitens<sup>258</sup> circa eam consequens est determinare, quae est/ [12v] adversorum aequanimis perpressio et dividitur secundum quod a diversis adversa conferuntur. Nam si a Deo, nomen retinet, patientia dicitur;<sup>259</sup> si a proximo, benignitas dicitur. Huic virtuti opponuntur ira et negligentia.

Ira est appetitus mali alterius vindicandi causa aut puniendi nequitia. Quae si erga Deum dirigitur et in mente volvitur, furor dicitur; si in verba prorumpit, blasphemia; si in actum, insania. Item si pro adversis<sup>260</sup> bonorum gratuitorum irascitur vel temporalium vel naturalium quaerendum, quia quanto minus mala adversitas, tanto pro his irasci maior fatuitas. Numquid irascetur aurum fabro quia mundat illud in fornace ignis? Maledictum vas quod ex lima trahit rubiginem, et iumentum quod pro stimulis recalcitrat. Bernardus: “Mira perversitas, irascitur medicanti et non irascitur sagittanti.”<sup>x</sup> Ira in proximum similiter dividitur: scilicet in odium, contumeliam, et pestiferationem, eo quod fieri potest corde, ore, et opere. Et quaelibet dupliciter quoad proximum, quia potest appetere malum proximi in corde [*read* corpore?] vel in anima, quod maius nefas<sup>261</sup> est. Item pestiferatio dividitur in laesionem et extinctionem, et hoc sui vel suorum. Item extinctio dividitur in extinctionem famae, quae scandalum dicitur, et extinctionem vitae, quae homicidium dicitur. Item scandalum fit aut diffamatione aut ruina. Ruina in peccatum fit suggestionem, coactionem, consensu, exemplo. Laesio dividitur in

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proficiens omnium sibi falsum (*om. with lacuna*, P) bonum des., β.A.B.C.Y.L; nam si quis sui ipsius prospiciens quieti omnium sibi famam hominum desiderabit, O.

<sup>256</sup> vitium sine delectatione] vitium sine dilectione, β; initium suae dilectionis, γ.

<sup>257</sup> cruciatus] *om.*, R; tristitia, J.

<sup>258</sup> poenitens] patientia, R; *om.*, J.

<sup>259</sup> patientia dicitur] pax, β. γ.

<sup>260</sup> adversis] diversis, α.

<sup>261</sup> maius nefas] maius, R; magis nefas, J.

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<sup>x</sup> Bernard, *In Cant.*, XLII, 3 (PL 183: 988).



laesionem corporis et<sup>262</sup> laboris et possessionis. De prima dicitur: *Si quis percusserit te in unam maxillam, praebe ei et alteram*. De secunda dicitur: *Si quis angariaverit te ire mille passus, vade cum illo et alia mille*. De tertia dicitur: *Si quis abstulerit a te pallium, da ei et tunicam* [Matt. 5: 39—41]. In his diligenter inquirendum necnon et de his quae peccatum hoc circumstant, ut de tempore quamdiu duraverit ira, de persona cui irascitur,<sup>263</sup> et de causa, quae multiplex<sup>264</sup> est. Quidam enim irascitur propter bonum sui ipsius, quidam propter iniurias sibi illatas. Sed nec hoc iustum est, quia alienae iniuriae tuae sunt deliciae, ergo vindicare iniurias nihil aliud est quam mordere medentem. Numquid insanum est de insano conqueri? *Mihi vindictam et ego retribuam, dicit Dominus* [Rom. 12: 19]. Bernardus: “Qui proximo infert vindictam, suam festinat damnationem. Qui vincit in ira, vincitur; et qui vincitur, vincit. Mollia cedendo resistunt, et dura resistendo franguntur.” Item<sup>265</sup> aliquando irascitur quis propter bonum aliorum, et hoc vel propter spirituale vel propter temporale. Aliquando propter malum, ut propter iniurias aut infortunia. Aliquando sola causa non communicandi irascitur quis adversus fratrem suum, et hoc nefas est. De persona cui irascitur quaerendum, an scilicet sit persona ecclesiastica, an parens, an alia. Item quaerendum an aliquam personam ad iram provocaverit et cuiusmodi personam.

Negligens est qui nulla motus causa omnia indifferenter sustinet, et hoc vel in se vel in proximo.<sup>266</sup> In se, ut si in peccatum ceciderit, facile<sup>267</sup> sustinet; si in proximo, similiter. / [13r] Quoniam ergo ob turpia nullo modo deducitur nec in honestis delectatur, est quasi sine electione et ita negligens. Hoc fit dupliciter: Aut penes Deum, cum scilicet proprias iniquitates pro nihilo reputat<sup>268</sup> et ad honestatis gradus non aspirat. Penes proximum multipliciter,<sup>269</sup> quia aut ipsius proximi peccata et mores indifferenter habendo, et sic dicitur remissus, quod maxime praelatis convenit, qui potius curant pecuniam populi accumulare quam vitia eorum eradicare, nec plus moventur pro decem fornicatoribus in parochia quam pro decem currentibus in via. Aut fit negligentia penes proximum plus aequo ipsum commendando, et tunc dicitur adulator.<sup>270</sup> Et hoc multi-

<sup>262</sup> corporis et] *om.*, *α*.

<sup>263</sup> de persona cui irascitur] *om.*, *α*.

<sup>264</sup> multiplex] materia, *β. γ*.

<sup>265</sup> item aliquando . . . et cuiusmodi personam] *om.*, *β. γ*.

<sup>266</sup> et hoc vel in se vel in proximo] vel in proximo vel in se, *α*.

<sup>267</sup> facile] de facili, *β. γ*.

<sup>268</sup> reputat] reputatur, *R*; imputat, *β. γ*.

<sup>269</sup> multipliciter] tripliciter, *β. γ*.

<sup>270</sup> adulator] adulatio, *J*.

pliciter, aut in bonis aut in malis. In bonis dupliciter, quia aut in illis quae non habet aut in illis quae habet dicit habere plus iusto. Similiter in malis dupliciter, quia aut commendando mala aut nimis attenuando aut accusando [*read* excusando?]. “Adulantium<sup>271</sup> linguae alligant homines in peccatis. Delectat enim ea facere in quibus non solum [non] metuitur fieri deprehensus sed inde laudatur.”<sup>y</sup> De prima adulatione dicitur: *Oleum autem*<sup>272</sup> *peccatoris non impinguet caput meum* [Ps. 140: 5]. De secunda dicitur: *Laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae et iniquus benedicitur* [Ps. H. 9: 3]. Iucunda habet adulatio principia, sed amarissimos exitus. Qui adulatori credit stultissimus est, quia a nullo melius quis cognoscitur quam a se ipso. De causa huius peccati quaeri debet, quia quidam negligentes sunt revocare populum ab erroribus suis propter laboris difficultatem, quidam<sup>273</sup> propter praemia errantium, quidam propter timorem potestatis saecularis, quidam quia in eadem damnatione cum ipsis sunt, quidam propter amorem saecularem, quidam propter ignorantiam revocandi. Fere omnibus his causis<sup>274</sup> adulationes contingunt.

[e] Peccata contra Occupationem — Accidia et Curiositas]

Sequitur de occupatione, quae est in bonis moralibus assidua continuatio, de qua dicit Hieronimus: “Semper aliquid boni operis<sup>275</sup> facies ut diabolus inveniatur te occupatum,”<sup>z</sup> quia quem invenerit otiosum, statim dat ei ad operandum. Et alibi: “Esto semper occupatus in aliquo, ne aliquando inveniatur te diabolus otiosum.”

Huic virtuti opponuntur duo vitia, scilicet accidia et curiositas. Accidia dividitur in accidiam mentis et accidiam corporis. Accidia mentis est interna mentis tristitia et dicitur desidia.<sup>aa</sup> Accidia corporis est quae pro corruptis<sup>276</sup> affectibus carnalibus a laboribus sanctis retrahit, et

<sup>271</sup> adulantium . . .] The quotation appears in a variety of forms, more or less meaningless in all MSS.

<sup>272</sup> autem] *om.*, R.

<sup>273</sup> quidam propter praemia (peccata, γ) . . . cum ipsis sunt] *om.*, α.

<sup>274</sup> causis] *om.*, α.

<sup>275</sup> boni operis] boni, J; operis, β. γ.

<sup>276</sup> pro corruptis] post corruptis, R; pro corruptibus, J; posse corporis, β. γ.

<sup>y</sup> Augustine, *Enarr. in Psalm.*, IX, 21 (PL 36: 126): “Adulantium linguae alligant animas in peccatis; delectat enim ea facere, in quibus non solum non metuitur reprehensor, sed etiam laudator auditur.”

<sup>z</sup> Cf. Jerome, *Epistolae*, CXXV, 11 (PL 22: 1078).

<sup>aa</sup> Cf. *Templum Domini* (fol. 102v): “Desidia animae, quae est interna mentis tristitia.”

dicitur otium.<sup>ab</sup> Haec quidem divisio provenit ex hoc quod occupatio tum est in contemplativa, tum in activa. Ex hoc patet quod est accidia ad Deum et ad proximum. Ad Deum: ut in meditationibus sanctis rarius aut minus<sup>277</sup> persistendo et in lectionibus et in aliis officiis divinis celebrandis et audiendis. Hoc peccatum maxime in clericis dominatur. Accidia quoad proximum in remisse faciendo opera misericordiae et cetera quae cum proximo spectant facienda. Fit autem accidia multis modis, quia quidam fingunt se infirmos, ut labores evadant tam saeculares quam spirituales, ut monachi. Nescio enim qua natura, statim cum fiunt monachi, infirmi<sup>278</sup> sunt eorum stomachi saeculares ut indomiti et deliciose nutriti. Alii histrioniis vacant, ut sine labore vivant. Alii quaesturare non desistunt, ut quiete vi-/ [13v] vant. Hii stant omnibus diebus in vinea otiosi [cf. Matt. 20: 6] et<sup>279</sup> labores populi comedunt. O quantam malitiam operatur otiositas! David in otio factus est adulter [II Reg. 11], et abundantia panis et otium causa fuit peccati Sodomorum [Ez. 16: 49]. Servus piger<sup>280</sup> abscondens pecuniam domini sui condemnatus est [Matt. 25 26 ff.]. Nec mirum, quia cum lac tepescit, musce appropinquant.<sup>ac</sup>

Curiositas est immoderatum bonorum operum exercitium, contra quod dicit Apostolus: *Rationabile sit obsequium vestrum* [Rom. 12: 1]. Sunt enim quidam qui nocturnis vigiliis in tantum se cruciant, alii qui tam assiduis orationibus insistunt, alii continuis fletibus, alii duris cubilibus et ceteris laboribus intolerabilibus corpus mortificant, quod<sup>281</sup> aut animo deficiunt aut in infirmitates magnas corruunt. Et sunt alii qui nec tenuissimis dietis nec asperis disciplinis<sup>282</sup> contenti sunt, sed quaedam nova genera indiscrete cruciandi excogitant, quibus de facili ruunt in peccatum vel in corporale periculum, velut<sup>283</sup> qui communiter se extinguunt mutilatione, et qui vinculis ferreis se cingunt et stringunt, et cetera, quae dicenda non sunt. In paucis tamen huiusmodi indiscretio<sup>284</sup> invenitur, nisi causa hypocrisis sit. Et ideo non multum indiget inquisitione nisi in mulieribus

<sup>277</sup> aut minus] nimis, α.

<sup>278</sup> infirmi sunt . . . nutriti] om., α.

<sup>279</sup> et labores populi . . . panis et otium] om., α.

<sup>280</sup> servus piger] item sicut (si, J) piger, α.

<sup>281</sup> quod] qui, α.

<sup>282</sup> nec asperis disciplinis] om., α.

<sup>283</sup> velut qui . . . et qui vinculis] vel in mutilationem (add. membrorum, J) qui vinculis, α.

<sup>284</sup> indiscretio] discretio, α.

<sup>ab</sup> Ibid.: "Otium corporis, quod fit cum a laboribus sanctis corpus retrahitur."

<sup>ac</sup> This simile ultimately derives from *Apophthegmata patrum*, Poemen, III (PG 65: 350).

coniugatis, quae quandoque invitis sponis ieiunia immoderata assumunt observanda, et hoc malum, quia mulier non est potens sui sed vir. Huiusmodi indiscretas poenitentias assumunt sibi quidem inconstantis animi in principio, de quibus dubitandum est ne in fine<sup>285</sup> deficient.

[f] Peccata contra Largitatem — Avaritia et Prodigalitas]

Sic hoc quaesito, inquirendum de largitate, quae consistit in dandorum datione et retinendorum retentione, cui opponuntur duo vitia, avaritia scilicet et prodigalitas. Avaritia est immoderatus amor habendi temporalia. Unde<sup>286</sup> et retinenda sibi et non retinenda retinet avarus. Temporalia bona aut sunt divitiae aut sunt honores aut honestates, et hae<sup>287</sup> aut ecclesiasticae aut saeculares. Avaritia circa divitias dicitur cupiditas, circa honores dicitur ambitio. Sed cum largitas consistat in dando, avaritia erit in non dando. Non dare dupliciter est, aut retinendo aut vendendo. Igitur superioribus<sup>288</sup> addendo habebuntur quattuor species avaritiae, scilicet usura, rapina, sacrilegium, et simonia. De quarum qualibet diligenter inquirendum, et hoc secundum status diversos personarum. Nam sunt iam pauci mercatores vel agriculatores, qui non tenentur in aliqua specie usurae, quia generaliter ubi plus requiritur quam datur usura est, sive in esca sive in vestibis sive in laboribus vel aliis, semper usura est; sive pro termino longiori reddendi census plus pro vendito quis accipit, usuram facit. Similiter de rapina. Nam non minus raptores sunt qui quod dare deberent sibi in proprios usus usurpant, quam qui aliena vi auferunt. Simonia vero et sacrilegium proprie in clericis est<sup>289</sup> et maxime in <sup>290</sup> beneficiatis, quia quidam servitio, quidam pecunia, quidam lingua gratis dandum emunt vel acquirunt, necnon acquisitum sic crucifixi patrimonium in usus proprios et insuper illicitos totum expendant, cum<sup>291</sup> sit tertia pars pauperum, tertia ecclesiae edificandae regendae<sup>292</sup> in his quae ad ecclesiam pertinent, et tertia praelati. O dolor ineffabilis! Plus valent praelati indumenta quam altaris vestimenta. O pudor abominabilis! Pretiosior est ornatus cubilis suae meretricis quam mensa in qua offertur<sup>293</sup> filius virginis. Sic ergo quasi/ [14r] affinitate

<sup>285</sup> est ne in fine] quod inde ,α.

<sup>286</sup> unde et . . . aut sunt divitiae] unde et retinendo sibi non retinenda retinet avarus temporalia bona, quae aut sunt divitiae, β. γ.

<sup>287</sup> he] hoc, α.

<sup>288</sup> superioribus] superius, α.

<sup>289</sup> proprie in clericis est] in proprie clericis est propria, α.

<sup>290</sup> in] om., α.

<sup>291</sup> cum sit . . . pertinent] om., α.

<sup>292</sup> regendae] detegendae, H; tegendae, γ; om., α (longer omission).

<sup>293</sup> offertur] ostenditur, β. γ'.



quadam maligna consequuntur haec duo vitia, scilicet<sup>294</sup> peccata in praelatis, nec minus in personis religiosis conditione pecuniae taxatae<sup>295</sup> religionem intrantibus, cum non possint tales nec pecuniae receptores nec datores in ecclesia illa salvari secundum canones sanctorum patrum irrequisita dispensatione domini papae vel saltem sui episcopi. Unde Gregorius: "Simoniacus nisi in vita sua ordines sponte reliquerit et mors aspera eum sine poenitentia invenerit, absque dubio aeternaliter peribit."<sup>ad</sup> Multo magis ergo nisi religiosus illam religionem reliquerit, peribit. Quid ergo dicunt moniales quae fere omnes simoniace religionem intrant et iterum religionis habitu suspecto statim volunt fieri domus suae procuratores vel procuratrices<sup>296</sup> in aliquo officio, ut res ecclesiae possint secundum placitum dispensare in<sup>297</sup> notis,<sup>298</sup> parentibus, et — quod peius est — in filiabus Aegyptiacis, et intentione accumulandi, ut eo melius ad dignitatem aliquam vocentur? Hii quidem authenticum illud<sup>299</sup> non attendunt: "Monachus habens nummum non valet obulum"; et aliud: "Si monachus pernoctaverit cum obulo, non est ei quies in Deo." Hoc dicetur si ad proprios usus reservaverit. Numquid<sup>300</sup> pauci sunt hodie in ecclesia Dei dignitates digne<sup>301</sup> et honores honorifice<sup>302</sup> acquirentes vel saltem desiderantes? Quia quos nulla poterit superbia subruere vel cupiditas obcaecare aut luxuria movere, sola ambitio<sup>303</sup> facit criminosos. Unde: *Facta est contentio inter discipulos, quis eorum esset maior* [Luc. 22: 24]. Iam patet a quibus personis quaerendum sit de istis peccatis. Avaritia autem circa honesta est ut circa doctrinam, et consimiliter libros<sup>304</sup> et huiusmodi. Haec avaritia proprie est scholarium et pessima est, quia scientia distributa crescit et non dispersa descrescit.

De causis autem cur cupiat avarus non praetermittendum est. Quidam enim accumulunt ut suos promoveant, quidam ut ipsi promoveantur,

<sup>294</sup> vitia scilicet] *om.*, β. γ.

<sup>295</sup> taxata] taxatis, β. γ.

<sup>296</sup> vel procuratrices] *om.*, β. γ.

<sup>297</sup> in] *om.*, α.

<sup>298</sup> notis] natis, α.

<sup>299</sup> illud] *om.*, α.

<sup>300</sup> numquid] heu quam, β. γ.

<sup>301</sup> digne] indigne, α.

<sup>302</sup> honorifice] non honorifice, α.

<sup>303</sup> ambitio] quaesitio, β. γ.

<sup>304</sup> libros] labores, α.

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<sup>ad</sup> *Decretum*, Causa I, qu. 1, c. 115: "Si quis neque sanctis pollens moribus . . . impudenter Christi sacerdotium . . . dignitatem acceperit, et in vita sua non sponte reliquerit, eumque in aspera [*al.* insperata] mors poenitentia non invenerit, proculdubio in eternum peribit" (ed. Friedberg); based on Gregory, *Epist.* V, 57, but not verbally (PL 77: 791).

alii solum ut habeant, alii ut in veneratione habeantur, et hii<sup>305</sup> quidem sunt fines peiores. Unde Apostolus: *Habentes victum et vestitum, his contenti sitis* [cf. I Tim 6: 8]. *Avaro quidem nihil est scelestius* [Eccl. 10: 9], nulli amicus est. “Deo enim detinet debita, proximo denegat necessaria, et sibi ipsi subtrahit opportuna.”<sup>306</sup><sup>ae</sup> Unde propter malitiam eius dicitur: *Avaritia omnium malorum radix est* [cf. I Tim 6: 10]. Quis enumerare poterit mala quae ex avaritia procedunt? Hanc etiam vocat Apostolus *idolorum servitus* [Eph. 5: 5], quia idolum quaerit gloriam ab hominibus quae debet esse solius Dei, et haec<sup>307</sup> munera rerum quas fecit Dominus hominibus ut essent communia, et appropriat. Dicitur autem avarus infernus, porcus, talpa, mare, hydropisis, adamas, quorum patent rationes. Similiter et febris, quia calescit ira cum amittit pecuniam, frigescit gaudio cum lucratur eam. Gregorius: “Non sine dolore amittitur quod cum gaudio possidetur.”<sup>af</sup> Laborat quidem continua in usura, unde usurarius non festinat<sup>308</sup> nec cessat, sed latro festinat et cessat. Tertia laborat in rapina, duplici tertia in sacrilegio, quartana in simonia. Si ergo perfectus est qui vendit omnia et dat pauperibus et sequitur Deum, igitur imperfectissimus est qui retinet omnia contemnens ipsum. / [14v]

Sequitur de prodigalitate, et est prodigalitas propriae possessionis indiscreta dissipatio. Nam opponitur largitati secundum partem, quia danda et non danda<sup>309</sup> distribuit. Non danda sunt aliqua duobus modis: vel<sup>310</sup> quia ipse dator ipsis indiget, vel quia indigentes<sup>311</sup> indigni sunt dandis. Qui<sup>312</sup> sibi ipsi iniuriosus est dator, dissipator dicitur. Quando vero dignis et indignis indifferenter distribuit, prodigi nomen retinet. Hic quidem suum tuetur errorem dicens: “Nolo esse acceptor personarum,” et iterum: “Non respicio cui do, sed pro cuius amore;”<sup>313</sup> item: <sup>314</sup>

<sup>305</sup> hii] *om.*, *α*.

<sup>306</sup> opportuna] *optima*, *α*.

<sup>307</sup> et haec munera . . . communia ei (omnia ei, *β*) appropriat] et haec est misericordia (?) rerum quas fecit dominus hominibus ut subessent omnia ei, *α*.

<sup>308</sup> non festinat (festivat?)] festinat, *β. γ*.

<sup>309</sup> et non danda] *om.*, *α*.

<sup>310</sup> vel . . . vel] et . . . et, *α*.

<sup>311</sup> indigentes] mendicantes, *γ*.

<sup>312</sup> qui] quia, R.H.γ; oportet, P.

<sup>313</sup> amore] livore, R.

<sup>314</sup> item si non iustus . . . datur] *om.*, *β. γ*.

<sup>ae</sup> Innocent III, *De miseria humanae conditionis*, II, 14 (ed. Maccarrone, p. 50).

<sup>af</sup> C. Gregory, *Moralia in Iob*, XXXI, xiii, 21 (PL 76: 585): “Sine dolore namque amittitur, quidquid sine amore possidetur.”

“Si non iustus cui datur, tamen iustus pro quo datur.” Non attendit quod histrionibus et ioculatoribus<sup>315</sup> dare prohibitum est nisi fuerint in extremis positi, quia talium receptores foveant eos in peccatis suis. Aliis autem indignis datur quando quidquam aliquibus datur ad inhonesta agenda. Quod faciunt burgenses et milites, quando pueris suis expensas conferunt ad luxuriam committendum et tabernas colendas, aut vestes pretiosas compositas et molles ad acuendam superbiam, aut ornamenta alia. Finis quidem omnis prodigi fere est laus humana vel vana gloria. Quia si de labore proprio prodigus est peccat mortaliter, si de patrimonio magis, se de rebus ecclesiae maxime, et iterum si in diebus festis, quod frequentius contingit, quia tunc fiunt convivia. Quae omnia diligenter quaerenda sunt.

[g] Peccata contra Abstinentiam — Gula et Extenuatio]

Sequitur de abstinentia, quae est virium vegetabilium ad mensuram cohibitio, ut virtutis appetitivae, attractivae, et ceterarum. Huic opponuntur duo vitia, gula et evacuatio. Gula est vorax edacitas nauseanti stomacho applaudens naturae finibus non contenta. Haec multiplices habet divisiones. Dividitur secundum materiam per quam fit in crapulam et ebrietatem, et utraque fit multis de causis: Aliquando quidem altiorum<sup>316</sup> prece, aliquando ut amoveatur taedium curiositatis, quandoque de quantitate temptando, quandoque certando quis plus possit, quandoque alios excitando, quandoque sola gulositate appetitum extinguendo, quandoque laudem quaerendo. Horum finium semper posterior peior est priore. Unde diligenter et hii fines sunt quaerendi. Similiter et ceterae circumstantiae, quia quidam<sup>317</sup> caninam naturam habentes ultra modum sumunt, quidam tempus praeveniunt, quidam temeritati gulae satisfaciunt lautiores cibos quaerunt, quidam tam ardenti affectu sumunt quod videntur<sup>318</sup> omnia posse devorare nec satiari. Et alii tanto studio tantoque apparatu parant sibi condimenta non contenti paratu naturae sed superaddunt artem trans-/[15r] mutandi naturam; et<sup>319</sup> hoc non est ad sustentandum naturam sed ad provocandum esuriam, nec ut necessitas suppleatur sed ut aviditas adimpleatur,<sup>ag</sup> ut *omnis labor eorum in ore*

<sup>315</sup> ioculatoribus] scaccatoribus, α; leculatoribus, β.

<sup>316</sup> altiorum] aliorum, β. γ.

<sup>317</sup> quia quidam] quia sicut quidam, α.

<sup>318</sup> videntur] add. eis, R; videtur eis, J.

<sup>319</sup> et hoc . . . naturam] om., α.

<sup>ag</sup> Cf. Innocent III, *De miseria*, II, 17 (ed. Maccarrone, p. 52).

*ipsorum* [cf. Eccle. 6: 7]. Quidam<sup>320</sup> totum diem ductum in gula fastidio unius provocant appetitum alterius, quia comedunt provocantia appetitum bibendi, ut species et electuaria vel cibos nimio sale conditos, et bibunt provocantia appetitum comedendi, ut vina aspera, acida, musta, et consimilia. Et sic vitium quod natura expellit sola malitia introducit. Quidam nimis frequenter [comedunt<sup>321</sup>], cum dictum sit: “Semel comedere in die vita est<sup>322</sup> angelorum, bis in die vita hominum, ter vel plus<sup>323</sup> vita brutorum.” Quidam nimis sumptuose<sup>324</sup> comedunt plus consumentes in uno<sup>325</sup> ferculo quam necesse esset promere pro toto prandio. Illi ergo qui ingurgitari desiderant Augustinum audiant qui dicit: “Si naturae debitum immoderantia tuae voracitatis excedis et violentia te ingurgitas, quantaslibet laudes tua lingua resonet, vita blasphematur.”<sup>ah</sup> Contra illos qui tempus praeveniunt dicit Isaias: *Vae terrae cuius rex puer est et principes mane comedunt* [Eccle. 10: 16]. Et iterum: *Vae qui consurgitis ad sectandam ebrietatem* [Is. 5: 11]. Contra tertios illos, scilicet qui deliciose et laute vivunt, dicit Seneca: “Palatum tuum fames excitet, non sapor.”<sup>ai</sup> Et dives qui splendide epulabatur sepultus est in inferno [Luc. 16: 20 ff.]. Salomon: *Qui delicate nutrit servum suum a pueritia, sentiet postea ipsum contumacem* [Prov. 29: 21]. Contra avide comedentes<sup>326</sup> dicit Augustinus: “Malo comedere pisces cum Christo quam lenticulas cum Esau.” Et Apostolus: *Carnis<sup>327</sup> curam ne feceritis in desideriis* [Rom. 13: 14].

Hoc peccatum totum fere genus humanum<sup>328</sup> polluit, et ideo curiosius perscrutandum et notabilius notandum.<sup>329</sup> Maxime tamen ab ordinatis, qui tabernas frequentant, conviviis insistent, ita gulae additi quod sobrii dormire non possunt, nisi scilicet inquietus spiritus eos quiescere faciat, et — quod horribilibus est — mane facto<sup>330</sup> frequentius post primam cum nauseanti stomacho ad Sacramentum Altaris accedere non

<sup>320</sup> quidam totam diem ductum in gula fastidio . . .] quidam t. d. ducunt in gula et fastidio . . ., β. γ.

<sup>321</sup> comedunt] *om.*, *all MSS.*

<sup>322</sup> est] *om.*, α, est quae est, β. γ.

<sup>323</sup> plus] plures, β; pluries, γ.

<sup>324</sup> sumptuose] sumptuosus, R; sumptuosa, β. γ.

<sup>325</sup> uno] *add.* duorum, β. γ.

<sup>326</sup> comedentes] sumentes, β. γ.

<sup>327</sup> carnis] *om.*, α.

<sup>328</sup> totum fere genus humanum] omne genus hominum, β, γ.

<sup>329</sup> et notabilius notandum] *om.*, α.

<sup>330</sup> mane facto] *add.* immo, β. γ.

<sup>ah</sup> Augustine, *Enarr. in Psalm.*, CXLVI, 2 (PL 37: 1900; “vinolentia”).

<sup>ai</sup> Martin of Braga, *Formula honestae vitae*, 4 (ed. C. W. Barlow, *Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Omnia*, New Haven, 1950, p. 242, line 10).



formidant. Nec mirum quia tam clerici quam laici opinantur gulam non esse peccatum mortale ex quo nihil mali consequitur; cum dicant sancti quod consuetudo superflue sumendi victualia mortale est; immo, quod plus est, ut dicunt magistri, semel sumere superflue aviditate gulae<sup>331</sup> mortale est.<sup>ak</sup> Numquid Adam pro pomi gustu vetito<sup>332</sup> eiectus est de paradiso [Gen. 3], et Esau pro edulio lenticulae perdidit primogenita [Gen. 27], et Satan filios Iob cum in convivio essent obruit [Iob. 1: 18—19]. Fines quoque harum circumstantiarum praedicti sunt. Tamen de duobus non praeenumeratis quaerendum, scilicet an propter ieiunium instans vel futurum alicuius praedictarum specierum gulae fuerit, an quia non proprio victuali an quia potentior et pronior ad peccandum<sup>333</sup> esse appetit. Sed hic pessimus. Dicunt enim quidam: „Multa oportet comedere quia ieiunamus,” et propter hoc dicit Isaias: *In diebus ieiuniorum vestrorum invenitur voluntas vestra* [Is. 58: 3], in praedictis scilicet circumstantiis. Isidorus: “Non est acceptum Deo / [15v] ieiunium quod vespere deliciis compensatur.”<sup>a1</sup> Alii praeveniunt ieiunium dicentes: “Coenare oportet quia cras ieiunandum est,” nec sciunt si in crastino vivendum est eis. Multi quidem in tantum<sup>334</sup> ingurgitantur carnibus in coena in die Iovis quod integrae iacent carnes indigestae in stomacho per totum diem Veneris. Numquid corpus talium totum praeter solam gulam indurat? Alii dicunt: “Sumamus quantum possumus de alieno.” Accidit qui etsi lingua non dicant, tamen actu probant. Hoc maxime tangit quosdam ad convivandum vocatos, ut convivantis necessitatem minuant; sed augent, quia plus duplo devorant comedendo vel potando quam de suo indigenti conferant. Huiusmodi congregationes reprobandae sunt tam propter iam dictum quam propter occasionem<sup>335</sup> multorum malorum quae inde oriuntur. Et poenitenti praecipiat ut non talibus assit congregationibus, et praecipue si ordinatus fuerit.

Consequenter quaerendum de extenuatione, quae est superflua abstinencia. Fit autem haec superfluitas aut per indiscretionem aut per nimietatem. Indiscreta abstinencia fit per tempus non debitum, ut sunt dies sollemnes, vel per tempus evacuans; et fit etiam per locum, ut inter

<sup>331</sup> aviditate gulae] avidae gulae, R; avidae gulosae, J.

<sup>332</sup> pomi gustu vetito] primo gustu vetiti, β. γ.

<sup>333</sup> peccandum] potandum, α.

<sup>334</sup> in tantum] ieiunantium, α.

<sup>335</sup> occasionem] orationem, R; originem, J.

<sup>ak</sup> Cf. Petrus Cantor, *Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis*, deuxième partie. Ed. J.-A. Dugauquier, “Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia,” 7 (Louvain, 1957), p. 239.

<sup>a1</sup> Isidore, *Sent.*, II, xlv, 11 (PL 83: 652).

convivantes; fit etiam per statum contrarium, ut est labor, infirmitas, complexio, obedientia, quod faciunt religiosi et coniugati, quia monachus ieiunare non habet nisi secundum regulam suae religionis, nec coniunx nisi permissione sui coniugati. Nimia abstinentia fit cum quis saepe ieiunat, et in nimis tenui dieta, vel cum ieiunat per unum vel per plures dies nihil gustando, vel non competentia naturae sumendo. Ab huiusmodi extenuatione revocandi sunt poenitentes, quia pauci tales perseverant.

[h] Peccato contra Continentiam — Luxuria et Insensibilitas]

Consequens est dicere de continentia, quae consequitur abstinentiam. Haec animales<sup>336</sup> illecebras mortificat, virtutis distributivae et expulsivae officium<sup>337</sup> coercens. Dividitur quidem secundum subiectum in continentiam virginum, coniugatorum, et viduarum, et iterum in continentiam mentis et corporis. Huic virtuti opponuntur duo vitia, scilicet luxuria et insensibilitas.

Luxuria est turpis animi motus illicitas carnis delectationes affectans, quae dividitur in libidinem et lasciviam. Libido est inordinata carnis petulantia ex turpium membrorum operatione proveniens. Haec dividitur in fornicationem, adulterium, incestum, sacrilegium, et sodomiticum.<sup>338</sup> Haec divisio est secundum subiectum in quo fit. Si igitur poenitens fornicationem fecerit,<sup>339</sup> est quaerendum utrum cum prius corrupta vel non. Et si cum prius corrupta, utrum cum meretrice vel non, quia magis peccat qui cum meretrice fornicatur propter plura pericula; quia quaedam sunt desponsatae, quaedam personae religionis, quaedam viduae, et quaedam parentes forte fornicantium. Si fecerit adulterium, quod est illusio<sup>340</sup> alieni coniugis tori, quaerendum utrum simplex vel duplex. Simplex est quando tantum alter illorum coniugatus vel viduatus fuerit, duplex quando uterque. Si incestum fecerit, / [16r] quod est inter consanguineos vel affines irregularis coitus, quaerendum utrum est soror vel neptis vel consanguinea, quia quanto proximior gradus, tanto peccatum maius; et iterum si cum duabus sororibus, vel consanguineis, vel cum aliqua quae sit infra quartum gradum consanguinitatis uxori tuae, vel cum aliqua quae spiritualiter filia tua vel mater, aut cum sorore vel matre alterius earum. Vice versa quaerendum est a muliere. Deinde<sup>341</sup> quaerendum de

<sup>336</sup> animales] amabiles, γ.

<sup>337</sup> officium] effectum, β.A.B.C.Y; veneris effectum, L.O.

<sup>338</sup> sodomiticum] sodomam, α.

<sup>339</sup> fornicationem fecerit] reminiscionem (reminiscentiam, J) fecerit de fornicatione, α.

<sup>340</sup> illusio] add. vel lesio, J (*interlin.*)

<sup>341</sup> deinde . . . fecerit] de sacrilegio quaerendum si in aliquo reus fuerit, J; deinde quaerendum si sacrilegium fecerit, β. γ.

sacrilegis, si aliquis sacrilegium fecerit, quod est sacrae personae laesio. Quod fit si ordinatus ad subdiaconum vel supra vel vir religiosus vel astrictus voto cum soluta rem habuerit, vel si mulier aliqua voto continentiae astricta cum soluto coierit, aut si sacer cum sacrata, quia tunc duplex sacrilegium fit. Ultimo quaerendum si sodomiticum fecerit. Fit quidem<sup>342</sup> sodomiticum quando masculus cum masculo abutitur, aut mulier cum muliere, aut alteruter cum brutis bestiis<sup>343</sup> aut cum inanimatis ut<sup>344</sup> cum imaginibus vel aliis, si homo muliere<sup>345</sup> abutitur aut mulier viro, aut alteruter seipso. Et ut generaliter dicam, quomodocumque<sup>346</sup> alter eorum semen effundit vigilando non modo naturali nec in loco debito, sodomiticum facit. Hoc dico propter aliquos coeuntes qui sponte semen emittunt extra vas naturale, ne per conceptum detegatur iniquitas eorum, et alii aliter, ut bestialiter aut promiscue; sed hic expressius scribere<sup>347</sup> non audeo. Hae quinque species, immo potius specierum deformitates, quinque digiti manus diaboli sunt. Fornicatio vero legem matrimonii impedit, adulterium violat et polluit, incestus caritatem minuit, sacrilegium votum dirimit, sodomiticum naturae contradicit et ordinem rerum destruit.

Quid si dormiendo emisit? Sodomiticum non est nec etiam peccatum, ut videtur. Cum tamen dicant quidam quod, si ex crapula provenerit vel ex praemeditatione vitiosa, mortale est; si ex natura complexionis vel a calore extrinseco, veniale est; quod videtur falsum. Nam dato quod ex crapula vel ex praemeditatione, nondum sequitur esse mortale, quia non omnis crapula mortale est. Item si ex crapula mortali, ante dormitionem posset poenituisse; similiter ex praemeditatione. Ergo illa pollutio post poenitentiam<sup>348</sup> mortale non esset, cum pollutio in se non sit mortale nec veniale nisi per causam. Si non mortale, non efficiet quidquam mortale. Et iterum cum nec posse nec scire peccare nisi velit sit peccatum, propter arbitrium erit voluntas origo peccati, et ex sola mala<sup>349</sup> voluntate peccandi contraheretur macula;<sup>350</sup> sed homine dormiente extinguitur usus volendi,<sup>351</sup> quia somnus est quies animalium cum intentione virtutum naturalium, quod voluntas animalis est; igitur dormiendo non peccatur. Forte dices quod etsi anima nihil in homine dormiente quod animalis

<sup>342</sup> quidem] quoque, R.

<sup>343</sup> bestiis] animalibus, β. γ.

<sup>344</sup> inanimatis ut] animatis aut, α.

<sup>345</sup> muliere] in muliere, α.

<sup>346</sup> quomodocumque] qualitercumque, J; quocumque modo, β. γ.

<sup>347</sup> scribere] exprimere, J.

<sup>348</sup> poenitentiam] sententiam, R.

<sup>349</sup> mala] om., β. γ.

<sup>350</sup> macula] om., α.

<sup>351</sup> volendi] peccandi volendi, β; peccandi et volendi, γ.

sit exerceat, tamen delecta- / [I6v] tionem quandam contrahit vegetabilitas ex pruritu in emittendo, et ex delectatione peccatur. Sed illud etiam ratione caret, quia omnis delectatio est aut ex concupiscibili<sup>352</sup> animae sensibilis aut ex desiderativa rationalis. Sed quis virginem incorruptam diceret peccasse etsi usque ad emissionem agitata esset? Et si<sup>353</sup> quis graviter obdormisset ita quod non percepisset<sup>354</sup> se polluisse, pollutione facta per crapulam mortalem, quod contingit,<sup>355</sup> sequitur hunc mortaliter peccasse, nec tamen scit illud nec scire potest. Quando ergo dimitti poterit? Si dimittitur quando de crapula conteritur,<sup>356</sup> tunc dimittitur aliquid de quo nullam contritionem habet nec oblitus eius est; quod si non fuerit, peccatur. Confitendum<sup>357</sup> est ergo cum accidit, quia nimium est prompta crapula<sup>358</sup> vel praemeditatio mala, vel saltem pronitatem demonstrat peccandi. Solvat hic unusquisque secundum conscientiam. Ad minus est immunditia, quod videtur esse ostensio<sup>359</sup> quod non fuerit in statu bono polluens.

Redeundo autem ad prius dicta:<sup>360</sup> Sacerdos circa praedictas species libidinis et maxime circa ultimam sibi provideat ne incaute quaerat sed sic ut reus intelligat, non reus nihil<sup>361</sup> cognoscat. Sic quaesito videndum est de circumstantiis, scilicet singulas singulis addendo, quia in hoc genere peccati maxime aggravant et minuunt. Fit autem libido aut causa propriae voluntatis<sup>362</sup> explendae, aut libidinis extinguendae, quod minus peccatum est, aut causa prolis procreandae, et hoc etiam minus. Sed haec intentio in sodomitico esse non potest, unde proprie fornicatio dicendum<sup>363</sup> esset, quia foras necat. Aliquando autem fit ad confusionem alterius, aliquando causa cupiditatis. Hii fines aggravant, et ob hoc de unoquoque quaerendum est. Quaerendum etiam si fuerit aliquando in loco sacro facta libido, aut in ecclesia, et si hoc, utrum in ecclesia dedicata. Et iterum si prope sancta sanctorum; illud tamen inauditum est esse factum nisi casu ab ordinatis et praelatis aliquibus. Item de tempore quaeren-

<sup>352</sup> concupiscibili . . . rationalis] *om. with lacuna*, R; voluntate aut peccatum non est, J.

<sup>353</sup> et si] et praeterea si, β. γ.

<sup>354</sup> percepisset] posset, α.

<sup>355</sup> pollutione facta per crapulam mortalem (mortale, R) quod contingit] pollutionem factam per crapulam mortale esse contingit, J.

<sup>356</sup> conteritur] contrahitur, β. γ.

<sup>357</sup> confitendum] gaudendum, R. β. γ.

<sup>358</sup> quia nimium est (*om.*, J) prompta crapula] quia minimum est (*lacuna*) crapula, R; quod minime est et memoratio cum praecessit crapula, β. γ.

<sup>359</sup> est immunditia quod videtur esse ostensio] immunditia quaedam videtur esse et ostensio (offensio, β.A.B.Y), β. γ.

<sup>360</sup> dicta] *om.*, α. β.

<sup>361</sup> non reus nihil] et res (rerum, J) nihil, α.

<sup>362</sup> voluntatis] voluptatis, β. γ.

<sup>363</sup> dicendum . . . necat] *om.*, α.



dum, utrum scilicet in sacro vel non sacro, quia non etiam coniugatis licet omni tempore coire. Nam sacrum tempus quandoque impedit et etiam intentio, quia cum scilicet non possit habere spem procreandi prolem, ut si fuerit sterilis vel habens in utero, aut cum non intendat extinguere libidinem vel praevenire fervorem in alterutro, fornicatur. Status etiam impedit, scilicet<sup>364</sup> si menstruata fuerit aut post partum non purgata aut infirma. Item de modo quaerendum est, ut si poenitens aliquam libidinem supra posse intendendo commiserit, aut si cibaria aut electuaria libidinem provocantia propter hoc sumpserit, vel alio modo quidquam<sup>365</sup> una persona in alteram ad coeundi officium<sup>366</sup> aut ad cito spermatizandum exercuerit, quae fiunt tactu, visu, et — quod turpius est — omnibus aliis sensibus. Tactu: ut osculando, amplexando, vel aliter palpando. De aliis ponat sibi exempla legens secundum quod poenitentis responsio expostulaverit. Item si vim alter alteri intulerit aut coeundo laeserit, quod faciunt raptores virginum et aliarum; et si hoc, / [17r] quaerendum quibus auxiliis. Item de numero, ut cum quot personis fornicatus fuerit poenitens et quot vicibus e quamdiu in hoc peccato fuerit. Item quaerendum si fuerit alii occasio peccandi, scilicet fornicandi<sup>367</sup> admonitione, auxilio, permissione. Admonitione, ut sunt vetulae fornicantium mediatrices; auxilio, ut adolescentulorum fautores; permissione, ut praelati negligentes et parentes iuvenum, qui nec errores corrigunt, verum etiam de erroribus gaudent. Has igitur circumstantias singulas singulis praedictarum specierum applicando, secundum personatus diversitatem prout responsio poenitentis postulaverit tanto diligentius inquirendum, quanto plura genera hominum<sup>368</sup> polluerunt.

Est autem alia species luxuriae, quae lascivia dicitur, et est vitiosa corporalis repletionis purgatio, quia superflua repletio evacuationes quaerit. Purgatur quidem tum sanguinem minuendo, tum balneando, tum sudando, tum per posteriora emittendo. In his omnibus potest esse lascivia ex superfluitate et delectatione. Quidam quoque sanguinem minuunt non indigentes sed ut deliciis fruantur et quiescant a laboribus, ut religiosi.<sup>369</sup> Quaerendum etiam si poenitens balneis fruatur non ad necessitatem sed ad delectationem. Quidam vero morantur in balneis ita quod vix sustinent, quidam frequentius quam oporteat, et quidam balnea parant aromatica. Quaerendum etiam si quam turpitudinem poenitens

<sup>364</sup> scilicet si] *add.* mulier, β. γ.

<sup>365</sup> quidquam] *om.*, α.

<sup>366</sup> officium] affectum, β; effectum, γ.

<sup>367</sup> fornicandi] fornicando, R.

<sup>368</sup> hominum] hominem, γ (*J has hominem with e expuncted*).

<sup>369</sup> ut religiosi] *om.*, J.

in ipsis operatus fuerit, quia non licet sponso cum sponsa in balneis commorari; nam si casu coirent, semen disperderetur,<sup>370</sup> aut si casu conciperetur, leprosus aut elephanticus<sup>371</sup> generetur. Quaerendum etiam de superfluitate, quae maxime mulierum est. Fruuntur enim talibus frequenter et nimium ut cutis tenerior et perspicabilior sit et subtilior, hoc est peccato carnis aptior et appetibilior. Labor lascivus est ludus inordinatus, qualis est lucta, choreae, ludus talorum et scaccorum, qui non solum mali sunt sed in concilio prohibiti clericis.<sup>am</sup> Huiusmodi lascivia praecipue fit in diebus festivis, et ideo diligentius revocanda. Lucta quidem adolescentes tangit, ex qua multa mala proveniunt; non attendunt luctatores quod quam cito in mundum venimus luctam cum malignis spiritibus inimus. Choreae vero puellarum sunt, contra quas dicit Augustinus: “Melius est in diebus dominicis arare quam choreas ducere.”<sup>an</sup> Et alibi: “Qui choreas ducunt, in foro diaboli venales se offerunt.”<sup>372</sup> Sunt<sup>373</sup> et alii ludi vitiosi secundum diversas provincias diversi, quos<sup>374</sup> expresse<sup>375</sup> in hoc loco memorabit sacerdos. Solent<sup>376</sup> autem fieri in diebus festivis ecclesiarum, similiter circa corpora mortuorum, sed hoc nullatenus tolerandum. Item<sup>377</sup> quaerendum de purgatione vitiosa. Purgant enim quidam se per inferiora vitiose cum in loco sacro ventositatem emittunt vel in hora non competenti, ut quando horas dicunt vel audiunt. Et sunt alii qui quasi quadam iocositate delectantur in talibus purgationibus, ut histriones, coterelli. Et sunt alii qui ad aliorum confusionem vel derisionem propter sui segnitiam<sup>378</sup> fecibus aut urina se purgant. Quomodo ergo et quotiens et quando fecerit, utrum scilicet in iuventute vel pueritia, et quibus locis etiam<sup>379</sup> quaerendum est. / [I7v]

Restat de insensibilitate quaerendum, quae appetitum purgandi mortificat et sensibiles concupiscentias insensibiliter sustinet, ut asserunt.<sup>380</sup> Hoc peccato delinquant coniugati, ut quando alter alteri de-

<sup>370</sup> disperderetur] dispergeretur, J.

<sup>371</sup> elephanticus] elephantinus, J.

<sup>372</sup> venales se offerunt] venales offeruntur, J; sunt, β. γ.

<sup>373</sup> sunt] item, α; om., β.A.B.C.Y.

<sup>374</sup> quos] quod, R; quidem, J.

<sup>375</sup> expresse] expellere, β. γ.

<sup>376</sup> solent autem . . . tolerandum] om., α.

<sup>377</sup> item querendum . . . per inferiora] purgant quoque per inferiora quidam, β. γ.

<sup>378</sup> sui segnitiam] in segnitiam, β.A.B.C.Y.L; segnitiam, O.

<sup>379</sup> quibus locis etiam] quibusque, β. γ.

<sup>380</sup> ut asserunt] nec affectat, β. γ.

<sup>am</sup> See above, p. 231 and n. 26.

<sup>an</sup> Augustine, *Enarr. in Psalm.*, XCI, 2 (PL 37: 1172): “Melius est arare quam saltare.”

bitum reddere negaverit. Huiusmodi negatio aliquando est causa effusionis seminis, aliquando causa fornicationis vel adulterii, similiter et aliorum, quod patuit in Eva. Et fit quandoque causa irae, quandoque causa vilitatis coeundi, quandoque causa contemptus mulierum. Similiter et mulier, vel quia alium plus amat vel quia nequam est, debitum similiter prohibet, vel ne dolorem partus sentiat, vel ne paupertate gravetur, vel ne labore nutriendo, vel quia taediosum est quod facere non tenetur.

Sed de distinctione vitiorum quae continentiae et abstinenciae opponuntur forte obiciet quis ex eo quod superius dictum est has septem virtutes duas habere facies, unam scilicet ad Deum, aliam ad proximum. Unde et vitia quaeque eis opposita<sup>381</sup> habebunt similiter. Sed nec incontinentia nec libido sic divisa est, ut videtur. Sed hoc falsum est. Quia etsi omnia peccata contra Deum sunt, illa tamen specialiter contra ipsum Deum quae<sup>382</sup> in propriam eius personam retorquentur. Sic quidem sacrilegium contra Deum est, adulterium contra proximum. Similiter et in proximum peccat, quia bona proximi avida gula devorat, in Deum quando res ecclesiae non pauperibus erogat sed gulositate et luxuria dissipat.

#### [4. Peccata contra Prudentiam]

Sequitur de virtutibus quattuor quae corpus mortificatum regenerant. Quarum prima est prudentia, quae est bonorum et malorum discretiva<sup>383</sup> scientia. Haec habet quattuor species: Providentiam, circumspectionem, cautionem, et docilitatem. Providentia est presentium notitia futurum pertractans eventum. Circumspectio est contrariorum vitiorum cautela. Cautio est virtutum a vitiis et ipsarum inter se discretio. Docilitas est prudentia erudiendi imperitos. Igitur qualiter se habuit poenitens circa unamquamque quaerendum. Prudentiae quidem opponitur imprudentia, quae fit duobus modis, secundum defectum vel secundum superfluitatem. Imprudentia secundum defectum stultitia dicitur, altera versutia. Et habet imprudentia bis tot species quam prudentia, unaquaeque divisa secundum defectum et superfluitatem. Igitur quaerendum si poenitens improvidus fuerit secundum diminutionem, et si hoc utrum in bonis spiritualibus vel temporalibus necnon et in omnibus agendis. Unde sit tibi exemplum dies praeterita quomodo vivendum sit in hodierna. Hoc est quantum ad spiri-

<sup>381</sup> opposita] contraria vel opposita, β. γ.

<sup>382</sup> quae . . . retorquentur] qui non in propriam eius personam principaliter retorquentur, β. γ.

<sup>383</sup> discretiva] discreta, β. γ.

tualia. De temporalibus: *Dispone domui tuae, quia cras morieris* [Is. 38:1]. De agendis aliis, ut de his quae erit cogitaturus, locuturus, factururus, quia opera improvisa cito sequitur poenitentia. Contra linguam impetuosam dicitur: *Pone, Domine, custodiam ori meo*, etc. [Ps. 140:3]. Superflua providentia in solis contingit temporalibus,<sup>384</sup> cuius causa est avaritia. Deinde si incircumspectus fuerit poenitens quaerendum, et maxime si sacerdos fuerit, quia eorum est discernere inter lepram et lepram, hoc est inter mortalia, similiter et inter venialia, et iterum inter veniale et mortale. Unde: *Vae terrae cuius* / [18r] *princeps*<sup>385</sup> *puer est* [Eccle. 10:16]. Hic quaerendum est de mortalibus quae a laicis pro venialibus habentur, ut fornicatio, ebrietas, et huiusmodi. Postea si incautus fuerit quaerendum, ut si vitium pro virtute reputat, sicut dicunt quidam abundantiam temporalium esse virtutem. Item si indocibilis fuerit, hoc est imprudens erudiendi imperitos, ut se ipsum, liberos, et familiam; se ipsum, ut si contempserit audire praedicationes, correctiones, aut lectiones, si ordinatus vel litteratus fuerit. Si laicus, an sciverit orationem dominicam, symbolum, et huiusmodi, et hoc vel in lingua ecclesiae vel propria. De eisdem etiam quoad alios quaerendum. Multi quidem peccant et graviter eo quod pueros suos in statu innocentiae moribus non informant.<sup>386</sup> Si ordinatus fuerit, quaerendum de scientia quae ad ordinem pertinet. Similiter de ordinis officio et etiam quomodo alios docuerit. Quidam enim etsi<sup>387</sup> scientiam habeant sunt *canes muti non valentes latrare* [Is. 56: 10], et hoc est quia praedicatio esset contraria vitae. De versutia, quae est perversa prudentia, ab his praecipue quaerendum qui legislatores constituti sunt.<sup>388</sup> Pauperes quidem sine causa in causam trahunt et eosdem reos sine reatu fieri convincunt. Similiter ab his de hac imprudentia quaerendum qui a subditis suis quantum placet et quantum licet sine causa extorquent. Sed certe coram iusto<sup>389</sup> iudice usque *novissimum quadrantem* restituent [cf. Matt. 5: 26].

#### [5. Peccata contra Iustitiam]

Post hoc de iustitia quaerendum. Haec est virtus attribuens unicuique quod suum est. Igitur Deo, sibi, et proximo, et diabolo sunt tribuenda propria. Homo quidem Dei est creatione, reformatione, redemptione. Creatione, quia animam eius a nihilo ad esse vocavit, corpus formavit,

<sup>384</sup> temporalibus] temporibus, α.

<sup>385</sup> princeps] rex, J.

<sup>386</sup> informant] instruunt, β. γ.

<sup>387</sup> etsi] si, α.

<sup>388</sup> sunt] add. et, α; esse, β. A. B. C. Y.

<sup>389</sup> iusto] certo, α.



et<sup>390</sup> tam dissimilia propria virtute univit. Reformatione, quia per peccatum primi parentis deformatum fuit genus humanum, quod ipse sua mirabili incarnatione, passione, resurrectione ad formam reduxit. Redemptione, scilicet sacramentorum, quia quos ipse Dominus sanguine proprio emit, adhuc per peccatum mortale alienatos redimere non cessat sacramentorum virtute. Quid etiam poenitenti<sup>391</sup> reddere<sup>392</sup> debeat patet, quia poenitentia corpori<sup>393</sup> (scilicet virga, onus, et pabulum [cf. Eccli. 33: 25]<sup>390</sup>), animae contritio, contemplatio, dilectio.<sup>394</sup> Proximo quidem sua reddi debent, malo castigatio, bono confortatio et temporalium plenaria restitutio. Diabolo debetur peccatorum<sup>395</sup> disiunctio.<sup>396</sup> Peccatum quidem ei<sup>397</sup> proprium est. Ipse fuit primo peccans, deinde hominem peccare faciens, unde accidentale est hominem<sup>398</sup> peccare. Item ipse fuit primo seductus et alios ob hoc adhuc vincere contendit, et propter hoc devinci debet. Unde est: "Si semel victus fuerit in aliquo peccato, nunquam ideo<sup>399</sup> poterit eundem temptare in ipso."<sup>400</sup> Quomodo ergo distribuerit poenitens unicuique, quaerendum, et maxime proximo. Iustitia quidem ad proximum dividitur in liberalitatem et severitatem. Severitas consistit<sup>400</sup> in duobus, in coercione et correctione. Debet enim malorum iniuriam sic<sup>401</sup> corrigere coercendo ne contemnat, et sic coercere corrigendo

<sup>390</sup> et tam . . . univit] et tamen de substantia propria virtute minuit (in-univit, J), α.

<sup>391</sup> poenitenti] poenitens, J.

<sup>392</sup> reddere] reddi, β. γ.

<sup>393</sup> quia poenitentia corpori] poenitentiam quidem corpori (corporibus tenetur, J), α.

<sup>394</sup> dilectio] discretio, β. γ.

<sup>395</sup> peccatorum] peccatum, all MSS.

<sup>396</sup> disiunctio] om., O.J. (with lacuna); deiunctis (?), R.

<sup>397</sup> ei] suum, J.

<sup>398</sup> accidentale est hominem] accidens est homini, β. γ.

<sup>399</sup> ideo] idem, β. γ; item, J.

<sup>400</sup> consistit] constat, β. γ.

<sup>401</sup> sic (om., γ) corrigere coercendo ne contemnat et sic coercere corrigendo ne] corrigere et coercere corrigendo ne, α; corrigere et coercere quia sic corrigitur coercendo ne cont. et sic coercere corrigendo ne, β.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Godefroy de Saint-Victor, *Microcosmus*, III, 159: "Dehinc non inutiliter considerandum est quam ordinato amore debeat amari a spiritu sua caro a qua portatur ut a iumento suo . . . Fiet autem ordinate si tria illi debita reddat, scil. virgam, onus, et pabulum. Virga iuste correptionis, onus debite actionis, pabulum pie consolationis"; ed. P. Delhay (Lille, 1951), p. 177. See also Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum*, ed. F. Broomfield, p. 450.

<sup>40</sup> The same fourfold division of *iustitia* in *Templum Domini* (fol. 103r): "Iustitia quoad Deum est dare te Deo in sacrificium, hostiam, victimam, immolationem, oblationem, holocaustum; quoad proximum est dare te illi in auxilium et consilium; quoad teipsum est dare animae tuae panem vitae et potum, corpori cibum, virgam, et onus; quoad diabolum est dare ei peccata tua, quia eius sunt, et etiam poenas perpetuas."

ne in vindictam seuiat. Liberalitas prohibet ne proximum miserum faciamus nec miserum relinquamus.

Prima ergo iniustitia quae est aduersus Deum est de ipso poenitente; secunda de proximo, tertia de sibi / [18v] appropriatis,<sup>402</sup> ut de rebus sacris, unde et sacrilegium dicitur, quasi legium, id est furtum, sacri. De quo quaerendum si fecerit poenitens, et utrum sacrum de sacro vel non sacrum de sacro vel sacrum de non sacro, et quantum, et quando, et quid etiam de sacro fecerit, et qualiter sacrum violaverit, utrum scilicet furtive vel violenter. De iniustitia apud proximum quaere<sup>403</sup> si corrigere neglexerit aut non in spiritu lenitatis, et iterum si coercere contemperit vel neglexerit vel timuerit, quod faciunt timidi praelati. Item si truculentus fuerit in coercione. Deinde de illiberalitate quaerendum, ut si proximum miserum in aliquo fecerit poenitens, quod fit furto, rapina, dolo, retentione debiti, dissipatione commissi, consensu in aliquo horum, destructione, subtractione. Quantum<sup>404</sup> igitur et qua causa et a cuiusmodi persona sic sua alienaverit, et quando et ubi quaerendum; ut, si furtum fecerit, quaerendum cui, quibus auxiliis, qua causa, scilicet necessitate vel odio, et quid etiam furatus fuerit. Et utrum alius furto illo diffamatus fuerit, utrum etiam sententia data fuerit pro illo furto. Similiter de rapina. De dolo etiam quaerendum utrum poenitens dolum fecerit circumveniendo aliquem vel aliquam blanditiis, promissis, muneribus, aut fallendo aliquem in emptione vel venditione, quod frequenter faciunt mercatores panni, pellium, vini,<sup>405</sup> et bladi, et aliorum, quorum fallacias prolixum esset enumerare. Item fit dolus machinando etiam laesionem vel mortem alicuius vel seditionem. Quaerendum etiam cui fit dolus, an scilicet amico vel inimico vel ignoto. Deinde de retentione debiti quaerendum, quomodo scilicet, an vi, an placito, an quia oblitus eius est, an odio. Item si commissum dissipatur aut legatum ab alio aut in custodia traditum aut procuracione depositum aut alio modo. Superflua liberalitas fit quando uni plus quam indigeat et magis indigenti minus vel nihil confertur vel de proprio habere patitur. Hoc est praelatorum ecclesiae, qui<sup>406</sup> subditos quosdam ex nimia abundantia rerum onerant sarcina peccatorum. Post haec quaerendum si poenitens proximum miserum in aliquo reliquerit, et maxime si necessitatis causa eum peccare viderit et clauserit viscera sua ab eo cum eripere

<sup>402</sup> appropriatis] impropriatis, β. γ.

<sup>403</sup> quaere . . . lenitatis] quam . . . lenitatis quaerendum, α.

<sup>404</sup> quantum igitur . . . quaerendum ut] quaerendum igitur qua causa et cuiusmodi persona sic sua et quando et ubi. Quod, α.

<sup>405</sup> vini] equorum, β. γ.

<sup>406</sup> qui subditos . . . onerant] quia quosdam subditos . . . onerat, β. γ.

eum a peccato potuerit. Miser relinquitur subtractione, diminutione, dilatione, offensione, exprobratione, et hoc diversis causis, quia aut odio aut avaritia aut contemptu, et hoc quaerendum. Quaere etiam cuiusmodi persona sit qui in miseria relinquitur, quia quanto maior, tanto maius peccatum non misereri. Item si de parentela eius fuerit, tunc est impietas non succurrere, et hoc si digna fuerit. Nam pietas debetur parentibus, reverentia maioribus, innocentia minoribus, vicinis amicitia, discrepantibus concordia, egenis misericordia,<sup>407</sup> alienis humanitas. Nullus in horum superfluitatibus peccare reperitur,<sup>408</sup> et ideo quaerere non oportet.

[6. Peccata contra Temperantiam]

Sequitur de temperantia, quae est hominis in motus illicitos et non rectos<sup>409</sup> animi<sup>410</sup> firma et moderata dominatio. Cuius sunt tres species: Modestia, verecundia, pudicitia. Modestia<sup>411</sup> est cultus et motus citra excessum<sup>412</sup> et ultra defectum sistere. Verecundia est in gestu et verbo honestatem ser- / [191] vare. Pudicitia est oculorum et aliorum sensuum<sup>413</sup> lasciviam domare. Quaerendum igitur de superfluo cultu, et vestium, domorum,<sup>414</sup> et aliorum necessariorum, equorum, utensilium, et consimilium. Vestium, ut si nimis compositae sint, nimis variae, et frequenter diversae, nimis pretiosae, et nimis deliciosae. Similiter de domorum edificiis. Tales cogitent quibus panniculis involutus fuerit ille humilis<sup>415</sup> puer, cui *non erat locus in diversorio* [Luc. 2: 7]. Post de motu quaerendum. Quidam enim ut histriones incedunt, quidem ut pugiles, et quidam mulierum passus addiscunt et mulieres virorum. Et sunt alii qui brachia incedendo huc illucque proiciunt quasi dissolutiones patiantur, alii caput hinc inde inclinantes, alii collo extenso et cervice erecta incedentes praetendunt in his animum moribus esse incultum [*sic*]. Postea de verecundia quaerendum quae est in gestu, an scilicet poenitens inter alios humiliter an superbe se habuerit, et iterum an scurriliter, an honeste, aut alio modo. Et maxime de sacerdotibus hoc quaerendum, qui cum statum perfectorum gerere debeant, etsi aliqui imperfecte vices perfectorum suppleant, maturissimum tamen decet eos habere vultum. Postea de verecundia

<sup>407</sup> misericordia] concordia, R.

<sup>408</sup> reperitur] videtur vel reperitur, β. γ.

<sup>409</sup> et non rectos] *om.*, β. γ.

<sup>410</sup> animi] non, α.

<sup>411</sup> modestia est . . . sistere] modestia est actuum nostrorum et motuum corporis decens moderatio, J.

<sup>412</sup> excessum] decessum, R.

<sup>413</sup> sensuum] sensurum, R; membrorum, J.

<sup>414</sup> domorum et . . . vestium] *om.*, α.

<sup>415</sup> humilis] virilis, β. γ.

in verbo quaerendum, quia procedunt ex ore iuramenta, maledictiones, mendacia, blasphemia, detractationes, ostentationes, falsae accusationes, falsa iudicia, turpiloquia, multiloquia,<sup>416</sup> derisiones, rixae, adulationes, exprobrationes, invectiones,<sup>417</sup> vituperia, traditiones, reprehensiones,<sup>418</sup> scurrilia verba, inventionum narrationes, iudicationes, garrulitates.<sup>419</sup> Unumquodque istorum, si in consuetudinem vertitur, mortale est. Postremo de pudicitia sensuum quaerendum, contra quam est venire exponendo sensus, non retrahendo, delectationes contrahendo. De viso igitur prima<sup>420</sup> fiat quaestio, ut an delectetur poenitens in intuendo speciem alterius sexus, et iterum si ipse in pudibundis nec inspiciendis diversi sexus delectetur aut aliud inhonestum, quia non licet intueri quod non licet concupisci. Post haec de auditu quaeratur, an in aliqua specie malorum ex ore procedentium delectetur poenitens, quia libenter audiens cito invenit confabulatorem.<sup>421</sup> Deinde de olfactu quaeratur, in quo peccant multum gulosi, quia non sufficit eis sapor in gustu nisi odor suavis immutet olfactum. Quia quidam vestimenta sua artificio faciunt redolentia propter odoris delectationem. Et sunt quidam vilius et turpius hoc sensu abutentes eo quod in foetidis et immundis delectantur. De gustu patens est superfluitas et delectatio, ubi etiam aliquod innaturale et dictu turpe gustaverit. Quaeratur etiam de tactu, an aliquod illicitum tetigerit et in hoc delectatus fuerit, quod contingit sicut in aliis secundum diversa peccata in diversis tangibilibus delectari. Nam avarus nummos numerare sitit, luxuriosus luxuriam provocantia tangere appetit, qualia sunt ubera et ipsa naturae pudibunda.

#### [7. Peccata contra Fortitudinem]

Sequitur de fortitudine,<sup>422</sup> quae est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum firma et grata propter spem boni perpassio. Haec habet quinque species: Magnanimitatem, / [19v] fiduciam, securitatem, constantiam, et magnificentiam. Magnanimitas est difficilium spontanea et rationalibus aggressio. Fiducia est certa spes perducendi ad finem rem inchoatam. Securitas est incommoditates imminentes et rei inchoatae affines non formidare. Constantia est animi stabilitas firma et in proposito perseverans.<sup>423</sup> Magnificentia est difficilium ac praeclarorum consumma-

<sup>416</sup> multiloquia] *om.*, J. β; *add.*, vaniloquia, β. γ.

<sup>417</sup> invectiones] inventiones, α.

<sup>418</sup> vituperia, traditiones, reprehensiones] *om.*, α.

<sup>419</sup> garrulitates] garrulationes, J.

<sup>420</sup> prima] post, α.

<sup>421</sup> confabulatorem] confabulationem, β. γ.

<sup>422</sup> fortitudine] *add.* quaerendum, α.

<sup>423</sup> perseverans] perseverantia, J.



tio. Quomodo ergo se habeat et habuerit poenitens circa hanc virtutem quaerendum. Et primo<sup>424</sup> circa magnanimitatem, quae potest esse multiplex, quia potest esse non difficilium, aut si difficilium, non spontanea, aut si utrorumque, non tamen rationabilis esse aggressio. Sed hoc est ex superabundantia fortitudinis, quae audacia dicitur. Et iterum timere poterit ad finem perducere rem inchoatam, et hoc propter incommoditates imminentes ex aggressionem et propter graves et morosos labores. Aut etsi spem habeat perducendi ad finem cum inchoat, poterit habere animum inconstantem in perseverandum,<sup>425</sup> quam inconstantiam sequitur inconsummatio inceptorum. In omnium istorum oppositis erit audacia, si non fuerit rationabilis aggressio, et sunt multi tales de se ipsis confidentes, qui temeritate audaciae in talem se peccandi facultatem et pronitatem<sup>426</sup> intrudunt quod aliquando vinculis peccati illaqueantur.<sup>427</sup> Hanc quidem fortitudinem contra inimicos tres habere oportet, scilicet contra diabolum, mundum, et carnem. Unicuique resistere victoria est: Diabolo in oratione, mundo in eleemosynarum largitione, carni in modica nutrimenti susceptione.

### [B. CONTRITIO]

Diligenter igitur cum in his omnibus fuerit poenitens examinatus, ut veram habeat contritionem<sup>428</sup> de omnibus quae iam fecisse confitetur videndum<sup>429</sup> est, et hoc per humani corporis et materiae vilitatem, per peccatorum enormitatem, per vitae fragilitatem, ut per labores et dolores, languores, et ad ultimum per mortis instabilem certitudinem, per poenas infernales, per glorias essentielles,<sup>430</sup> postremo per ipsam Domini nostri passionem, quae si pio affectu et ardore caritatis discernitur, mens audientis procul dubio etsi lapidea esset disgelabitur,<sup>431</sup> nimirum cum in ipsius dulcissimae<sup>432</sup> passionis hora lapides scinderentur, monumenta aperirentur.

### [C. SATISFACTIO]

Deinde hac eadem virtute animetur poenitens ad satisfactionem, intinendo ei quod nihil valet oris apertio<sup>433</sup> nisi subsequatur operis satisfactio

<sup>424</sup> primo] *add.* de debilitate, β. γ.

<sup>425</sup> in perseverandum] ad pers., J; in perseverando, γ.

<sup>426</sup> pronitatem] *add.* incurrunt vel, β. γ.

<sup>427</sup> illaqueantur] allaqueantur, α.

<sup>428</sup> contritionem] attritionem, β. γ.

<sup>429</sup> videndum (vitendum, R)] utendum, β.A.B.C.Y; hortandum, L.O.

<sup>430</sup> per glorias essentielles] *om.*, α.

<sup>431</sup> disgelabitur] disgregabitur, γ.

<sup>432</sup> dulcissime] dominice, β. γ.

<sup>433</sup> oris apertio] eius apertio, R; eius apperitio, J; oris operatio, β.A.B.C.Y.

et quod Deus apponit manum surgere conanti. Tria hic attendat sacerdos poenitentiam iniungens: Posse poenitentis, acerbitem contritionis, numerum et quantitatem peccatorum confitentis. Deinde primum iniungendum sit hoc quod, si casu in aliquod mortale lapsus in posterum poenitens fuerit, ante noctem si poterit ad remedium confessionis recurrat. Et ut hoc attentius faciat, iniungatur ei ut in pane et aqua vivat quousque sacerdotem adierit, quamvis propositum non habeat dimittendi peccatum, quia taedium et erubescencia frequenter confitendi retrahunt aliquando poenitentem a proposito peccandi. Et hoc habet fieri cum poenitens infirmitatibus non laborat, quia infirmo non est iniungenda poenitentia sed indicenda, et hoc fit ad augmentum contritionis, nam tanta potest esse quod non solum culpam verum etiam et poenam dimittit / [20r] ille *misericors*<sup>434</sup> et *miserator Dominus*, *patiens et multum misericors* [cf. Ps. 144: 8]. De specialibus vero iniungendis ad praesens taceo, quia in multis sanctorum patrum traditionibus<sup>435</sup> inveniuntur, cum etiam sic nec semper observari possint, sed secundum arbitrium viri discreti statum<sup>436</sup> poenitentis solliciter attendentis canonum rigorem obtemperare permittunt.

### [III. EPILOGUS]

Sed quia materia libri nomen imponit auctori, nec in uno dicendus est auctor immo potius diversorum adunatorum,<sup>437</sup> quia tot habet auctores quot auctoritates.<sup>39</sup> Ideo legentibus supplicat scribentis indignitas quatinus precibus et utilitate legentium quae est in officio consequatur scriba finem in se ipso quem opus in opere quaerit in aliis,<sup>438</sup> qui est in praesenti<sup>439</sup> peccatorum remissio et in futuro aeternae vitae fruitio. Quod nobis praestare dignetur malorum indultor et bonorum largitor, qui cum Patre vere est, a quo est,<sup>440</sup> quo nihil melius excogitari potest. Amen.<sup>441</sup>

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<sup>434</sup> *misericors et miserator . . . misericors*] *misericors et miserator dominus et multum misericors*, J; *miserator et misericors Deus, pater et multum misericors dominus*, β; *miserator et misericors, patiens et multae misericordiae*, γ.

<sup>435</sup> *traditionibus*] *tractationibus*, J.

<sup>436</sup> *statum*] *statim*, α.

<sup>437</sup> *adunatorum*] *adunator*, H; *adiuuator*, P.

<sup>438</sup> *in aliis*] *alieno*, β. γ.

<sup>439</sup> *praesenti*] *add. culparum et*, β. γ.

<sup>440</sup> *qui cum Patre vere est a quo est*] *qui est quod vere est, a quo est quod est*, β. γ.

<sup>441</sup> *amen*] *om.*, H.A.B.C.L.; et cetera, O.Y; *add. Explicit liber de examinatione poenitentis. Incipit sermo Roberti Lincolnensis super scriptum est de leuitis, prima pars*, P.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. above, p. 231 and n. 27.

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